

Canada

This document provides citations of the relevant legislation, regulation, policy and guidance, and notes explaining the assigned ratings for all relevant Principles of a given jurisdiction, by FMI type. It is a direct download of all the information for one jurisdiction that is included in the online CPMI-IOSCO PFMI implementation database (www.bis.org/committees/cpmi/pfmi/l2-database and www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=cpmi_iosco).

It includes all Principles and all key considerations: for the ones where gaps were identified the last column provides details on key conclusions and recommendations. The online CPMI-IOSCO PFMI implementation database allows to search information by Principle across different jurisdictions.

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	1.0	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.			Consistent	
CCP	1.1	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	The legal basis should provide a high degree of certainty for each material aspect of an FMI's activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	BoC Standard 1: Legal Basis NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	1.2	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI should have rules, procedures, and contracts that are clear, understandable, and consistent with relevant laws and regulations.	BoC Standard 1: Legal Basis NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	1.3	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI should be able to articulate the legal basis for its activities to relevant authorities, participants, and, where relevant, participants' customers, in a clear and understandable way.	BoC Standard 1: Legal Basis NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	1.4	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI should have rules, procedures, and contracts that are enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions. There should be a high degree of certainty that actions taken by the FMI under such rules and procedures will not be voided, reversed, or subject to stays.	BoC Standard 1: Legal Basis NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	1.5	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI conducting business in multiple jurisdictions should identify and mitigate the risks arising from any potential conflict of laws across jurisdictions.	BoC Standard 1: Legal Basis NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

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CCP	2.0	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.			Consistent	Canadian authorities should consider providing greater clarity with respect to safeguards for the independence of the risk management and audit functions in situations where the FMI's chief risk officer or the chief compliance officer report to the CEO instead of the board.
CCP	2.1	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	An FMI should have objectives that place a high priority on the safety and efficiency of the FMI and explicitly support financial stability and other relevant public interest considerations.	BoC Standard 2: Governance NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	2.2	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	An FMI should have documented governance arrangements that provide clear and direct lines of responsibility and accountability. These arrangements should be disclosed to owners, relevant authorities, participants, and, at a more general level, the public.	BoC Standard 2: Governance NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	2.3	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The roles and responsibilities of an FMI's board of directors (or equivalent) should be clearly specified, and there should be documented procedures for its functioning, including procedures to identify, address, and manage member conflicts of interest. The board should review both its overall performance and the performance of its individual board members regularly.	BoC Standard 2: Governance NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	2.4	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The board should contain suitable members with the appropriate skills and incentives to fulfil its multiple roles. This typically requires the inclusion of non-executive board member(s).	BoC Standard 2: Governance NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

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CCP	2.5	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The roles and responsibilities of management should be clearly specified. An FMI's management should have the appropriate experience, a mix of skills, and the integrity necessary to discharge their responsibilities for the operation and risk management of the FMI.	BoC Standard 2: Governance NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	2.6	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The board should establish a clear, documented risk-management framework that includes the FMI's risk-tolerance policy, assigns responsibilities and accountability for risk decisions, and addresses decision making in crises and emergencies. Governance arrangements should ensure that the risk-management and internal control functions have sufficient authority, independence, resources, and access to the board.	BoC Standard 2: Governance NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	Section 4.3(1) of NI 24-102 permits the Chief Risk Officer (CRO) and Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) of the FMI to report to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) instead of the board, if so determined by the board. The PFMI does not explicitly prohibit this but KC 6 does require "that the risk-management and internal control functions have sufficient authority, independence, resources and access to the board". NI 24-102 specifies several ways for the CRO/CCO to contact the Board (eg through recommendations or via the Risk/Audit Committees). However, a reporting line to the CEO may result in insufficient independence of the risk and audit functions unless there are adequate safeguards in place that address the potential conflicts of interest if the risk / audit functions report to the CEO. This may be of particular interest, for instance, during the preparation of proposals to the Board or Risk/Audit Committees as well as regarding certain administrative functions such as the performance management of the CRO/CCO by the CEO.
CCP	2.7	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The board should ensure that the FMI's design, rules, overall strategy, and major decisions reflect appropriately the legitimate interests of its direct and indirect participants and other relevant stakeholders. Major decisions should be clearly disclosed to relevant stakeholders and, where there is a broad market impact, the public.	BoC Standard 2: Governance NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	3.0	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.			Consistent	

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CCP	3.1	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should have risk-management policies, procedures, and systems that enable it to identify, measure, monitor, and manage the range of risks that arise in or are borne by the FMI. Risk-management frameworks should be subject to periodic review.	BoC Standard 3: Framework for the Comprehensive Management of Risks NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	3.2	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should provide incentives to participants and, where relevant, their customers to manage and contain the risks they pose to the FMI.	BoC Standard 3: Framework for the Comprehensive Management of Risks NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	3.3	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should regularly review the material risks it bears from and poses to other entities (such as other FMIs, settlement banks, liquidity providers, and service providers) as a result of interdependencies and develop appropriate risk-management tools to address these risks.	BoC Standard 3: Framework for the Comprehensive Management of Risks NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	3.4	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should identify scenarios that may potentially prevent it from being able to provide its critical operations and services as a going concern and assess the effectiveness of a full range of options for recovery or orderly wind-down. An FMI should prepare appropriate plans for its recovery or orderly wind-down based on the results of that assessment. Where applicable, an FMI should also provide relevant authorities with the information needed for purposes of resolution planning.	BoC Standard 3: Framework for the Comprehensive Management of Risks NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

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CCP	4.0	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.			Consistent	

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CCP	4.1	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should establish a robust framework to manage its credit exposures to its participants and the credit risks arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. Credit exposure may arise from current exposures, potential future exposures, or both.	BoC Standard 4: Credit Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

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CCP	4.2	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should identify sources of credit risk, routinely measure and monitor credit exposures, and use appropriate risk-management tools to control these risks.	BoC Standard 4: Credit Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

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CCP	4.4	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	A CCP should cover its current and potential future exposures to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence using margin and other prefunded financial resources (see Principle 5 on collateral and Principle 6 on margin). In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure for the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure for the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. In all cases, a CCP should document its supporting rationale for, and should have appropriate governance arrangements relating to, the amount of total financial resources it maintains.	BoC Standard 4: Credit Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

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CCP	4.5	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	A CCP should determine the amount and regularly test the sufficiency of its total financial resources available in the event of a default or multiple defaults in extreme but plausible market conditions through rigorous stress testing. A CCP should have clear procedures to report the results of its stress tests to appropriate decision makers at the CCP and to use these results to evaluate the adequacy of and adjust its total financial resources. Stress tests should be performed daily using standard and predetermined parameters and assumptions. On at least a monthly basis, a CCP should perform a comprehensive and thorough analysis of stress testing scenarios, models, and underlying parameters and assumptions used to ensure they are appropriate for determining the CCP's required level of default protection in light of current and evolving market conditions. A CCP should perform this analysis of stress testing more frequently when the products cleared or markets served display high volatility, become less liquid, or when the size or concentration of positions held by a CCP's participants increases significantly. A full validation of a CCP's risk-management model should be performed at least annually.	BoC Standard 4: Credit Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

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CCP	4.6	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	In conducting stress testing, a CCP should consider the effect of a wide range of relevant stress scenarios in terms of both defaulters' positions and possible price changes in liquidation periods. Scenarios should include relevant peak historic price volatilities, shifts in other market factors such as price determinants and yield curves, multiple defaults over various time horizons, simultaneous pressures in funding and asset markets, and a spectrum of forward-looking stress scenarios in a variety of extreme but plausible market conditions.	BoC Standard 4: Credit Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	4.7	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should establish explicit rules and procedures that address fully any credit losses it may face as a result of any individual or combined default among its participants with respect to any of their obligations to the FMI. These rules and procedures should address how potentially uncovered credit losses would be allocated, including the repayment of any funds an FMI may borrow from liquidity providers. These rules and procedures should also indicate the FMI's process to replenish any financial resources that the FMI may employ during a stress event, so that the FMI can continue to operate in a safe and sound manner.	BoC Standard 4: Credit Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	5.0	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.			Consistent	
CCP	5.1	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI should generally limit the assets it (routinely) accepts as collateral to those with low credit, liquidity, and market risks.	BoC Standard 5: Collateral NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

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CCP	5.2	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI should establish prudent valuation practices and develop haircuts that are regularly tested and take into account stressed market conditions.	BoC Standard 5: Collateral NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	5.3	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	In order to reduce the need for procyclical adjustments, an FMI should establish stable and conservative haircuts that are calibrated to include periods of stressed market conditions, to the extent practicable and prudent.	BoC Standard 5: Collateral NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	5.4	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI should avoid concentrated holdings of certain assets where this would significantly impair the ability to liquidate such assets quickly without significant adverse price effects.	BoC Standard 5: Collateral NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	5.5	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI that accepts cross-border collateral should mitigate the risks associated with its use and ensure that the collateral can be used in a timely manner.	BoC Standard 5: Collateral NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	5.6	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI should use a collateral management system that is well-designed and operationally flexible.	BoC Standard 5: Collateral NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	6.0	A CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants for all products through an effective margin system that is risk-based and regularly reviewed.			Consistent	

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CCP	6.1	A CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants for all products through an effective margin system that is risk-based and regularly reviewed.	A CCP should have a margin system that establishes margin levels commensurate with the risks and particular attributes of each product, portfolio, and market it serves.	BoC Standard 6: Margin NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	6.2	A CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants for all products through an effective margin system that is risk-based and regularly reviewed.	A CCP should have a reliable source of timely price data for its margin system. A CCP should also have procedures and sound valuation models for addressing circumstances in which pricing data are not readily available or reliable.	BoC Standard 6: Margin NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	6.3	A CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants for all products through an effective margin system that is risk-based and regularly reviewed.	A CCP should adopt initial margin models and parameters that are risk-based and generate margin requirements sufficient to cover its potential future exposure to participants in the interval between the last margin collection and the close out of positions following a participant default. Initial margin should meet an established single-tailed confidence level of at least 99 percent with respect to the estimated distribution of future exposure. For a CCP that calculates margin at the portfolio level, this requirement applies to each portfolio's distribution of future exposure. For a CCP that calculates margin at more-granular levels, such as at the subportfolio level or by product, the requirement must be met for the corresponding distributions of future exposure. The model should (a) use a conservative estimate of the time horizons for the effective hedging or close out of the particular types of products cleared by the CCP (including in stressed market conditions), (b) have an appropriate method for measuring credit exposure that accounts for relevant product risk factors and portfolio effects across products, and (c) to the extent practicable and prudent, limit the need for destabilising, procyclical changes.	BoC Standard 6: Margin NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

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CCP	6.4	A CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants for all products through an effective margin system that is risk-based and regularly reviewed.	A CCP should mark participant positions to market and collect variation margin at least daily to limit the build-up of current exposures. A CCP should have the authority and operational capacity to make intraday margin calls and payments, both scheduled and unscheduled, to participants.	BoC Standard 6: Margin NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	6.5	A CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants for all products through an effective margin system that is risk-based and regularly reviewed.	In calculating margin requirements, a CCP may allow offsets or reductions in required margin across products that it clears or between products that it and another CCP clear, if the risk of one product is significantly and reliably correlated with the risk of the other product. Where two or more CCPs are authorised to offer cross-margining, they must have appropriate safeguards and harmonised overall risk-management systems.	BoC Standard 6: Margin NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	6.6	A CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants for all products through an effective margin system that is risk-based and regularly reviewed.	A CCP should analyse and monitor its model performance and overall margin coverage by conducting rigorous daily backtesting and at least monthly, and more-frequent where appropriate, sensitivity analysis. A CCP should regularly conduct an assessment of the theoretical and empirical properties of its margin model for all products it clears. In conducting sensitivity analysis of the model's coverage, a CCP should take into account a wide range of parameters and assumptions that reflect possible market conditions, including the most-volatile periods that have been experienced by the markets it serves and extreme changes in the correlations between prices.	BoC Standard 6: Margin NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	6.7	A CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants for all products through an effective margin system that is risk-based and regularly reviewed.	A CCP should regularly review and validate its margin system.	BoC Standard 6: Margin NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

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CCP	7.0	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.			Partly consistent	The Canadian authorities should adapt their regulatory framework to be consistent with the PFMI in the allowed use of other liquid resources and the definition of qualifying liquid resources.
CCP	7.1	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should have a robust framework to manage its liquidity risks from its participants, settlement banks, nostro agents, custodian banks, liquidity providers, and other entities.	BoC Standard 7: Liquidity Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Partly consistent	
CCP	7.2	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should have effective operational and analytical tools to identify, measure, and monitor its settlement and funding flows on an ongoing and timely basis, including its use of intraday liquidity.	BoC Standard 7: Liquidity Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Partly consistent	

