Australia

This document provides citations of the relevant legislation, regulation, policy and guidance, and notes explaining the assigned ratings for all relevant Principles of a given jurisdiction, by FMI type. It is a direct download of all the information for one jurisdiction that is included in the online CPMI-IOSCO PFMI implementation database (www.bis.org/committees/cpmi/pfmi/l2-database and www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=cpmi_iosco).

It includes all Principles and all key considerations: for the ones where gaps were identified the last column provides details on key conclusions and recommendations. The online CPMI-IOSCO PFMI implementation database allows to search information by Principle across different jurisdictions.

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	1.0	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 1	Consistent	
CCP	1.1	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	The legal basis should provide a high degree of certainty for each material aspect of an FMI's activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 1.2	Consistent	
CCP	1.2	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI should have rules, procedures, and contracts that are clear, understandable, and consistent with relevant laws and regulations.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 1.3	Consistent	
CCP	1.3	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI should be able to articulate the legal basis for its activities to relevant authorities, participants, and, where relevant, participants' customers, in a clear and understandable way.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 1.4	Consistent	
CCP	1.4	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI should have rules, procedures, and contracts that are enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions. There should be a high degree of certainty that actions taken by the FMI under such rules and procedures will not be voided, reversed, or subject to stays.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 1.5	Consistent	
CCP	1.5	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI conducting business in multiple jurisdictions should identify and mitigate the risks arising from any potential conflict of laws across jurisdictions.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 1.6	Consistent	

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CCP	2.0	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 2	Consistent	RBA CCP Standard 2 does not explicitly address the efficiency of the CCP since ASIC's responsibilities include ensuring a licensed CCP provides services in a "fair and effective" way. In practice, ASIC considers the "efficiency" of a CCP within the CCP's general licence obligation to provide its service in a fair and effective way. Recommendation: Where there are inconsistencies in language or requirements between the Corporations Act or RG 211 and the PFMI, ASIC should provide clarity to CCPs with respect to minimum standards.
CCP	2.1	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	An FMI should have objectives that place a high priority on the safety and efficiency of the FMI and explicitly support financial stability and other relevant public interest considerations.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 2.1	Consistent	As with the headline standard, the efficiency of the CCP is not mentioned in Principle 2 KC1.
CCP	2.2	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	An FMI should have documented governance arrangements that provide clear and direct lines of responsibility and accountability. These arrangements should be disclosed to owners, relevant authorities, participants, and, at a more general level, the public.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 2.2	Consistent	
CCP	2.3	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The roles and responsibilities of an FMI's board of directors (or equivalent) should be clearly specified, and there should be documented procedures for its functioning, including procedures to identify, address, and manage member conflicts of interest. The board should review both its overall performance and the performance of its individual board members regularly.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 2.3	Consistent	

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CCP	2.4	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The board should contain suitable members with the appropriate skills and incentives to fulfil its multiple roles. This typically requires the inclusion of non-executive board member(s).	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 2.4	Consistent	
CCP	2.5	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The roles and responsibilities of management should be clearly specified. An FMI's management should have the appropriate experience, a mix of skills, and the integrity necessary to discharge their responsibilities for the operation and risk management of the FMI.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 2.5	Consistent	
CCP	2.6	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The board should establish a clear, documented risk-management framework that includes the FMI's risk-tolerance policy, assigns responsibilities and accountability for risk decisions, and addresses decision making in crises and emergencies. Governance arrangements should ensure that the risk-management and internal control functions have sufficient authority, independence, resources, and access to the board.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 2.6	Consistent	
CCP	2.7	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The board should ensure that the FMI's design, rules, overall strategy, and major decisions reflect appropriately the legitimate interests of its direct and indirect participants and other relevant stakeholders. Major decisions should be clearly disclosed to relevant stakeholders and, where there is a broad market impact, the public.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 2.8	Consistent	
CCP	3.0	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 3	Consistent	

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CCP	3.1	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should have risk-management policies, procedures, and systems that enable it to identify, measure, monitor, and manage the range of risks that arise in or are borne by the FMI. Risk-management frameworks should be subject to periodic review.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 3.1.	Consistent	
CCP	3.2	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should provide incentives to participants and, where relevant, their customers to manage and contain the risks they pose to the FMI.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 3.3	Consistent	
CCP	3.3	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should regularly review the material risks it bears from and poses to other entities (such as other FMIs, settlement banks, liquidity providers, and service providers) as a result of interdependencies and develop appropriate risk-management tools to address these risks.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 3.4	Consistent	
CCP	3.4	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should identify scenarios that may potentially prevent it from being able to provide its critical operations and services as a going concern and assess the effectiveness of a full range of options for recovery or orderly wind-down. An FMI should prepare appropriate plans for its recovery or orderly wind-down based on the results of that assessment. Where applicable, an FMI should also provide relevant authorities with the information needed for purposes of resolution planning.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 3.5	Consistent	

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CCP	4.0	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 4	Consistent	

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CCP	4.1	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should establish a robust framework to manage its credit exposures to its participants and the credit risks arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. Credit exposure may arise from current exposures, potential future exposures, or both.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 4.1	Consistent	

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CCP	4.2	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should identify sources of credit risk, routinely measure and monitor credit exposures, and use appropriate risk-management tools to control these risks.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 4.2	Consistent	

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CCP	4.4	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	A CCP should cover its current and potential future exposures to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence using margin and other prefunded financial resources (see Principle 5 on collateral and Principle 6 on margin). In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure for the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure for the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. In all cases, a CCP should document its supporting rationale for, and should have appropriate governance arrangements relating to, the amount of total financial resources it maintains.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 4.4	Consistent	

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CCP	4.5	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	A CCP should determine the amount and regularly test the sufficiency of its total financial resources available in the event of a default or multiple defaults in extreme but plausible market conditions through rigorous stress testing. A CCP should have clear procedures to report the results of its stress tests to appropriate decision makers at the CCP and to use these results to evaluate the adequacy of and adjust its total financial resources. Stress tests should be performed daily using standard and predetermined parameters and assumptions. On at least a monthly basis, a CCP should perform a comprehensive and thorough analysis of stress testing scenarios, models, and underlying parameters and assumptions used to ensure they are appropriate for determining the CCP’s required level of default protection in light of current and evolving market conditions. A CCP should perform this analysis of stress testing more frequently when the products cleared or markets served display high volatility, become less liquid, or when the size or concentration of positions held by a CCP’s participants increases significantly. A full validation of a CCP’s risk-management model should be performed at least annually.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standards 4.5 and 4.7	Consistent	

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CCP	4.6	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	In conducting stress testing, a CCP should consider the effect of a wide range of relevant stress scenarios in terms of both defaulters' positions and possible price changes in liquidation periods. Scenarios should include relevant peak historic price volatilities, shifts in other market factors such as price determinants and yield curves, multiple defaults over various time horizons, simultaneous pressures in funding and asset markets, and a spectrum of forward-looking stress scenarios in a variety of extreme but plausible market conditions.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 4.6	Consistent	

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CCP	4.7	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should establish explicit rules and procedures that address fully any credit losses it may face as a result of any individual or combined default among its participants with respect to any of their obligations to the FMI. These rules and procedures should address how potentially uncovered credit losses would be allocated, including the repayment of any funds an FMI may borrow from liquidity providers. These rules and procedures should also indicate the FMI's process to replenish any financial resources that the FMI may employ during a stress event, so that the FMI can continue to operate in a safe and sound manner.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 4.8	Consistent	
CCP	5.0	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 5	Consistent	
CCP	5.1	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI should generally limit the assets it (routinely) accepts as collateral to those with low credit, liquidity, and market risks.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 5.1	Consistent	

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CCP	5.2	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI should establish prudent valuation practices and develop haircuts that are regularly tested and take into account stressed market conditions.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 5.3	Consistent	
CCP	5.3	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	In order to reduce the need for procyclical adjustments, an FMI should establish stable and conservative haircuts that are calibrated to include periods of stressed market conditions, to the extent practicable and prudent.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 5.4	Consistent	
CCP	5.4	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI should avoid concentrated holdings of certain assets where this would significantly impair the ability to liquidate such assets quickly without significant adverse price effects.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 5.5	Consistent	
CCP	5.5	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI that accepts cross-border collateral should mitigate the risks associated with its use and ensure that the collateral can be used in a timely manner.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 5.6	Consistent	
CCP	5.6	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI should use a collateral management system that is well-designed and operationally flexible.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 5.7	Consistent	
CCP	6.0	A CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants for all products through an effective margin system that is risk-based and regularly reviewed.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 6	Consistent	

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CCP	6.1	A CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants for all products through an effective margin system that is risk-based and regularly reviewed.	A CCP should have a margin system that establishes margin levels commensurate with the risks and particular attributes of each product, portfolio, and market it serves.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 6.1	Consistent	
CCP	6.2	A CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants for all products through an effective margin system that is risk-based and regularly reviewed.	A CCP should have a reliable source of timely price data for its margin system. A CCP should also have procedures and sound valuation models for addressing circumstances in which pricing data are not readily available or reliable.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 6.2	Consistent	
CCP	6.3	A CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants for all products through an effective margin system that is risk-based and regularly reviewed.	A CCP should adopt initial margin models and parameters that are risk-based and generate margin requirements sufficient to cover its potential future exposure to participants in the interval between the last margin collection and the close out of positions following a participant default. Initial margin should meet an established single-tailed confidence level of at least 99 percent with respect to the estimated distribution of future exposure. For a CCP that calculates margin at the portfolio level, this requirement applies to each portfolio's distribution of future exposure. For a CCP that calculates margin at more-granular levels, such as at the subportfolio level or by product, the requirement must be met for the corresponding distributions of future exposure. The model should (a) use a conservative estimate of the time horizons for the effective hedging or close out of the particular types of products cleared by the CCP (including in stressed market conditions), (b) have an appropriate method for measuring credit exposure that accounts for relevant product risk factors and portfolio effects across products, and (c) to the extent practicable and prudent, limit the need for destabilising, procyclical changes.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 6.3	Consistent	

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CCP	6.4	A CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants for all products through an effective margin system that is risk-based and regularly reviewed.	A CCP should mark participant positions to market and collect variation margin at least daily to limit the build-up of current exposures. A CCP should have the authority and operational capacity to make intraday margin calls and payments, both scheduled and unscheduled, to participants.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 6.4	Consistent	
CCP	6.5	A CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants for all products through an effective margin system that is risk-based and regularly reviewed.	In calculating margin requirements, a CCP may allow offsets or reductions in required margin across products that it clears or between products that it and another CCP clear, if the risk of one product is significantly and reliably correlated with the risk of the other product. Where two or more CCPs are authorised to offer cross-margining, they must have appropriate safeguards and harmonised overall risk-management systems.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 6.5	Consistent	
CCP	6.6	A CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants for all products through an effective margin system that is risk-based and regularly reviewed.	A CCP should analyse and monitor its model performance and overall margin coverage by conducting rigorous daily backtesting and at least monthly, and more-frequent where appropriate, sensitivity analysis. A CCP should regularly conduct an assessment of the theoretical and empirical properties of its margin model for all products it clears. In conducting sensitivity analysis of the model’s coverage, a CCP should take into account a wide range of parameters and assumptions that reflect possible market conditions, including the most-volatile periods that have been experienced by the markets it serves and extreme changes in the correlations between prices.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 6.6	Consistent	
CCP	6.7	A CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants for all products through an effective margin system that is risk-based and regularly reviewed.	A CCP should regularly review and validate its margin system.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 6.7	Consistent	

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CCP	7.0	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 7	Consistent	
CCP	7.1	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should have a robust framework to manage its liquidity risks from its participants, settlement banks, nostro agents, custodian banks, liquidity providers, and other entities.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 7.1	Consistent	
CCP	7.2	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should have effective operational and analytical tools to identify, measure, and monitor its settlement and funding flows on an ongoing and timely basis, including its use of intraday liquidity.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 7.2	Consistent	

