PFMI implementation database
This is an online data repository of jurisdictions' implementation measures for the Principles for financial market infrastructures and associated CPMI and IOSCO assessment principle ratings. It complements the Level 2 assessment programme on the extent to which jurisdictions' implementation measures are complete and consistent with the international standards for payment systems, central securities depositories, securities settlement systems, central counterparties and trade repositories.
Note that authorities may have updated their rules, regulations and policies since the assessment. For current implementation measures, please contact the relevant authority.
US-SEC
- Principle ID 6.3
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
A CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants for all products through an effective margin system that is risk-based and regularly reviewed.
Implementation measures
See above citations to the Exchange Act and proposed Rules 17Ad-22(e)(6)(iii), (e)(6)(v), and (a)(14) thereunder in response to Key Consideration 1, and the following rule under the Exchange Act. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ad-22(b)(2): http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2013-title17-vol3/pdf/CFR-2013-title17-vol3-sec240-17Ad-22.pdf
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
The SEC’s proposed rules do not explicitly require that: the model use a conservative estimate of the time horizon; or limit the need for destabilising procyclical changes. While the proposed rules would require a CCP to consider, and produce margin levels commensurate with, the risks and particular attributes of each relevant product, portfolio, and market, they do not explicitly contemplate CCPs that calculate margin at more granular levels such as subportfolio levels.
US-SEC
- Principle ID 6.4
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
A CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants for all products through an effective margin system that is risk-based and regularly reviewed.
Implementation measures
See above citations to the Exchange Act and proposed Rule 17Ad-22(e)(6)(ii) thereunder in response to Key Consideration 1.
US-SEC
- Principle ID 6.5
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
A CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants for all products through an effective margin system that is risk-based and regularly reviewed.
Implementation measures
See above citations to the Exchange Act and proposed Rule 17Ad-22(e)(6)(i) thereunder in response to Key Consideration 1.
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
There are no proposed requirements relating to margin offsets between products and cross-margining arrangements. However, 17Ad 22(e)(6)(i) requires CCPs to consider the attributes of relevant products; arguably, this rule may be applied to ensure prudent offsets and cross-margining arrangements. There are, however, no explicit provisions in the proposed regime regarding the scope of permissible margin offsets or rules requiring that if two or more CCPs are authorised to offer cross-margining, they must have appropriate safeguards and harmonised overall risk management systems.
US-SEC
- Principle ID 6.6
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
A CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants for all products through an effective margin system that is risk-based and regularly reviewed.
Implementation measures
See above citations to the Exchange Act and proposed Rules 17Ad-22(e)(6)(vi), (a)(1), and (a)(6) thereunder in response to Key Consideration 1.
US-SEC
- Principle ID 6.7
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
A CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants for all products through an effective margin system that is risk-based and regularly reviewed.
Implementation measures
See above citations to the Exchange Act and proposed Rules 17Ad-22(e)(6)(vi), (e)(6)(vii), (a)(1), (a)(5), and (a)(6) thereunder in response to Key Consideration 1, and the following rule under the Exchange Act: 17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ad-22(b)(4): http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2013-title17-vol3/pdf/CFR-2013-title17-vol3-sec240-17Ad-22.pdf
US-SEC
- Principle ID 7.0
- Rating Broadly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
The standards in Principle 7 are addressed by the following statutory provisions and proposed rules: Section 17A of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title15/pdf/USCODE-2011-title15-chap2B-sec78q-1.pdf Section 19 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78s: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title15/pdf/USCODE-2011-title15-chap2B-sec78s.pdf Proposed Rules 17Ad-22(e)(7), (a)(5), (a)(15), and (a)(18): http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-03-26/pdf/2014-05806.pdf
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
Recommendation: The SEC is recommended to implement measures which address the gaps or inconsistencies identified, specifically those related to key consideration 10. Key conclusion: The proposed implementation measures of the SEC are broadly consistent with Principle 7. The overall rating has been influenced by a shortcoming in key consideration 10. Gaps or shortcomings identified with other key considerations have no material impact on completeness or consistency.
