PFMI implementation database
This is an online data repository of jurisdictions' implementation measures for the Principles for financial market infrastructures and associated CPMI and IOSCO assessment principle ratings. It complements the Level 2 assessment programme on the extent to which jurisdictions' implementation measures are complete and consistent with the international standards for payment systems, central securities depositories, securities settlement systems, central counterparties and trade repositories.
Note that authorities may have updated their rules, regulations and policies since the assessment. For current implementation measures, please contact the relevant authority.
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 7.6
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
An FMI may supplement its qualifying liquid resources with other forms of liquid resources. If the FMI does so, then these liquid resources should be in the form of assets that are likely to be saleable or acceptable as collateral for lines of credit, swaps, or repos on an ad hoc basis following a default, even if this cannot be reliably prearranged or guaranteed in extreme market conditions. Even if an FMI does not have access to routine central bank credit, it should still take account of what collateral is typically accepted by the relevant central bank, as such assets may be more likely to be liquid in stressed circumstances. An FMI should not assume the availability of emergency central bank credit as a part of its liquidity plan.
Implementation measures
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/390 Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework Note - rated as "consistent" for CSDs/SSSs that provide banking-type ancillary services
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
A CSD that employs DvP2/DvP3 settlement models and that does not provide any settlement guarantee should adopt the measures prescribed above in relation to liquidity exposures that participants may incur vis-à-vis each other. In this case there are no implementation measures.
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 7.7
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
An FMI should obtain a high degree of confidence, through rigorous due diligence, that each provider of its minimum required qualifying liquid resources, whether a participant of the FMI or an external party, has sufficient information to understand and to manage its associated liquidity risks, and that it has the capacity to perform as required under its commitment. Where relevant to assessing a liquidity provider’s performance reliability with respect to a particular currency, a liquidity provider’s potential access to credit from the central bank of issue may be taken into account. An FMI should regularly test its procedures for accessing its liquid resources at a liquidity provider.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/390 Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework Note - rated as "consistent" for CSDs/SSSs that provide banking-type ancillary services
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
A CSD that employs DvP2/DvP3 settlement models and that does not provide any settlement guarantee should adopt the measures prescribed above in relation to liquidity exposures that participants may incur vis-à-vis each other. In this case there are no implementation measures.
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 7.8
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
An FMI with access to central bank accounts, payment services, or securities services should use these services, where practical, to enhance its management of liquidity risk.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework Note - rated as "consistent" for CSDs/SSSs that provide banking-type ancillary services
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
A CSD that employs DvP2/DvP3 settlement models and that does not provide any settlement guarantee should adopt the measures prescribed above in relation to liquidity exposures that participants may incur vis-à-vis each other. In this case there are no implementation measures.
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 7.9
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
An FMI should determine the amount and regularly test the sufficiency of its liquid resources through rigorous stress testing. An FMI should have clear procedures to report the results of its stress tests to appropriate decision makers at the FMI and to use these results to evaluate the adequacy of and adjust its liquidity risk-management framework. In conducting stress testing, an FMI should consider a wide range of relevant scenarios. Scenarios should include relevant peak historic price volatilities, shifts in other market factors such as price determinants and yield curves, multiple defaults over various time horizons, simultaneous pressures in funding and asset markets, and a spectrum of forward-looking stress scenarios in a variety of extreme but plausible market conditions. Scenarios should also take into account the design and operation of the FMI, include all entities that might pose material liquidity risks to the FMI (such as settlement banks, nostro agents, custodian banks, liquidity providers, and linked FMIs), and where appropriate, cover a multiday period. In all cases, an FMI should document its supporting rationale for, and should have appropriate governance arrangements relating to, the amount and form of total liquid resources it maintains.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/390 Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework Note - rated as "consistent" for CSDs/SSSs that provide banking-type ancillary services
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
A CSD that employs DvP2/DvP3 settlement models and that does not provide any settlement guarantee should adopt the measures prescribed above in relation to liquidity exposures that participants may incur vis-à-vis each other. In this case there are no implementation measures.