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CCP	7.4	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	A CCP should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to settle securities-related payments, make required variation margin payments, and meet other payment obligations on time with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate payment obligation to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should consider maintaining additional liquidity resources sufficient to cover a wider range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate payment obligation to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 7.3	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	7.5	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	For the purpose of meeting its minimum liquid resource requirement, an FMI's qualifying liquid resources in each currency include cash at the central bank of issue and at creditworthy commercial banks, committed lines of credit, committed foreign exchange swaps, and committed repos, as well as highly marketable collateral held in custody and investments that are readily available and convertible into cash with prearranged and highly reliable funding arrangements, even in extreme but plausible market conditions. If an FMI has access to routine credit at the central bank of issue, the FMI may count such access as part of the minimum requirement to the extent it has collateral that is eligible for pledging to (or for conducting other appropriate forms of transactions with) the relevant central bank. All such resources should be available when needed.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 7.4	Consistent	
CCP	7.6	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI may supplement its qualifying liquid resources with other forms of liquid resources. If the FMI does so, then these liquid resources should be in the form of assets that are likely to be saleable or acceptable as collateral for lines of credit, swaps, or repos on an ad hoc basis following a default, even if this cannot be reliably prearranged or guaranteed in extreme market conditions. Even if an FMI does not have access to routine central bank credit, it should still take account of what collateral is typically accepted by the relevant central bank, as such assets may be more likely to be liquid in stressed circumstances. An FMI should not assume the availability of emergency central bank credit as a part of its liquidity plan.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 7.5	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	7.7	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should obtain a high degree of confidence, through rigorous due diligence, that each provider of its minimum required qualifying liquid resources, whether a participant of the FMI or an external party, has sufficient information to understand and to manage its associated liquidity risks, and that it has the capacity to perform as required under its commitment. Where relevant to assessing a liquidity provider's performance reliability with respect to a particular currency, a liquidity provider's potential access to credit from the central bank of issue may be taken into account. An FMI should regularly test its procedures for accessing its liquid resources at a liquidity provider.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 7.6	Consistent	
CCP	7.8	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI with access to central bank accounts, payment services, or securities services should use these services, where practical, to enhance its management of liquidity risk.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 7.7	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	7.9	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should determine the amount and regularly test the sufficiency of its liquid resources through rigorous stress testing. An FMI should have clear procedures to report the results of its stress tests to appropriate decision makers at the FMI and to use these results to evaluate the adequacy of and adjust its liquidity risk-management framework. In conducting stress testing, an FMI should consider a wide range of relevant scenarios. Scenarios should include relevant peak historic price volatilities, shifts in other market factors such as price determinants and yield curves, multiple defaults over various time horizons, simultaneous pressures in funding and asset markets, and a spectrum of forward-looking stress scenarios in a variety of extreme but plausible market conditions. Scenarios should also take into account the design and operation of the FMI, include all entities that might pose material liquidity risks to the FMI (such as settlement banks, nostro agents, custodian banks, liquidity providers, and linked FMIs), and where appropriate, cover a multiday period. In all cases, an FMI should document its supporting rationale for, and should have appropriate governance arrangements relating to, the amount and form of total liquid resources it maintains.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 7.8	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	7.10	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should establish explicit rules and procedures that enable the FMI to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations on time following any individual or combined default among its participants. These rules and procedures should address unforeseen and potentially uncovered liquidity shortfalls and should aim to avoid unwinding, revoking, or delaying the same-day settlement of payment obligations. These rules and procedures should also indicate the FMI's process to replenish any liquidity resources it may employ during a stress event, so that it can continue to operate in a safe and sound manner.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 7.9	Consistent	
CCP	8.0	An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 8.	Consistent	
CCP	8.1	An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.	An FMI's rules and procedures should clearly define the point at which settlement is final.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 8.1	Consistent	
CCP	8.2	An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.	An FMI should complete final settlement no later than the end of the value date, and preferably intraday or in real time, to reduce settlement risk. An LVPS or SSS should consider adopting RTGS or multiple-batch processing during the settlement day.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 8.2	Consistent	
CCP	8.3	An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.	An FMI should clearly define the point after which unsettled payments, transfer instructions, or other obligations may not be revoked by a participant.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 8.3	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	9.0	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.		RNA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 9	Consistent	
CCP	9.1	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money, where practical and available, to avoid credit and liquidity risks.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 9.1	Consistent	
CCP	9.2	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	If central bank money is not used, an FMI should conduct its money settlements using a settlement asset with little or no credit or liquidity risk.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 9.2	Consistent	
CCP	9.3	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	If an FMI settles in commercial bank money, it should monitor, manage, and limit its credit and liquidity risks arising from the commercial settlement banks. In particular, an FMI should establish and monitor adherence to strict criteria for its settlement banks that take account of, among other things, their regulation and supervision, creditworthiness, capitalisation, access to liquidity, and operational reliability. An FMI should also monitor and manage the concentration of credit and liquidity exposures to its commercial settlement banks.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 9.3	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	9.4	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	If an FMI conducts money settlements on its own books, it should minimise and strictly control its credit and liquidity risks.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 9.4	Consistent	
CCP	9.5	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	An FMI's legal agreements with any settlement banks should state clearly when transfers on the books of individual settlement banks are expected to occur, that transfers are to be final when effected, and that funds received should be transferable as soon as possible, at a minimum by the end of the day and ideally intraday, in order to enable the FMI and its participants to manage credit and liquidity risks.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 9.5	Consistent	
CCP	10.0	An FMI should clearly state its obligations with respect to the delivery of physical instruments or commodities and should identify, monitor, and manage the risks associated with such physical deliveries.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 10	Consistent	
CCP	10.1	An FMI should clearly state its obligations with respect to the delivery of physical instruments or commodities and should identify, monitor, and manage the risks associated with such physical deliveries.	An FMI's rules should clearly state its obligations with respect to the delivery of physical instruments or commodities.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 10.1	Consistent	
CCP	10.2	An FMI should clearly state its obligations with respect to the delivery of physical instruments or commodities and should identify, monitor, and manage the risks associated with such physical deliveries.	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the risks and costs associated with the storage and delivery of physical instruments or commodities.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 10.2	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	12.0	If an FMI settles transactions that involve the settlement of two linked obligations (for example, securities or foreign exchange transactions), it should eliminate principal risk by conditioning the final settlement of one obligation upon the final settlement of the other.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 11	Consistent	
CCP	12.1	If an FMI settles transactions that involve the settlement of two linked obligations (for example, securities or foreign exchange transactions), it should eliminate principal risk by conditioning the final settlement of one obligation upon the final settlement of the other.	An FMI that is an exchange-of-value settlement system should eliminate principal risk by ensuring that the final settlement of one obligation occurs if and only if the final settlement of the linked obligation also occurs, regardless of whether the FMI settles on a gross or net basis and when finality occurs.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 11.1	Consistent	
CCP	13.0	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 12	Consistent	
CCP	13.1	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.	An FMI should have default rules and procedures that enable the FMI to continue to meet its obligations in the event of a participant default and that address the replenishment of resources following a default.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 12.1	Consistent	
CCP	13.2	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.	An FMI should be well prepared to implement its default rules and procedures, including any appropriate discretionary procedures provided for in its rules.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 12.2 Guidance issued in relation to the RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Guidance on Standard 12.2.2.	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	13.3	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.	An FMI should publicly disclose key aspects of its default rules and procedures.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 12.3	Consistent	
CCP	13.4	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.	An FMI should involve its participants and other stakeholders in the testing and review of the FMI's default procedures, including any close-out procedures. Such testing and review should be conducted at least annually or following material changes to the rules and procedures to ensure that they are practical and effective.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 12.4	Consistent	
CCP	14.0	A CCP should have rules and procedures that enable the segregation and portability of positions of a participant's customers and the collateral provided to the CCP with respect to those positions.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 13	Consistent	Recommendation: The RBA is recommended to make public the intended interpretation of matters identified with respect to the Financial Stability Standards in the course of this assessment, and other matters as they may come to light, to clarify their consistency with the Principles.
CCP	14.1	A CCP should have rules and procedures that enable the segregation and portability of positions of a participant's customers and the collateral provided to the CCP with respect to those positions.	A CCP should, at a minimum, have segregation and portability arrangements that effectively protect a participant's customers' positions and related collateral from the default or insolvency of that participant. If the CCP additionally offers protection of such customer positions and collateral against the concurrent default of the participant and a fellow customer, the CCP should take steps to ensure that such protection is effective.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 13.1	Consistent	
CCP	14.2	A CCP should have rules and procedures that enable the segregation and portability of positions of a participant's customers and the collateral provided to the CCP with respect to those positions.	A CCP should employ an account structure that enables it readily to identify positions of a participant's customers and to segregate related collateral. A CCP should maintain customer positions and collateral in individual customer accounts or in omnibus customer accounts.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 13.2	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	14.3	A CCP should have rules and procedures that enable the segregation and portability of positions of a participant's customers and the collateral provided to the CCP with respect to those positions.	A CCP should structure its portability arrangements in a way that makes it highly likely that the positions and collateral of a defaulting participant's customers will be transferred to one or more other participants.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 13.3	Consistent	
CCP	14.4	A CCP should have rules and procedures that enable the segregation and portability of positions of a participant's customers and the collateral provided to the CCP with respect to those positions.	A CCP should disclose its rules, policies, and procedures relating to the segregation and portability of a participant's customers' positions and related collateral. In particular, the CCP should disclose whether customer collateral is protected on an individual or omnibus basis. In addition, a CCP should disclose any constraints, such as legal or operational constraints, that may impair its ability to segregate or port a participant's customers' positions and related collateral.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standards 13.4 and 20.1 Guidance issued in relation to the RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Guidance on Standard 13.4.1	Consistent	The RBA rules cover almost all of this KC explicitly – RBA CCP Standard 13.4 listed here covers all the elements of the KC with the exception of the requirement to disclose the rules/policies/ procedures for portability. The guidance to RBA CCP Standard 13.4 (which is intended to assist the interpretation of the standard) is broader than the KC in this respect and clarifies that portability arrangements should be disclosed in the CCP's rules/policies/procedures. Furthermore, Standard 20.1 provides for disclosure of rules/policies and procedures to participants. So the remaining element is disclosure of the rules/policies/procedures for portability to the public. Standard 20.1 does provide for public disclosure of relevant rules/policies/procedures – this cross refers to Standard 13.4.

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	15.0	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 14	Broadly consistent	The RBA has modified the Principle to address a concern that, given the Australian legal regime, assets held by an FMI are not bankruptcy remote and therefore would be at risk of being drawn upon in the event that a participant default exhausted pre-funded default resources. The guidance to the RBA Standards envisages arrangements under which assets would be held on behalf of the CCP by an affiliate/group entity of the CCP, and clarifies the safeguards necessary to support such an arrangement, including consultation with the RBA and demonstration of legal certainty. There nevertheless remains a risk that the liquid assets will not be accessible when needed. The Australian Government has recently consulted on legislation that would provide the RBA with directive powers over related entities that provide critical services/funding to a CCP. Such powers, while intended to have broader application, would allow the RBA to direct a parent to disperse funds held on behalf of the CCP and thereby strengthen such an arrangement in an effort to make it functionally equivalent to the CCP itself holding the assets. Recommendation: The RBA is recommended to implement measures that address the gaps or inconsistencies identified, particularly those related to KC2 and KC3.
CCP	15.1	A CCP should have rules and procedures that enable the segregation and portability of positions of a participant's customers and the collateral provided to the CCP with respect to those positions.	An FMI should have robust management and control systems to identify, monitor, and manage general business risks, including losses from poor execution of business strategy, negative cash flows, or unexpected and excessively large operating expenses.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 14.1	Broadly consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	15.2	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should hold liquid net assets funded by equity (such as common stock, disclosed reserves, or other retained earnings) so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if it incurs general business losses. The amount of liquid net assets funded by equity an FMI should hold should be determined by its general business risk profile and the length of time required to achieve a recovery or orderly wind-down, as appropriate, of its critical operations and services if such action is taken.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 14.2 Guidance issued in relation to the RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Guidance on Standard 14.2.1.	Broadly consistent	The RBA has modified the Principle to address a concern that, given the Australian legal regime, assets held by an FMI are not bankruptcy remote and therefore would be at risk of being drawn upon in the event that a participant default exhausted pre-funded default resources. The guidance to the RBA Standards envisages arrangements under which assets would be held on behalf of the CCP by an affiliate/group entity of the CCP, and clarifies the safeguards necessary to support such an arrangement, including consultation with the RBA and demonstration of legal certainty. There nevertheless remains a risk that the liquid assets will not be accessible when needed. The Australian Government has recently consulted on legislation that would provide the RBA with directive powers over related entities that provide critical services/funding to a CCP. Such powers, while intended to have broader application, would allow the RBA to direct a parent to disperse funds held on behalf of the CCP and thereby strengthen such an arrangement in an effort to make it functionally equivalent to the CCP itself holding the assets.
CCP	15.3	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should maintain a viable recovery or orderly wind-down plan and should hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to implement this plan. At a minimum, an FMI should hold liquid net assets funded by equity equal to at least six months of current operating expenses. These assets are in addition to resources held to cover participant defaults or other risks covered under the financial resources principles. However, equity held under international risk-based capital standards can be included where relevant and appropriate to avoid duplicate capital requirements.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 14.3	Broadly consistent	The RBA has modified the Principle to address a concern that, given the Australian legal regime, assets held by an FMI are not bankruptcy remote and therefore would be at risk of being drawn upon in the event that a participant default exhausted pre-funded default resources. The guidance to the RBA Standards envisages arrangements under which assets would be held on behalf of the CCP by an affiliate/group entity of the CCP, and clarifies the safeguards necessary to support such an arrangement, including consultation with the RBA and demonstration of legal certainty. There nevertheless remains a risk that the liquid assets will not be accessible when needed. The Australian Government has recently consulted on legislation that would provide the RBA with directive powers over related entities that provide critical services/funding to a CCP. Such powers, while intended to have broader application, would allow the RBA to direct a parent to disperse funds held on behalf of the CCP and thereby strengthen such an arrangement in an effort to make it functionally equivalent to the CCP itself holding the assets.

