PFMI implementation database
This is an online data repository of jurisdictions' implementation measures for the Principles for financial market infrastructures and associated CPMI and IOSCO assessment principle ratings. It complements the Level 2 assessment programme on the extent to which jurisdictions' implementation measures are complete and consistent with the international standards for payment systems, central securities depositories, securities settlement systems, central counterparties and trade repositories.
Note that authorities may have updated their rules, regulations and policies since the assessment. For current implementation measures, please contact the relevant authority.
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 3.3
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
An FMI should regularly review the material risks it bears from and poses to other entities (such as other FMIs, settlement banks, liquidity providers, and service providers) as a result of interdependencies and develop appropriate risk-management tools to address these risks.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/392 Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 3.4
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
An FMI should identify scenarios that may potentially prevent it from being able to provide its critical operations and services as a going concern and assess the effectiveness of a full range of options for recovery or orderly wind-down. An FMI should prepare appropriate plans for its recovery or orderly wind-down based on the results of that assessment. Where applicable, an FMI should also provide relevant authorities with the information needed for purposes of resolution planning.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Directive 2014/59/EU (BRRD) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/392 Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
There is no specific implementation measure with respect to the following part of KC 4: “Where applicable, an FMI should also provide relevant authorities with the information needed for purposes of resolution planning.” Instead, it is up to the national competent authorities to ensure that the CSDR requirement is duly implemented under the relevant national rules. This is considered to be a minor gap and so the Principle has been rated as consistent.
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 4.0
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/390 Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework Note - rated as "consistent" for CSDs/SSSs that provide banking-type ancillary services
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
An SSS that employs DvP2/DvP3 settlement models and that does not provide any settlement guarantee should effectively measure, monitor and manage the credit risk exposures arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes as well as maintain, at a minimum, sufficient resources to cover the exposures of the two participants and their affiliates that would create the largest aggregate credit exposure in the system. In this case there are no implementation measures. The EU authorities are recommended to implement measures to address the gaps or inconsistencies related to KCs 1, 2, 3, and 7.
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 4.1
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
An FMI should establish a robust framework to manage its credit exposures to its participants and the credit risks arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. Credit exposure may arise from current exposures, potential future exposures, or both.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/390 Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework Note - rated as "consistent" for CSDs/SSSs that provide banking-type ancillary services
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
A CSD that employs DvP2/DvP3 settlement models and that does not provide any settlement guarantee should adopt the measures prescribed above in relation to credit exposures that participants may incur vis-à-vis each other. In this case there are no implementation measures.
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 4.2
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
An FMI should identify sources of credit risk, routinely measure and monitor credit exposures, and use appropriate risk-management tools to control these risks.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/390 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/1229 Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework Note - rated as "consistent" for CSDs/SSSs that provide banking-type ancillary services
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
A CSD that employs DvP2/DvP3 settlement models and that does not provide any settlement guarantee should adopt the measures prescribed above in relation to credit exposures that participants may incur vis-à-vis each other. In this case there are no implementation measures.
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 4.3
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
A payment system or SSS should cover its current and, where they exist, potential future exposures to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence using collateral and other equivalent financial resources (see Principle 5 on collateral). In the case of a DNS payment system or DNS SSS in which there is no settlement guarantee but where its participants face credit exposures arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes, such an FMI should maintain, at a minimum, sufficient resources to cover the exposures of the two participants and their affiliates that would create the largest aggregate credit exposure in the system.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/390 Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework Note - rated as "consistent" for CSDs/SSSs that provide banking-type ancillary services
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
A CSD that employs DvP2/DvP3 settlement models and that does not provide any settlement guarantee should adopt the measures prescribed above in relation to credit exposures that participants may incur vis-à-vis each other. In this case there are no implementation measures.