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CCP	7.4	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	A CCP should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to settle securities-related payments, make required variation margin payments, and meet other payment obligations on time with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate payment obligation to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should consider maintaining additional liquidity resources sufficient to cover a wider range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate payment obligation to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	BoC Standard 7: Liquidity Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Partly consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	7.5	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	For the purpose of meeting its minimum liquid resource requirement, an FMI's qualifying liquid resources in each currency include cash at the central bank of issue and at creditworthy commercial banks, committed lines of credit, committed foreign exchange swaps, and committed repos, as well as highly marketable collateral held in custody and investments that are readily available and convertible into cash with prearranged and highly reliable funding arrangements, even in extreme but plausible market conditions. If an FMI has access to routine credit at the central bank of issue, the FMI may count such access as part of the minimum requirement to the extent it has collateral that is eligible for pledging to (or for conducting other appropriate forms of transactions with) the relevant central bank. All such resources should be available when needed.	BoC Standard 7: Liquidity Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Partly consistent	The BoC-CSA Supplementary Guidance on liquidity risk allows the use of "other liquid resources" to meet a certain portion of minimum liquid resource requirements. The rationale given in the supplementary guidance is that "it may be prohibitively expensive, or even impossible, for the FMI to obtain sufficient qualifying liquid resources." Notwithstanding the rationale, allowing such use of other liquid resources is inconsistent with KC 5 which explicitly requires the use of qualifying liquid resources for meeting minimum liquid resource requirements.
CCP	7.6	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI may supplement its qualifying liquid resources with other forms of liquid resources. If the FMI does so, then these liquid resources should be in the form of assets that are likely to be saleable or acceptable as collateral for lines of credit, swaps, or repos on an ad hoc basis following a default, even if this cannot be reliably prearranged or guaranteed in extreme market conditions. Even if an FMI does not have access to routine central bank credit, it should still take account of what collateral is typically accepted by the relevant central bank, as such assets may be more likely to be liquid in stressed circumstances. An FMI should not assume the availability of emergency central bank credit as a part of its liquidity plan.	BoC Standard 7: Liquidity Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Partly consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	7.7	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should obtain a high degree of confidence, through rigorous due diligence, that each provider of its minimum required qualifying liquid resources, whether a participant of the FMI or an external party, has sufficient information to understand and to manage its associated liquidity risks, and that it has the capacity to perform as required under its commitment. Where relevant to assessing a liquidity provider's performance reliability with respect to a particular currency, a liquidity provider's potential access to credit from the central bank of issue may be taken into account. An FMI should regularly test its procedures for accessing its liquid resources at a liquidity provider.	BoC Standard 7: Liquidity Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Partly consistent	
CCP	7.8	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI with access to central bank accounts, payment services, or securities services should use these services, where practical, to enhance its management of liquidity risk.	BoC Standard 7: Liquidity Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Partly consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	7.9	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should determine the amount and regularly test the sufficiency of its liquid resources through rigorous stress testing. An FMI should have clear procedures to report the results of its stress tests to appropriate decision makers at the FMI and to use these results to evaluate the adequacy of and adjust its liquidity risk-management framework. In conducting stress testing, an FMI should consider a wide range of relevant scenarios. Scenarios should include relevant peak historic price volatilities, shifts in other market factors such as price determinants and yield curves, multiple defaults over various time horizons, simultaneous pressures in funding and asset markets, and a spectrum of forward-looking stress scenarios in a variety of extreme but plausible market conditions. Scenarios should also take into account the design and operation of the FMI, include all entities that might pose material liquidity risks to the FMI (such as settlement banks, nostro agents, custodian banks, liquidity providers, and linked FMIs), and where appropriate, cover a multiday period. In all cases, an FMI should document its supporting rationale for, and should have appropriate governance arrangements relating to, the amount and form of total liquid resources it maintains.	BoC Standard 7: Liquidity Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Partly consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	7.10	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should establish explicit rules and procedures that enable the FMI to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations on time following any individual or combined default among its participants. These rules and procedures should address unforeseen and potentially uncovered liquidity shortfalls and should aim to avoid unwinding, revoking, or delaying the same-day settlement of payment obligations. These rules and procedures should also indicate the FMI's process to replenish any liquidity resources it may employ during a stress event, so that it can continue to operate in a safe and sound manner.	BoC Standard 7: Liquidity Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Partly consistent	
CCP	8.0	An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.			Consistent	
CCP	8.1	An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.	An FMI's rules and procedures should clearly define the point at which settlement is final.	BoC Standard 8: Settlement Finality NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	8.2	An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.	An FMI should complete final settlement no later than the end of the value date, and preferably intraday or in real time, to reduce settlement risk. An LVPS or SSS should consider adopting RTGS or multiple-batch processing during the settlement day.	BoC Standard 8: Settlement Finality NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	8.3	An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.	An FMI should clearly define the point after which unsettled payments, transfer instructions, or other obligations may not be revoked by a participant.	BoC Standard 8: Settlement Finality NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	9.0	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.			Consistent	
CCP	9.1	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money, where practical and available, to avoid credit and liquidity risks.	BoC Standard 9: Money Settlements NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	9.2	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	If central bank money is not used, an FMI should conduct its money settlements using a settlement asset with little or no credit or liquidity risk.	BoC Standard 9: Money Settlements NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	9.3	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	If an FMI settles in commercial bank money, it should monitor, manage, and limit its credit and liquidity risks arising from the commercial settlement banks. In particular, an FMI should establish and monitor adherence to strict criteria for its settlement banks that take account of, among other things, their regulation and supervision, creditworthiness, capitalisation, access to liquidity, and operational reliability. An FMI should also monitor and manage the concentration of credit and liquidity exposures to its commercial settlement banks.	BoC Standard 9: Money Settlements NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	9.4	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	If an FMI conducts money settlements on its own books, it should minimise and strictly control its credit and liquidity risks.	BoC Standard 9: Money Settlements NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	9.5	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	An FMI's legal agreements with any settlement banks should state clearly when transfers on the books of individual settlement banks are expected to occur, that transfers are to be final when effected, and that funds received should be transferable as soon as possible, at a minimum by the end of the day and ideally intraday, in order to enable the FMI and its participants to manage credit and liquidity risks.	BoC Standard 9: Money Settlements NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	10.0	An FMI should clearly state its obligations with respect to the delivery of physical instruments or commodities and should identify, monitor, and manage the risks associated with such physical deliveries.			Consistent	
CCP	10.1	An FMI should clearly state its obligations with respect to the delivery of physical instruments or commodities and should identify, monitor, and manage the risks associated with such physical deliveries.	An FMI's rules should clearly state its obligations with respect to the delivery of physical instruments or commodities.	BoC Standard 10: Physical Deliveries NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	10.2	An FMI should clearly state its obligations with respect to the delivery of physical instruments or commodities and should identify, monitor, and manage the risks associated with such physical deliveries.	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the risks and costs associated with the storage and delivery of physical instruments or commodities.	BoC Standard 10: Physical Deliveries NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	12.0	If an FMI settles transactions that involve the settlement of two linked obligations (for example, securities or foreign exchange transactions), it should eliminate principal risk by conditioning the final settlement of one obligation upon the final settlement of the other.			Consistent	
CCP	12.1	If an FMI settles transactions that involve the settlement of two linked obligations (for example, securities or foreign exchange transactions), it should eliminate principal risk by conditioning the final settlement of one obligation upon the final settlement of the other.	An FMI that is an exchange-of-value settlement system should eliminate principal risk by ensuring that the final settlement of one obligation occurs if and only if the final settlement of the linked obligation also occurs, regardless of whether the FMI settles on a gross or net basis and when finality occurs.	BoC Standard 12: Exchange-of-Value Settlement Systems NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	13.0	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.			Consistent	
CCP	13.1	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.	An FMI should have default rules and procedures that enable the FMI to continue to meet its obligations in the event of a participant default and that address the replenishment of resources following a default.	BoC Standard 13: Participant-Default Rules and Procedures NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	13.2	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.	An FMI should be well prepared to implement its default rules and procedures, including any appropriate discretionary procedures provided for in its rules.	BoC Standard 13: Participant-Default Rules and Procedures NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	13.3	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.	An FMI should publicly disclose key aspects of its default rules and procedures.	BoC Standard 13: Participant-Default Rules and Procedures NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	13.4	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.	An FMI should involve its participants and other stakeholders in the testing and review of the FMI's default procedures, including any close-out procedures. Such testing and review should be conducted at least annually or following material changes to the rules and procedures to ensure that they are practical and effective.	BoC Standard 13: Participant-Default Rules and Procedures NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	14.0	A CCP should have rules and procedures that enable the segregation and portability of positions of a participant's customers and the collateral provided to the CCP with respect to those positions.			Consistent	
CCP	14.1	A CCP should have rules and procedures that enable the segregation and portability of positions of a participant's customers and the collateral provided to the CCP with respect to those positions.	A CCP should, at a minimum, have segregation and portability arrangements that effectively protect a participant's customers' positions and related collateral from the default or insolvency of that participant. If the CCP additionally offers protection of such customer positions and collateral against the concurrent default of the participant and a fellow customer, the CCP should take steps to ensure that such protection is effective.	BoC Standard 14: Segregation and Portability NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle" NI 94-102, Part 5, particularly ss. 29 and 30 94-201CP - Part 5, particularly ss. 29 and 30	Consistent	
CCP	14.2	A CCP should have rules and procedures that enable the segregation and portability of positions of a participant's customers and the collateral provided to the CCP with respect to those positions.	A CCP should employ an account structure that enables it readily to identify positions of a participant's customers and to segregate related collateral. A CCP should maintain customer positions and collateral in individual customer accounts or in omnibus customer accounts.	BoC Standard 14: Segregation and Portability NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle" NI 94-102, s. 30. 94-102CP, s. 30.	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	14.3	A CCP should have rules and procedures that enable the segregation and portability of positions of a participant's customers and the collateral provided to the CCP with respect to those positions.	A CCP should structure its portability arrangements in a way that makes it highly likely that the positions and collateral of a defaulting participant's customers will be transferred to one or more other participants.	BoC Standard 14: Segregation and Portability NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle" NI 94-102, s. 30 and 32. 94-102CP, s. 30 and 32.	Consistent	
CCP	14.4	A CCP should have rules and procedures that enable the segregation and portability of positions of a participant's customers and the collateral provided to the CCP with respect to those positions.	A CCP should disclose its rules, policies, and procedures relating to the segregation and portability of a participant's customers' positions and related collateral. In particular, the CCP should disclose whether customer collateral is protected on an individual or omnibus basis. In addition, a CCP should disclose any constraints, such as legal or operational constraints, that may impair its ability to segregate or port a participant's customers' positions and related collateral.	BoC Standard 14: Segregation and Portability NI 24-102, para. 3.1(a), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	15.0	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.			Consistent	The Canadian authorities should adapt their regulatory framework to be consistent with the PFMI in the definition of current operating expenses
CCP	15.1	A CCP should have rules and procedures that enable the segregation and portability of positions of a participant's customers and the collateral provided to the CCP with respect to those positions.	An FMI should have robust management and control systems to identify, monitor, and manage general business risks, including losses from poor execution of business strategy, negative cash flows, or unexpected and excessively large operating expenses.	BoC Standard 15: General Business Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principles"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	15.2	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should hold liquid net assets funded by equity (such as common stock, disclosed reserves, or other retained earnings) so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if it incurs general business losses. The amount of liquid net assets funded by equity an FMI should hold should be determined by its general business risk profile and the length of time required to achieve a recovery or orderly wind-down, as appropriate, of its critical operations and services if such action is taken.	BoC Standard 15: General Business Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principles"	Consistent	
CCP	15.3	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should maintain a viable recovery or orderly wind-down plan and should hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to implement this plan. At a minimum, an FMI should hold liquid net assets funded by equity equal to at least six months of current operating expenses. These assets are in addition to resources held to cover participant defaults or other risks covered under the financial resources principles. However, equity held under international risk-based capital standards can be included where relevant and appropriate to avoid duplicate capital requirements.	BoC Standard 15: General Business Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principles"	Consistent	The BoC-CSA Supplementary Guidance on general business risk instructs FMIs to exclude "any extraordinary expenses (ie unessential, infrequent or one-off costs)" from the calculation of current operating expenses. This is not fully consistent with KC 3. Footnote 137 for the explanatory note 3.15.5 in the PFMI explicitly mentions excluding depreciation and amortisation from the current operating expenses, but not extraordinary expenses.
CCP	15.4	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	Assets held to cover general business risk should be of high quality and sufficiently liquid in order to allow the FMI to meet its current and projected operating expenses under a range of scenarios, including in adverse market conditions.	BoC Standard 15: General Business Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principles"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	15.5	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should maintain a viable plan for raising additional equity should its equity fall close to or below the amount needed. This plan should be approved by the board of directors and updated regularly.	BoC Standard 15: General Business Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principles"	Consistent	
CCP	16.0	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.			Consistent	
CCP	16.1	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.	An FMI should hold its own and its participants' assets at supervised and regulated entities that have robust accounting practices, safekeeping procedures, and internal controls that fully protect these assets.	BoC Standard 16: Custody and Investment Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle" NI 94-102, s. 30. 94-102CP, s. 30.	Consistent	
CCP	16.2	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.	An FMI should have prompt access to its assets and the assets provided by participants, when required.	BoC Standard 16: Custody and Investment Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	16.3	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.	An FMI should evaluate and understand its exposures to its custodian banks, taking into account the full scope of its relationships with each.	BoC Standard 16: Custody and Investment Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	16.4	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.	An FMI's investment strategy should be consistent with its overall risk-management strategy and fully disclosed to its participants, and investments should be secured by, or be claims on, high-quality obligors. These investments should allow for quick liquidation with little, if any, adverse price effect.	BoC Standard 16: Custody and Investment Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle" NI 94-102, ss. 32 and 33. 94-102CP, ss. 32 and 33	Consistent	
CCP	17.0	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.			Consistent	
CCP	17.1	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should establish a robust operational risk-management framework with appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls to identify, monitor, and manage operational risks.	BoC Standard 17: Operational Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	17.2	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI's board of directors should clearly define the roles and responsibilities for addressing operational risk and should endorse the FMI's operational risk-management framework. Systems, operational policies, procedures, and controls should be reviewed, audited, and tested periodically and after significant changes.	BoC Standard 17: Operational Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	17.3	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should have clearly defined operational reliability objectives and should have policies in place that are designed to achieve those objectives.	BoC Standard 17: Operational Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	17.4	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should ensure that it has scalable capacity adequate to handle increasing stress volumes and to achieve its service-level objectives.	BoC Standard 17: Operational Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	17.5	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should have comprehensive physical and information security policies that address all potential vulnerabilities and threats.	BoC Standard 17: Operational Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	17.6	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should have a business continuity plan that addresses events posing a significant risk of disrupting operations, including events that could cause a wide-scale or major disruption. The plan should incorporate the use of a secondary site and should be designed to ensure that critical information technology (IT) systems can resume operations within two hours following disruptive events. The plan should be designed to enable the FMI to complete settlement by the end of the day of the disruption, even in case of extreme circumstances. The FMI should regularly test these arrangements.	BoC Standard 17: Operational Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	17.7	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the risks that key participants, other FMIs, and service and utility providers might pose to its operations. In addition, an FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the risks its operations might pose to other FMIs.	BoC Standard 17: Operational Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	18.0	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.			Consistent	
CCP	18.1	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.	An FMI should allow for fair and open access to its services, including by direct and, where relevant, indirect participants and other FMIs, based on reasonable risk-related participation requirements.	BoC Standard 18: Access and Participation Requirements NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	18.2	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.	An FMI's participation requirements should be justified in terms of the safety and efficiency of the FMI and the markets it serves, be tailored to and commensurate with the FMI's specific risks, and be publicly disclosed. Subject to maintaining acceptable risk control standards, an FMI should endeavour to set requirements that have the least-restrictive impact on access that circumstances permit.	BoC Standard 18: Access and Participation Requirements NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	18.3	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.	An FMI should monitor compliance with its participation requirements on an ongoing basis and have clearly defined and publicly disclosed procedures for facilitating the suspension and orderly exit of a participant that breaches, or no longer meets, the participation requirements.	BoC Standard 18: Access and Participation Requirements NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	19.0	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.			Consistent	
CCP	19.1	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should ensure that its rules, procedures, and agreements allow it to gather basic information about indirect participation in order to identify, monitor, and manage any material risks to the FMI arising from such tiered participation arrangements.	BoC Standard 19: Tiered Participation Arrangements NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	19.2	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should identify material dependencies between direct and indirect participants that might affect the FMI.	BoC Standard 19: Tiered Participation Arrangements NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	19.3	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should identify indirect participants responsible for a significant proportion of transactions processed by the FMI and indirect participants whose transaction volumes or values are large relative to the capacity of the direct participants through which they access the FMI in order to manage the risks arising from these transactions.	BoC Standard 19: Tiered Participation Arrangements NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	19.4	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should regularly review risks arising from tiered participation arrangements and should take mitigating action when appropriate.	BoC Standard 19: Tiered Participation Arrangements NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	20.0	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.			Consistent	
CCP	20.1	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.	Before entering into a link arrangement and on an ongoing basis once the link is established, an FMI should identify, monitor, and manage all potential sources of risk arising from the link arrangement. Link arrangements should be designed such that each FMI is able to observe the other principles in this report.	BoC Standard 20: FMI Links NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	20.2	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.	A link should have a well-founded legal basis, in all relevant jurisdictions, that supports its design and provides adequate protection to the FMIs involved in the link.	BoC Standard 20: FMI Links NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	20.7	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.	Before entering into a link with another CCP, a CCP should identify and manage the potential spill-over effects from the default of the linked CCP. If a link has three or more CCPs, each CCP should identify, assess, and manage the risks of the collective link arrangement.	BoC Standard 20: FMI Links NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	20.8	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.	Each CCP in a CCP link arrangement should be able to cover, at least on a daily basis, its current and potential future exposures to the linked CCP and its participants, if any, fully with a high degree of confidence without reducing the CCP's ability to fulfil its obligations to its own participants at any time.	BoC Standard 20: FMI Links NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	21.0	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.			Consistent	
CCP	21.1	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.	An FMI should be designed to meet the needs of its participants and the markets it serves, in particular, with regard to choice of a clearing and settlement arrangement; operating structure; scope of products cleared, settled, or recorded; and use of technology and procedures.	BoC Standard 21: Efficiency and Effectiveness NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	21.2	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.	An FMI should have clearly defined goals and objectives that are measurable and achievable, such as in the areas of minimum service levels, risk-management expectations, and business priorities.	BoC Standard 21: Efficiency and Effectiveness NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	21.3	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.	An FMI should have established mechanisms for the regular review of its efficiency and effectiveness.	BoC Standard 21: Efficiency and Effectiveness NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	22.0	An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, relevant internationally accepted communication procedures and standards in order to facilitate efficient payment, clearing, settlement, and recording.			Consistent	
CCP	22.1	An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, relevant internationally accepted communication procedures and standards in order to facilitate efficient payment, clearing, settlement, and recording.	An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, internationally accepted communication procedures and standards.	BoC Standard 22: Communication Procedures and Standards NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	23.0	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.			Consistent	
CCP	23.1	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should adopt clear and comprehensive rules and procedures that are fully disclosed to participants. Relevant rules and key procedures should also be publicly disclosed.	BoC Standard 23: Disclosure of Rules, Key Procedures, and Market Data NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	23.2	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should disclose clear descriptions of the system's design and operations, as well as the FMI's and participants' rights and obligations, so that participants can assess the risks they would incur by participating in the FMI.	BoC Standard 23: Disclosure of Rules, Key Procedures, and Market Data NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CCP	23.3	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should provide all necessary and appropriate documentation and training to facilitate participants' understanding of the FMI's rules and procedures and the risks they face from participating in the FMI.	BoC Standard 23: Disclosure of Rules, Key Procedures, and Market Data NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	23.4	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should publicly disclose its fees at the level of individual services it offers as well as its policies on any available discounts. The FMI should provide clear descriptions of priced services for comparability purposes.	BoC Standard 23: Disclosure of Rules, Key Procedures, and Market Data NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CCP	23.5	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should complete regularly and disclose publicly responses to the CPSS-IOSCO Disclosure framework for financial market infrastructures. An FMI also should, at a minimum, disclose basic data on transaction volumes and values.	BoC Standard 23: Disclosure of Rules, Key Procedures, and Market Data NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle", and sections 2.1 and 2.2 and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Disclosure Framework Document"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	1.0	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.			Consistent	
CSD_SSS	1.1	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	The legal basis should provide a high degree of certainty for each material aspect of an FMI's activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	BoC Standard 1: Legal Basis NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	1.2	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI should have rules, procedures, and contracts that are clear, understandable, and consistent with relevant laws and regulations.	BoC Standard 1: Legal Basis NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

