PFMI implementation database
This is an online data repository of jurisdictions' implementation measures for the Principles for financial market infrastructures and associated CPMI and IOSCO assessment principle ratings. It complements the Level 2 assessment programme on the extent to which jurisdictions' implementation measures are complete and consistent with the international standards for payment systems, central securities depositories, securities settlement systems, central counterparties and trade repositories.
Note that authorities may have updated their rules, regulations and policies since the assessment. For current implementation measures, please contact the relevant authority.
US-SEC
- Principle ID 3.2
- Rating Broadly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.
Implementation measures
See above citations to Section 17A of the Exchange Act in response to Key Consideration 1.
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
The details of key consideration 2 are not addressed separately in the proposed rules and the headline does not provide sufficient details to be able to consider the substance of the key consideration to have been implemented. In practice the required implementing measures might be covered by other Principles (e.g. Principle 6 on margin and Principle 4 on default fund contributions and loss allocation act (among other things)) as incentives for participants to manage the risks they pose to the CCP. Taking all this together, the shortcoming in details of the implementation measure regarding key consideration 2 is assessed to have no material impact on consistency.
US-SEC
- Principle ID 3.3
- Rating Broadly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.
Implementation measures
See above citations to Section 17A of the Exchange Act and proposed Rule 17Ad-22(e)(3)(i) thereunder in response to Key Consideration 1.
US-SEC
- Principle ID 3.4
- Rating Broadly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.
Implementation measures
See above citations to Section 17A of the Exchange Act and proposed Rule 17Ad-22(e)(3)(ii) thereunder in response to Key Consideration 1.
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
The proposed rules require that CCPs have recovery and orderly wind-down plans. The proposed SEC rules do not, however, require that a CCP identify scenarios that potentially could prevent the CCP from being able to provide its critical operations and services and assess the effectiveness of a full range of options for recovery or orderly wind-down. Further, the proposed SEC rules do not require that a CCP’s plans for its recovery or orderly wind-down be based on the results of that assessment. Nor do the rules require a CCP to provide relevant authorities with the information needed for purposes of resolution planning although this is not a hard requirement in the key consideration.
US-SEC
- Principle ID 4.0
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
The standards in Principle 4 are addressed by the following statutory provisions, rules, and proposed rules: Section 17A of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title15/pdf/USCODE-2011-title15-chap2B-sec78q-1.pdf Section 19 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78s: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title15/pdf/USCODE-2011-title15-chap2B-sec78s.pdf 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17Ad-22(b)(1), (b)(3), and (d)(14): http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2013-title17-vol3/pdf/CFR-2013-title17-vol3-sec240-17Ad-22.pdf Proposed Rules 17Ad-22(e)(4), (e)(13), (a)(5), and (a)(18): http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-03-26/pdf/2014-05806.pdf
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
Recommendation: The SEC is recommended to implement measures which address the gaps or inconsistencies identified, specifically those related to key consideration 6. Key considersation: The proposed implementation measures of the SEC are consistent with Principle 4; however, the SEC’s proposed rules are less detailed than key consideration 6. Gaps or shortcomings identified with other key considerations have no material impact on completeness or consistency.
US-SEC
- Principle ID 4.1
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
Section 17A(a)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(a)(2)(A); Section 17A(b)(3)(A) and (F) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(b)(3)(A), (F): http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title15/pdf/USCODE-2011-title15-chap2B-sec78q-1.pdf Proposed Rule 17Ad-22(e)(4); Proposed Rule 17Ad-22(a)(5); Proposed Rule 17Ad-22(a)(18): http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-03-26/pdf/2014-05806.pdf
US-SEC
- Principle ID 4.2
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
See above citations to the Exchange Act and proposed Rule 17Ad-22(e)(4) thereunder in response to Key Consideration 1, and the following rule under the Exchange Act: 17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ad-22(b)(1): http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2013-title17-vol3/pdf/CFR-2013-title17-vol3-sec240-17Ad-22.pdf
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
Proposed rule 17Ad 22(e)(4) substantially mirrors key consideration 2 and will require covered clearing agencies to credit risks arising from its participants and its ‘payment, clearing, and settlement processes’. While this rule is still narrower in drafting than key consideration 2, because it does not require a CCP to identify all sources of credit risk, this gap does not have a material impact on the completeness of the SEC’s proposed rules. There is no requirement in the SEC’s proposed rules to use ‘appropriate risk management tools.’
