PFMI implementation database
This is an online data repository of jurisdictions' implementation measures for the Principles for financial market infrastructures and associated CPMI and IOSCO assessment principle ratings. It complements the Level 2 assessment programme on the extent to which jurisdictions' implementation measures are complete and consistent with the international standards for payment systems, central securities depositories, securities settlement systems, central counterparties and trade repositories.
Note that authorities may have updated their rules, regulations and policies since the assessment. For current implementation measures, please contact the relevant authority.
BR-BCB,CVM
- Principle ID 2.0
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 30-May-2020
Assessment rating date: 30-May-2018
Principle
An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.
Implementation measures
BCB Policy Statement 25,097 BCB Policy Statement 30,516 CVM Instruction No. 461 (amended by CVM Instruction No. 544 of December 2013); Article 110, Paragraphs 4 and 5 Law No. 12,810, Article 28. Law No. 13,506, Article 1; Article 3 Resolution CMN 2,882, Article 1; Article 5, Subparagraphs II and III; Article 6, Subparagraphs II and III
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
The consistent rating for this Principle is driven by the BCB’s policy statements 25,097 and 30,516, supported by an analysis of how FMIs are required to observe the PFMI Principle and KCs. These measures cover the gap created by the overlap between the pre-existing and new implementation measures for some parts of this Principle. The relevant authorities may want to consider making it formally and publicly explicit that, in the absence of adequate or sufficiently detailed rules or of overlapping rules, the PFMI will apply in full.
BR-BCB,CVM
- Principle ID 2.1
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 30-May-2020
Assessment rating date: 30-May-2018
Principle
An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.
Implementation measures
As above, and in addition: Circular BCB 3.743, Annex, Article 2; Article 11. Circular BCB 3057, Article 2 CVM Instruction No. 461 (amended by CVM Instruction No. 544 of December 2013) Article 14; Resolution CMN 2,554, Article 1; Article 4 Resolution CMN 2,882, Article 3; Article 8
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
In the pre-existing regulation there is no requirement for Trade Repositories to explicitly support financial stability, although under the pre-existing regulations TRs are required to observe the principles of efficiency, safety, integrity and reliability. This gap is covered by the BCB’s policy statements 25,097 and 30,516, supported through the relevant supervisory evidence that provided context on how FMIs are required to observe the PFMI Principle and KCs.
BR-BCB,CVM
- Principle ID 2.2
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 30-May-2020
Assessment rating date: 30-May-2018
Principle
An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.
Implementation measures
As above, and in addition: Circular BCB 3.743, Annex, Article 2, Article 11. Circular BCB 3057, Article 2; Annex Article 20; Annex Article 21 CVM Instruction No. 461 (amended by CVM Instruction No. 544 of December 2013) Article 19; Article 22; Resolution CMN 2,554, Article 1; Article 2; Article 4 Resolution CMN 2,882, Article 3; Article 8
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
The pre-existing regulations do not require TRs to disclose their documented governance arrangements to owners, participants, and, at a more general level, the public. This gap is covered by the BCB’s policy statements 25,097 and 30,516, supported through the relevant supervisory evidence that provided context on how FMIs are required to observe the PFMI Principle and KCs.
BR-BCB,CVM
- Principle ID 2.3
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 30-May-2020
Assessment rating date: 30-May-2018
Principle
An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.
Implementation measures
As above, and in addition: Circular BCB 3.743, Annex, Article 2; Article 11. Circular BCB 3057, Article 2; Annex Article 20; Annex Article 21 CVM Instruction No. 461 (amended by CVM Instruction No. 544 of December 2013), Article 24; Resolution CMN 2,554, Article 1; Article 4 Resolution CMN 2,882, Article 3; Article 8
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
The pre-existing regulations are not specific on the requirement to review both the overall performance of the board and the performance of the individual board members. This gap is covered by the BCB’s policy statements 25,097 and 30,516, supported through the relevant supervisory evidence that provided context on how FMIs are required to observe the PFMI Principle and KCs.