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CSD_SSS	1.3	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI should be able to articulate the legal basis for its activities to relevant authorities, participants, and, where relevant, participants' customers, in a clear and understandable way.	BoC Standard 1: Legal Basis NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	1.4	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI should have rules, procedures, and contracts that are enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions. There should be a high degree of certainty that actions taken by the FMI under such rules and procedures will not be voided, reversed, or subject to stays.	BoC Standard 1: Legal Basis NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	1.5	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI conducting business in multiple jurisdictions should identify and mitigate the risks arising from any potential conflict of laws across jurisdictions.	BoC Standard 1: Legal Basis NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	2.0	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.			Consistent	Canadian authorities should consider providing greater clarity with respect to safeguards for the independence of the risk management and audit functions in situations where the FMI's chief risk officer or the chief compliance officer report to the CEO instead of the board.
CSD_SSS	2.1	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	An FMI should have objectives that place a high priority on the safety and efficiency of the FMI and explicitly support financial stability and other relevant public interest considerations.	BoC Standard 2: Governance NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	2.2	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	An FMI should have documented governance arrangements that provide clear and direct lines of responsibility and accountability. These arrangements should be disclosed to owners, relevant authorities, participants, and, at a more general level, the public.	BoC Standard 2: Governance NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

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CSD_SSS	2.3	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The roles and responsibilities of an FMI's board of directors (or equivalent) should be clearly specified, and there should be documented procedures for its functioning, including procedures to identify, address, and manage member conflicts of interest. The board should review both its overall performance and the performance of its individual board members regularly.	BoC Standard 2: Governance NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	2.4	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The board should contain suitable members with the appropriate skills and incentives to fulfil its multiple roles. This typically requires the inclusion of non-executive board member(s).	BoC Standard 2: Governance NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	2.5	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The roles and responsibilities of management should be clearly specified. An FMI's management should have the appropriate experience, a mix of skills, and the integrity necessary to discharge their responsibilities for the operation and risk management of the FMI.	BoC Standard 2: Governance NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	2.6	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The board should establish a clear, documented risk-management framework that includes the FMI's risk-tolerance policy, assigns responsibilities and accountability for risk decisions, and addresses decision making in crises and emergencies. Governance arrangements should ensure that the risk-management and internal control functions have sufficient authority, independence, resources, and access to the board.	BoC Standard 2: Governance NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	Section 4.3(1) of NI 24-102 permits the Chief Risk Officer (CRO) and Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) of the FMI to report to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) instead of the board, if so determined by the board. The PFMI does not explicitly prohibit this but KC 6 does require "that the risk-management and internal control functions have sufficient authority, independence, resources and access to the board". NI 24-102 specifies several ways for the CRO/CCO to contact the Board (eg through recommendations or via the Risk/Audit Committees). However, a reporting line to the CEO may result in insufficient independence of the risk and audit functions unless there are adequate safeguards in place that address the potential conflicts of interest if the risk / audit functions report to the CEO. This may be of particular interest, for instance, during the preparation of proposals to the Board or Risk/Audit Committees as well as regarding certain administrative functions such as the performance management of the CRO/CCO by the CEO.
CSD_SSS	2.7	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The board should ensure that the FMI's design, rules, overall strategy, and major decisions reflect appropriately the legitimate interests of its direct and indirect participants and other relevant stakeholders. Major decisions should be clearly disclosed to relevant stakeholders and, where there is a broad market impact, the public.	BoC Standard 2: Governance NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	3.0	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.			Consistent	
CSD_SSS	3.1	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should have risk-management policies, procedures, and systems that enable it to identify, measure, monitor, and manage the range of risks that arise in or are borne by the FMI. Risk-management frameworks should be subject to periodic review.	BoC Standard 3: Framework for the Comprehensive Management of Risks NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	3.2	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should provide incentives to participants and, where relevant, their customers to manage and contain the risks they pose to the FMI.	BoC Standard 3: Framework for the Comprehensive Management of Risks NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	3.3	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should regularly review the material risks it bears from and poses to other entities (such as other FMIs, settlement banks, liquidity providers, and service providers) as a result of interdependencies and develop appropriate risk-management tools to address these risks.	BoC Standard 3: Framework for the Comprehensive Management of Risks NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	3.4	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should identify scenarios that may potentially prevent it from being able to provide its critical operations and services as a going concern and assess the effectiveness of a full range of options for recovery or orderly wind-down. An FMI should prepare appropriate plans for its recovery or orderly wind-down based on the results of that assessment. Where applicable, an FMI should also provide relevant authorities with the information needed for purposes of resolution planning.	BoC Standard 3: Framework for the Comprehensive Management of Risks NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	4.0	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.			Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	4.1	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should establish a robust framework to manage its credit exposures to its participants and the credit risks arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. Credit exposure may arise from current exposures, potential future exposures, or both.	BoC Standard 4: Credit Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	4.2	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should identify sources of credit risk, routinely measure and monitor credit exposures, and use appropriate risk-management tools to control these risks.	BoC Standard 4: Credit Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	4.3	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	A payment system or SSS should cover its current and, where they exist, potential future exposures to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence using collateral and other equivalent financial resources (see Principle 5 on collateral). In the case of a DNS payment system or DNS SSS in which there is no settlement guarantee but where its participants face credit exposures arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes, such an FMI should maintain, at a minimum, sufficient resources to cover the exposures of the two participants and their affiliates that would create the largest aggregate credit exposure in the system.	BoC Standard 4: Credit Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	4.7	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should establish explicit rules and procedures that address fully any credit losses it may face as a result of any individual or combined default among its participants with respect to any of their obligations to the FMI. These rules and procedures should address how potentially uncovered credit losses would be allocated, including the repayment of any funds an FMI may borrow from liquidity providers. These rules and procedures should also indicate the FMI's process to replenish any financial resources that the FMI may employ during a stress event, so that the FMI can continue to operate in a safe and sound manner.	BoC Standard 4: Credit Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	5.0	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.			Consistent	
CSD_SSS	5.1	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI should generally limit the assets it (routinely) accepts as collateral to those with low credit, liquidity, and market risks.	BoC Standard 5: Collateral NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	5.2	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI should establish prudent valuation practices and develop haircuts that are regularly tested and take into account stressed market conditions.	BoC Standard 5: Collateral NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	5.3	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	In order to reduce the need for procyclical adjustments, an FMI should establish stable and conservative haircuts that are calibrated to include periods of stressed market conditions, to the extent practicable and prudent.	BoC Standard 5: Collateral NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	5.4	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI should avoid concentrated holdings of certain assets where this would significantly impair the ability to liquidate such assets quickly without significant adverse price effects.	BoC Standard 5: Collateral NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	5.5	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI that accepts cross-border collateral should mitigate the risks associated with its use and ensure that the collateral can be used in a timely manner.	BoC Standard 5: Collateral NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	5.6	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI should use a collateral management system that is well-designed and operationally flexible.	BoC Standard 5: Collateral NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	7.0	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.			Partly consistent	The Canadian authorities should adapt their regulatory framework to be consistent with the PFMI in the allowed use of other liquid resources and the definition of qualifying liquid resources.
CSD_SSS	7.1	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should have a robust framework to manage its liquidity risks from its participants, settlement banks, nostro agents, custodian banks, liquidity providers, and other entities.	BoC Standard 7: Liquidity Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Partly consistent	
CSD_SSS	7.2	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should have effective operational and analytical tools to identify, measure, and monitor its settlement and funding flows on an ongoing and timely basis, including its use of intraday liquidity.	BoC Standard 7: Liquidity Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Partly consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	7.3	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	A payment system or SSS, including one employing a DNS mechanism, should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day settlement, and where appropriate intraday or multiday settlement, of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate payment obligation in extreme but plausible market conditions.	BoC Standard 7: Liquidity Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Partly consistent	
CSD_SSS	7.5	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	For the purpose of meeting its minimum liquid resource requirement, an FMI's qualifying liquid resources in each currency include cash at the central bank of issue and at creditworthy commercial banks, committed lines of credit, committed foreign exchange swaps, and committed repos, as well as highly marketable collateral held in custody and investments that are readily available and convertible into cash with prearranged and highly reliable funding arrangements, even in extreme but plausible market conditions. If an FMI has access to routine credit at the central bank of issue, the FMI may count such access as part of the minimum requirement to the extent it has collateral that is eligible for pledging to (or for conducting other appropriate forms of transactions with) the relevant central bank. All such resources should be available when needed.	BoC Standard 7: Liquidity Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Partly consistent	The BoC-CSA Supplementary Guidance on liquidity risk allows the use of "other liquid resources" to meet a certain portion of minimum liquid resource requirements. The rationale given in the supplementary guidance is that "it may be prohibitively expensive, or even impossible, for the FMI to obtain sufficient qualifying liquid resources." Notwithstanding the rationale, allowing such use of other liquid resources is inconsistent with KC 5 which explicitly requires the use of qualifying liquid resources for meeting minimum liquid resource requirements.