US-SEC
- Principle ID 4.4
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
See above citations to the Exchange Act and proposed Rule 17Ad-22(e)(4)(i) through (iii) thereunder in response to Key Consideration 1, and the following rules under the Exchange Act: 17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ad-22(b)(3); 17 C.F.R. § 240.17Ad-22(d)(14): http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2013-title17-vol3/pdf/CFR-2013-title17-vol3-sec240-17Ad-22.pdf
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
The SEC’s proposed rules refer to ‘foreseeable stress scenarios’ while key consideration 4 refers to ‘potential stress scenarios’. This drafting should not affect the intention or completeness of the SEC’s rules.
US-SEC
- Principle ID 4.5
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
See above citations to the Exchange Act and proposed Rules 17Ad-22(e)(4)(vi), (e)(4)(vii), (a)(5), and (a)(18) thereunder in response to Key Consideration 1.
US-SEC
- Principle ID 4.6
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
See above citations to the Exchange Act and proposed Rules 17Ad-22(e)(4)(vi) and (a)(18) thereunder in response to Key Consideration 1.
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
Although the intention of the SEC’s proposed rules is consistent with key consideration 6, the gaps outlined have a minor impact on the completeness of the SEC’s rules with respect to key consideration 6. The SEC’s proposed rules are less detailed than key consideration 6. While the SEC’s proposed rules require CCPs to consider a ‘wide range of scenarios’ (proposed rule 17Ad 22(e)(4)((ii) and (iii)) and to consider ‘extreme but plausible price changes or…other valuation inputs and assumptions’ (17Ad 22(a)(18)), the rules do not set out the specific scenarios considered by key consideration 6. The proposed rules do not require CCPs to consider a wide range of defaulters’ positions.
US-SEC
- Principle ID 4.7
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
See above citations to the Exchange Act and the following proposed rule thereunder: Proposed Rule 17Ad-22(e)(13): http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-03-26/pdf/2014-05806.pdf
Description of filters
Jurisdiction
This filter limits the search results to selected jurisdictions. The available jurisdictions represent assessments that have been completed to date. The table below provides also a pdf of key conclusions and recommendations for all Principles of a given jurisdiction.
| Jurisdiction and relevant authorities | Assessments and comments |
|---|---|
Australia RBA: Reserve Bank of Australia | |
Brazil BCB: Central Bank of Brazil | |
Canada | |
European Union ESMA: European Securities and Markets Authority | |
Hong Kong SAR HKMA: Hong Kong Monetary Authority | |
Japan | |
Singapore | |
Switzerland FINMA: Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority | |
Turkey CMB: Capital Markets Board of Türkiye | |
United Kingdom | |
United States CFTC: Commodity Futures Trading Commission |
FMI type
This filter limits the search results to the selected FMI types. FMIs may be subject to different regulatory, supervisory and oversight regimes depending on their organisation, function and design.
PS: Payment system
A set of instruments, procedures and rules for the transfer of funds between or among participants; the system includes the participants and the entity operating the arrangement.
CSD/SSS: Central securities depository / Securities settlement system
CSDs are entities that provide securities accounts, central safekeeping services and asset services, which may include the administration of corporate actions and redemptions, and play an important role in helping to ensure the integrity of securities issues (that securities are not accidentally or fraudulently created or destroyed or their details changed). The precise activities of a CSD vary based on jurisdiction and market practices.
SSS are entities that enable securities to be transferred and settled by book entry according to a set of predetermined multilateral rules. Such systems allow transfers of securities either free of payment or against payment. Typically, a CSD also operates an SSS.
CCP: Central counterparty
An entity that interposes itself between counterparties to contracts traded in one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer and thereby ensuring the performance of open contracts.
TR: Trade repository
An entity that maintains a centralised electronic record (database) of transaction data.
Principle or key consideration ID
This filter limits the search results to selected principles and key considerations. Each principle includes a headline standard and a list of key considerations that further explain the headline standard. The principles are listed below. A detailed list of key considerations is available in the CPMI-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures.
Principle rating
This filter limits the search results to selected principle rating(s) used in the L2 assessments. The ratings reflect conditions at the time of the assessment, and are built on key conclusions that reflect CPMI and IOSCO's collective expert judgment regarding the impact of identified gaps and/or shortcomings. Ratings are determined for each principle after the jurisdiction's legislative and regulatory framework, including policy statements, as relevant, was compared against the corresponding content of the PFMI.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified no gaps or shortcomings, or only a few gaps and/or shortcomings that have no material impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is broadly consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a minor impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is partly consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a significant impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is not consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a major impact on completeness and/or consistency.
This status corresponds to the case where no relevant FMI exists that is within the scope of the Principles. A rating of “NA” will be indicated only if no relevant regulatory measures are being taken and no such FMI is expected to develop within the jurisdiction.