BR-BCB,CVM
- Principle ID 2.4
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 30-May-2020
Assessment rating date: 30-May-2018
Principle
An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.
Implementation measures
Resolution CMN 2,882, Article 1, Article 5, Subparagraphs II and III, and Article 6, Subparagraphs II and III Law No. 12,810, Article 28. BCB Policy Statement 25,097 CVM Instruction No. 461, Article 110, Paragraphs 4 and 5 Law No. 13,506, Article 1, and Article 3
BR-BCB,CVM
- Principle ID 2.5
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 30-May-2020
Assessment rating date: 30-May-2018
Principle
An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.
Implementation measures
Resolution CMN 2,882, Article 1, Article 5, Subparagraphs II and III, and Article 6, Subparagraphs II and III Law No. 12,810, Article 28. BCB Policy Statement 25,097 CVM Instruction No. 461, Article 110, Paragraphs 4 and 5 Law No. 13,506, Article 1, and Article 3
BR-BCB,CVM
- Principle ID 2.6
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 30-May-2020
Assessment rating date: 30-May-2018
Principle
An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.
Implementation measures
As above, and in addition: Circular BCB 3.743, Article 11. CVM Instruction No. 461 (amended by CVM Instruction No. 544 of December 2013) Article 27; Article 31; Article 63; Article 75; Resolution CMN 2,554, Article 1; Article 2; Article 3; Article 4 Resolution CMN 2,882, Article 3; Article 8
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
The pre-existing regulations specifically refer to internal controls and in some cases to operational risk, but it is not clear that such requirements cover the broader risk-management framework; there is no explicit reference to decision-making in crisis and emergencies (but only a general reference to “measures provided for contingency or emergency situations”); and there are no clear requirements or provisions for the risk-management and internal control functions to have sufficient authority, independence, resources, and access to the board. This gap is covered by the BCB’s policy statements 25,097 and 30,516, supported through the relevant supervisory evidence that provided context on how FMIs are required to observe the PFMI Principle and KCs.
BR-BCB,CVM
- Principle ID 2.7
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 30-May-2020
Assessment rating date: 30-May-2018
Principle
An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.
Implementation measures
As above, and in addition: Circular BCB 3.743, Annex, Article 2; Article 11. Circular BCB 3057, Article 2 CVM Instruction No. 461 (amended by CVM Instruction No. 544 of December 2013) Article 14; Resolution CMN 2,554, Article 1; Article 2; Article 4 Resolution CMN 2,882, Article 3; Article 8
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
The pre-existing regulations are not clear on the requirements for the board to ensure that the Trade Repository’s design, rules, overall strategy, and major decisions reflect appropriately the legitimate interests of its direct and indirect participants and other relevant stakeholders; also, the pre-existing regulations are not clear on the provisions for requiring the disclosure of major decisions to relevant stakeholders and the public. This gap is covered by the BCB’s policy statements 25,097 and 30,516, supported through the relevant supervisory evidence that provided context on how FMIs are required to observe the PFMI Principle and KCs.
BR-BCB,CVM
- Principle ID 20.0
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 30-May-2020
Assessment rating date: 30-May-2018
Principle
An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.
Implementation measures
BCB Policy Statement 25,097 BCB Policy Statement 30,516 CVM Instruction No. 461 (amended by CVM Instruction No. 544 of December 2013); Article 110, Paragraphs 4 and 5 Law No. 12,810, Article 28. Law No. 13,506, Article 1; Article 3 Resolution CMN 2,882, Article 1; Article 5, Subparagraphs II and III; Article 6, Subparagraphs II and III
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
The consistent rating for this Principle is driven by the BCB’s policy statements 25,097 and 30,516, supported by an analysis of how FMIs are required to observe the PFMI Principle and KCs. These measures cover the gap created by the overlap between the pre-existing and new implementation measures for some parts of this Principle. The relevant authorities may want to consider making it formally and publicly explicit that, in the absence of adequate or sufficiently detailed rules or of overlapping rules, the PFMI will apply in full.