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	7.6	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI may supplement its qualifying liquid resources with other forms of liquid resources. If the FMI does so, then these liquid resources should be in the form of assets that are likely to be saleable or acceptable as collateral for lines of credit, swaps, or repos on an ad hoc basis following a default, even if this cannot be reliably prearranged or guaranteed in extreme market conditions. Even if an FMI does not have access to routine central bank credit, it should still take account of what collateral is typically accepted by the relevant central bank, as such assets may be more likely to be liquid in stressed circumstances. An FMI should not assume the availability of emergency central bank credit as a part of its liquidity plan.	BoC Standard 7: Liquidity Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Partly consistent	
CSD_SSS	7.7	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should obtain a high degree of confidence, through rigorous due diligence, that each provider of its minimum required qualifying liquid resources, whether a participant of the FMI or an external party, has sufficient information to understand and to manage its associated liquidity risks, and that it has the capacity to perform as required under its commitment. Where relevant to assessing a liquidity provider's performance reliability with respect to a particular currency, a liquidity provider's potential access to credit from the central bank of issue may be taken into account. An FMI should regularly test its procedures for accessing its liquid resources at a liquidity provider.	BoC Standard 7: Liquidity Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Partly consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	7.8	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI with access to central bank accounts, payment services, or securities services should use these services, where practical, to enhance its management of liquidity risk.	BoC Standard 7: Liquidity Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Partly consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	7.9	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should determine the amount and regularly test the sufficiency of its liquid resources through rigorous stress testing. An FMI should have clear procedures to report the results of its stress tests to appropriate decision makers at the FMI and to use these results to evaluate the adequacy of and adjust its liquidity risk-management framework. In conducting stress testing, an FMI should consider a wide range of relevant scenarios. Scenarios should include relevant peak historic price volatilities, shifts in other market factors such as price determinants and yield curves, multiple defaults over various time horizons, simultaneous pressures in funding and asset markets, and a spectrum of forward-looking stress scenarios in a variety of extreme but plausible market conditions. Scenarios should also take into account the design and operation of the FMI, include all entities that might pose material liquidity risks to the FMI (such as settlement banks, nostro agents, custodian banks, liquidity providers, and linked FMIs), and where appropriate, cover a multiday period. In all cases, an FMI should document its supporting rationale for, and should have appropriate governance arrangements relating to, the amount and form of total liquid resources it maintains.	BoC Standard 7: Liquidity Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Partly consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	7.10	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should establish explicit rules and procedures that enable the FMI to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations on time following any individual or combined default among its participants. These rules and procedures should address unforeseen and potentially uncovered liquidity shortfalls and should aim to avoid unwinding, revoking, or delaying the same-day settlement of payment obligations. These rules and procedures should also indicate the FMI's process to replenish any liquidity resources it may employ during a stress event, so that it can continue to operate in a safe and sound manner.	BoC Standard 7: Liquidity Risk NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Partly consistent	
CSD_SSS	8.0	An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.			Consistent	
CSD_SSS	8.1	An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.	An FMI's rules and procedures should clearly define the point at which settlement is final.	BoC Standard 8: Settlement Finality NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	8.2	An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.	An FMI should complete final settlement no later than the end of the value date, and preferably intraday or in real time, to reduce settlement risk. An LVPS or SSS should consider adopting RTGS or multiple-batch processing during the settlement day.	BoC Standard 8: Settlement Finality NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	8.3	An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.	An FMI should clearly define the point after which unsettled payments, transfer instructions, or other obligations may not be revoked by a participant.	BoC Standard 8: Settlement Finality NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	9.0	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.			Consistent	
CSD_SSS	9.1	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money, where practical and available, to avoid credit and liquidity risks.	BoC Standard 9: Money Settlements NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	9.2	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	If central bank money is not used, an FMI should conduct its money settlements using a settlement asset with little or no credit or liquidity risk.	BoC Standard 9: Money Settlements NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	9.3	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	If an FMI settles in commercial bank money, it should monitor, manage, and limit its credit and liquidity risks arising from the commercial settlement banks. In particular, an FMI should establish and monitor adherence to strict criteria for its settlement banks that take account of, among other things, their regulation and supervision, creditworthiness, capitalisation, access to liquidity, and operational reliability. An FMI should also monitor and manage the concentration of credit and liquidity exposures to its commercial settlement banks.	BoC Standard 9: Money Settlements NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	9.4	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	If an FMI conducts money settlements on its own books, it should minimise and strictly control its credit and liquidity risks.	BoC Standard 9: Money Settlements NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	9.5	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	An FMI's legal agreements with any settlement banks should state clearly when transfers on the books of individual settlement banks are expected to occur, that transfers are to be final when effected, and that funds received should be transferable as soon as possible, at a minimum by the end of the day and ideally intraday, in order to enable the FMI and its participants to manage credit and liquidity risks.	BoC Standard 9: Money Settlements NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	10.0	An FMI should clearly state its obligations with respect to the delivery of physical instruments or commodities and should identify, monitor, and manage the risks associated with such physical deliveries.			Consistent	
CSD_SSS	10.1	An FMI should clearly state its obligations with respect to the delivery of physical instruments or commodities and should identify, monitor, and manage the risks associated with such physical deliveries.	An FMI's rules should clearly state its obligations with respect to the delivery of physical instruments or commodities.	BoC Standard 10: Physical Deliveries NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	10.2	An FMI should clearly state its obligations with respect to the delivery of physical instruments or commodities and should identify, monitor, and manage the risks associated with such physical deliveries.	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the risks and costs associated with the storage and delivery of physical instruments or commodities.	BoC Standard 10: Physical Deliveries NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	11.0	A CSD should have appropriate rules and procedures to help ensure the integrity of securities issues and minimise and manage the risks associated with the safekeeping and transfer of securities. A CSD should maintain securities in an immobilised or dematerialised form for their transfer by book entry.			Consistent	
CSD_SSS	11.1	A CSD should have appropriate rules and procedures to help ensure the integrity of securities issues and minimise and manage the risks associated with the safekeeping and transfer of securities. A CSD should maintain securities in an immobilised or dematerialised form for their transfer by book entry.	A CSD should have appropriate rules, procedures, and controls, including robust accounting practices, to safeguard the rights of securities issuers and holders, prevent the unauthorised creation or deletion of securities, and conduct periodic and at least daily reconciliation of securities issues it maintains.	BoC: Standard 11: Central Securities Depository NI 24-102, para. 3.1(c), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	11.2	A CSD should have appropriate rules and procedures to help ensure the integrity of securities issues and minimise and manage the risks associated with the safekeeping and transfer of securities. A CSD should maintain securities in an immobilised or dematerialised form for their transfer by book entry.	A CSD should prohibit overdrafts and debit balances in securities accounts.	BoC: Standard 11: Central Securities Depository NI 24-102, para. 3.1(c), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	11.3	A CSD should have appropriate rules and procedures to help ensure the integrity of securities issues and minimise and manage the risks associated with the safekeeping and transfer of securities. A CSD should maintain securities in an immobilised or dematerialised form for their transfer by book entry.	A CSD should maintain securities in an immobilised or dematerialised form for their transfer by book entry. Where appropriate, a CSD should provide incentives to immobilise or dematerialise securities.	BoC: Standard 11: Central Securities Depository NI 24-102, para. 3.1(c), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	11.4	A CSD should have appropriate rules and procedures to help ensure the integrity of securities issues and minimise and manage the risks associated with the safekeeping and transfer of securities. A CSD should maintain securities in an immobilised or dematerialised form for their transfer by book entry.	A CSD should protect assets against custody risk through appropriate rules and procedures consistent with its legal framework.	BoC: Standard 11: Central Securities Depository NI 24-102, para. 3.1(c), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	11.5	A CSD should have appropriate rules and procedures to help ensure the integrity of securities issues and minimise and manage the risks associated with the safekeeping and transfer of securities. A CSD should maintain securities in an immobilised or dematerialised form for their transfer by book entry.	A CSD should employ a robust system that ensures segregation between the CSD's own assets and the securities of its participants and segregation among the securities of participants. Where supported by the legal framework, the CSD should also support operationally the segregation of securities belonging to a participant's customers on the participant's books and facilitate the transfer of customer holdings.	BoC: Standard 11: Central Securities Depository NI 24-102, para. 3.1(c), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	11.6	A CSD should have appropriate rules and procedures to help ensure the integrity of securities issues and minimise and manage the risks associated with the safekeeping and transfer of securities. A CSD should maintain securities in an immobilised or dematerialised form for their transfer by book entry.	A CSD should identify, measure, monitor, and manage its risks from other activities that it may perform; additional tools may be necessary in order to address these risks.	BoC: Standard 11: Central Securities Depository NI 24-102, para. 3.1(c), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	12.0	If an FMI settles transactions that involve the settlement of two linked obligations (for example, securities or foreign exchange transactions), it should eliminate principal risk by conditioning the final settlement of one obligation upon the final settlement of the other.			Consistent	
CSD_SSS	12.1	If an FMI settles transactions that involve the settlement of two linked obligations (for example, securities or foreign exchange transactions), it should eliminate principal risk by conditioning the final settlement of one obligation upon the final settlement of the other.	An FMI that is an exchange-of-value settlement system should eliminate principal risk by ensuring that the final settlement of one obligation occurs if and only if the final settlement of the linked obligation also occurs, regardless of whether the FMI settles on a gross or net basis and when finality occurs.	BoC Standard 12: Exchange-of-Value Settlement Systems NI 24-102, para. 3.1(b), and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	13.0	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.			Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	13.1	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.	An FMI should have default rules and procedures that enable the FMI to continue to meet its obligations in the event of a participant default and that address the replenishment of resources following a default.	BoC Standard 13: Participant-Default Rules and Procedures NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	13.2	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.	An FMI should be well prepared to implement its default rules and procedures, including any appropriate discretionary procedures provided for in its rules.	BoC Standard 13: Participant-Default Rules and Procedures NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	13.3	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.	An FMI should publicly disclose key aspects of its default rules and procedures.	BoC Standard 13: Participant-Default Rules and Procedures NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	13.4	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.	An FMI should involve its participants and other stakeholders in the testing and review of the FMI's default procedures, including any close-out procedures. Such testing and review should be conducted at least annually or following material changes to the rules and procedures to ensure that they are practical and effective.	BoC Standard 13: Participant-Default Rules and Procedures NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	15.0	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.			Consistent	The Canadian authorities should adapt their regulatory framework to be consistent with the PFMI in the definition of current operating expenses.

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	15.1	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should have robust management and control systems to identify, monitor, and manage general business risks, including losses from poor execution of business strategy, negative cash flows, or unexpected and excessively large operating expenses.	BoC Standard 15: General Business Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition “PFMI Principle”	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	15.2	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should hold liquid net assets funded by equity (such as common stock, disclosed reserves, or other retained earnings) so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if it incurs general business losses. The amount of liquid net assets funded by equity an FMI should hold should be determined by its general business risk profile and the length of time required to achieve a recovery or orderly wind-down, as appropriate, of its critical operations and services if such action is taken.	BoC Standard 15: General Business Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition “PFMI Principle”	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	15.3	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should maintain a viable recovery or orderly wind-down plan and should hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to implement this plan. At a minimum, an FMI should hold liquid net assets funded by equity equal to at least six months of current operating expenses. These assets are in addition to resources held to cover participant defaults or other risks covered under the financial resources principles. However, equity held under international risk-based capital standards can be included where relevant and appropriate to avoid duplicate capital requirements.	BoC Standard 15: General Business Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition “PFMI Principle”	Consistent	The BoC-CSA Supplementary Guidance on general business risk instructs FMIs to exclude “any extraordinary expenses (ie unessential, infrequent or one-off costs)” from the calculation of current operating expenses. This is not fully consistent with KC 3. Footnote 137 for the explanatory note 3.15.5 in the PFMI explicitly mentions excluding depreciation and amortization from the current operating expenses, but not extraordinary expenses.