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 4.7
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
An FMI should establish explicit rules and procedures that address fully any credit losses it may face as a result of any individual or combined default among its participants with respect to any of their obligations to the FMI. These rules and procedures should address how potentially uncovered credit losses would be allocated, including the repayment of any funds an FMI may borrow from liquidity providers. These rules and procedures should also indicate the FMI’s process to replenish any financial resources that the FMI may employ during a stress event, so that the FMI can continue to operate in a safe and sound manner.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/390 Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework Note - rated as "consistent" for CSDs/SSSs that provide banking-type ancillary services
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
A CSD that employs DvP2/DvP3 settlement models and that does not provide any settlement guarantee should adopt the measures prescribed above in relation to credit exposures that participants may incur vis-à-vis each other. In this case there are no implementation measures.
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 5.0
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
An FMI that requires collateral to manage its or its participants’ credit exposure should accept collateral with low credit, liquidity, and market risks. An FMI should also set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/390 Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 5.1
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
An FMI should generally limit the assets it (routinely) accepts as collateral to those with low credit, liquidity, and market risks.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/390 Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework
EU-EC,ESMA,ECB,EBA
- Principle ID 5.2
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Oct-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Oct-2019
Principle
An FMI should establish prudent valuation practices and develop haircuts that are regularly tested and take into account stressed market conditions.
Implementation measures
Regulation No 909/2014/EU (CSDR) Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/390 Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework T2S Oversight Framework
Description of filters
Jurisdiction
This filter limits the search results to selected jurisdictions. The available jurisdictions represent assessments that have been completed to date. The table below provides also a pdf of key conclusions and recommendations for all Principles of a given jurisdiction.
| Jurisdiction and relevant authorities | Assessments and comments |
|---|---|
Australia RBA: Reserve Bank of Australia | |
Brazil BCB: Central Bank of Brazil | |
Canada | |
European Union ESMA: European Securities and Markets Authority | |
Hong Kong SAR HKMA: Hong Kong Monetary Authority | |
Japan | |
Singapore | |
Switzerland FINMA: Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority | |
Turkey CMB: Capital Markets Board of Türkiye | |
United Kingdom | |
United States CFTC: Commodity Futures Trading Commission |
FMI type
This filter limits the search results to the selected FMI types. FMIs may be subject to different regulatory, supervisory and oversight regimes depending on their organisation, function and design.
PS: Payment system
A set of instruments, procedures and rules for the transfer of funds between or among participants; the system includes the participants and the entity operating the arrangement.
CSD/SSS: Central securities depository / Securities settlement system
CSDs are entities that provide securities accounts, central safekeeping services and asset services, which may include the administration of corporate actions and redemptions, and play an important role in helping to ensure the integrity of securities issues (that securities are not accidentally or fraudulently created or destroyed or their details changed). The precise activities of a CSD vary based on jurisdiction and market practices.
SSS are entities that enable securities to be transferred and settled by book entry according to a set of predetermined multilateral rules. Such systems allow transfers of securities either free of payment or against payment. Typically, a CSD also operates an SSS.
CCP: Central counterparty
An entity that interposes itself between counterparties to contracts traded in one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer and thereby ensuring the performance of open contracts.
TR: Trade repository
An entity that maintains a centralised electronic record (database) of transaction data.
Principle or key consideration ID
This filter limits the search results to selected principles and key considerations. Each principle includes a headline standard and a list of key considerations that further explain the headline standard. The principles are listed below. A detailed list of key considerations is available in the CPMI-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures.
Principle rating
This filter limits the search results to selected principle rating(s) used in the L2 assessments. The ratings reflect conditions at the time of the assessment, and are built on key conclusions that reflect CPMI and IOSCO's collective expert judgment regarding the impact of identified gaps and/or shortcomings. Ratings are determined for each principle after the jurisdiction's legislative and regulatory framework, including policy statements, as relevant, was compared against the corresponding content of the PFMI.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified no gaps or shortcomings, or only a few gaps and/or shortcomings that have no material impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is broadly consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a minor impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is partly consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a significant impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is not consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a major impact on completeness and/or consistency.
This status corresponds to the case where no relevant FMI exists that is within the scope of the Principles. A rating of “NA” will be indicated only if no relevant regulatory measures are being taken and no such FMI is expected to develop within the jurisdiction.