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	15.4	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	Assets held to cover general business risk should be of high quality and sufficiently liquid in order to allow the FMI to meet its current and projected operating expenses under a range of scenarios, including in adverse market conditions.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 14.4	Broadly consistent	
CCP	15.5	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should maintain a viable plan for raising additional equity should its equity fall close to or below the amount needed. This plan should be approved by the board of directors and updated regularly.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 14.5	Broadly consistent	
CCP	16.0	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 15	Consistent	
CCP	16.1	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.	An FMI should hold its own and its participants' assets at supervised and regulated entities that have robust accounting practices, safekeeping procedures, and internal controls that fully protect these assets.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 15.1	Consistent	
CCP	16.2	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.	An FMI should have prompt access to its assets and the assets provided by participants, when required.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 15.2	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	16.3	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.	An FMI should evaluate and understand its exposures to its custodian banks, taking into account the full scope of its relationships with each.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 15.3	Consistent	
CCP	16.4	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.	An FMI's investment strategy should be consistent with its overall risk-management strategy and fully disclosed to its participants, and investments should be secured by, or be claims on, high-quality obligors. These investments should allow for quick liquidation with little, if any, adverse price effect.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 15.4	Consistent	
CCP	17.0	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 16	Consistent	
CCP	17.1	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should establish a robust operational risk-management framework with appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls to identify, monitor, and manage operational risks.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 16.1	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	17.2	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI's board of directors should clearly define the roles and responsibilities for addressing operational risk and should endorse the FMI's operational risk-management framework. Systems, operational policies, procedures, and controls should be reviewed, audited, and tested periodically and after significant changes.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 16.2	Consistent	
CCP	17.3	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should have clearly defined operational reliability objectives and should have policies in place that are designed to achieve those objectives.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 16.3	Consistent	
CCP	17.4	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should ensure that it has scalable capacity adequate to handle increasing stress volumes and to achieve its service-level objectives.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 16.3	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	17.5	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should have comprehensive physical and information security policies that address all potential vulnerabilities and threats.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 16.3	Consistent	
CCP	17.6	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should have a business continuity plan that addresses events posing a significant risk of disrupting operations, including events that could cause a wide-scale or major disruption. The plan should incorporate the use of a secondary site and should be designed to ensure that critical information technology (IT) systems can resume operations within two hours following disruptive events. The plan should be designed to enable the FMI to complete settlement by the end of the day of the disruption, even in case of extreme circumstances. The FMI should regularly test these arrangements.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 16.7	Consistent	
CCP	17.7	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the risks that key participants, other FMIs, and service and utility providers might pose to its operations. In addition, an FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the risks its operations might pose to other FMIs.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 16.5	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	18.0	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 17	Consistent	Recommendation: Where there are inconsistencies in language or requirements between the Corporations Act, the Corporations Regulations or RG 211 and the PFMI, ASIC should provide clarity to CCPs with respect to minimum standards.
CCP	18.1	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.	An FMI should allow for fair and open access to its services, including by direct and, where relevant, indirect participants and other FMIs, based on reasonable risk-related participation requirements.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 17.1	Consistent	
CCP	18.2	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.	An FMI's participation requirements should be justified in terms of the safety and efficiency of the FMI and the markets it serves, be tailored to and commensurate with the FMI's specific risks, and be publicly disclosed. Subject to maintaining acceptable risk control standards, an FMI should endeavour to set requirements that have the least-restrictive impact on access that circumstances permit.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 17.2	Consistent	RBA CCP Standard 17.2 does not explicitly address the efficiency of the CCP, which is within ASIC´s responsibilities. In practice, ASIC considers the "efficiency" of a CCP within the concept of "effective", in enforcing the CCP's general licence obligation to provide its service in a fair and effective way. This is deemed to sufficiently capture this aspect of KC 2.
CCP	18.3	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.	An FMI should monitor compliance with its participation requirements on an ongoing basis and have clearly defined and publicly disclosed procedures for facilitating the suspension and orderly exit of a participant that breaches, or no longer meets, the participation requirements.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 17.3	Consistent	
CCP	19.0	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 18.	Consistent	
CCP	19.1	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should ensure that its rules, procedures, and agreements allow it to gather basic information about indirect participation in order to identify, monitor, and manage any material risks to the FMI arising from such tiered participation arrangements.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 18.1	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	19.2	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should identify material dependencies between direct and indirect participants that might affect the FMI.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 18.2	Consistent	
CCP	19.3	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should identify indirect participants responsible for a significant proportion of transactions processed by the FMI and indirect participants whose transaction volumes or values are large relative to the capacity of the direct participants through which they access the FMI in order to manage the risks arising from these transactions.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 18.3	Consistent	
CCP	19.4	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should regularly review risks arising from tiered participation arrangements and should take mitigating action when appropriate.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 18.4	Consistent	
CCP	20.0	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 19	Consistent	Recommendation: The RBA is recommended to implement measures which address the gaps or inconsistencies identified, specifically those related to KC1.
CCP	20.1	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.	Before entering into a link arrangement and on an ongoing basis once the link is established, an FMI should identify, monitor, and manage all potential sources of risk arising from the link arrangement. Link arrangements should be designed such that each FMI is able to observe the other principles in this report.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 19.1	Consistent	The RBA takes the view that each FMI entering into a link is responsible for ensuring that the design of the link arrangement would not impede its own ability to observe the other Principles. Contrary to the intent of the KC, however, this does not require that the FMI also ensure that the design of the link arrangement would not prevent the other linked FMI from observing the Principles.
CCP	20.2	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.	A link should have a well-founded legal basis, in all relevant jurisdictions, that supports its design and provides adequate protection to the FMIs involved in the link.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 19.2	Consistent	
CCP	20.7	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.	Before entering into a link with another CCP, a CCP should identify and manage the potential spill-over effects from the default of the linked CCP. If a link has three or more CCPs, each CCP should identify, assess, and manage the risks of the collective link arrangement.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 19.4	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	20.8	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.	Each CCP in a CCP link arrangement should be able to cover, at least on a daily basis, its current and potential future exposures to the linked CCP and its participants, if any, fully with a high degree of confidence without reducing the CCP's ability to fulfil its obligations to its own participants at any time.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 19.5	Consistent	
CCP	21.0	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.		Corporations Act: Section 821A(a) ASIC - Appendix 2 of RG 211 RG 211.152-3, 211.239	Broadly consistent	The RBA's Financial Stability Standards do not have a standard that addresses Principle 21, because Principle 21 falls solely within ASIC's regulatory remit. ASIC's framework has two components concerning this Principle. First, in advising the responsible Minister on licensing and in assessing a licensee's compliance with its regulatory obligations, ASIC considers whether the entity complies with the Principles relevant to its regulatory remit. In addition, one of the statutory obligations on a licensed CCP is, to the extent reasonably practicable, to do all things necessary to ensure that its services are provided in a fair and effective way (s821A(a) of the Corporations Act). In practice, ASIC considers the "efficiency" of a CCP within the concept of "effective" in applying the fair and effective services obligation. Fair and effective is, however, not the same scope as the Principle which concerns efficiency and effectiveness; and ASIC's general policy statement on considering an entity's compliance with the PFMI when assessing a licence application does not create a binding obligation for the CCP to comply with this Principle. However, there is evidence from Australia that ASIC has applied the Principles as part of its supervision. Accordingly this Principle is regarded as broadly consistent. Recommendation: ASIC is recommended to implement measures that address the gaps or inconsistencies identified, particularly those related to KC1 and KC2.

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	21.1	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.	An FMI should be designed to meet the needs of its participants and the markets it serves, in particular, with regard to choice of a clearing and settlement arrangement; operating structure; scope of products cleared, settled, or recorded; and use of technology and procedures.	Corporations Act: Section 827A(2) RG 211.239	Broadly consistent	The RBA's Financial Stability Standards do not have a standard that addresses Principle 21, because Principle 21 falls solely within ASIC's regulatory remit. ASIC's framework has two components concerning this Principle. First, in advising the responsible Minister on licensing and in assessing a licensee's compliance with its regulatory obligations, ASIC considers whether the entity complies with the Principles relevant to its regulatory remit. In addition, one of the statutory obligations on a licensed CCP is, to the extent reasonably practicable, to do all things necessary to ensure that its services are provided in a fair and effective way (s821A(a) of the Corporations Act). In practice, ASIC considers the "efficiency" of a CCP within the concept of "effective" in applying the fair and effective services obligation. Fair and effective is, however, not the same scope as the Principle which concerns efficiency and effectiveness; and ASIC's general policy statement on considering an entity's compliance with the PFMI when assessing a licence application does not create a binding obligation for the CCP to comply with this Principle. However, there is evidence from Australia that ASIC has applied the Principles as part of its supervision. Accordingly this Principle is regarded as broadly consistent. Recommendation: ASIC is recommended to implement measures that address the gaps or inconsistencies identified, particularly those related to KC1 and KC2.
CCP	21.2	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.	An FMI should have clearly defined goals and objectives that are measurable and achievable, such as in the areas of minimum service levels, risk-management expectations, and business priorities.	Corporations Act: Section 821A(a) ASIC - RG 211.239	Broadly consistent	The KC requires the FMI to have clear goals and objectives in a number of areas. ASIC's general policy statement (in ASIC Regulatory Guide 211) on considering an entity's compliance with the PFMI when assessing a licensing application does not appear to create a binding obligation for the CCP to comply with this KC.
CCP	21.3	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.	An FMI should have established mechanisms for the regular review of its efficiency and effectiveness.	Corporations Act: Section 821E ASIC - RG 211.229. 211.239	Broadly consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	22.0	An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, relevant internationally accepted communication procedures and standards in order to facilitate efficient payment, clearing, settlement, and recording.		Corporations Act: Sections 821A(a) and 821A(d) ASIC - Appendix 2 of RG 211 RG 211.152-3, 211.239	Broadly consistent	Principle 22 falls solely within ASIC's regulatory remit. ASIC's framework does not have a specific standard on communication procedures and standards, and, as discussed above, ASIC's general policy statement on considering an entity's compliance with the PFMI when assessing a licensing application does not create a binding obligation for the CCP to comply with this principle. However there is evidence from Australia that ASIC has applied the Principles as part of its supervision. Accordingly this Principle is regarded as broadly consistent. Recommendation: ASIC is recommended to implement measures that address the gaps or inconsistencies identified.
CCP	22.1	An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, relevant internationally accepted communication procedures and standards in order to facilitate efficient payment, clearing, settlement, and recording.	An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, internationally accepted communication procedures and standards.	Corporations Act: Section 821A(d) RG 211.239	Broadly consistent	Principle 22 falls solely within ASIC's regulatory remit. ASIC's framework does not have a specific standard on communication procedures and standards, and, as discussed above, ASIC's general policy statement on considering an entity's compliance with the PFMI when assessing a licensing application does not create a binding obligation for the CCP to comply with this principle. However there is evidence from Australia that ASIC has applied the Principles as part of its supervision. Accordingly this Principle is regarded as broadly consistent.
CCP	23.0	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 20	Consistent	Recommendation: Where there are inconsistencies in language or requirements between Corporations Act, the Corporations Regulations, or RG 211 and the PFMI, ASIC should provide clarity to CCPs with respect to minimum standards.
CCP	23.1	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should adopt clear and comprehensive rules and procedures that are fully disclosed to participants. Relevant rules and key procedures should also be publicly disclosed.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 20.1	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	23.2	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should disclose clear descriptions of the system's design and operations, as well as the FMI's and participants' rights and obligations, so that participants can assess the risks they would incur by participating in the FMI.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 20.3	Consistent	
CCP	23.3	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should provide all necessary and appropriate documentation and training to facilitate participants' understanding of the FMI's rules and procedures and the risks they face from participating in the FMI.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 20.4	Consistent	
CCP	23.4	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should publicly disclose its fees at the level of individual services it offers as well as its policies on any available discounts. The FMI should provide clear descriptions of priced services for comparability purposes.	Corporations Act: Section 821A ASIC - Appendix 2 of RG 211; RG 211.152-3, 211.239, 211.4, and Table 1	Consistent	The ASIC requirements address the disclosure to participants but it is unclear that this amounts to public disclosure as required by the KC.
CCP	23.5	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should complete regularly and disclose publicly responses to the CPSS-IOSCO Disclosure framework for financial market infrastructures. An FMI also should, at a minimum, disclose basic data on transaction volumes and values.	Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 20.5 Guidance issued in relation to the Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Guidance on Standard 20.5.	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	1.0	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 1	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	1.1	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	The legal basis should provide a high degree of certainty for each material aspect of an FMI's activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 1.2	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	1.2	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI should have rules, procedures, and contracts that are clear, understandable, and consistent with relevant laws and regulations.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 1.3	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	1.3	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI should be able to articulate the legal basis for its activities to relevant authorities, participants, and, where relevant, participants' customers, in a clear and understandable way.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 1.4	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	1.4	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI should have rules, procedures, and contracts that are enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions. There should be a high degree of certainty that actions taken by the FMI under such rules and procedures will not be voided, reversed, or subject to stays.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 1.5	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	1.5	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI conducting business in multiple jurisdictions should identify and mitigate the risks arising from any potential conflict of laws across jurisdictions.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 1.6	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	2.0	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 2	Consistent	RBA SSS Standard 2 does not explicitly address the efficiency of the CSD/SSS since ASIC's responsibilities include ensuring a licensed CSD/SSS provides services in a "fair and effective" way. ASIC considers the "efficiency" of a CSD/SSS within the CSD/SSS's general licence obligation to provide its service in a fair and effective way. Recommendation: Where there are inconsistencies in language or requirements between the Corporations Act or RG 211 and the PFMI, ASIC should provide clarity to CSDs/SSSs with respect to minimum standards.