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	15.4	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	Assets held to cover general business risk should be of high quality and sufficiently liquid in order to allow the FMI to meet its current and projected operating expenses under a range of scenarios, including in adverse market conditions.	BoC Standard 15: General Business Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	15.5	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should maintain a viable plan for raising additional equity should its equity fall close to or below the amount needed. This plan should be approved by the board of directors and updated regularly.	BoC Standard 15: General Business Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	16.0	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.			Consistent	
CSD_SSS	16.1	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.	An FMI should hold its own and its participants' assets at supervised and regulated entities that have robust accounting practices, safekeeping procedures, and internal controls that fully protect these assets.	BoC Standard 16: Custody and Investment Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle" NI 94-102, s. 30 94-102CP, s. 30	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	16.2	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.	An FMI should have prompt access to its assets and the assets provided by participants, when required.	BoC Standard 16: Custody and Investment Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	16.3	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.	An FMI should evaluate and understand its exposures to its custodian banks, taking into account the full scope of its relationships with each.	BoC Standard 16: Custody and Investment Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	16.4	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.	An FMI's investment strategy should be consistent with its overall risk-management strategy and fully disclosed to its participants, and investments should be secured by, or be claims on, high-quality obligors. These investments should allow for quick liquidation with little, if any, adverse price effect.	BoC Standard 16: Custody and Investment Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle" NI 94-102, ss. 32 and 33 94-102CP, ss. 32 and 33	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	17.0	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.			Consistent	
CSD_SSS	17.1	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should establish a robust operational risk-management framework with appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls to identify, monitor, and manage operational risks.	BoC Standard 17: Operational Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	17.2	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI's board of directors should clearly define the roles and responsibilities for addressing operational risk and should endorse the FMI's operational risk-management framework. Systems, operational policies, procedures, and controls should be reviewed, audited, and tested periodically and after significant changes.	BoC Standard 17: Operational Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	17.3	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should have clearly defined operational reliability objectives and should have policies in place that are designed to achieve those objectives.	BoC Standard 17: Operational Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	17.4	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should ensure that it has scalable capacity adequate to handle increasing stress volumes and to achieve its service-level objectives.	BoC Standard 17: Operational Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	17.5	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should have comprehensive physical and information security policies that address all potential vulnerabilities and threats.	BoC Standard 17: Operational Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	17.6	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should have a business continuity plan that addresses events posing a significant risk of disrupting operations, including events that could cause a wide-scale or major disruption. The plan should incorporate the use of a secondary site and should be designed to ensure that critical information technology (IT) systems can resume operations within two hours following disruptive events. The plan should be designed to enable the FMI to complete settlement by the end of the day of the disruption, even in case of extreme circumstances. The FMI should regularly test these arrangements.	BoC Standard 17: Operational Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	17.7	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the risks that key participants, other FMIs, and service and utility providers might pose to its operations. In addition, an FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the risks its operations might pose to other FMIs.	BoC Standard 17: Operational Risk NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	18.0	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.			Consistent	
CSD_SSS	18.1	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.	An FMI should allow for fair and open access to its services, including by direct and, where relevant, indirect participants and other FMIs, based on reasonable risk-related participation requirements.	BoC Standard 18: Access and Participation Requirements NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	18.2	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.	An FMI's participation requirements should be justified in terms of the safety and efficiency of the FMI and the markets it serves, be tailored to and commensurate with the FMI's specific risks, and be publicly disclosed. Subject to maintaining acceptable risk control standards, an FMI should endeavour to set requirements that have the least-restrictive impact on access that circumstances permit.	BoC Standard 18: Access and Participation Requirements NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	18.3	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.	An FMI should monitor compliance with its participation requirements on an ongoing basis and have clearly defined and publicly disclosed procedures for facilitating the suspension and orderly exit of a participant that breaches, or no longer meets, the participation requirements.	BoC Standard 18: Access and Participation Requirements NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	19.0	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.			Consistent	
CSD_SSS	19.1	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should ensure that its rules, procedures, and agreements allow it to gather basic information about indirect participation in order to identify, monitor, and manage any material risks to the FMI arising from such tiered participation arrangements.	BoC Standard 19: Tiered Participation Arrangements NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	19.2	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should identify material dependencies between direct and indirect participants that might affect the FMI.	BoC Standard 19: Tiered Participation Arrangements NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	19.3	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should identify indirect participants responsible for a significant proportion of transactions processed by the FMI and indirect participants whose transaction volumes or values are large relative to the capacity of the direct participants through which they access the FMI in order to manage the risks arising from these transactions.	BoC Standard 19: Tiered Participation Arrangements NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	19.4	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should regularly review risks arising from tiered participation arrangements and should take mitigating action when appropriate.	BoC Standard 19: Tiered Participation Arrangements NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	20.0	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.			Consistent	
CSD_SSS	20.1	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.	Before entering into a link arrangement and on an ongoing basis once the link is established, an FMI should identify, monitor, and manage all potential sources of risk arising from the link arrangement. Link arrangements should be designed such that each FMI is able to observe the other principles in this report.	BoC Standard 20: FMI Links NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	20.2	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.	A link should have a well-founded legal basis, in all relevant jurisdictions, that supports its design and provides adequate protection to the FMIs involved in the link.	BoC Standard 20: FMI Links NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	20.3	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.	Linked CSDs should measure, monitor, and manage the credit and liquidity risks arising from each other. Any credit extensions between CSDs should be covered fully with high-quality collateral and be subject to limits.	BoC Standard 20: FMI Links NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	20.4	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.	Provisional transfers of securities between linked CSDs should be prohibited or, at a minimum, the retransfer of provisionally transferred securities should be prohibited prior to the transfer becoming final.	BoC Standard 20: FMI Links NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	20.5	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.	An investor CSD should only establish a link with an issuer CSD if the arrangement provides a high level of protection for the rights of the investor CSD's participants.	BoC Standard 20: FMI Links NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	20.6	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.	An investor CSD that uses an intermediary to operate a link with an issuer CSD should measure, monitor, and manage the additional risks (including custody, credit, legal, and operational risks) arising from the use of the intermediary.	BoC Standard 20: FMI Links NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	21.0	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.			Consistent	
CSD_SSS	21.1	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.	An FMI should be designed to meet the needs of its participants and the markets it serves, in particular, with regard to choice of a clearing and settlement arrangement; operating structure; scope of products cleared, settled, or recorded; and use of technology and procedures.	BoC Standard 21: Efficiency and Effectiveness NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	21.2	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.	An FMI should have clearly defined goals and objectives that are measurable and achievable, such as in the areas of minimum service levels, risk-management expectations, and business priorities.	BoC Standard 21: Efficiency and Effectiveness NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	21.3	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.	An FMI should have established mechanisms for the regular review of its efficiency and effectiveness.	BoC Standard 21: Efficiency and Effectiveness NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	22.0	An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, relevant internationally accepted communication procedures and standards in order to facilitate efficient payment, clearing, settlement, and recording.			Consistent	
CSD_SSS	22.1	An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, relevant internationally accepted communication procedures and standards in order to facilitate efficient payment, clearing, settlement, and recording.	An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, internationally accepted communication procedures and standards.	BoC Standard 22: Communication Procedures and Standards NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	23.0	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.			Consistent	
CSD_SSS	23.1	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should adopt clear and comprehensive rules and procedures that are fully disclosed to participants. Relevant rules and key procedures should also be publicly disclosed.	BoC Standard 23: Disclosure of Rules, Key Procedures, and Market Data NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	23.2	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should disclose clear descriptions of the system's design and operations, as well as the FMI's and participants' rights and obligations, so that participants can assess the risks they would incur by participating in the FMI.	BoC Standard 23: Disclosure of Rules, Key Procedures, and Market Data NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
CSD_SSS	23.3	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should provide all necessary and appropriate documentation and training to facilitate participants' understanding of the FMI's rules and procedures and the risks they face from participating in the FMI.	BoC Standard 23: Disclosure of Rules, Key Procedures, and Market Data NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	23.4	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should publicly disclose its fees at the level of individual services it offers as well as its policies on any available discounts. The FMI should provide clear descriptions of priced services for comparability purposes.	BoC Standard 23: Disclosure of Rules, Key Procedures, and Market Data NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle"	Consistent	
CSD_SSS	23.5	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should complete regularly and disclose publicly responses to the CPSS-IOSCO Disclosure framework for financial market infrastructures. An FMI also should, at a minimum, disclose basic data on transaction volumes and values.	BoC Standard 23: Disclosure of Rules, Key Procedures, and Market Data NI 24-102, s. 3.1, and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Principle", and sections 2.1 and 2.2 and s. 1.1 definition "PFMI Disclosure Framework Document"	Consistent	
PS	1.0	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.		The BoC has adopted the PFMI and key considerations verbatim as its risk management standards.	Consistent	
PS	1.1	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	The legal basis should provide a high degree of certainty for each material aspect of an FMI's activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	BoC Standard 1: Legal Basis	Consistent	
PS	1.2	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI should have rules, procedures, and contracts that are clear, understandable, and consistent with relevant laws and regulations.	BoC Standard 1: Legal Basis	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	1.3	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI should be able to articulate the legal basis for its activities to relevant authorities, participants, and, where relevant, participants' customers, in a clear and understandable way.	BoC Standard 1: Legal Basis	Consistent	
PS	1.4	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI should have rules, procedures, and contracts that are enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions. There should be a high degree of certainty that actions taken by the FMI under such rules and procedures will not be voided, reversed, or subject to stays.	BoC Standard 1: Legal Basis	Consistent	
PS	1.5	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI conducting business in multiple jurisdictions should identify and mitigate the risks arising from any potential conflict of laws across jurisdictions.	BoC Standard 1: Legal Basis	Consistent	
PS	2.0	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.		The Bank of Canada has adopted the PFMI and key considerations verbatim as its risk management standards. In addition, supplementary guidance was provided on the Governance Principle.	Consistent	
PS	2.1	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	An FMI should have objectives that place a high priority on the safety and efficiency of the FMI and explicitly support financial stability and other relevant public interest considerations.	BOC Standard 2: Governance	Consistent	
PS	2.2	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	An FMI should have documented governance arrangements that provide clear and direct lines of responsibility and accountability. These arrangements should be disclosed to owners, relevant authorities, participants, and, at a more general level, the public.	BOC Standard 2: Governance	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	2.3	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The roles and responsibilities of an FMI's board of directors (or equivalent) should be clearly specified, and there should be documented procedures for its functioning, including procedures to identify, address, and manage member conflicts of interest. The board should review both its overall performance and the performance of its individual board members regularly.	BOC Standard 2: Governance	Consistent	
PS	2.4	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The board should contain suitable members with the appropriate skills and incentives to fulfil its multiple roles. This typically requires the inclusion of non-executive board member(s).	BOC Standard 2: Governance	Consistent	
PS	2.5	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The roles and responsibilities of management should be clearly specified. An FMI's management should have the appropriate experience, a mix of skills, and the integrity necessary to discharge their responsibilities for the operation and risk management of the FMI.	BOC Standard 2: Governance	Consistent	
PS	2.6	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The board should establish a clear, documented risk-management framework that includes the FMI's risk-tolerance policy, assigns responsibilities and accountability for risk decisions, and addresses decision making in crises and emergencies. Governance arrangements should ensure that the risk-management and internal control functions have sufficient authority, independence, resources, and access to the board.	BOC Standard 2: Governance	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	2.7	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The board should ensure that the FMI's design, rules, overall strategy, and major decisions reflect appropriately the legitimate interests of its direct and indirect participants and other relevant stakeholders. Major decisions should be clearly disclosed to relevant stakeholders and, where there is a broad market impact, the public.	BOC Standard 2: Governance	Consistent	
PS	3.0	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.		The Bank of Canada has adopted the PFMI and key considerations verbatim as its risk management standards.	Consistent	
PS	3.1	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should have risk-management policies, procedures, and systems that enable it to identify, measure, monitor, and manage the range of risks that arise in or are borne by the FMI. Risk-management frameworks should be subject to periodic review.	BOC Standard 3: Framework for the Comprehensive Management of Risks	Consistent	
PS	3.2	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should provide incentives to participants and, where relevant, their customers to manage and contain the risks they pose to the FMI.	BOC Standard 3: Framework for the Comprehensive Management of Risks	Consistent	
PS	3.3	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should regularly review the material risks it bears from and poses to other entities (such as other FMIs, settlement banks, liquidity providers, and service providers) as a result of interdependencies and develop appropriate risk-management tools to address these risks.	BOC Standard 3: Framework for the Comprehensive Management of Risks	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	3.4	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should identify scenarios that may potentially prevent it from being able to provide its critical operations and services as a going concern and assess the effectiveness of a full range of options for recovery or orderly wind-down. An FMI should prepare appropriate plans for its recovery or orderly wind-down based on the results of that assessment. Where applicable, an FMI should also provide relevant authorities with the information needed for purposes of resolution planning.	BOC Standard 3: Framework for the Comprehensive Management of Risks	Consistent	
PS	4.0	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.		The Bank of Canada has adopted the PFMI and key considerations verbatim as its risk management standards.	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	4.1	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should establish a robust framework to manage its credit exposures to its participants and the credit risks arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. Credit exposure may arise from current exposures, potential future exposures, or both.	BOC Standard 4: Credit Risk	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	4.2	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should identify sources of credit risk, routinely measure and monitor credit exposures, and use appropriate risk-management tools to control these risks.	BOC Standard 4: Credit Risk	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	4.3	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	A payment system or SSS should cover its current and, where they exist, potential future exposures to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence using collateral and other equivalent financial resources (see Principle 5 on collateral). In the case of a DNS payment system or DNS SSS in which there is no settlement guarantee but where its participants face credit exposures arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes, such an FMI should maintain, at a minimum, sufficient resources to cover the exposures of the two participants and their affiliates that would create the largest aggregate credit exposure in the system.	BOC Standard 4: Credit Risk	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	4.7	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should establish explicit rules and procedures that address fully any credit losses it may face as a result of any individual or combined default among its participants with respect to any of their obligations to the FMI. These rules and procedures should address how potentially uncovered credit losses would be allocated, including the repayment of any funds an FMI may borrow from liquidity providers. These rules and procedures should also indicate the FMI's process to replenish any financial resources that the FMI may employ during a stress event, so that the FMI can continue to operate in a safe and sound manner.	BOC Standard 4: Credit Risk	Consistent	
PS	5.0	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.		The Bank of Canada has adopted the PFMI and key considerations verbatim as its risk management standards. In addition, supplementary guidance was provided on certain elements of the Collateral Principle.	Consistent	
PS	5.1	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI should generally limit the assets it (routinely) accepts as collateral to those with low credit, liquidity, and market risks.	BOC Standard 5: Collateral	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	5.2	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI should establish prudent valuation practices and develop haircuts that are regularly tested and take into account stressed market conditions.	BOC Standard 5: Collateral	Consistent	
PS	5.3	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	In order to reduce the need for procyclical adjustments, an FMI should establish stable and conservative haircuts that are calibrated to include periods of stressed market conditions, to the extent practicable and prudent.	BOC Standard 5: Collateral	Consistent	
PS	5.4	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI should avoid concentrated holdings of certain assets where this would significantly impair the ability to liquidate such assets quickly without significant adverse price effects.	BOC Standard 5: Collateral	Consistent	
PS	5.5	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI that accepts cross-border collateral should mitigate the risks associated with its use and ensure that the collateral can be used in a timely manner.	BOC Standard 5: Collateral	Consistent	
PS	5.6	An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.	An FMI should use a collateral management system that is well-designed and operationally flexible.	BOC Standard 5: Collateral	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	7.0	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.			Partly consistent	Recommendation: The Canadian authorities should adapt their regulatory framework to be consistent with the PFMI in the allowed use of other liquid resources and the definition of qualifying liquid resources.
PS	7.1	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should have a robust framework to manage its liquidity risks from its participants, settlement banks, nostro agents, custodian banks, liquidity providers, and other entities.	BoC Standard 7: Liquidity Risk	Partly consistent	
PS	7.2	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should have effective operational and analytical tools to identify, measure, and monitor its settlement and funding flows on an ongoing and timely basis, including its use of intraday liquidity.	BoC Standard 7: Liquidity Risk	Partly consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	7.3	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	A payment system or SSS, including one employing a DNS mechanism, should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day settlement, and where appropriate intraday or multiday settlement, of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate payment obligation in extreme but plausible market conditions.	BoC Standard 7: Liquidity Risk	Partly consistent	
PS	7.5	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	For the purpose of meeting its minimum liquid resource requirement, an FMI's qualifying liquid resources in each currency include cash at the central bank of issue and at creditworthy commercial banks, committed lines of credit, committed foreign exchange swaps, and committed repos, as well as highly marketable collateral held in custody and investments that are readily available and convertible into cash with prearranged and highly reliable funding arrangements, even in extreme but plausible market conditions. If an FMI has access to routine credit at the central bank of issue, the FMI may count such access as part of the minimum requirement to the extent it has collateral that is eligible for pledging to (or for conducting other appropriate forms of transactions with) the relevant central bank. All such resources should be available when needed.	BoC Standard 7: Liquidity Risk	Partly consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	7.6	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI may supplement its qualifying liquid resources with other forms of liquid resources. If the FMI does so, then these liquid resources should be in the form of assets that are likely to be saleable or acceptable as collateral for lines of credit, swaps, or repos on an ad hoc basis following a default, even if this cannot be reliably prearranged or guaranteed in extreme market conditions. Even if an FMI does not have access to routine central bank credit, it should still take account of what collateral is typically accepted by the relevant central bank, as such assets may be more likely to be liquid in stressed circumstances. An FMI should not assume the availability of emergency central bank credit as a part of its liquidity plan.	BoC Standard 7: Liquidity Risk	Partly consistent	The BoC-CSA Supplementary Guidance on liquidity risk allows the use of “other liquid resources” to meet a certain portion of minimum liquid resource requirements. The rationale given in the supplementary guidance is that “it may be prohibitively expensive, or even impossible, for the FMI to obtain sufficient qualifying liquid resources.” Notwithstanding the rationale, allowing such use of other liquid resources is inconsistent with KC 5 which explicitly requires the use of qualifying liquid resources for meeting minimum liquid resource requirements.
PS	7.7	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should obtain a high degree of confidence, through rigorous due diligence, that each provider of its minimum required qualifying liquid resources, whether a participant of the FMI or an external party, has sufficient information to understand and to manage its associated liquidity risks, and that it has the capacity to perform as required under its commitment. Where relevant to assessing a liquidity provider’s performance reliability with respect to a particular currency, a liquidity provider’s potential access to credit from the central bank of issue may be taken into account. An FMI should regularly test its procedures for accessing its liquid resources at a liquidity provider.	BoC Standard 7: Liquidity Risk	Partly consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	7.8	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI with access to central bank accounts, payment services, or securities services should use these services, where practical, to enhance its management of liquidity risk.	BoC Standard 7: Liquidity Risk	Partly consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	7.9	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should determine the amount and regularly test the sufficiency of its liquid resources through rigorous stress testing. An FMI should have clear procedures to report the results of its stress tests to appropriate decision makers at the FMI and to use these results to evaluate the adequacy of and adjust its liquidity risk-management framework. In conducting stress testing, an FMI should consider a wide range of relevant scenarios. Scenarios should include relevant peak historic price volatilities, shifts in other market factors such as price determinants and yield curves, multiple defaults over various time horizons, simultaneous pressures in funding and asset markets, and a spectrum of forward-looking stress scenarios in a variety of extreme but plausible market conditions. Scenarios should also take into account the design and operation of the FMI, include all entities that might pose material liquidity risks to the FMI (such as settlement banks, nostro agents, custodian banks, liquidity providers, and linked FMIs), and where appropriate, cover a multiday period. In all cases, an FMI should document its supporting rationale for, and should have appropriate governance arrangements relating to, the amount and form of total liquid resources it maintains.	BoC Standard 7: Liquidity Risk	Partly consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	7.10	An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.	An FMI should establish explicit rules and procedures that enable the FMI to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations on time following any individual or combined default among its participants. These rules and procedures should address unforeseen and potentially uncovered liquidity shortfalls and should aim to avoid unwinding, revoking, or delaying the same-day settlement of payment obligations. These rules and procedures should also indicate the FMI's process to replenish any liquidity resources it may employ during a stress event, so that it can continue to operate in a safe and sound manner.	BoC Standard 7: Liquidity Risk	Partly consistent	
PS	8.0	An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.		The BoC has adopted the PFMI and key considerations verbatim as its risk management standards.	Consistent	
PS	8.1	An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.	An FMI's rules and procedures should clearly define the point at which settlement is final.	BOC Standard 8: Settlement Finality	Consistent	
PS	8.2	An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.	An FMI should complete final settlement no later than the end of the value date, and preferably intraday or in real time, to reduce settlement risk. An LVPS or SSS should consider adopting RTGS or multiple-batch processing during the settlement day.	BOC Standard 8: Settlement Finality	Consistent	
PS	8.3	An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.	An FMI should clearly define the point after which unsettled payments, transfer instructions, or other obligations may not be revoked by a participant.	BOC Standard 8: Settlement Finality	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	9.0	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.		The Bank of Canada has adopted the PFMI and key considerations verbatim as its risk management standards.	Consistent	
PS	9.1	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money, where practical and available, to avoid credit and liquidity risks.	BOC Standard 9: Money settlements	Consistent	
PS	9.2	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	If central bank money is not used, an FMI should conduct its money settlements using a settlement asset with little or no credit or liquidity risk.	BOC Standard 9: Money settlements	Consistent	
PS	9.3	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	If an FMI settles in commercial bank money, it should monitor, manage, and limit its credit and liquidity risks arising from the commercial settlement banks. In particular, an FMI should establish and monitor adherence to strict criteria for its settlement banks that take account of, among other things, their regulation and supervision, creditworthiness, capitalisation, access to liquidity, and operational reliability. An FMI should also monitor and manage the concentration of credit and liquidity exposures to its commercial settlement banks.	BOC Standard 9: Money settlements	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	9.4	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	If an FMI conducts money settlements on its own books, it should minimise and strictly control its credit and liquidity risks.	BOC Standard 9: Money settlements	Consistent	
PS	9.5	An FMI should conduct its money settlements in central bank money where practical and available. If central bank money is not used, an FMI should minimise and strictly control the credit and liquidity risk arising from the use of commercial bank money.	An FMI's legal agreements with any settlement banks should state clearly when transfers on the books of individual settlement banks are expected to occur, that transfers are to be final when effected, and that funds received should be transferable as soon as possible, at a minimum by the end of the day and ideally intraday, in order to enable the FMI and its participants to manage credit and liquidity risks.	BOC Standard 9: Money settlements	Consistent	
PS	12.0	If an FMI settles transactions that involve the settlement of two linked obligations (for example, securities or foreign exchange transactions), it should eliminate principal risk by conditioning the final settlement of one obligation upon the final settlement of the other.		The Bank of Canada has adopted the PFMI and key considerations verbatim as its risk management standards.	Consistent	
PS	12.1	If an FMI settles transactions that involve the settlement of two linked obligations (for example, securities or foreign exchange transactions), it should eliminate principal risk by conditioning the final settlement of one obligation upon the final settlement of the other.	An FMI that is an exchange-of-value settlement system should eliminate principal risk by ensuring that the final settlement of one obligation occurs if and only if the final settlement of the linked obligation also occurs, regardless of whether the FMI settles on a gross or net basis and when finality occurs.	BOC Standard 12: Exchange of value settlement systems	Consistent	
PS	13.0	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.		The BoC has adopted the PFMI and key considerations verbatim as its risk management standards.	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	13.1	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.	An FMI should have default rules and procedures that enable the FMI to continue to meet its obligations in the event of a participant default and that address the replenishment of resources following a default.	BOC Standard 13: Participant-default rules and procedures	Consistent	
PS	13.2	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.	An FMI should be well prepared to implement its default rules and procedures, including any appropriate discretionary procedures provided for in its rules.	BOC Standard 13: Participant-default rules and procedures	Consistent	
PS	13.3	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.	An FMI should publicly disclose key aspects of its default rules and procedures.	BOC Standard 13: Participant-default rules and procedures	Consistent	
PS	13.4	An FMI should have effective and clearly defined rules and procedures to manage a participant default. These rules and procedures should be designed to ensure that the FMI can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and continue to meet its obligations.	An FMI should involve its participants and other stakeholders in the testing and review of the FMI's default procedures, including any close-out procedures. Such testing and review should be conducted at least annually or following material changes to the rules and procedures to ensure that they are practical and effective.	BOC Standard 13: Participant-default rules and procedures	Consistent	
PS	15.0	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.		The BoC has adopted the PFMI and key considerations verbatim as its risk management standards. In addition, supplementary guidance was provided on certain elements of the General Business Risk Principle (General business risk and Recovery Plans).	Consistent	Recommendation: The Canadian authorities should adapt their regulatory framework to be consistent with the PFMI in the definition of current operating expenses.