US-SEC
- Principle ID 7.1
- Rating Broadly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
Section 17A(a)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(a)(2)(A): Section 17A(b)(3)(A) and (F) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(b)(3)(A), (F): http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title15/pdf/USCODE-2011-title15-chap2B-sec78q-1.pdf Proposed Rule 17Ad-22(a)(5), (a)(15), (a)(18), (e)(7): http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-03-26/pdf/2014-05806.pdf
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
Although proposed rule 17Ad 22(e)(7) does not list the entities which a CCP should consider in managing its liquidity risks, the rule requires a CCP to measure, monitor and manage the liquidity risks it faces; the intention of the rule is clearly to include all entities listed in key consideration 1.
US-SEC
- Principle ID 7.10
- Rating Broadly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
See above citations to the Exchange Act and proposed Rules 17Ad-22(e)(7)(viii) and (ix) thereunder in response to Key Consideration 1.
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
Proposed rule 17Ad 22(e)(7)(viii) requires a CCP to maintain policies and procedures to address foreseeable liquidity shortfalls; however key consideration 10 also expects a CCP to address ‘unforeseen and potentially uncovered liquidity shortfalls’.
US-SEC
- Principle ID 7.2
- Rating Broadly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
See above citations to the Exchange Act and proposed Rule 17Ad-22(e)(7) thereunder in response to Key Consideration 1.
US-SEC
- Principle ID 7.4
- Rating Broadly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
See above citations to the Exchange Act and proposed Rules 17Ad-22(e)(7)(i) and (x) thereunder in response to Key Consideration 1.
Description of filters
Jurisdiction
This filter limits the search results to selected jurisdictions. The available jurisdictions represent assessments that have been completed to date. The table below provides also a pdf of key conclusions and recommendations for all Principles of a given jurisdiction.
| Jurisdiction and relevant authorities | Assessments and comments |
|---|---|
Australia RBA: Reserve Bank of Australia | |
Brazil BCB: Central Bank of Brazil | |
Canada | |
European Union ESMA: European Securities and Markets Authority | |
Hong Kong SAR HKMA: Hong Kong Monetary Authority | |
Japan | |
Singapore | |
Switzerland FINMA: Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority | |
Turkey CMB: Capital Markets Board of Türkiye | |
United Kingdom | |
United States CFTC: Commodity Futures Trading Commission |
FMI type
This filter limits the search results to the selected FMI types. FMIs may be subject to different regulatory, supervisory and oversight regimes depending on their organisation, function and design.
PS: Payment system
A set of instruments, procedures and rules for the transfer of funds between or among participants; the system includes the participants and the entity operating the arrangement.
CSD/SSS: Central securities depository / Securities settlement system
CSDs are entities that provide securities accounts, central safekeeping services and asset services, which may include the administration of corporate actions and redemptions, and play an important role in helping to ensure the integrity of securities issues (that securities are not accidentally or fraudulently created or destroyed or their details changed). The precise activities of a CSD vary based on jurisdiction and market practices.
SSS are entities that enable securities to be transferred and settled by book entry according to a set of predetermined multilateral rules. Such systems allow transfers of securities either free of payment or against payment. Typically, a CSD also operates an SSS.
CCP: Central counterparty
An entity that interposes itself between counterparties to contracts traded in one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer and thereby ensuring the performance of open contracts.
TR: Trade repository
An entity that maintains a centralised electronic record (database) of transaction data.
Principle or key consideration ID
This filter limits the search results to selected principles and key considerations. Each principle includes a headline standard and a list of key considerations that further explain the headline standard. The principles are listed below. A detailed list of key considerations is available in the CPMI-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures.
Principle rating
This filter limits the search results to selected principle rating(s) used in the L2 assessments. The ratings reflect conditions at the time of the assessment, and are built on key conclusions that reflect CPMI and IOSCO's collective expert judgment regarding the impact of identified gaps and/or shortcomings. Ratings are determined for each principle after the jurisdiction's legislative and regulatory framework, including policy statements, as relevant, was compared against the corresponding content of the PFMI.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified no gaps or shortcomings, or only a few gaps and/or shortcomings that have no material impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is broadly consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a minor impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is partly consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a significant impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is not consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a major impact on completeness and/or consistency.
This status corresponds to the case where no relevant FMI exists that is within the scope of the Principles. A rating of “NA” will be indicated only if no relevant regulatory measures are being taken and no such FMI is expected to develop within the jurisdiction.