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	2.1	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	An FMI should have objectives that place a high priority on the safety and efficiency of the FMI and explicitly support financial stability and other relevant public interest considerations.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 2.1	Consistent	As with the headline standard, the efficiency of the CSD/SSS is not mentioned in Principle 2 KC1.
CSD_SSS	2.2	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	An FMI should have documented governance arrangements that provide clear and direct lines of responsibility and accountability. These arrangements should be disclosed to owners, relevant authorities, participants, and, at a more general level, the public.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 2.2	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	2.3	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The roles and responsibilities of an FMI's board of directors (or equivalent) should be clearly specified, and there should be documented procedures for its functioning, including procedures to identify, address, and manage member conflicts of interest. The board should review both its overall performance and the performance of its individual board members regularly.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 2.3	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	2.4	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The board should contain suitable members with the appropriate skills and incentives to fulfil its multiple roles. This typically requires the inclusion of non-executive board member(s).	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 2.4	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	2.5	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The roles and responsibilities of management should be clearly specified. An FMI's management should have the appropriate experience, a mix of skills, and the integrity necessary to discharge their responsibilities for the operation and risk management of the FMI.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 2.5	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	2.6	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The board should establish a clear, documented risk-management framework that includes the FMI's risk-tolerance policy, assigns responsibilities and accountability for risk decisions, and addresses decision making in crises and emergencies. Governance arrangements should ensure that the risk-management and internal control functions have sufficient authority, independence, resources, and access to the board.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 2.6	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	2.7	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The board should ensure that the FMI's design, rules, overall strategy, and major decisions reflect appropriately the legitimate interests of its direct and indirect participants and other relevant stakeholders. Major decisions should be clearly disclosed to relevant stakeholders and, where there is a broad market impact, the public.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 2.8	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	3.0	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 3	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	3.1	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should have risk-management policies, procedures, and systems that enable it to identify, measure, monitor, and manage the range of risks that arise in or are borne by the FMI. Risk-management frameworks should be subject to periodic review.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 3.1	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	3.2	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should provide incentives to participants and, where relevant, their customers to manage and contain the risks they pose to the FMI.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 3.3	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	3.3	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should regularly review the material risks it bears from and poses to other entities (such as other FMIs, settlement banks, liquidity providers, and service providers) as a result of interdependencies and develop appropriate risk-management tools to address these risks.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 3.4	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	3.4	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should identify scenarios that may potentially prevent it from being able to provide its critical operations and services as a going concern and assess the effectiveness of a full range of options for recovery or orderly wind-down. An FMI should prepare appropriate plans for its recovery or orderly wind-down based on the results of that assessment. Where applicable, an FMI should also provide relevant authorities with the information needed for purposes of resolution planning.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 3.5	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	4.0	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 4	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	4.1	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should establish a robust framework to manage its credit exposures to its participants and the credit risks arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. Credit exposure may arise from current exposures, potential future exposures, or both.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 4.1	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	4.2	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should identify sources of credit risk, routinely measure and monitor credit exposures, and use appropriate risk-management tools to control these risks.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 4.2	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	4.3	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	A payment system or SSS should cover its current and, where they exist, potential future exposures to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence using collateral and other equivalent financial resources (see Principle 5 on collateral). In the case of a DNS payment system or DNS SSS in which there is no settlement guarantee but where its participants face credit exposures arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes, such an FMI should maintain, at a minimum, sufficient resources to cover the exposures of the two participants and their affiliates that would create the largest aggregate credit exposure in the system.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 4.4	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	4.7	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should establish explicit rules and procedures that address fully any credit losses it may face as a result of any individual or combined default among its participants with respect to any of their obligations to the FMI. These rules and procedures should address how potentially uncovered credit losses would be allocated, including the repayment of any funds an FMI may borrow from liquidity providers. These rules and procedures should also indicate the FMI's process to replenish any financial resources that the FMI may employ during a stress event, so that the FMI can continue to operate in a safe and sound manner.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 4.5	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	5.0	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities Standard 5	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	5.1	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI should generally limit the assets it (routinely) accepts as collateral to those with low credit, liquidity, and market risks.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 5.1	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	5.2	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI should establish prudent valuation practices and develop haircuts that are regularly tested and take into account stressed market conditions.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 5.3	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	5.3	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	In order to reduce the need for procyclical adjustments, an FMI should establish stable and conservative haircuts that are calibrated to include periods of stressed market conditions, to the extent practicable and prudent.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 5.4	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	5.4	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI should avoid concentrated holdings of certain assets where this would significantly impair the ability to liquidate such assets quickly without significant adverse price effects.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 5.5	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	5.5	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI that accepts cross-border collateral should mitigate the risks associated with its use and ensure that the collateral can be used in a timely manner.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 5.6	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	5.6	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI should use a collateral management system that is well-designed and operationally flexible.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 5.7	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	7.0	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities Standard 6	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	7.1	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should have a robust framework to manage its liquidity risks from its participants, settlement banks, nostro agents, custodian banks, liquidity providers, and other entities.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 6.1	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	7.2	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should have effective operational and analytical tools to identify, measure, and monitor its settlement and funding flows on an ongoing and timely basis, including its use of intraday liquidity.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 6.2	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	7.3	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	A payment system or SSS, including one employing a DNS mechanism, should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day settlement, and where appropriate intraday or multiday settlement, of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate payment obligation in extreme but plausible market conditions.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 6.3	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	7.5	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	For the purpose of meeting its minimum liquid resource requirement, an FMI's qualifying liquid resources in each currency include cash at the central bank of issue and at creditworthy commercial banks, committed lines of credit, committed foreign exchange swaps, and committed repos, as well as highly marketable collateral held in custody and investments that are readily available and convertible into cash with prearranged and highly reliable funding arrangements, even in extreme but plausible market conditions. If an FMI has access to routine credit at the central bank of issue, the FMI may count such access as part of the minimum requirement to the extent it has collateral that is eligible for pledging to (or for conducting other appropriate forms of transactions with) the relevant central bank. All such resources should be available when needed.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 6.4	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	7.6	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI may supplement its qualifying liquid resources with other forms of liquid resources. If the FMI does so, then these liquid resources should be in the form of assets that are likely to be saleable or acceptable as collateral for lines of credit, swaps, or repos on an ad hoc basis following a default, even if this cannot be reliably prearranged or guaranteed in extreme market conditions. Even if an FMI does not have access to routine central bank credit, it should still take account of what collateral is typically accepted by the relevant central bank, as such assets may be more likely to be liquid in stressed circumstances. An FMI should not assume the availability of emergency central bank credit as a part of its liquidity plan.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 6.5	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	7.7	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should obtain a high degree of confidence, through rigorous due diligence, that each provider of its minimum required qualifying liquid resources, whether a participant of the FMI or an external party, has sufficient information to understand and to manage its associated liquidity risks, and that it has the capacity to perform as required under its commitment. Where relevant to assessing a liquidity provider's performance reliability with respect to a particular currency, a liquidity provider's potential access to credit from the central bank of issue may be taken into account. An FMI should regularly test its procedures for accessing its liquid resources at a liquidity provider.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 6.6	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	7.8	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI with access to central bank accounts, payment services, or securities services should use these services, where practical, to enhance its management of liquidity risk.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 6.7	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	7.9	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should determine the amount and regularly test the sufficiency of its liquid resources through rigorous stress testing. An FMI should have clear procedures to report the results of its stress tests to appropriate decision makers at the FMI and to use these results to evaluate the adequacy of and adjust its liquidity risk-management framework. In conducting stress testing, an FMI should consider a wide range of relevant scenarios. Scenarios should include relevant peak historic price volatilities, shifts in other market factors such as price determinants and yield curves, multiple defaults over various time horizons, simultaneous pressures in funding and asset markets, and a spectrum of forward-looking stress scenarios in a variety of extreme but plausible market conditions. Scenarios should also take into account the design and operation of the FMI, include all entities that might pose material liquidity risks to the FMI (such as settlement banks, nostro agents, custodian banks, liquidity providers, and linked FMIs), and where appropriate, cover a multiday period. In all cases, an FMI should document its supporting rationale for, and should have appropriate governance arrangements relating to, the amount and form of total liquid resources it maintains.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 6.8	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	7.10	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should establish explicit rules and procedures that enable the FMI to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations on time following any individual or combined default among its participants. These rules and procedures should address unforeseen and potentially uncovered liquidity shortfalls and should aim to avoid unwinding, revoking, or delaying the same-day settlement of payment obligations. These rules and procedures should also indicate the FMI's process to replenish any liquidity resources it may employ during a stress event, so that it can continue to operate in a safe and sound manner.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 6.9	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	8.0	An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities Standard 7	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	8.1	An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.	An FMI's rules and procedures should clearly define the point at which settlement is final.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 7.1	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	8.2	An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.	An FMI should complete final settlement no later than the end of the value date, and preferably intraday or in real time, to reduce settlement risk. An LVPS or SSS should consider adopting RTGS or multiple-batch processing during the settlement day.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 7.2	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	8.3	An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.	An FMI should clearly define the point after which unsettled payments, transfer instructions, or other obligations may not be revoked by a participant.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 7.3	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	9.0	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities Standard 8	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	9.1	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money, where practical and available, to avoid credit and liquidity risks.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 8.1	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	9.2	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	If central bank money is not used, an FMI should conduct its money settlements using a settlement asset with little or no credit or liquidity risk.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 8.2	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	9.3	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	If an FMI settles in commercial bank money, it should monitor, manage, and limit its credit and liquidity risks arising from the commercial settlement banks. In particular, an FMI should establish and monitor adherence to strict criteria for its settlement banks that take account of, among other things, their regulation and supervision, creditworthiness, capitalisation, access to liquidity, and operational reliability. An FMI should also monitor and manage the concentration of credit and liquidity exposures to its commercial settlement banks.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 8.3	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	9.4	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	If an FMI conducts money settlements on its own books, it should minimise and strictly control its credit and liquidity risks.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 8.4	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	9.5	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	An FMI's legal agreements with any settlement banks should state clearly when transfers on the books of individual settlement banks are expected to occur, that transfers are to be final when effected, and that funds received should be transferable as soon as possible, at a minimum by the end of the day and ideally intraday, in order to enable the FMI and its participants to manage credit and liquidity risks.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 8.5	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	10.0	An FMI should clearly state its obligations with respect to the delivery of physical instruments or commodities and should identify, monitor, and manage the risks associated with such physical deliveries.		Not applicable. Principle 10 on physical deliveries is not relevant to securities settlement facilities that settle immobilised or dematerialised securities, such as Austraclear. No SSS or CSD that settles physically deliverable obligations currently operates in Australia and it is not expected that such a facility will be established and/or seek to operate in Australia in the near future. However, if such a facility were to apply for a CS facility licence, the Bank has the power to amend the FSS for SSFs to require licensees to meet the requirements under Principle 10.	Not applicable	
CSD_SSS	10.1	An FMI should clearly state its obligations with respect to the delivery of physical instruments or commodities and should identify, monitor, and manage the risks associated with such physical deliveries.	An FMI's rules should clearly state its obligations with respect to the delivery of physical instruments or commodities.	Not applicable	Not applicable	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	10.2	An FMI should clearly state its obligations with respect to the delivery of physical instruments or commodities and should identify, monitor, and manage the risks associated with such physical deliveries.	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the risks and costs associated with the storage and delivery of physical instruments or commodities.	Not applicable	Not applicable	
CSD_SSS	11.0	A CSD should have appropriate rules and procedures to help ensure the integrity of securities issues and minimise and manage the risks associated with the safekeeping and transfer of securities. A CSD should maintain securities in an immobilised or dematerialised form for their transfer by book entry.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities Standard 9	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	11.1	A CSD should have appropriate rules and procedures to help ensure the integrity of securities issues and minimise and manage the risks associated with the safekeeping and transfer of securities. A CSD should maintain securities in an immobilised or dematerialised form for their transfer by book entry.	A CSD should have appropriate rules, procedures, and controls, including robust accounting practices, to safeguard the rights of securities issuers and holders, prevent the unauthorised creation or deletion of securities, and conduct periodic and at least daily reconciliation of securities issues it maintains.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 9.1	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	11.2	A CSD should have appropriate rules and procedures to help ensure the integrity of securities issues and minimise and manage the risks associated with the safekeeping and transfer of securities. A CSD should maintain securities in an immobilised or dematerialised form for their transfer by book entry.	A CSD should prohibit overdrafts and debit balances in securities accounts.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 9.2	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	11.3	A CSD should have appropriate rules and procedures to help ensure the integrity of securities issues and minimise and manage the risks associated with the safekeeping and transfer of securities. A CSD should maintain securities in an immobilised or dematerialised form for their transfer by book entry.	A CSD should maintain securities in an immobilised or dematerialised form for their transfer by book entry. Where appropriate, a CSD should provide incentives to immobilise or dematerialise securities.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 9.3	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	11.4	A CSD should have appropriate rules and procedures to help ensure the integrity of securities issues and minimise and manage the risks associated with the safekeeping and transfer of securities. A CSD should maintain securities in an immobilised or dematerialised form for their transfer by book entry.	A CSD should protect assets against custody risk through appropriate rules and procedures consistent with its legal framework.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 9.4	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	11.5	A CSD should have appropriate rules and procedures to help ensure the integrity of securities issues and minimise and manage the risks associated with the safekeeping and transfer of securities. A CSD should maintain securities in an immobilised or dematerialised form for their transfer by book entry.	A CSD should employ a robust system that ensures segregation between the CSD's own assets and the securities of its participants and segregation among the securities of participants. Where supported by the legal framework, the CSD should also support operationally the segregation of securities belonging to a participant's customers on the participant's books and facilitate the transfer of customer holdings.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 9.5	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	11.6	A CSD should have appropriate rules and procedures to help ensure the integrity of securities issues and minimise and manage the risks associated with the safekeeping and transfer of securities. A CSD should maintain securities in an immobilised or dematerialised form for their transfer by book entry.	A CSD should identify, measure, monitor, and manage its risks from other activities that it may perform; additional tools may be necessary in order to address these risks.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 9.6	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	12.0	If an FMI settles transactions that involve the settlement of two linked obligations (for example, securities or foreign exchange transactions), it should eliminate principal risk by conditioning the final settlement of one obligation upon the final settlement of the other.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities Standard 10	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	12.1	If an FMI settles transactions that involve the settlement of two linked obligations (for example, securities or foreign exchange transactions), it should eliminate principal risk by conditioning the final settlement of one obligation upon the final settlement of the other.	An FMI that is an exchange-of-value settlement system should eliminate principal risk by ensuring that the final settlement of one obligation occurs if and only if the final settlement of the linked obligation also occurs, regardless of whether the FMI settles on a gross or net basis and when finality occurs.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 10.1	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	13.0	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities Standard 11	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	13.1	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.	An FMI should have default rules and procedures that enable the FMI to continue to meet its obligations in the event of a participant default and that address the replenishment of resources following a default.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 11.1	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	13.2	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.	An FMI should be well prepared to implement its default rules and procedures, including any appropriate discretionary procedures provided for in its rules.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 11.2	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	13.3	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.	An FMI should publicly disclose key aspects of its default rules and procedures.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 11.3	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	13.4	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.	An FMI should involve its participants and other stakeholders in the testing and review of the FMI’s default procedures, including any close-out procedures. Such testing and review should be conducted at least annually or following material changes to the rules and procedures to ensure that they are practical and effective.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 11.4	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	15.0	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities Standard 12	Broadly consistent	The RBA has modified the Principle to address a concern initially raised in the context of CCPs that, given the Australian legal regime, assets held by an FMI are not bankruptcy remote and therefore would be at risk of being drawn upon in the event that a participant default exhausted pre-funded default resources. The guidance to the RBA Standards envisages arrangements under which assets would be held on behalf of the CSD/SSS by an affiliate/group entity of the CSD/SSS, and clarifies the safeguards necessary to support such an arrangement, including consultation with the RBA and demonstration of legal certainty. There nevertheless remains a risk that the liquid assets will not be accessible when needed. The Australian Government has recently consulted on legislation that would provide the RBA with directive powers over related entities that provide critical services/funding to a CSD/SSS. Such powers, while intended to have broader application, would allow the RBA to direct a parent to disperse funds held on behalf of the CSD/SSS and thereby strengthen such an arrangement in an effort to make it functionally equivalent to the CSD/SSS itself holding the assets. Recommendation: The RBA is recommended to implement measures that address the gaps or inconsistencies identified, particularly those related to KC2 and KC3.
CSD_SSS	15.1	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should have robust management and control systems to identify, monitor, and manage general business risks, including losses from poor execution of business strategy, negative cash flows, or unexpected and excessively large operating expenses.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 12.1	Broadly consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	15.2	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should hold liquid net assets funded by equity (such as common stock, disclosed reserves, or other retained earnings) so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if it incurs general business losses. The amount of liquid net assets funded by equity an FMI should hold should be determined by its general business risk profile and the length of time required to achieve a recovery or orderly wind-down, as appropriate, of its critical operations and services if such action is taken.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 12.2	Broadly consistent	The RBA has modified the Principle to address a concern initially raised in the context of CCPs that, given the Australian legal regime, assets held by an FMI are not bankruptcy remote and therefore would be at risk of being drawn upon in the event that a participant default exhausted pre-funded default resources. The guidance to the RBA Standards envisages arrangements under which assets would be held on behalf of the CSD/SSS by an affiliate/group entity of the CSD/SSS, and clarifies the safeguards necessary to support such an arrangement, including consultation with the RBA and demonstration of legal certainty. There nevertheless remains a risk that the liquid assets will not be accessible when needed. The Australian Government has recently consulted on legislation that would provide the RBA with directive powers over related entities that provide critical services/funding to a CSD/SSS. Such powers, while intended to have broader application, would allow the RBA to direct a parent to disperse funds held on behalf of the CSD/SSS and thereby strengthen such an arrangement in an effort to make it functionally equivalent to the CSD/SSS itself holding the assets.
CSD_SSS	15.3	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should maintain a viable recovery or orderly wind-down plan and should hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to implement this plan. At a minimum, an FMI should hold liquid net assets funded by equity equal to at least six months of current operating expenses. These assets are in addition to resources held to cover participant defaults or other risks covered under the financial resources principles. However, equity held under international risk-based capital standards can be included where relevant and appropriate to avoid duplicate capital requirements.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 12.3	Broadly consistent	The RBA has modified the Principle to address a concern initially raised in the context of CCPs that, given the Australian legal regime, assets held by an FMI are not bankruptcy remote and therefore would be at risk of being drawn upon in the event that a participant default exhausted pre-funded default resources. The guidance to the RBA Standards envisages arrangements under which assets would be held on behalf of the CSD/SSS by an affiliate/group entity of the CSD/SSS, and clarifies the safeguards necessary to support such an arrangement, including consultation with the RBA and demonstration of legal certainty. There nevertheless remains a risk that the liquid assets will not be accessible when needed. The Australian Government has recently consulted on legislation that would provide the RBA with directive powers over related entities that provide critical services/funding to a CSD/SSS. Such powers, while intended to have broader application, would allow the RBA to direct a parent to disperse funds held on behalf of the CSD/SSS and thereby strengthen such an arrangement in an effort to make it functionally equivalent to the CSD/SSS itself holding the assets.