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	15.1	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should have robust management and control systems to identify, monitor, and manage general business risks, including losses from poor execution of business strategy, negative cash flows, or unexpected and excessively large operating expenses.	BOC Standard 15: General Business Risk	Consistent	
PS	15.2	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should hold liquid net assets funded by equity (such as common stock, disclosed reserves, or other retained earnings) so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if it incurs general business losses. The amount of liquid net assets funded by equity an FMI should hold should be determined by its general business risk profile and the length of time required to achieve a recovery or orderly wind-down, as appropriate, of its critical operations and services if such action is taken.	BOC Standard 15: General Business Risk	Consistent	
PS	15.3	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should maintain a viable recovery or orderly wind-down plan and should hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to implement this plan. At a minimum, an FMI should hold liquid net assets funded by equity equal to at least six months of current operating expenses. These assets are in addition to resources held to cover participant defaults or other risks covered under the financial resources principles. However, equity held under international risk-based capital standards can be included where relevant and appropriate to avoid duplicate capital requirements.	BOC Standard 15: General Business Risk	Consistent	The BoC-CSA Supplementary Guidance on general business risk instructs FMIs to exclude “any extraordinary expenses (i.e. unessential, infrequent or one-off costs)” from the calculation of current operating expenses. This is not fully consistent with KC 3. Note that footnote 137 for the explanatory note 3.15.5 in the PFMI explicitly mentions excluding depreciation and amortisation from the current operating expenses, but not extraordinary expenses.

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	15.4	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	Assets held to cover general business risk should be of high quality and sufficiently liquid in order to allow the FMI to meet its current and projected operating expenses under a range of scenarios, including in adverse market conditions.	BOC Standard 15: General Business Risk	Consistent	
PS	15.5	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should maintain a viable plan for raising additional equity should its equity fall close to or below the amount needed. This plan should be approved by the board of directors and updated regularly.	BOC Standard 15: General Business Risk	Consistent	
PS	16.0	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.		The Bank of Canada has adopted the PFMI and key considerations verbatim as its risk management standards. In addition, supplementary guidance was provided on the custody and investment risk Principle.	Consistent	
PS	16.1	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.	An FMI should hold its own and its participants' assets at supervised and regulated entities that have robust accounting practices, safekeeping procedures, and internal controls that fully protect these assets.	BOC Standard 16: Custody and Investment risk	Consistent	
PS	16.2	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.	An FMI should have prompt access to its assets and the assets provided by participants, when required.	BOC Standard 16: Custody and Investment risk	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	16.3	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.	An FMI should evaluate and understand its exposures to its custodian banks, taking into account the full scope of its relationships with each.	BOC Standard 16: Custody and Investment risk	Consistent	
PS	16.4	An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants' assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI's investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.	An FMI's investment strategy should be consistent with its overall risk-management strategy and fully disclosed to its participants, and investments should be secured by, or be claims on, high-quality obligors. These investments should allow for quick liquidation with little, if any, adverse price effect.	BOC Standard 16: Custody and Investment risk	Consistent	
PS	17.0	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.		The Bank of Canada has adopted the PFMI and key considerations verbatim as its risk management standards.	Consistent	
PS	17.1	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should establish a robust operational risk-management framework with appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls to identify, monitor, and manage operational risks.	BOC Standard 17: Operational Risk	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	17.2	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI's board of directors should clearly define the roles and responsibilities for addressing operational risk and should endorse the FMI's operational risk-management framework. Systems, operational policies, procedures, and controls should be reviewed, audited, and tested periodically and after significant changes.	BOC Standard 17: Operational Risk	Consistent	
PS	17.3	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should have clearly defined operational reliability objectives and should have policies in place that are designed to achieve those objectives.	BOC Standard 17: Operational Risk	Consistent	
PS	17.4	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should ensure that it has scalable capacity adequate to handle increasing stress volumes and to achieve its service-level objectives.	BOC Standard 17: Operational Risk	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	17.5	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should have comprehensive physical and information security policies that address all potential vulnerabilities and threats.	BOC Standard 17: Operational Risk	Consistent	
PS	17.6	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should have a business continuity plan that addresses events posing a significant risk of disrupting operations, including events that could cause a wide-scale or major disruption. The plan should incorporate the use of a secondary site and should be designed to ensure that critical information technology (IT) systems can resume operations within two hours following disruptive events. The plan should be designed to enable the FMI to complete settlement by the end of the day of the disruption, even in case of extreme circumstances. The FMI should regularly test these arrangements.	BOC Standard 17: Operational Risk	Consistent	
PS	17.7	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the risks that key participants, other FMIs, and service and utility providers might pose to its operations. In addition, an FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the risks its operations might pose to other FMIs.	BOC Standard 17: Operational Risk	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	18.0	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.		The Bank of Canada has adopted the PFMI and key considerations verbatim as its risk management standards.	Consistent	
PS	18.1	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.	An FMI should allow for fair and open access to its services, including by direct and, where relevant, indirect participants and other FMIs, based on reasonable risk-related participation requirements.	BOC Standard 18: Access and participation requirements	Consistent	
PS	18.2	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.	An FMI's participation requirements should be justified in terms of the safety and efficiency of the FMI and the markets it serves, be tailored to and commensurate with the FMI's specific risks, and be publicly disclosed. Subject to maintaining acceptable risk control standards, an FMI should endeavour to set requirements that have the least-restrictive impact on access that circumstances permit.	BOC Standard 18: Access and participation requirements	Consistent	
PS	18.3	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.	An FMI should monitor compliance with its participation requirements on an ongoing basis and have clearly defined and publicly disclosed procedures for facilitating the suspension and orderly exit of a participant that breaches, or no longer meets, the participation requirements.	BOC Standard 18: Access and participation requirements	Consistent	
PS	19.0	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.		The Bank of Canada has adopted the PFMI and key considerations verbatim as its risk management standards.	Consistent	
PS	19.1	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should ensure that its rules, procedures, and agreements allow it to gather basic information about indirect participation in order to identify, monitor, and manage any material risks to the FMI arising from such tiered participation arrangements.	BOC Standard 19: Tiered participation arrangements	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	19.2	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should identify material dependencies between direct and indirect participants that might affect the FMI.	BOC Standard 19: Tiered participation arrangements	Consistent	
PS	19.3	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should identify indirect participants responsible for a significant proportion of transactions processed by the FMI and indirect participants whose transaction volumes or values are large relative to the capacity of the direct participants through which they access the FMI in order to manage the risks arising from these transactions.	BOC Standard 19: Tiered participation arrangements	Consistent	
PS	19.4	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should regularly review risks arising from tiered participation arrangements and should take mitigating action when appropriate.	BOC Standard 19: Tiered participation arrangements	Consistent	
PS	21.0	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.		The Bank of Canada has adopted the PFMI and key considerations verbatim as its risk management standards.	Consistent	
PS	21.1	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.	An FMI should be designed to meet the needs of its participants and the markets it serves, in particular, with regard to choice of a clearing and settlement arrangement; operating structure; scope of products cleared, settled, or recorded; and use of technology and procedures.	BOC Standard 21: Efficiency and Effectiveness	Consistent	
PS	21.2	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.	An FMI should have clearly defined goals and objectives that are measurable and achievable, such as in the areas of minimum service levels, risk-management expectations, and business priorities.	BOC Standard 21: Efficiency and Effectiveness	Consistent	
PS	21.3	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.	An FMI should have established mechanisms for the regular review of its efficiency and effectiveness.	BOC Standard 21: Efficiency and Effectiveness	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	22.0	An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, relevant internationally accepted communication procedures and standards in order to facilitate efficient payment, clearing, settlement, and recording.		The Bank of Canada has adopted the PFMI and key considerations verbatim as its risk management standards.	Consistent	
PS	22.1	An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, relevant internationally accepted communication procedures and standards in order to facilitate efficient payment, clearing, settlement, and recording.	An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, internationally accepted communication procedures and standards.	BOC Standard 22: Communication procedures and standards	Consistent	
PS	23.0	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.		The Bank of Canada has adopted the PFMI and key considerations verbatim as its risk management standards. In addition, supplementary guidance was provided on the disclosure Principle.	Consistent	
PS	23.1	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should adopt clear and comprehensive rules and procedures that are fully disclosed to participants. Relevant rules and key procedures should also be publicly disclosed.	BOC Standard 23: Disclosure of rules, key procedures and market data	Consistent	
PS	23.2	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should disclose clear descriptions of the system's design and operations, as well as the FMI's and participants' rights and obligations, so that participants can assess the risks they would incur by participating in the FMI.	BOC Standard 23: Disclosure of rules, key procedures and market data	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
PS	23.3	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should provide all necessary and appropriate documentation and training to facilitate participants' understanding of the FMI's rules and procedures and the risks they face from participating in the FMI.	BOC Standard 23: Disclosure of rules, key procedures and market data	Consistent	
PS	23.4	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should publicly disclose its fees at the level of individual services it offers as well as its policies on any available discounts. The FMI should provide clear descriptions of priced services for comparability purposes.	BOC Standard 23: Disclosure of rules, key procedures and market data	Consistent	
PS	23.5	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should complete regularly and disclose publicly responses to the CPSS-IOSCO Disclosure framework for financial market infrastructures. An FMI also should, at a minimum, disclose basic data on transaction volumes and values.	BOC Standard 23: Disclosure of rules, key procedures and market data	Consistent	
TR	1.0	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.		OSC TR Rule, s. 7(1) OSC TR Rule Companion Policy guidance for s. 7(1) QC TR Regulations. 7(1) and Policy Statement for s. 7(1) MSC TR Rule s. 7(1) and MSC CP guidance MI 96-101, s. 7(1) MI 96-101 Companion Policy guidance for s. 7(1)	Broadly consistent	Key conclusion: The local implementation measures of the respective provincial securities regulators are broadly consistent with Principle 1. The overall rating has been influenced by the absence of specific measures implementing KC 5. Recommendation: The provincial securities regulators are recommended to implement measures which address the gap identified in relation to KC 5.