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 8.0
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 8.1
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
An FMI’s rules and procedures should clearly define the point at which settlement is final.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 8.2
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
An FMI should complete final settlement no later than the end of the value date, and preferably intraday or in real time, to reduce settlement risk. An LVPS or SSS should consider adopting RTGS or multiple-batch processing during the settlement day.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/1229 Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 8.3
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
An FMI should clearly define the point after which unsettled payments, transfer instructions, or other obligations may not be revoked by a participant.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 9.0
- Rating Broadly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/392 Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
There are two minor gaps in the implementation measures. The CSDR focuses on the use of central bank money only on transactions denominated in the currency of the country in which settlement takes place. However, as KC 9.1 is qualified “where practical and available” the AT concluded that this is only likely to lead to a small (and potentially no) gap. In addition, there is no provision stating that “An FMI’s legal agreements with any settlement banks should state clearly when transfers on the books of individual settlement banks are expected to occur.” The EU authorities are recommended to implement measures to address the minor gaps related to KCs 1 and 5.
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 9.1
- Rating Broadly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money, where practical and available, to avoid credit and liquidity risks.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/392 Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
The CSDR focuses on the use of central bank money only on transactions denominated in the currency of the country in which settlement takes place. However, as KC 9.1 is qualified to “where practical and available”, the AT concluded that this is only likely to lead to a small (or potentially no) gap.
Description of filters
Jurisdiction
This filter limits the search results to selected jurisdictions. The available jurisdictions represent assessments that have been completed to date. The table below provides also a pdf of key conclusions and recommendations for all Principles of a given jurisdiction.
| Jurisdiction and relevant authorities | Assessments and comments |
|---|---|
Australia RBA: Reserve Bank of Australia | |
Brazil BCB: Central Bank of Brazil | |
Canada | |
European Union ESMA: European Securities and Markets Authority | |
Hong Kong SAR HKMA: Hong Kong Monetary Authority | |
Japan | |
Singapore | |
Switzerland FINMA: Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority | |
Turkey CMB: Capital Markets Board of Türkiye | |
United Kingdom | |
United States CFTC: Commodity Futures Trading Commission |
FMI type
This filter limits the search results to the selected FMI types. FMIs may be subject to different regulatory, supervisory and oversight regimes depending on their organisation, function and design.
PS: Payment system
A set of instruments, procedures and rules for the transfer of funds between or among participants; the system includes the participants and the entity operating the arrangement.
CSD/SSS: Central securities depository / Securities settlement system
CSDs are entities that provide securities accounts, central safekeeping services and asset services, which may include the administration of corporate actions and redemptions, and play an important role in helping to ensure the integrity of securities issues (that securities are not accidentally or fraudulently created or destroyed or their details changed). The precise activities of a CSD vary based on jurisdiction and market practices.
SSS are entities that enable securities to be transferred and settled by book entry according to a set of predetermined multilateral rules. Such systems allow transfers of securities either free of payment or against payment. Typically, a CSD also operates an SSS.
CCP: Central counterparty
An entity that interposes itself between counterparties to contracts traded in one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer and thereby ensuring the performance of open contracts.
TR: Trade repository
An entity that maintains a centralised electronic record (database) of transaction data.
Principle or key consideration ID
This filter limits the search results to selected principles and key considerations. Each principle includes a headline standard and a list of key considerations that further explain the headline standard. The principles are listed below. A detailed list of key considerations is available in the CPMI-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures.
Principle rating
This filter limits the search results to selected principle rating(s) used in the L2 assessments. The ratings reflect conditions at the time of the assessment, and are built on key conclusions that reflect CPMI and IOSCO's collective expert judgment regarding the impact of identified gaps and/or shortcomings. Ratings are determined for each principle after the jurisdiction's legislative and regulatory framework, including policy statements, as relevant, was compared against the corresponding content of the PFMI.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified no gaps or shortcomings, or only a few gaps and/or shortcomings that have no material impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is broadly consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a minor impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is partly consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a significant impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is not consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a major impact on completeness and/or consistency.
This status corresponds to the case where no relevant FMI exists that is within the scope of the Principles. A rating of “NA” will be indicated only if no relevant regulatory measures are being taken and no such FMI is expected to develop within the jurisdiction.