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	15.4	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	Assets held to cover general business risk should be of high quality and sufficiently liquid in order to allow the FMI to meet its current and projected operating expenses under a range of scenarios, including in adverse market conditions.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 12.4	Broadly consistent	
CSD_SSS	15.5	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should maintain a viable plan for raising additional equity should its equity fall close to or below the amount needed. This plan should be approved by the board of directors and updated regularly.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 12.5	Broadly consistent	
CSD_SSS	16.0	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities Standard 13	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	16.1	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.	An FMI should hold its own and its participants' assets at supervised and regulated entities that have robust accounting practices, safekeeping procedures, and internal controls that fully protect these assets.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 13.1	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	16.2	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.	An FMI should have prompt access to its assets and the assets provided by participants, when required.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 13.2	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	16.3	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.	An FMI should evaluate and understand its exposures to its custodian banks, taking into account the full scope of its relationships with each.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 13.3	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	16.4	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.	An FMI's investment strategy should be consistent with its overall risk-management strategy and fully disclosed to its participants, and investments should be secured by, or be claims on, high-quality obligors. These investments should allow for quick liquidation with little, if any, adverse price effect.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 13.4	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	17.0	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities Standard 14	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	17.1	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should establish a robust operational risk-management framework with appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls to identify, monitor, and manage operational risks.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 14.1	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	17.2	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI's board of directors should clearly define the roles and responsibilities for addressing operational risk and should endorse the FMI's operational risk-management framework. Systems, operational policies, procedures, and controls should be reviewed, audited, and tested periodically and after significant changes.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 14.2	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	17.3	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should have clearly defined operational reliability objectives and should have policies in place that are designed to achieve those objectives.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 14.3	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	17.4	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should ensure that it has scalable capacity adequate to handle increasing stress volumes and to achieve its service-level objectives.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 14.3	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	17.5	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should have comprehensive physical and information security policies that address all potential vulnerabilities and threats.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 14.3	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	17.6	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should have a business continuity plan that addresses events posing a significant risk of disrupting operations, including events that could cause a wide-scale or major disruption. The plan should incorporate the use of a secondary site and should be designed to ensure that critical information technology (IT) systems can resume operations within two hours following disruptive events. The plan should be designed to enable the FMI to complete settlement by the end of the day of the disruption, even in case of extreme circumstances. The FMI should regularly test these arrangements.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 14.7	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	17.7	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the risks that key participants, other FMIs, and service and utility providers might pose to its operations. In addition, an FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the risks its operations might pose to other FMIs.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 14.5	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	18.0	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities Standard 15	Consistent	Recommendation: Where there are inconsistencies in language or requirements between the Corporations Act, Corporations Regulations, or RG 211 and the PFMI, ASIC should provide clarity to CSDs/SSSs with respect to minimum standards.
CSD_SSS	18.1	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.	An FMI should allow for fair and open access to its services, including by direct and, where relevant, indirect participants and other FMIs, based on reasonable risk-related participation requirements.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 15.1	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	18.2	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.	An FMI's participation requirements should be justified in terms of the safety and efficiency of the FMI and the markets it serves, be tailored to and commensurate with the FMI's specific risks, and be publicly disclosed. Subject to maintaining acceptable risk control standards, an FMI should endeavour to set requirements that have the least-restrictive impact on access that circumstances permit.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 15.2	Consistent	RBA Standard 15.2 does not explicitly address the efficiency of the CSD/SSS, which is within ASIC's responsibilities. In practice, ASIC considers the "efficiency" of a CSD/SSS within the concept of "effective", in enforcing the CSD/SSS's general licence obligation to provide its service in a fair and effective way. This is deemed to sufficiently capture this aspect of KC 2.
CSD_SSS	18.3	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.	An FMI should monitor compliance with its participation requirements on an ongoing basis and have clearly defined and publicly disclosed procedures for facilitating the suspension and orderly exit of a participant that breaches, or no longer meets, the participation requirements.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 15.3	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	19.0	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities Standard 16	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	19.1	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should ensure that its rules, procedures, and agreements allow it to gather basic information about indirect participation in order to identify, monitor, and manage any material risks to the FMI arising from such tiered participation arrangements.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 16.1	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	19.2	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should identify material dependencies between direct and indirect participants that might affect the FMI.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 16.2	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	19.3	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should identify indirect participants responsible for a significant proportion of transactions processed by the FMI and indirect participants whose transaction volumes or values are large relative to the capacity of the direct participants through which they access the FMI in order to manage the risks arising from these transactions.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 16.3	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	19.4	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should regularly review risks arising from tiered participation arrangements and should take mitigating action when appropriate.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 16.4	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	20.0	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities Standard 17	Consistent	Recommendation: The RBA is recommended to implement measures which address the gaps or inconsistencies identified, specifically those related to KC1.
CSD_SSS	20.1	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.	Before entering into a link arrangement and on an ongoing basis once the link is established, an FMI should identify, monitor, and manage all potential sources of risk arising from the link arrangement. Link arrangements should be designed such that each FMI is able to observe the other principles in this report.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 17.1	Consistent	The RBA takes the view that each FMI entering into a link is responsible for ensuring that the design of the link arrangement would not impede its own ability to observe the other Principles. Contrary to the intent of the KC, however, this does not require that the FMI also ensure that the design of the link arrangement would not prevent the other linked FMI from observing the Principles.
CSD_SSS	20.2	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.	A link should have a well-founded legal basis, in all relevant jurisdictions, that supports its design and provides adequate protection to the FMIs involved in the link.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 17.2	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	20.3	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.	Linked CSDs should measure, monitor, and manage the credit and liquidity risks arising from each other. Any credit extensions between CSDs should be covered fully with high-quality collateral and be subject to limits.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 17.4	Consistent	This presents an issue similar to KC 1, in that the KC addresses both linked FMIs, regardless of whether they are in the same jurisdictions or different ones. In this case, however, it does not seem practical or realistic to require a domestic FMI to post collateral for any credit extensions to it, if the foreign FMI does not have a risk management framework that would require so.

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	20.4	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.	Provisional transfers of securities between linked CSDs should be prohibited or, at a minimum, the retransfer of provisionally transferred securities should be prohibited prior to the transfer becoming final.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 17.5	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	20.5	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.	An investor CSD should only establish a link with an issuer CSD if the arrangement provides a high level of protection for the rights of the investor CSD's participants.	ASIC - Appendix 2 of RG 211 RG 211.152-3, 211.239 Corporations Act: Section 821A	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	20.6	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.	An investor CSD that uses an intermediary to operate a link with an issuer CSD should measure, monitor, and manage the additional risks (including custody, credit, legal, and operational risks) arising from the use of the intermediary.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 17.6	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	21.0	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.		ASIC - Appendix 2 of RG 211 RG 211.152-3, 211.239 Corporations Act: Section 821A	Broadly consistent	The RBA's Financial Stability Standards do not have a standard that addresses Principle 21, because Principle 21 falls solely within ASIC's regulatory remit. ASIC's framework has two components concerning this Principle. First, in advising the responsible Minister on licensing and in assessing a licensee's compliance with its regulatory obligations, ASIC considers whether the entity complies with the Principles relevant to its regulatory remit. In addition, one of the statutory obligations on a licensed CSD/SSS is, to the extent reasonably practicable, to do all things necessary to ensure that its services are provided in a fair and effective way (s821A(a) of the Corporations Act). In practice, ASIC considers the "efficiency" of a CSD/SSS within the concept of "effective" in applying the fair and effective services obligation. Fair and effective is, however, not the same scope as the Principle which concerns efficiency and effectiveness; and ASIC's general policy statement on considering an entity's compliance with the PFMI when assessing a licence application does not create a binding obligation for the CSD/SSS to comply with this Principle. However, there is evidence from Australia that ASIC has applied the Principles as part of its supervision. Accordingly this Principle is regarded as broadly consistent. Recommendation: ASIC is recommended to implement measures that address the gaps or inconsistencies identified, particularly those related to KC1 and KC2