BR-BCB,CVM
- Principle ID 20.1
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 30-May-2020
Assessment rating date: 30-May-2018
Principle
An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.
Implementation measures
As above, and in addition: Circular BCB 3.743, Annex Article 2; Annex Article 3; Annex Article 11 Circular BCB 3057, Article 2; Annex Article 11-A; Annex Article 15; Annex Article 22 Resolution CMN 2,554, Article 1; Article 2 Resolution CMN 2,882, Article 3; Article 8
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
Although the pre-existing regulations require that the TR’s internal controls identify “internal and external factors that may adversely affect the attainment of the institution’s objectives”, and also require that “Internal controls shall be periodically revised and updated, in a way to incorporate measures related to new or previously untreated risks”, it is not clear that these provisions address the need for TRs to identify all potential sources of risk arising from link arrangements before entering into a such arrangements, as foreseen in this Key Consideration. This gap is covered by the BCB’s policy statements 25,097 and 30,516, supported through the relevant supervisory evidence that provided context on how FMIs are required to observe the PFMI Principle and KCs.
Description of filters
Jurisdiction
This filter limits the search results to selected jurisdictions. The available jurisdictions represent assessments that have been completed to date. The table below provides also a pdf of key conclusions and recommendations for all Principles of a given jurisdiction.
| Jurisdiction and relevant authorities | Assessments and comments |
|---|---|
Australia RBA: Reserve Bank of Australia | |
Brazil BCB: Central Bank of Brazil | |
Canada | |
European Union ESMA: European Securities and Markets Authority | |
Hong Kong SAR HKMA: Hong Kong Monetary Authority | |
Japan | |
Singapore | |
Switzerland FINMA: Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority | |
Turkey CMB: Capital Markets Board of Türkiye | |
United Kingdom | |
United States CFTC: Commodity Futures Trading Commission |
FMI type
This filter limits the search results to the selected FMI types. FMIs may be subject to different regulatory, supervisory and oversight regimes depending on their organisation, function and design.
PS: Payment system
A set of instruments, procedures and rules for the transfer of funds between or among participants; the system includes the participants and the entity operating the arrangement.
CSD/SSS: Central securities depository / Securities settlement system
CSDs are entities that provide securities accounts, central safekeeping services and asset services, which may include the administration of corporate actions and redemptions, and play an important role in helping to ensure the integrity of securities issues (that securities are not accidentally or fraudulently created or destroyed or their details changed). The precise activities of a CSD vary based on jurisdiction and market practices.
SSS are entities that enable securities to be transferred and settled by book entry according to a set of predetermined multilateral rules. Such systems allow transfers of securities either free of payment or against payment. Typically, a CSD also operates an SSS.
CCP: Central counterparty
An entity that interposes itself between counterparties to contracts traded in one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer and thereby ensuring the performance of open contracts.
TR: Trade repository
An entity that maintains a centralised electronic record (database) of transaction data.
Principle or key consideration ID
This filter limits the search results to selected principles and key considerations. Each principle includes a headline standard and a list of key considerations that further explain the headline standard. The principles are listed below. A detailed list of key considerations is available in the CPMI-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures.
Principle rating
This filter limits the search results to selected principle rating(s) used in the L2 assessments. The ratings reflect conditions at the time of the assessment, and are built on key conclusions that reflect CPMI and IOSCO's collective expert judgment regarding the impact of identified gaps and/or shortcomings. Ratings are determined for each principle after the jurisdiction's legislative and regulatory framework, including policy statements, as relevant, was compared against the corresponding content of the PFMI.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified no gaps or shortcomings, or only a few gaps and/or shortcomings that have no material impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is broadly consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a minor impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is partly consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a significant impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is not consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a major impact on completeness and/or consistency.
This status corresponds to the case where no relevant FMI exists that is within the scope of the Principles. A rating of “NA” will be indicated only if no relevant regulatory measures are being taken and no such FMI is expected to develop within the jurisdiction.