PFMI implementation database
This is an online data repository of jurisdictions' implementation measures for the Principles for financial market infrastructures and associated CPMI and IOSCO assessment principle ratings. It complements the Level 2 assessment programme on the extent to which jurisdictions' implementation measures are complete and consistent with the international standards for payment systems, central securities depositories, securities settlement systems, central counterparties and trade repositories.
Note that authorities may have updated their rules, regulations and policies since the assessment. For current implementation measures, please contact the relevant authority.
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 5.3
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
In order to reduce the need for procyclical adjustments, an FMI should establish stable and conservative haircuts that are calibrated to include periods of stressed market conditions, to the extent practicable and prudent.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/390 Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 5.4
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
An FMI should avoid concentrated holdings of certain assets where this would significantly impair the ability to liquidate such assets quickly without significant adverse price effects.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/390 Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 5.5
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
An FMI that accepts cross-border collateral should mitigate the risks associated with its use and ensure that the collateral can be used in a timely manner.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/390 Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 5.6
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
An FMI should use a collateral management system that is well-designed and operationally flexible.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/390 Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 7.0
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/390 Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework Note - rated as "consistent" for CSDs/SSSs that provide banking-type ancillary services
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
An SSS CSD that employs DvP2/DvP3 settlement models and that does not provide any settlement guarantee should effectively measure, monitor, and manage liquidity risk as well as maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day settlement and, where appropriate, intraday or multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate payment obligation in extreme but plausible market conditions. In this case there are no implementation measures. The EU authorities are recommended to implement measures to address the gaps or inconsistencies related to KCs 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 7.1
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
An FMI should have a robust framework to manage its liquidity risks from its participants, settlement banks, nostro agents, custodian banks, liquidity providers, and other entities.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/390 Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework Note - rated as "consistent" for CSDs/SSSs that provide banking-type ancillary services
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
A CSD that employs DvP2/DvP3 settlement models and that does not provide any settlement guarantee should adopt the measures prescribed above in relation to liquidity exposures that participants may incur vis-à-vis each other. In this case there are no implementation measures.
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 7.10
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
An FMI should establish explicit rules and procedures that enable the FMI to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations on time following any individual or combined default among its participants. These rules and procedures should address unforeseen and potentially uncovered liquidity shortfalls and should aim to avoid unwinding, revoking, or delaying the same-day settlement of payment obligations. These rules and procedures should also indicate the FMI’s process to replenish any liquidity resources it may employ during a stress event, so that it can continue to operate in a safe and sound manner.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/390 Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework Note - rated as "consistent" for CSDs/SSSs that provide banking-type ancillary services
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
A CSD that employs DvP2/DvP3 settlement models and that does not provide any settlement guarantee should adopt the measures prescribed above in relation to liquidity exposures that participants may incur vis-à-vis each other. In this case there are no implementation measures.
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 7.2
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
An FMI should have effective operational and analytical tools to identify, measure, and monitor its settlement and funding flows on an ongoing and timely basis, including its use of intraday liquidity.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/390 Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework Note - rated as "consistent" for CSDs/SSSs that provide banking-type ancillary services
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
A CSD that employs DvP2/DvP3 settlement models and that does not provide any settlement guarantee should adopt the measures prescribed above in relation to liquidity exposures that participants may incur vis-à-vis each other. In this case there are no implementation measures.
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 7.3
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
A payment system or SSS, including one employing a DNS mechanism, should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day settlement, and where appropriate intraday or multiday settlement, of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate payment obligation in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/390 Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework Note - rated as "consistent" for CSDs/SSSs that provide banking-type ancillary services
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
A CSD that employs DvP2/DvP3 settlement models and that does not provide any settlement guarantee should adopt the measures prescribed above in relation to liquidity exposures that participants may incur vis-à-vis each other. In this case there are no implementation measures.
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 7.5
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
For the purpose of meeting its minimum liquid resource requirement, an FMI’s qualifying liquid resources in each currency include cash at the central bank of issue and at creditworthy commercial banks, committed lines of credit, committed foreign exchange swaps, and committed repos, as well as highly marketable collateral held in custody and investments that are readily available and convertible into cash with prearranged and highly reliable funding arrangements, even in extreme but plausible market conditions. If an FMI has access to routine credit at the central bank of issue, the FMI may count such access as part of the minimum requirement to the extent it has collateral that is eligible for pledging to (or for conducting other appropriate forms of transactions with) the relevant central bank. All such resources should be available when needed.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/390 Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework Note - rated as "consistent" for CSDs/SSSs that provide banking-type ancillary services
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
A CSD that employs DvP2/DvP3 settlement models and that does not provide any settlement guarantee should adopt the measures prescribed above in relation to liquidity exposures that participants may incur vis-à-vis each other. In this case there are no implementation measures.
Description of filters
Jurisdiction
This filter limits the search results to selected jurisdictions. The available jurisdictions represent assessments that have been completed to date. The table below provides also a pdf of key conclusions and recommendations for all Principles of a given jurisdiction.
| Jurisdiction and relevant authorities | Assessments and comments |
|---|---|
Australia RBA: Reserve Bank of Australia | |
Brazil BCB: Central Bank of Brazil | |
Canada | |
European Union ESMA: European Securities and Markets Authority | |
Hong Kong SAR HKMA: Hong Kong Monetary Authority | |
Japan | |
Singapore | |
Switzerland FINMA: Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority | |
Turkey CMB: Capital Markets Board of Türkiye | |
United Kingdom | |
United States CFTC: Commodity Futures Trading Commission |
FMI type
This filter limits the search results to the selected FMI types. FMIs may be subject to different regulatory, supervisory and oversight regimes depending on their organisation, function and design.
PS: Payment system
A set of instruments, procedures and rules for the transfer of funds between or among participants; the system includes the participants and the entity operating the arrangement.
CSD/SSS: Central securities depository / Securities settlement system
CSDs are entities that provide securities accounts, central safekeeping services and asset services, which may include the administration of corporate actions and redemptions, and play an important role in helping to ensure the integrity of securities issues (that securities are not accidentally or fraudulently created or destroyed or their details changed). The precise activities of a CSD vary based on jurisdiction and market practices.
SSS are entities that enable securities to be transferred and settled by book entry according to a set of predetermined multilateral rules. Such systems allow transfers of securities either free of payment or against payment. Typically, a CSD also operates an SSS.
CCP: Central counterparty
An entity that interposes itself between counterparties to contracts traded in one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer and thereby ensuring the performance of open contracts.
TR: Trade repository
An entity that maintains a centralised electronic record (database) of transaction data.
Principle or key consideration ID
This filter limits the search results to selected principles and key considerations. Each principle includes a headline standard and a list of key considerations that further explain the headline standard. The principles are listed below. A detailed list of key considerations is available in the CPMI-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures.
Principle rating
This filter limits the search results to selected principle rating(s) used in the L2 assessments. The ratings reflect conditions at the time of the assessment, and are built on key conclusions that reflect CPMI and IOSCO's collective expert judgment regarding the impact of identified gaps and/or shortcomings. Ratings are determined for each principle after the jurisdiction's legislative and regulatory framework, including policy statements, as relevant, was compared against the corresponding content of the PFMI.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified no gaps or shortcomings, or only a few gaps and/or shortcomings that have no material impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is broadly consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a minor impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is partly consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a significant impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is not consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a major impact on completeness and/or consistency.
This status corresponds to the case where no relevant FMI exists that is within the scope of the Principles. A rating of “NA” will be indicated only if no relevant regulatory measures are being taken and no such FMI is expected to develop within the jurisdiction.