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	21.1	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.	An FMI should be designed to meet the needs of its participants and the markets it serves, in particular, with regard to choice of a clearing and settlement arrangement; operating structure; scope of products cleared, settled, or recorded; and use of technology and procedures.	ASIC - RG 211.239 Corporations Act: Section 827A(2)	Broadly consistent	The RBA's Financial Stability Standards do not have a standard that addresses Principle 21, because Principle 21 falls solely within ASIC's regulatory remit. ASIC's framework has two components concerning this Principle. First, in advising the responsible Minister on licensing and in assessing a licensee's compliance with its regulatory obligations, ASIC considers whether the entity complies with the Principles relevant to its regulatory remit. In addition, one of the statutory obligations on a licensed CSD/SSS is, to the extent reasonably practicable, to do all things necessary to ensure that its services are provided in a fair and effective way (s821A(a) of the Corporations Act). In practice, ASIC considers the "efficiency" of a CSD/SSS within the concept of "effective" in applying the fair and effective services obligation. Fair and effective is, however, not the same scope as the Principle which concerns efficiency and effectiveness; and ASIC's general policy statement on considering an entity's compliance with the PFMI when assessing a licence application does not create a binding obligation for the CSD/SSS to comply with this Principle. However, there is evidence from Australia that ASIC has applied the Principles as part of its supervision. Accordingly this Principle is regarded as broadly consistent.
CSD_SSS	21.2	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.	An FMI should have clearly defined goals and objectives that are measurable and achievable, such as in the areas of minimum service levels, risk-management expectations, and business priorities.	ASIC - RG 211.239 Corporations Act: Section 821E	Broadly consistent	The KC requires the FMI to have clear goals and objectives in a number of areas. ASIC's general policy statement (in ASIC RG 211) on considering an entity's compliance with the PFMI when assessing a licensing application does not appear to create a binding obligation for the CCP to comply with this KC.
CSD_SSS	21.3	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.	An FMI should have established mechanisms for the regular review of its efficiency and effectiveness.	RG 211.229 and 211.239 Corporations Act: Section 821E	Broadly consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	22.0	An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, relevant internationally accepted communication procedures and standards in order to facilitate efficient payment, clearing, settlement, and recording.		ASIC - Appendix 2 of RG 211 RG 211.152-3, 211.239 Corporations Act: Sections 821A(a) and 821A(d)	Broadly consistent	Principle 22 falls solely within ASIC's regulatory remit. ASIC's framework does not have a specific standard on communication procedures and standards, and, as discussed above, ASIC's general policy statement on considering an entity's compliance with the PFMI when assessing a licensing application does not create a binding obligation for the CSD/SSS to comply with this principle. However there is evidence from Australia that ASIC has applied the Principles as part of its supervision. Accordingly this Principle is regarded as broadly consistent. Recommendation: ASIC is recommended to implement measures that address the gaps or inconsistencies identified.
CSD_SSS	22.1	An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, relevant internationally accepted communication procedures and standards in order to facilitate efficient payment, clearing, settlement, and recording.	An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, internationally accepted communication procedures and standards.	RG 211.239 Corporations Act: Section 821A(d)	Broadly consistent	Principle 22 falls solely within ASIC's regulatory remit. ASIC's framework does not have a specific standard on communication procedures and standards, and, as discussed above, ASIC's general policy statement on considering an entity's compliance with the PFMI when assessing a licensing application does not create a binding obligation for the CSD/SSS to comply with this principle. However there is evidence from Australia that ASIC has applied the Principles as part of its supervision. Accordingly this Principle is regarded as broadly consistent
CSD_SSS	23.0	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.		RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities Standard 18	Consistent	Recommendation: Where there are inconsistencies in language or requirements between the Corporations Act, Corporations Regulations, or RG 211 and the PFMI, ASIC should provide clarity to CSDs/SSSs with respect to minimum standards.
CSD_SSS	23.1	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should adopt clear and comprehensive rules and procedures that are fully disclosed to participants. Relevant rules and key procedures should also be publicly disclosed.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 18.1	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	23.2	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should disclose clear descriptions of the system's design and operations, as well as the FMI's and participants' rights and obligations, so that participants can assess the risks they would incur by participating in the FMI.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 18.2	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	23.3	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should provide all necessary and appropriate documentation and training to facilitate participants' understanding of the FMI's rules and procedures and the risks they face from participating in the FMI.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 18.3	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	23.4	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should publicly disclose its fees at the level of individual services it offers as well as its policies on any available discounts. The FMI should provide clear descriptions of priced services for comparability purposes.	ASIC - Appendix 2 of RG 211 RG 211.152-3, 211.239, 211.4 and Table 1 Corporations Act: Section 821A	Consistent	The ASIC requirements address the disclosure to participants but it is unclear that this amounts to public disclosure as required by the KC
CSD_SSS	23.5	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should complete regularly and disclose publicly responses to the CPSS-IOSCO Disclosure framework for financial market infrastructures. An FMI also should, at a minimum, disclose basic data on transaction volumes and values.	RBA Financial Stability Standards for Securities Settlement Facilities: Standard 18.4	Consistent	
PS	1.0	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.		Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	1.1	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	The legal basis should provide a high degree of certainty for each material aspect of an FMI's activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	1.2	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI should have rules, procedures, and contracts that are clear, understandable, and consistent with relevant laws and regulations.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	1.3	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI should be able to articulate the legal basis for its activities to relevant authorities, participants, and, where relevant, participants' customers, in a clear and understandable way.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	1.4	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI should have rules, procedures, and contracts that are enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions. There should be a high degree of certainty that actions taken by the FMI under such rules and procedures will not be voided, reversed, or subject to stays.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	1.5	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI conducting business in multiple jurisdictions should identify and mitigate the risks arising from any potential conflict of laws across jurisdictions.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	2.0	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.		Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	2.1	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	An FMI should have objectives that place a high priority on the safety and efficiency of the FMI and explicitly support financial stability and other relevant public interest considerations.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	2.2	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	An FMI should have documented governance arrangements that provide clear and direct lines of responsibility and accountability. These arrangements should be disclosed to owners, relevant authorities, participants, and, at a more general level, the public.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	2.3	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The roles and responsibilities of an FMI's board of directors (or equivalent) should be clearly specified, and there should be documented procedures for its functioning, including procedures to identify, address, and manage member conflicts of interest. The board should review both its overall performance and the performance of its individual board members regularly.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	2.4	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The board should contain suitable members with the appropriate skills and incentives to fulfil its multiple roles. This typically requires the inclusion of non-executive board member(s).	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	2.5	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The roles and responsibilities of management should be clearly specified. An FMI's management should have the appropriate experience, a mix of skills, and the integrity necessary to discharge their responsibilities for the operation and risk management of the FMI.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	2.6	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The board should establish a clear, documented risk-management framework that includes the FMI's risk-tolerance policy, assigns responsibilities and accountability for risk decisions, and addresses decision making in crises and emergencies. Governance arrangements should ensure that the risk-management and internal control functions have sufficient authority, independence, resources, and access to the board.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	2.7	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The board should ensure that the FMI's design, rules, overall strategy, and major decisions reflect appropriately the legitimate interests of its direct and indirect participants and other relevant stakeholders. Major decisions should be clearly disclosed to relevant stakeholders and, where there is a broad market impact, the public.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	3.0	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.		Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	3.1	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should have risk-management policies, procedures, and systems that enable it to identify, measure, monitor, and manage the range of risks that arise in or are borne by the FMI. Risk-management frameworks should be subject to periodic review.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	3.2	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should provide incentives to participants and, where relevant, their customers to manage and contain the risks they pose to the FMI.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	3.3	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should regularly review the material risks it bears from and poses to other entities (such as other FMIs, settlement banks, liquidity providers, and service providers) as a result of interdependencies and develop appropriate risk-management tools to address these risks.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	3.4	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should identify scenarios that may potentially prevent it from being able to provide its critical operations and services as a going concern and assess the effectiveness of a full range of options for recovery or orderly wind-down. An FMI should prepare appropriate plans for its recovery or orderly wind-down based on the results of that assessment. Where applicable, an FMI should also provide relevant authorities with the information needed for purposes of resolution planning.	Not applicable. It is the Bank's view that expectations around recovery planning and the organisation of operational arrangements to support resolution actions will not typically apply in the case of a central bank-owned system. Accordingly, to date the Bank has not assessed RITS against Key Consideration 3.4.	Consistent	The approach taken by the RBA for a central bank operated RTGS payment system is consistent with paragraph 1.23 of the PFMI, as elaborated in the CPMI-IOSCO Guidance note Application of the Principles for financial market infrastructures to central bank FMIs.

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	4.0	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.		Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	4.1	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should establish a robust framework to manage its credit exposures to its participants and the credit risks arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. Credit exposure may arise from current exposures, potential future exposures, or both.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	4.2	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should identify sources of credit risk, routinely measure and monitor credit exposures, and use appropriate risk-management tools to control these risks.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	4.3	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	A payment system or SSS should cover its current and, where they exist, potential future exposures to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence using collateral and other equivalent financial resources (see Principle 5 on collateral). In the case of a DNS payment system or DNS SSS in which there is no settlement guarantee but where its participants face credit exposures arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes, such an FMI should maintain, at a minimum, sufficient resources to cover the exposures of the two participants and their affiliates that would create the largest aggregate credit exposure in the system.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	4.7	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should establish explicit rules and procedures that address fully any credit losses it may face as a result of any individual or combined default among its participants with respect to any of their obligations to the FMI. These rules and procedures should address how potentially uncovered credit losses would be allocated, including the repayment of any funds an FMI may borrow from liquidity providers. These rules and procedures should also indicate the FMI's process to replenish any financial resources that the FMI may employ during a stress event, so that the FMI can continue to operate in a safe and sound manner.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	5.0	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.		Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia	Consistent	
PS	5.1	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI should generally limit the assets it (routinely) accepts as collateral to those with low credit, liquidity, and market risks.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	5.2	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI should establish prudent valuation practices and develop haircuts that are regularly tested and take into account stressed market conditions.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	5.3	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	In order to reduce the need for procyclical adjustments, an FMI should establish stable and conservative haircuts that are calibrated to include periods of stressed market conditions, to the extent practicable and prudent.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	5.4	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI should avoid concentrated holdings of certain assets where this would significantly impair the ability to liquidate such assets quickly without significant adverse price effects.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	5.5	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI that accepts cross-border collateral should mitigate the risks associated with its use and ensure that the collateral can be used in a timely manner.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	5.6	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI should use a collateral management system that is well-designed and operationally flexible.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	7.0	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.		Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	7.1	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should have a robust framework to manage its liquidity risks from its participants, settlement banks, nostro agents, custodian banks, liquidity providers, and other entities.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	7.2	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should have effective operational and analytical tools to identify, measure, and monitor its settlement and funding flows on an ongoing and timely basis, including its use of intraday liquidity.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	7.3	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	A payment system or SSS, including one employing a DNS mechanism, should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day settlement, and where appropriate intraday or multiday settlement, of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate payment obligation in extreme but plausible market conditions.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	7.5	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	For the purpose of meeting its minimum liquid resource requirement, an FMI's qualifying liquid resources in each currency include cash at the central bank of issue and at creditworthy commercial banks, committed lines of credit, committed foreign exchange swaps, and committed repos, as well as highly marketable collateral held in custody and investments that are readily available and convertible into cash with prearranged and highly reliable funding arrangements, even in extreme but plausible market conditions. If an FMI has access to routine credit at the central bank of issue, the FMI may count such access as part of the minimum requirement to the extent it has collateral that is eligible for pledging to (or for conducting other appropriate forms of transactions with) the relevant central bank. All such resources should be available when needed.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	7.6	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI may supplement its qualifying liquid resources with other forms of liquid resources. If the FMI does so, then these liquid resources should be in the form of assets that are likely to be saleable or acceptable as collateral for lines of credit, swaps, or repos on an ad hoc basis following a default, even if this cannot be reliably prearranged or guaranteed in extreme market conditions. Even if an FMI does not have access to routine central bank credit, it should still take account of what collateral is typically accepted by the relevant central bank, as such assets may be more likely to be liquid in stressed circumstances. An FMI should not assume the availability of emergency central bank credit as a part of its liquidity plan.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	7.7	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should obtain a high degree of confidence, through rigorous due diligence, that each provider of its minimum required qualifying liquid resources, whether a participant of the FMI or an external party, has sufficient information to understand and to manage its associated liquidity risks, and that it has the capacity to perform as required under its commitment. Where relevant to assessing a liquidity provider’s performance reliability with respect to a particular currency, a liquidity provider’s potential access to credit from the central bank of issue may be taken into account. An FMI should regularly test its procedures for accessing its liquid resources at a liquidity provider.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	7.8	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI with access to central bank accounts, payment services, or securities services should use these services, where practical, to enhance its management of liquidity risk.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	7.9	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should determine the amount and regularly test the sufficiency of its liquid resources through rigorous stress testing. An FMI should have clear procedures to report the results of its stress tests to appropriate decision makers at the FMI and to use these results to evaluate the adequacy of and adjust its liquidity risk-management framework. In conducting stress testing, an FMI should consider a wide range of relevant scenarios. Scenarios should include relevant peak historic price volatilities, shifts in other market factors such as price determinants and yield curves, multiple defaults over various time horizons, simultaneous pressures in funding and asset markets, and a spectrum of forward-looking stress scenarios in a variety of extreme but plausible market conditions. Scenarios should also take into account the design and operation of the FMI, include all entities that might pose material liquidity risks to the FMI (such as settlement banks, nostro agents, custodian banks, liquidity providers, and linked FMIs), and where appropriate, cover a multiday period. In all cases, an FMI should document its supporting rationale for, and should have appropriate governance arrangements relating to, the amount and form of total liquid resources it maintains.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	7.10	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should establish explicit rules and procedures that enable the FMI to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations on time following any individual or combined default among its participants. These rules and procedures should address unforeseen and potentially uncovered liquidity shortfalls and should aim to avoid unwinding, revoking, or delaying the same-day settlement of payment obligations. These rules and procedures should also indicate the FMI's process to replenish any liquidity resources it may employ during a stress event, so that it can continue to operate in a safe and sound manner.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	8.0	An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.		Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	8.1	An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.	An FMI's rules and procedures should clearly define the point at which settlement is final.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	8.2	An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.	An FMI should complete final settlement no later than the end of the value date, and preferably intraday or in real time, to reduce settlement risk. An LVPS or SSS should consider adopting RTGS or multiple-batch processing during the settlement day.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	8.3	An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.	An FMI should clearly define the point after which unsettled payments, transfer instructions, or other obligations may not be revoked by a participant.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	9.0	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.		Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	9.1	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money, where practical and available, to avoid credit and liquidity risks.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	9.2	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	If central bank money is not used, an FMI should conduct its money settlements using a settlement asset with little or no credit or liquidity risk.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	9.3	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	If an FMI settles in commercial bank money, it should monitor, manage, and limit its credit and liquidity risks arising from the commercial settlement banks. In particular, an FMI should establish and monitor adherence to strict criteria for its settlement banks that take account of, among other things, their regulation and supervision, creditworthiness, capitalisation, access to liquidity, and operational reliability. An FMI should also monitor and manage the concentration of credit and liquidity exposures to its commercial settlement banks.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	9.4	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	If an FMI conducts money settlements on its own books, it should minimise and strictly control its credit and liquidity risks.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	9.5	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	An FMI's legal agreements with any settlement banks should state clearly when transfers on the books of individual settlement banks are expected to occur, that transfers are to be final when effected, and that funds received should be transferable as soon as possible, at a minimum by the end of the day and ideally intraday, in order to enable the FMI and its participants to manage credit and liquidity risks.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	12.0	If an FMI settles transactions that involve the settlement of two linked obligations (for example, securities or foreign exchange transactions), it should eliminate principal risk by conditioning the final settlement of one obligation upon the final settlement of the other.		This Principle is not applicable to RITS as it is not an exchange-of value settlement system. It does not perform the settlement of foreign exchange transactions or securities transactions. In accordance with the Joint Statement, if a Payment System that was an exchange-of-value settlement system was established in Australia and was deemed by the Bank to be systemically important, it would be assessed against Principle 12. In determining whether a particular system should be subject to ongoing oversight as a systemically important payment system and assessed against the Principles, the Bank takes into account whether the system: • is the sole payment system in the country or the principal system in terms of the aggregate value of payments • mainly handles time-critical, high-value payments • is used to effect settlement in other systemically important FMIs.	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	12.1	If an FMI settles transactions that involve the settlement of two linked obligations (for example, securities or foreign exchange transactions), it should eliminate principal risk by conditioning the final settlement of one obligation upon the final settlement of the other.	An FMI that is an exchange-of-value settlement system should eliminate principal risk by ensuring that the final settlement of one obligation occurs if and only if the final settlement of the linked obligation also occurs, regardless of whether the FMI settles on a gross or net basis and when finality occurs.		Consistent	
PS	13.0	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.		Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	13.1	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.	An FMI should have default rules and procedures that enable the FMI to continue to meet its obligations in the event of a participant default and that address the replenishment of resources following a default.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	13.2	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.	An FMI should be well prepared to implement its default rules and procedures, including any appropriate discretionary procedures provided for in its rules.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	13.3	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.	An FMI should publicly disclose key aspects of its default rules and procedures.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	13.4	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.	An FMI should involve its participants and other stakeholders in the testing and review of the FMI's default procedures, including any close-out procedures. Such testing and review should be conducted at least annually or following material changes to the rules and procedures to ensure that they are practical and effective.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	15.0	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.		Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	15.1	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should have robust management and control systems to identify, monitor, and manage general business risks, including losses from poor execution of business strategy, negative cash flows, or unexpected and excessively large operating expenses.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	15.2	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should hold liquid net assets funded by equity (such as common stock, disclosed reserves, or other retained earnings) so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if it incurs general business losses. The amount of liquid net assets funded by equity an FMI should hold should be determined by its general business risk profile and the length of time required to achieve a recovery or orderly wind-down, as appropriate, of its critical operations and services if such action is taken.	Not applicable. Since RITS is a central bank-owned system, it is not assessed against the requirement to hold liquid net assets funded by equity to cover business risk and support a recovery or wind-down plan (Key considerations 15.2–15.4). This recognises central banks' inherent ability to supply liquidity to support continuity of operations, should liquidity be required for this purpose.	Consistent	The approach taken by the RBA for a central bank operated RTGS payment system is consistent with paragraph 1.23 of the PFMI, as elaborated in the CPMI-IOSCO Guidance note Application of the Principles for financial market infrastructures to central bank FMIs.