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	1.1	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	The legal basis should provide a high degree of certainty for each material aspect of an FMI's activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	OSC TR Rule and Companion Policy guidance, s. 7(1) OSC TR Rule, s. 7(2) QC TR Regulation ss. 7(1), (2) and Policy Statement MSC TR Rule s. 7(1), 7(2) and MSC CP guidance MI 96-101s. 7(2)	Broadly consistent	
TR	1.2	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI should have rules, procedures, and contracts that are clear, understandable, and consistent with relevant laws and regulations.	OSC TR Rule, ss. 7(1), (2) OSC TR Rule, s. 8(1)(a) OSC TR Rule, ss. 17(1)(a), (3), (4) QC TR Regulation ss. 7(1), (2) QDA s. 26 QC TR Regulation ss. 17(1)(a), (3), (4) MSC TR Rule s. 7(1), 7(2), 8(1), and ss 17(1), (3) and (4) and the MSC CP guidance MI 96-101, ss 7(1), (2) MI 96-101, s. 8 MI 96-101 s. 17	Broadly consistent	
TR	1.3	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI should be able to articulate the legal basis for its activities to relevant authorities, participants, and, where relevant, participants' customers, in a clear and understandable way.	OSC TR Rule, ss. 7(1), (2)(b), 8(1)(a) QC TR Regulations. 7(1) and QDA s. 26 MSC TR Rule s. 7(1), 7(2)(b) and 8(1)(a) and the MSC CP guidance MI 96-101, s. 7	Broadly consistent	
TR	1.4	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI should have rules, procedures, and contracts that are enforceable in all relevant jurisdictions. There should be a high degree of certainty that actions taken by the FMI under such rules and procedures will not be voided, reversed, or subject to stays.	OSC TR Rule, s. 7(1) QC TR Regulations. 7(1) MSC TR Rule s.7(1) MI 96-101, ss. 7 and 17(2)	Broadly consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	1.5	An FMI should have a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each material aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.	An FMI conducting business in multiple jurisdictions should identify and mitigate the risks arising from any potential conflict of laws across jurisdictions.	OSC TR Rule, s. 7(1), (2) QC TR Regulation ss. 7(1), (2) QC QDA s. 28 MSC TR Rule s.7(1), (2) MI 96-101, ss. 7 and 17	Broadly consistent	According to the Canadian provincial securities regulators, the need to mitigate risks is inherent in establishing, implementing, maintaining and enforcing rules, procedures and policies that are designed to ensure a well-founded, clear, transparent and enforceable legal basis. However, there are no specific implementation measures consistent with KC 5 since the requirement of identifying and mitigating the risks arising from any potential conflict of laws across jurisdictions is not covered.
TR	2.0	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.		OSC TR Rule, s. 8 QC TR Regulation s.8 and QDA s. 26 MSC TR Rule s.8 MI 96-101, s. 8	Partly consistent	Key conclusion: The implementation measures of the provincial securities regulators are partly consistent with Principle 2. The overall rating has been influenced by gaps and shortcomings in KC 3 and KC 6. Recommendation: The provincial securities regulators are recommended to implement measures which address the gaps identified with reference to KC 3 and KC 6.
TR	2.1	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	An FMI should have objectives that place a high priority on the safety and efficiency of the FMI and explicitly support financial stability and other relevant public interest considerations.	OSC TR Rule, s. 8 (1) QC TR Regulation s.8 (1) and QDA s. 26 MSC TR Rule s.8(1) MI 96-101, s. 8 (1)	Partly consistent	
TR	2.2	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	0	OSC TR Rule, s. 8 OSC TR Rule, ss. 9, 10 QC TR Regulation, s. 8 (1) and QDA s. 26 QC TR Regulation ss. 9 and 10 MSC TR Rule s.8, 9 and 10 MI 96-101, s. 8, 9 and 10	Partly consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	2.3	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The roles and responsibilities of an FMI's board of directors (or equivalent) should be clearly specified, and there should be documented procedures for its functioning, including procedures to identify, address, and manage member conflicts of interest. The board should review both its overall performance and the performance of its individual board members regularly.	OSC TR Rule s. 9 QC TR Regulation s.9 MSC TR Rule s.9 MI 96-101 s. 9	Partly consistent	According to the Canadian provincial securities regulators framework a designated trade repository must establish, implement and maintain written governance arrangements that set out a clear organisational structure with consistent lines of responsibility. A designated trade repository must have a board of directors. The board of directors of a designated trade repository must, in consultation with the chief compliance officer of the designated trade repository, resolve conflicts of interest identified by the chief compliance officer. However, the wording of the requirements corresponding to KC 3 does not reach the specificity of this key consideration. Furthermore a gap is created by the lack of explicit requirements in the regulation that "The board should review both its overall performance and the performance of its individual board members regularly".
TR	2.4	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The board should contain suitable members with the appropriate skills and incentives to fulfil its multiple roles. This typically requires the inclusion of non-executive board member(s).	OSC TR Rule s. 9 QC TR Regulation s.9 MSC TR Rule s.9 MI 96-101 s. 9	Partly consistent	
TR	2.5	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The roles and responsibilities of management should be clearly specified. An FMI's management should have the appropriate experience, a mix of skills, and the integrity necessary to discharge their responsibilities for the operation and risk management of the FMI.	OSC TR Rule s. 10 QC TR Regulation s.10 MSC TR Rule s.10 MI 96-101 s. 10	Partly consistent	
TR	2.6	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The board should establish a clear, documented risk-management framework that includes the FMI's risk-tolerance policy, assigns responsibilities and accountability for risk decisions, and addresses decision making in crises and emergencies. Governance arrangements should ensure that the risk-management and internal control functions have sufficient authority, independence, resources, and access to the board.	OSC TR Rule, ss. 8, 10 OSC TR Rule, s. 19 QC TR Regulation ss. 8 and 10 QC TR Regulation s.19 MSC TR Rule ss. 8, 10 and 19 MI 96-101 s. 8, 10, 17 and 19	Partly consistent	According to the Canadian provincial securities regulators, the TR regulations do not reach the specificity of this key consideration. Nevertheless, they would expect that KC 6 is followed as part of the compliance with the relevant framework. However a gap is identified in the absence of specific implementation measures covering all aspects of KC 6.

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	2.7	An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.	The board should ensure that the FMI's design, rules, overall strategy, and major decisions reflect appropriately the legitimate interests of its direct and indirect participants and other relevant stakeholders. Major decisions should be clearly disclosed to relevant stakeholders and, where there is a broad market impact, the public.	OSC TR Rule, s. 8(1)(g) QC QDA s. 26 MSC TR Rule s. 8(1)(g) MI 96-101, s. 8(1)	Partly consistent	
TR	3.0	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.		OSC TR Rule, s. 19 OSC TR Rule. s. 20 QC TR Regulation ss.19 and 20 MSC TR Rule ss.19 and 20 MI 96-101, ss. 19 and. 20	Consistent	
TR	3.1	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should have risk-management policies, procedures, and systems that enable it to identify, measure, monitor, and manage the range of risks that arise in or are borne by the FMI. Risk-management frameworks should be subject to periodic review.	OSC TR Rule, s. 19, 20(1) QC TR Regulation ss. 19 and 20(1) MSC TR Rule ss.19 and 20(1) MI 96-101, ss. 19, 20	Consistent	
TR	3.2	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should provide incentives to participants and, where relevant, their customers to manage and contain the risks they pose to the FMI.	OSC TR Rule: See responses in connection with Principle 17 QC TR Regulation: See responses in connection with Principle 17 QC QDA s. 28 MSC TR Rule – See responses in connection with Principle 17 MI 96-101: See responses in connection with Principle 17	Consistent	The provincial securities regulators consider the primary risks that participants' pose to the TRs to be operational in nature. Accordingly, they believe as appropriate to reference also the provisions related to identifying, preventing and mitigating operational risks.

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	3.3	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should regularly review the material risks it bears from and poses to other entities (such as other FMIs, settlement banks, liquidity providers, and service providers) as a result of interdependencies and develop appropriate risk-management tools to address these risks.	OSC TR Rule Companion Policy guidance for s. 19 QC TR Policy Statement for s.19 MSC TR CP guidance for s.19 MI 96-101 ss 19, 20 MI 96-101 Companion Policy for section 19	Consistent	
TR	3.4	An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.	An FMI should identify scenarios that may potentially prevent it from being able to provide its critical operations and services as a going concern and assess the effectiveness of a full range of options for recovery or orderly wind-down. An FMI should prepare appropriate plans for its recovery or orderly wind-down based on the results of that assessment. Where applicable, an FMI should also provide relevant authorities with the information needed for purposes of resolution planning.	OSC TR Rule ss. 20(4), (5), (6) QC TR Regulation ss. 20(4), (5), (6) MSC TR Rule ss.20(4), (5), (6) MI 96-101 ss. 20(4), (5), (6) and 21	Consistent	
TR	15.0	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.		OSC TR Rule, ss. 20(1), (2), (3), (4) OSC TR Rule Companion Policy guidance for ss. 20(1) QC TR Regulation and Policy Statement for ss. 20(1) (2), (3), (4) QC QDA s.30 MSC TR Rule and CP guidance for ss. 20(1) (2), (3), (4) MI 96-101, s. 20 MI 96-101 Companion Policy, s 20	Broadly consistent	Key conclusion: The implementation measures of the provincial securities regulators are broadly consistent with Principle 15. The overall rating has been influenced by the absence of measures implementing KC 5. Recommendation: The provincial securities regulators are recommended to implement measures which address the gaps identified in KC 5.