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	15.3	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should maintain a viable recovery or orderly wind-down plan and should hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to implement this plan. At a minimum, an FMI should hold liquid net assets funded by equity equal to at least six months of current operating expenses. These assets are in addition to resources held to cover participant defaults or other risks covered under the financial resources principles. However, equity held under international risk-based capital standards can be included where relevant and appropriate to avoid duplicate capital requirements.	Not applicable. Since RITS is a central bank-owned system, it is not assessed against the requirement to hold liquid net assets funded by equity to cover business risk and support a recovery or wind-down plan (Key considerations 15.2–15.4). This recognises central banks' inherent ability to supply liquidity to support continuity of operations, should liquidity be required for this purpose.	Consistent	The approach taken by the RBA for a central bank operated RTGS payment system is consistent with paragraph 1.23 of the PFMI, as elaborated in the CPMI-IOSCO Guidance note Application of the Principles for financial market infrastructures to central bank FMIs.
PS	15.4	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	Assets held to cover general business risk should be of high quality and sufficiently liquid in order to allow the FMI to meet its current and projected operating expenses under a range of scenarios, including in adverse market conditions.	Not applicable. Since RITS is a central bank-owned system, it is not assessed against the requirement to hold liquid net assets funded by equity to cover business risk and support a recovery or wind-down plan (Key considerations 15.2–15.4). This recognises central banks' inherent ability to supply liquidity to support continuity of operations, should liquidity be required for this purpose.	Consistent	The approach taken by the RBA for a central bank operated RTGS payment system is consistent with paragraph 1.23 of the PFMI, as elaborated in the CPMI-IOSCO Guidance note Application of the Principles for financial market infrastructures to central bank FMIs.
PS	15.5	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should maintain a viable plan for raising additional equity should its equity fall close to or below the amount needed. This plan should be approved by the board of directors and updated regularly.	Not applicable. Similar to 15.2-15.4, RITS is not assessed against the requirement to maintain a plan to raise additional equity.	Consistent	The approach taken by the RBA for a central bank operated RTGS payment system is consistent with paragraph 1.23 of the PFMI, as elaborated in the CPMI-IOSCO Guidance note Application of the Principles for financial market infrastructures to central bank FMIs.
PS	16.0	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.		Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	16.1	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.	An FMI should hold its own and its participants' assets at supervised and regulated entities that have robust accounting practices, safekeeping procedures, and internal controls that fully protect these assets.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	16.2	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.	An FMI should have prompt access to its assets and the assets provided by participants, when required.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	16.3	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.	An FMI should evaluate and understand its exposures to its custodian banks, taking into account the full scope of its relationships with each.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	16.4	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.	An FMI's investment strategy should be consistent with its overall risk-management strategy and fully disclosed to its participants, and investments should be secured by, or be claims on, high-quality obligors. These investments should allow for quick liquidation with little, if any, adverse price effect.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	17.0	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.		Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	17.1	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should establish a robust operational risk-management framework with appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls to identify, monitor, and manage operational risks.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	17.2	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI's board of directors should clearly define the roles and responsibilities for addressing operational risk and should endorse the FMI's operational risk-management framework. Systems, operational policies, procedures, and controls should be reviewed, audited, and tested periodically and after significant changes.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	17.3	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should have clearly defined operational reliability objectives and should have policies in place that are designed to achieve those objectives.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	17.4	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should ensure that it has scalable capacity adequate to handle increasing stress volumes and to achieve its service-level objectives.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	17.5	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should have comprehensive physical and information security policies that address all potential vulnerabilities and threats.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	17.6	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should have a business continuity plan that addresses events posing a significant risk of disrupting operations, including events that could cause a wide-scale or major disruption. The plan should incorporate the use of a secondary site and should be designed to ensure that critical information technology (IT) systems can resume operations within two hours following disruptive events. The plan should be designed to enable the FMI to complete settlement by the end of the day of the disruption, even in case of extreme circumstances. The FMI should regularly test these arrangements.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	17.7	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the risks that key participants, other FMIs, and service and utility providers might pose to its operations. In addition, an FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the risks its operations might pose to other FMIs.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	18.0	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.		Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	18.1	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.	An FMI should allow for fair and open access to its services, including by direct and, where relevant, indirect participants and other FMIs, based on reasonable risk-related participation requirements.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	18.2	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.	An FMI's participation requirements should be justified in terms of the safety and efficiency of the FMI and the markets it serves, be tailored to and commensurate with the FMI's specific risks, and be publicly disclosed. Subject to maintaining acceptable risk control standards, an FMI should endeavour to set requirements that have the least-restrictive impact on access that circumstances permit.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	18.3	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.	An FMI should monitor compliance with its participation requirements on an ongoing basis and have clearly defined and publicly disclosed procedures for facilitating the suspension and orderly exit of a participant that breaches, or no longer meets, the participation requirements.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	19.0	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.		Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	19.1	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should ensure that its rules, procedures, and agreements allow it to gather basic information about indirect participation in order to identify, monitor, and manage any material risks to the FMI arising from such tiered participation arrangements.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	19.2	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should identify material dependencies between direct and indirect participants that might affect the FMI.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	19.3	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should identify indirect participants responsible for a significant proportion of transactions processed by the FMI and indirect participants whose transaction volumes or values are large relative to the capacity of the direct participants through which they access the FMI in order to manage the risks arising from these transactions.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	19.4	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should regularly review risks arising from tiered participation arrangements and should take mitigating action when appropriate.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	21.0	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.		Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	21.1	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.	An FMI should be designed to meet the needs of its participants and the markets it serves, in particular, with regard to choice of a clearing and settlement arrangement; operating structure; scope of products cleared, settled, or recorded; and use of technology and procedures.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	21.2	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.	An FMI should have clearly defined goals and objectives that are measurable and achievable, such as in the areas of minimum service levels, risk-management expectations, and business priorities.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	21.3	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.	An FMI should have established mechanisms for the regular review of its efficiency and effectiveness.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	22.0	An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, relevant internationally accepted communication procedures and standards in order to facilitate efficient payment, clearing, settlement, and recording.		Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	22.1	An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, relevant internationally accepted communication procedures and standards in order to facilitate efficient payment, clearing, settlement, and recording.	An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, internationally accepted communication procedures and standards.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	23.0	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.		Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	23.1	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should adopt clear and comprehensive rules and procedures that are fully disclosed to participants. Relevant rules and key procedures should also be publicly disclosed.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	23.2	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should disclose clear descriptions of the system's design and operations, as well as the FMI's and participants' rights and obligations, so that participants can assess the risks they would incur by participating in the FMI.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	23.3	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should provide all necessary and appropriate documentation and training to facilitate participants' understanding of the FMI's rules and procedures and the risks they face from participating in the FMI.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	23.4	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should publicly disclose its fees at the level of individual services it offers as well as its policies on any available discounts. The FMI should provide clear descriptions of priced services for comparability purposes.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	
PS	23.5	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should complete regularly and disclose publicly responses to the CPSS-IOSCO Disclosure framework for financial market infrastructures. An FMI also should, at a minimum, disclose basic data on transaction volumes and values.	Implementing the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures in Australia (Joint Statement)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	1.0	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.		ASIC's Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.2.1 ASIC's Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 158-162	Broadly consistent	The implementation measures of ASIC are broadly consistent with Principle 1. The overall rating has been influenced by the absence of implementation measures for key considerations 1, 3, and 4. Recommendation: ASIC is recommended to implement measures that address the gaps or inconsistencies identified, particularly those related to KC1, KC3 and KC4.
TR	1.1	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	The legal basis should provide a high degree of certainty for each material aspect of an FMI's activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	ASIC's Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.2.1(1) ASIC's Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.159 and RG 249.161	Broadly consistent	The phrase "in all relevant jurisdictions" was not adopted explicitly into ASIC's rules and guidance. Although ASIC has explained that there is nothing in its rules that would limit this requirement to the home jurisdiction (and therefore it would cover all relevant jurisdictions), the absence of a limitation cannot be taken as the presence of a specific requirement.
TR	1.2	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI should have rules, procedures, and contracts that are clear, understandable, and consistent with relevant laws and regulations.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.2.1(2)-(4)	Broadly consistent	
TR	1.3	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI should be able to articulate the legal basis for its activities to relevant authorities, participants, and, where relevant, participants' customers, in a clear and understandable way.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.2.1(1) and 2.2.1(3) ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.158 and RG 249.159	Broadly consistent	The purpose of the KC is on demonstrating that the TR has a clear legal basis, rather than just ensuring that it does. A significant gap is created by the absence of explicit requirements for the articulation of legal basis by the FMI.
TR	1.4	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI should have rules, procedures, and contracts that are enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions. There should be a high degree of certainty that actions taken by the FMI under such rules and procedures will not be voided, reversed, or subject to stays.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.2.1(1) ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.158-162	Broadly consistent	As with the headline standard, the concept of having rules, procedures, and contracts "in all relevant jurisdictions" is missing.
TR	1.5	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI conducting business in multiple jurisdictions should identify and mitigate the risks arising from any potential conflict of laws across jurisdictions.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.2.1(5)	Broadly consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	2.0	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.		Corporation Act 2001, Section 904C(3) ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.2.3, 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 2.4.3, 2.4.5, 2.4.6, 2.5.1, and 2.5.2 ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.130-132, RG 249.134, RG 249.138-139, RG 249.175, and RG 249.192	Broadly consistent	The rules do not specifically put the responsibility on the board to carry out certain responsibilities. Recommendation: ASIC is recommended to implement measures that address the gaps or inconsistencies identified, particularly those related to KC3, KC4, KC6 and KC7.
TR	2.1	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	An FMI should have objectives that place a high priority on the safety and efficiency of the FMI and explicitly support financial stability and other relevant public interest considerations.	ASIC's Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.1(1)	Broadly consistent	
TR	2.2	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	An FMI should have documented governance arrangements that provide clear and direct lines of responsibility and accountability. These arrangements should be disclosed to owners, relevant authorities, participants, and, at a more general level, the public.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.1(2) and 2.5.2(1) ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.130-131	Broadly consistent	
TR	2.3	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The roles and responsibilities of an FMI's board of directors (or equivalent) should be clearly specified, and there should be documented procedures for its functioning, including procedures to identify, address, and manage member conflicts of interest. The board should review both its overall performance and the performance of its individual board members regularly.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.1(1)-(2), 2.4.2, and 2.4.3(2) ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.131(b), RG 249.134, RG 249.138, and RG 249.139	Broadly consistent	It is unclear how the cited rule texts (2.4.1(2) and 2.4.3(2)) can be interpreted to mean that the board is required to review the performance of the overall board and individual members. It does not seem like the "board" or its individual members falls under any of the categories requiring review ("arrangements, rules, procedures, policies, plans, systems and controls"). Although RG 249.131(b) require the TR to include in their application a description of [...] performance evaluation of Board Members, the KC puts the onus on the board to conduct the review of the overall and individual member performance, whereas this rule is addressed to the "Operator."

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	2.4	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The board should contain suitable members with the appropriate skills and incentives to fulfil its multiple roles. This typically requires the inclusion of non-executive board member(s).	Corporation Act 2001, Section 904C(3) ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.5 and 2.4.6 ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.131 and RG 249.134	Broadly consistent	The cited rule (2.4.6) requiring officers of the TR to be "fit for office" do not fully capture the requirement that the board members should have the appropriate incentives to fulfil its multiple roles. "Fit for office," as described in the rule, seems to focus on whether the officer would have the appropriate skillset only. Although one can make the argument that if the rules required the inclusion of non-executive board members, there might be an implicit requirement for board members to have the right incentives to fulfil their roles. However, as stated by ASIC, there is no requirement for non-executive board members. Although the wording in the KC for the inclusion of non-executive board member(s) is more generic (by the use of "typically" as opposed to "should"), the lack of a requirement for the board to have appropriate incentives creates a minor gap.
TR	2.5	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The roles and responsibilities of management should be clearly specified. An FMI's management should have the appropriate experience, a mix of skills, and the integrity necessary to discharge their responsibilities for the operation and risk management of the FMI.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.1(1)-(2) and Rule 2.4.6 ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.134(b)	Broadly consistent	
TR	2.6	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The board should establish a clear, documented risk-management framework that includes the FMI's risk-tolerance policy, assigns responsibilities and accountability for risk decisions, and addresses decision making in crises and emergencies. Governance arrangements should ensure that the risk-management and internal control functions have sufficient authority, independence, resources, and access to the board.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.1(2)(a), (c)(i), and (d) Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.175, RG 249.132, and RG 249.192	Broadly consistent	Board for risk management: Because the rule cited (2.4.1(2)) addresses both the board (i.e., governing body) and the management – it's unclear whether the responsibility for establishing a risk management framework would fall to the board or to management. Risk-management function having sufficient authority, independence, etc: Having sufficient human, tech and financial resources does not mean having sufficient authority, independence and access to the board, as in 2.4.1(2)(d) for internal control functions

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	2.7	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The board should ensure that the FMI's design, rules, overall strategy, and major decisions reflect appropriately the legitimate interests of its direct and indirect participants and other relevant stakeholders. Major decisions should be clearly disclosed to relevant stakeholders and, where there is a broad market impact, the public.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.1(2)(c)(ii), 2.2.3(2), 2.5.1, and 2.5.2	Broadly consistent	Rule 2.4.1(2)(c) only refers to users, and not indirect participants and other relevant stakeholders. It is also unclear from the rules whether the board itself is responsible for ensuring that the FMI's design, rules, overall strategy, and major decisions meet the appropriate parties' interests. A gap is created by the lack of requirements that would specifically compel the TR board to ensure the TR's design, rules, overall strategy, and major decisions reflect appropriately the interest of the indirect participants and other various stakeholders.
TR	3.0	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.		ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.2.2, 2.4.3, 2.4.4, and 2.4.11 ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.147 and RG 249.167	Consistent	
TR	3.1	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should have risk-management policies, procedures, and systems that enable it to identify, measure, monitor, and manage the range of risks that arise in or are borne by the FMI. Risk-management frameworks should be subject to periodic review.	ASIC's Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.4(1) and 2.4.3(2) ASIC's Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.147 and RG 249.167	Consistent	
TR	3.2	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should provide incentives to participants and, where relevant, their customers to manage and contain the risks they pose to the FMI.	ASIC's Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.2.2(2)	Consistent	
TR	3.3	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should regularly review the material risks it bears from and poses to other entities (such as other FMIs, settlement banks, liquidity providers, and service providers) as a result of interdependencies and develop appropriate risk-management tools to address these risks.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.4(1)-(2) and 2.4.3(2) ASIC's Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.191	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	3.4	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should identify scenarios that may potentially prevent it from being able to provide its critical operations and services as a going concern and assess the effectiveness of a full range of options for recovery or orderly wind-down. An FMI should prepare appropriate plans for its recovery or orderly wind-down based on the results of that assessment. Where applicable, an FMI should also provide relevant authorities with the information needed for purposes of resolution planning.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.11(1)-(3)	Consistent	
TR	15.0	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.		ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.1, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, and 2.4.7 ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.196 and RG 249.191	Broadly consistent	The implementation measures of ASIC are broadly consistent with Principle 15. The overall rating has been influenced by the absence of implementation measures for aspects of key consideration 2. Recommendation: ASIC is recommended to implement measures that address the gaps or inconsistencies identified in key consideration 2.
TR	15.1	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should have robust management and control systems to identify, monitor, and manage general business risks, including losses from poor execution of business strategy, negative cash flows, or unexpected and excessively large operating expenses.	ASIC’s Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.4(1) ASIC’s Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.191	Broadly consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	15.2	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should hold liquid net assets funded by equity (such as common stock, disclosed reserves, or other retained earnings) so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if it incurs general business losses. The amount of liquid net assets funded by equity an FMI should hold should be determined by its general business risk profile and the length of time required to achieve a recovery or orderly wind-down, as appropriate, of its critical operations and services if such action is taken.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.5 and 2.4.7 ASIC's Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.196	Broadly consistent	The rules do not require liquid net assets funded by equity to be determined by the TR's general risk profile and the length of time required to achieve recovery or orderly wind-down.
TR	15.3	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should maintain a viable recovery or orderly wind-down plan and should hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to implement this plan. At a minimum, an FMI should hold liquid net assets funded by equity equal to at least six months of current operating expenses. These assets are in addition to resources held to cover participant defaults or other risks covered under the financial resources principles. However, equity held under international risk-based capital standards can be included where relevant and appropriate to avoid duplicate capital requirements.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.11(1), 2.4.5, and 2.4.7(1) ASIC's Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.196	Broadly consistent	
TR	15.4	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	Assets held to cover general business risk should be of high quality and sufficiently liquid in order to allow the FMI to meet its current and projected operating expenses under a range of scenarios, including in adverse market conditions.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.5 and 2.4.7 ASIC's Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.196	Broadly consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	15.5	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should maintain a viable plan for raising additional equity should its equity fall close to or below the amount needed. This plan should be approved by the board of directors and updated regularly.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.7(2)	Broadly consistent	
TR	17.0	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.		ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.1, 2.4.3, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, 2.4.8, 2.4.9, 2.4.10, and 2.4.13 ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.197-201 and RG 249.140-141:	Broadly consistent	The implementation measures of ASIC are broadly consistent with Principle 17. The overall rating has been influenced by the absence of implementation measures for key considerations 2, 3, and 6. Recommendation: ASIC is recommended to implement measures that address the gaps or inconsistencies identified.
TR	17.1	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should establish a robust operational risk-management framework with appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls to identify, monitor, and manage operational risks.	ASIC's Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.9(1)-(2), 2.4.4(1), and 2.4.8 ASIC's Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.197	Broadly consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	17.2	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI's board of directors should clearly define the roles and responsibilities for addressing operational risk and should endorse the FMI's operational risk-management framework. Systems, operational policies, procedures, and controls should be reviewed, audited, and tested periodically and after significant changes.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.1(1), 2.4.1(2)(b), and 2.4.3(2)	Broadly consistent	As with Principle 2 – the cited rule (2.4.1(2)(b)) combines the roles and responsibilities of the board and management. It is unclear who has which responsibility. Further, KC 2 requires the board to endorse the TR's operational risk management framework – which is a level of specificity (a specific role/responsibility) that is not included in the rule
TR	17.3	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should have clearly defined operational reliability objectives and should have policies in place that are designed to achieve those objectives.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.9, 2.4.1, 2.4.4, and 2.4.5	Broadly consistent	The rules cited do not capture the KC's intent, which is focused on operational reliability objectives. However, some of the rules cited are broad enough to cover operational reliability objectives.
TR	17.4	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should ensure that it has scalable capacity adequate to handle increasing stress volumes and to achieve its service-level objectives.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.9	Broadly consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	17.5	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should have comprehensive physical and information security policies that address all potential vulnerabilities and threats.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.8(a)-(b) ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.198	Broadly consistent	
TR	17.6	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should have a business continuity plan that addresses events posing a significant risk of disrupting operations, including events that could cause a wide-scale or major disruption. The plan should incorporate the use of a secondary site and should be designed to ensure that critical information technology (IT) systems can resume operations within two hours following disruptive events. The plan should be designed to enable the FMI to complete settlement by the end of the day of the disruption, even in case of extreme circumstances. The FMI should regularly test these arrangements.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.10(a)-(b) ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.199, RG 249.200, and RG 249.201	Broadly consistent	The rules do not require a 2-hour RTO; only end of day resumption required. A significant gap is created by the absence of requirements for the TR to ensure that critical information technology (IT) systems can resume operations within two hours following disruptive events.
TR	17.7	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the risks that key participants, other FMIs, and service and utility providers might pose to its operations. In addition, an FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the risks its operations might pose to other FMIs.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.4(1)-(2), 2.4.13(a)-(d), 2.3.4(4), and 2.3.4(6) ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.140 and RG 249.141	Broadly consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	18.0	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.		ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.2.2 and 2.5.2	Consistent	
TR	18.1	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.	An FMI should allow for fair and open access to its services, including by direct and, where relevant, indirect participants and other FMIs, based on reasonable risk-related participation requirements.	ASIC's Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.2.2(1) and 2.2.2(3)	Consistent	
TR	18.2	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.	An FMI's participation requirements should be justified in terms of the safety and efficiency of the FMI and the markets it serves, be tailored to and commensurate with the FMI's specific risks, and be publicly disclosed. Subject to maintaining acceptable risk control standards, an FMI should endeavour to set requirements that have the least-restrictive impact on access that circumstances permit.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.2.2(2)	Consistent	
TR	18.3	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.	An FMI should monitor compliance with its participation requirements on an ongoing basis and have clearly defined and publicly disclosed procedures for facilitating the suspension and orderly exit of a participant that breaches, or no longer meets, the participation requirements.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.2.2(4) and 2.5.2(1)(d)	Consistent	
TR	19.0	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.		ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.186	Consistent	
TR	19.1	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should ensure that its rules, procedures, and agreements allow it to gather basic information about indirect participation in order to identify, monitor, and manage any material risks to the FMI arising from such tiered participation arrangements.	ASIC's Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.186(a)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	19.2	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should identify material dependencies between direct and indirect participants that might affect the FMI.	ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.186(b)	Consistent	
TR	19.3	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should identify indirect participants responsible for a significant proportion of transactions processed by the FMI and indirect participants whose transaction volumes or values are large relative to the capacity of the direct participants through which they access the FMI in order to manage the risks arising from these transactions.	ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.186(c)	Consistent	
TR	19.4	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should regularly review risks arising from tiered participation arrangements and should take mitigating action when appropriate.	ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.186(d)	Consistent	
TR	20.0	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.		ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.4 ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.187 and RG 249.188	Broadly consistent	The implementation measures of ASIC are broadly consistent with Principle 20. The overall rating has been influenced by the absence of implementation measures for key considerations 1 and 2. Recommendation: ASIC is recommended to implement measures that address the gaps or inconsistencies identified particularly those related to KC1 and KC2.
TR	20.1	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.	Before entering into a link arrangement and on an ongoing basis once the link is established, an FMI should identify, monitor, and manage all potential sources of risk arising from the link arrangement. Link arrangements should be designed such that each FMI is able to observe the other principles in this report.	ASIC's Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.4(1), and 2.4.4(2)(b) ASIC's Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.187, RG 249.188(a)	Broadly consistent	ASIC's rules do not require the licensed TR (ie one side of the link) to consider the design and the effects of the arrangement holistically (i.e., both sides of the link). Specifically the TR is not required to ensure that there is no limitation built into the linked arrangement that would prevent the linked FMIs in other jurisdictions from complying with the Principles.
TR	20.2	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.	A link should have a well-founded legal basis, in all relevant jurisdictions, that supports its design and provides adequate protection to the FMIs involved in the link.	ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.188(b)	Broadly consistent	ASIC's rules do not require the TR to ensure that the link has a well-founded legal basis in all relevant jurisdictions that provides adequate protection for all the FMIs involved in the link.

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	20.9	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.	A TR should carefully assess the additional operational risks related to its links to ensure the scalability and reliability of IT and related resources.	ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.188(c) and RG 249.187	Broadly consistent	
TR	21.0	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.		ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.2.3, 2.5.1, and 2.4.1 ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.167, RG 249.168, and RG 249.175	Consistent	
TR	21.1	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.	An FMI should be designed to meet the needs of its participants and the markets it serves, in particular, with regard to choice of a clearing and settlement arrangement; operating structure; scope of products cleared, settled, or recorded; and use of technology and procedures.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.2.3(1) and 2.4.1(2)(c) ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.168 and RG 249.175	Consistent	
TR	21.2	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.	An FMI should have clearly defined goals and objectives that are measurable and achievable, such as in the areas of minimum service levels, risk-management expectations, and business priorities.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.2.3(2) and 2.5.1(b) ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.167	Consistent	
TR	21.3	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.	An FMI should have established mechanisms for the regular review of its efficiency and effectiveness.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.2.3(2) ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.167	Consistent	
TR	22.0	An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, relevant internationally accepted communication procedures and standards in order to facilitate efficient payment, clearing, settlement, and recording.		ASIC’s Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.3.7	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	22.1	An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, relevant internationally accepted communication procedures and standards in order to facilitate efficient payment, clearing, settlement, and recording.	An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, internationally accepted communication procedures and standards.	ASIC's Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.3.7	Consistent	
TR	23.0	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.		ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.3.5, 2.5.1, and 2.5.2 ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.196 and RG 249.203	Consistent	
TR	23.1	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should adopt clear and comprehensive rules and procedures that are fully disclosed to participants. Relevant rules and key procedures should also be publicly disclosed.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.5.1(1), 2.5.2(1)(c), (e), and (f)	Consistent	
TR	23.2	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should disclose clear descriptions of the system's design and operations, as well as the FMI's and participants' rights and obligations, so that participants can assess the risks they would incur by participating in the FMI.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.5.1(1)(c)	Consistent	
TR	23.3	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should provide all necessary and appropriate documentation and training to facilitate participants' understanding of the FMI's rules and procedures and the risks they face from participating in the FMI.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.5.1(1) and (2)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	23.4	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should publicly disclose its fees at the level of individual services it offers as well as its policies on any available discounts. The FMI should provide clear descriptions of priced services for comparability purposes.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.5.2(1)(g) and 2.5.2(2) ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.196	Consistent	
TR	23.5	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should complete regularly and disclose publicly responses to the CPSS-IOSCO Disclosure framework for financial market infrastructures. An FMI also should, at a minimum, disclose basic data on transaction volumes and values.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.3.5(1) and 2.3.5(2)(a)-(b) ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.203	Consistent	
TR	24.0	A TR should provide timely and accurate data to relevant authorities and the public in line with their respective needs.		ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.3.2 and 2.3.4	Consistent	
TR	24.1	A TR should provide timely and accurate data to relevant authorities and the public in line with their respective needs.	A TR should provide data in line with regulatory and industry expectations to relevant authorities and the public, respectively, that is comprehensive and at a level of detail sufficient to enhance market transparency and support other public policy objectives.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.3.4(1)-(5)	Consistent	
TR	24.2	A TR should provide timely and accurate data to relevant authorities and the public in line with their respective needs.	A TR should have effective processes and procedures to provide data to relevant authorities in a timely and appropriate manner to enable them to meet their respective regulatory mandates and legal responsibilities.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.3.4(5) and (7)	Consistent	
TR	24.3	A TR should provide timely and accurate data to relevant authorities and the public in line with their respective needs.	A TR should have robust information systems that provide accurate current and historical data. Data should be provided in a timely manner and in a format that permits it to be easily analysed.	ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.3.2(1)-(5) and 2.3.4(5) and (7)	Consistent	