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	15.1	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should have robust management and control systems to identify, monitor, and manage general business risks, including losses from poor execution of business strategy, negative cash flows, or unexpected and excessively large operating expenses.	OSC TR Rule/Companion Policy Guidance, s. 20(1) QC TR Policy Statement for s. 20(1). QC QDA s.30 MSC TR Rule and CP guidance for s.20(1). MI 96-101, s. 20 MI 96-101 Companion Policy, s 20	Broadly consistent	
TR	15.2	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should hold liquid net assets funded by equity (such as common stock, disclosed reserves, or other retained earnings) so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if it incurs general business losses. The amount of liquid net assets funded by equity an FMI should hold should be determined by its general business risk profile and the length of time required to achieve a recovery or orderly wind-down, as appropriate, of its critical operations and services if such action is taken.	OSC TR Rule/Companion Policy Guidance, ss. 20(1), (2), (3) QC TR Regulation and Policy Statement for ss. 20(1), (2), (3) QC QDA s.30 MSC TR Rule and CP guidance for ss.20(1), (2) and (3) MI 96-101, ss. 20(2), (3) MI 96-101 Companion Policy, s 20(2)	Broadly consistent	
TR	15.3	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should maintain a viable recovery or orderly wind-down plan and should hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to implement this plan. At a minimum, an FMI should hold liquid net assets funded by equity equal to at least six months of current operating expenses. These assets are in addition to resources held to cover participant defaults or other risks covered under the financial resources principles. However, equity held under international risk-based capital standards can be included where relevant and appropriate to avoid duplicate capital requirements.	OSC TR Rule/Companion Policy Guidance, s. 20(1), (2), (3), (4) QC TR Regulation and Policy Statement for ss. 20(1), (2), (3), (4) QC QDA s.30 MSC TR Rule and CP guidance for s.20(1), (2), (3) and (4) MI 96-101, ss. 20 MI 96-101 Companion Policy, s 20	Broadly consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	15.4	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	Assets held to cover general business risk should be of high quality and sufficiently liquid in order to allow the FMI to meet its current and projected operating expenses under a range of scenarios, including in adverse market conditions.	OSC TR Rule, ss. 20(2), (3) QC TR Regulation ss. 20(2), (3) QC QDA s. 30 MSC TR Rule, ss. 20(2), (3) MI 96-101, ss. 20(2), (3)	Broadly consistent	
TR	15.5	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.	An FMI should maintain a viable plan for raising additional equity should its equity fall close to or below the amount needed. This plan should be approved by the board of directors and updated regularly.	OSC TR Rule/Companion Policy guidance, s. 20(4) QC TR Policy Statement for s. 20(4) QC QDA s. 30 MSC TR Rule and CP guidance for s.20(4) MI 96-101, ss. 20(4), (5)	Broadly consistent	According to the provincial securities regulators the TR rules/regulations do not reach the specificity of this key consideration. Nevertheless, they would expect that KC 5 is followed as part of the compliance with the relevant parts of the framework. However there is a gap in the absence of specific provisions requiring the TR to maintain a plan for raising additional equity approved by the board of directors and updated regularly.
TR	17.0	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.		OSC TR Rule, ss. 21(1), (3)(a), (4), (5) OSC TR Rule Companion Policy guidance for s. 21(1) QC TR Policy Statement for s. 21(1) QC TR Regulation ss. 21(1), (3)(a), (4), (5) . QC QDA s. 27 MSC TR Rule ss 21(1), 3(a), (4) and (5) MSC TR CP guidance for s 21(1) MI 96-101, ss. 21(1), (2), (4), (5), (6)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	17.1	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should establish a robust operational risk-management framework with appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls to identify, monitor, and manage operational risks.	OSC TR Rule, s. 21(1) QC TR Regulations. 21(1) QC QDA s. 28 MSC TR Rule s 21(1) MI 96-101, s 21(1)	Consistent	
TR	17.2	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI's board of directors should clearly define the roles and responsibilities for addressing operational risk and should endorse the FMI's operational risk-management framework. Systems, operational policies, procedures, and controls should be reviewed, audited, and tested periodically and after significant changes.	OSC TR Rule, ss. 8, 9, 10 OSC TR Rule, ss. 21(2), (5), (6), (7) OSC TR Rule Companion Policy guidance for ss. 21(2), (5), (6) QC TR Regulation ss. 8, 9 and 10 QC TR Regulation ss. 21(2), (5), (6), (7) and QC TR Policy Statement for ss. 21(2), (5), (6) MSC TR Rule ss 8, 9 and 10 MSC TR Rule ss 21(2), (5), (6) and (7) and MSC CP guidance for ss 21(2), (5), and (6) MI 96-101 ss.8, 9, 10, 17 and 21(2), (5), (6)	Consistent	
TR	17.3	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should have clearly defined operational reliability objectives and should have policies in place that are designed to achieve those objectives.	OSC TR Rule Companion Policy guidance for s. 21(1) QC TR Regulation Policy Statement for s. 21(1) MSC TR Rule CP guidance MI 96-101, s. 21 MI 96-101 Companion Policy, s 21(1)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	17.4	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should ensure that it has scalable capacity adequate to handle increasing stress volumes and to achieve its service-level objectives.	OSC TR Rule, ss. 21(3)(b) QC TR Regulations. 21(3)(b) MSC TR Rule s 21(3)(b) MI 96-101, s 21(3)	Consistent	
TR	17.5	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should have comprehensive physical and information security policies that address all potential vulnerabilities and threats.	OSC TR Rule, s. 21(3)(a). OSC TR Rule, s. 22: QC TR Regulation ss. 21(3)(a) and 22 MSC TR Rule ss. 21(3) (a) and 22. MI 96-101, s 21(3)(a) and s. 22(1)	Consistent	
TR	17.6	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should have a business continuity plan that addresses events posing a significant risk of disrupting operations, including events that could cause a wide-scale or major disruption. The plan should incorporate the use of a secondary site and should be designed to ensure that critical information technology (IT) systems can resume operations within two hours following disruptive events. The plan should be designed to enable the FMI to complete settlement by the end of the day of the disruption, even in case of extreme circumstances. The FMI should regularly test these arrangements.	OSC TR Rule, ss. 21(1), (4), (5) OSC TR Rule Companion Policy guidance for ss. 21(4) OSC TR Rule Companion Policy guidance for ss. 21(5), (6) QC TR Regulation ss. 21(1), (4), (5) and Policy Statement for s. 21(4) MI 96-101, ss. 21(1), (2), (4), (5), (6) MI 96-101 Companion Policy, ss. 21(4), (5), (6)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	17.7	An FMI should identify the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigate their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls. Systems should be designed to ensure a high degree of security and operational reliability and should have adequate, scalable capacity. Business continuity management should aim for timely recovery of operations and fulfilment of the FMI's obligations, including in the event of a wide-scale or major disruption.	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the risks that key participants, other FMIs, and service and utility providers might pose to its operations. In addition, an FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the risks its operations might pose to other FMIs.	OSC TR Rule, s. 21 OSC TR Rule, s. 24 QC TR Regulation ss.21 and 24 QDA s. 28, 31 MSC TR Rule ss. 21 and 24 MI 96-101, ss. 21.and 24	Consistent	
TR	18.0	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.		OSC TR Rule, s. 13(1) QC TR Regulation s.13(1) MSC TR Rule s. 13(1) MI 96-101, s. 13(1)	Consistent	
TR	18.1	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.	An FMI should allow for fair and open access to its services, including by direct and, where relevant, indirect participants and other FMIs, based on reasonable risk-related participation requirements.	OSC TR Rule, s. 13(1) OSC TR Rule, s. 13(3) QC TR Regulation ss.13(1) and (3) MSC TR Rule ss. 13 (1) and (3) MI 96-101, ss. 13(1) and (3)	Consistent	
TR	18.2	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.	An FMI's participation requirements should be justified in terms of the safety and efficiency of the FMI and the markets it serves, be tailored to and commensurate with the FMI's specific risks, and be publicly disclosed. Subject to maintaining acceptable risk control standards, an FMI should endeavour to set requirements that have the least-restrictive impact on access that circumstances permit.	OSC TR Rule, ss. 13(1), (2) and (3) QC TR Regulation ss.13(1), 13(2) and 13(3) MSC TR Rule ss. 13 (1), 13(2) and 13(3) MI 96-101, ss. 13(1), (2) and (3)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	18.3	An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.	An FMI should monitor compliance with its participation requirements on an ongoing basis and have clearly defined and publicly disclosed procedures for facilitating the suspension and orderly exit of a participant that breaches, or no longer meets, the participation requirements.	OSC TR Rule, ss. 16, 17 QC TR Regulation ss.16 and 17(1), (2), (3), and (4) QC QDA s. 26 QC QDA s. 14 MSC TR Rule ss.16 and 17(1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) MI 96-101, ss. 16, 17	Consistent	
TR	19.0	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.		No specific provisions in the local rules or MI 96-101. Companion Policies state that “the trade repository may be expected to observe or broadly observe the principles, where applicable.”	Not consistent	Key conclusion: The implementation measures of the provincial securities regulators are not consistent with Principle 19. The overall rating has been influenced by the fact that the regulatory framework does not include specific corresponding rules covering tiered participation but a general reference of the Companion Policy, which is non-binding and serves as guidance only in the case where underlying rules exist. Recommendation: The provincial securities regulators are recommended to implement measures which address the gaps identified.
TR	19.1	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should ensure that its rules, procedures, and agreements allow it to gather basic information about indirect participation in order to identify, monitor, and manage any material risks to the FMI arising from such tiered participation arrangements.		Not consistent	
TR	19.2	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should identify material dependencies between direct and indirect participants that might affect the FMI.		Not consistent	
TR	19.3	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should identify indirect participants responsible for a significant proportion of transactions processed by the FMI and indirect participants whose transaction volumes or values are large relative to the capacity of the direct participants through which they access the FMI in order to manage the risks arising from these transactions.		Not consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	19.4	An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.	An FMI should regularly review risks arising from tiered participation arrangements and should take mitigating action when appropriate.		Not consistent	
TR	20.0	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.		No specific provisions in the local rules or MI 96-101. Companion Policies state that “the trade repository may be expected to observe or broadly observe the principles, where applicable.”	Not consistent	Key conclusion: The implementation measures of the provincial securities regulators are not consistent with Principle 20. The overall rating has been influenced by the fact that the regulatory framework does not include specific corresponding rules covering FMI links but a general reference of the Companion Policy, which is non-binding and serves as guidance only in the case where underlying rules exist. Recommendation: The provincial securities regulators are recommended to implement measures which address the gaps identified.
TR	20.1	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.	Before entering into a link arrangement and on an ongoing basis once the link is established, an FMI should identify, monitor, and manage all potential sources of risk arising from the link arrangement. Link arrangements should be designed such that each FMI is able to observe the other principles in this report.		Not consistent	
TR	20.2	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.	A link should have a well-founded legal basis, in all relevant jurisdictions, that supports its design and provides adequate protection to the FMIs involved in the link.		Not consistent	
TR	20.9	An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.	A TR should carefully assess the additional operational risks related to its links to ensure the scalability and reliability of IT and related resources.		Not consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	21.0	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.		No specific provisions in the local rules or MI 96-101. Companion Policies state that “the trade repository may be expected to observe or broadly observe the principles, where applicable.”	Not consistent	Key conclusion: The implementation measures of the provincial securities regulators are not consistent with Principle 21. The overall rating has been influenced by the fact that the regulatory framework does not include specific corresponding rules covering efficiency and effectiveness but a general reference of the Companion Policy, which is non-binding and serves as guidance only in the case where underlying rules exist. Recommendation: The provincial securities regulators are recommended to implement measures which address the gaps identified.
TR	21.1	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.	An FMI should be designed to meet the needs of its participants and the markets it serves, in particular, with regard to choice of a clearing and settlement arrangement; operating structure; scope of products cleared, settled, or recorded; and use of technology and procedures.		Not consistent	
TR	21.2	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.	An FMI should have clearly defined goals and objectives that are measurable and achievable, such as in the areas of minimum service levels, risk-management expectations, and business priorities.		Not consistent	
TR	21.3	An FMI should be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves.	An FMI should have established mechanisms for the regular review of its efficiency and effectiveness.		Not consistent	
TR	22.0	An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, relevant internationally accepted communication procedures and standards in order to facilitate efficient payment, clearing, settlement, and recording.		OSC TR Rule, s. 15 QC TR Regulation s.15 MSC TR Rule s.15 MI 96-101, s. 15	Consistent	
TR	22.1	An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, relevant internationally accepted communication procedures and standards in order to facilitate efficient payment, clearing, settlement, and recording.	An FMI should use, or at a minimum accommodate, internationally accepted communication procedures and standards.	OSC TR Rule, s. 15 QC TR Regulation s.15 MSC TR Rule s.15 MI 96-101, s. 15	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	23.0	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.			Consistent	
TR	23.1	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should adopt clear and comprehensive rules and procedures that are fully disclosed to participants. Relevant rules and key procedures should also be publicly disclosed.	OSC TR Rule, ss. 17(1), (4) QC TR Regulation ss. 17(1) and (4) MSC TR Rule ss.17(1) and (4) MI 96-101, ss. 17(1), (5)	Consistent	
TR	23.2	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should disclose clear descriptions of the system's design and operations, as well as the FMI's and participants' rights and obligations, so that participants can assess the risks they would incur by participating in the FMI.	OSC TR Rule, ss. 17(1), (4) OSC TR Rule Companion Policy guidance for s. 17 OSC TR Rule, ss. 21(8), (9), (10) QC TR Regulation ss. 17(1) and (4), 21(8)-(10) and Policy Statement for s.17 MSC TR Rule and CP guidance for ss.17(1) and (4), 21(8)-(10) MI 96-101, ss. 17(1), (5) MI 96-101 Companion Policy, s. 17 MI 96-101, ss. 21(8), (9), (10)	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	23.3	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should provide all necessary and appropriate documentation and training to facilitate participants' understanding of the FMI's rules and procedures and the risks they face from participating in the FMI.	OSC TR Rule, ss. 17(4), (5) OSC TR Rule, Form 91-507F1 (Application for Designation TR Information Statement), Exhibit E, item 9 QC TR Regulations. 17(4) QC QDA s. 14 QC TR Regulation, Form 91-507F1 (Application for Recognition Trade Repository Information Statement), Exhibit E, item 9 MSC TR Rule ss. 17(4) and 17(5) MSC TR Rule, Form 91-507F1 MI 96-101, ss. 17(4), (5) MI 96-101, Form 91-507F1 (Application for Designation TR Information Statement), Exhibit E, item 9	Consistent	
TR	23.4	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should publicly disclose its fees at the level of individual services it offers as well as its policies on any available discounts. The FMI should provide clear descriptions of priced services for comparability purposes.	OSC TR Rule, s. 12 QC TR Regulations. 12 MSC TR Rule s. 12 MI 96-101, s 12	Consistent	
TR	23.5	An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.	An FMI should complete regularly and disclose publicly responses to the CPSS-IOSCO Disclosure framework for financial market infrastructures. An FMI also should, at a minimum, disclose basic data on transaction volumes and values.	OSC TR Rule, ss. 17(1), (4) OSC TR Rule Companion Policy guidance for s. 17 QC TR Regulation ss. 17(1), (4) and Policy Statement for s. 17 MSC TR Rule and CP guidance ss. 17(1), (4) MI 96-101, ss. 17(1), (4), (5) MI 96-101 Companion Policy, s. 17	Consistent	

FMI Type	Principle or Type key consideration ID	Principle	Key consideration	Implementation measures	Principle rating	Assessment comments (ie key conclusions and recommendations)
TR	24.0	A TR should provide timely and accurate data to relevant authorities and the public in line with their respective needs.		OSC TR Rule, Part 4 (generally); in particular, ss. 37(1), (3), 38(1), 39 MSC TR Rule ss 37(1), 37(3), 38(1) and 39 MI 96-101, ss. 37, 38(1), 39	Consistent	
TR	24.1	A TR should provide timely and accurate data to relevant authorities and the public in line with their respective needs.	A TR should provide data in line with regulatory and industry expectations to relevant authorities and the public, respectively, that is comprehensive and at a level of detail sufficient to enhance market transparency and support other public policy objectives.	OSC TR Rule, ss. 37(1), (3) OSC TR Rule, s. 37(2) OSC TR Rule, Appendices A, C QC TR Regulation ss. 37 (1), 37(2), 37(3), and Appendices A, C QC QDA ss. 36, 37 MSC TR Rule ss 37(1), 37(2) and 37(3) with Appendices A and C MI 96-101 s. 37	Consistent	
TR	24.2	A TR should provide timely and accurate data to relevant authorities and the public in line with their respective needs.	A TR should have effective processes and procedures to provide data to relevant authorities in a timely and appropriate manner to enable them to meet their respective regulatory mandates and legal responsibilities.	OSC TR Rule, s. 37, Appendices A, C OSC TR Rule, s. 18 QC TR Regulation ss. 37, 18 and Appendices A, C QC QDA ss. 36, 37 MSC TR Rule ss. 37, 18 and Appendices A, C MI 96-101, s. 37 MI 96-101 Companion Policy, s. 37(1) MI 96-101, s. 18(1):	Consistent	
TR	24.3	A TR should provide timely and accurate data to relevant authorities and the public in line with their respective needs.	A TR should have robust information systems that provide accurate current and historical data. Data should be provided in a timely manner and in a format that permits it to be easily analysed.	OSC TR Rule, ss. 37, 18 QC TR Regulation ss. 37, 18 QC QDA ss. 36, 37 MSC TR Rule ss. 37, 18 MI 96-101, s 37 MI 96-101 Companion Policy, s. 37(1) MI 96-101, s. 18	Consistent	