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PFMI implementation database

This is an online data repository of jurisdictions' implementation measures for the Principles for financial market infrastructures and associated CPMI and IOSCO assessment principle ratings. It complements the Level 2 assessment programme on the extent to which jurisdictions' implementation measures are complete and consistent with the international standards for payment systems, central securities depositories, securities settlement systems, central counterparties and trade repositories.

Note that authorities may have updated their rules, regulations and policies since the assessment. For current implementation measures, please contact the relevant authority.

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United States CCP
US-CFTC
  • Principle ID 23.5
  • Rating Consistent

Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014

Principle

An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.

Implementation measures

CFTC regulations 17 C.F.R. 39.37(a), (b), (c) "Further, the Commission notes that on October 15, 2013, CPMI–IOSCO published a consultative document on public quantitative disclosure standards for central counterparties. Moreover, CPMI–IOSCO states that these quantitative disclosures, together with the PFMI Disclosure framework also published by CPMI–IOSCO, would form the minimum disclosures expected of CCPs under Principle 23, Key Consideration 5, of the Principles. Thus, if and when such public quantitative disclosure standards are finalised, the Commission would expect SIDCOs and Subpart C DCOs to look to such standards in complying with the requirements set forth in regulation 39.37(c).” See Derivatives Clearing Organizations and International Standards (Part 39, Subpart C), 78 FR 72476, 72494 (December 2, 2013).

United States CCP
US-CFTC
  • Principle ID 3.0
  • Rating Consistent

Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014

Principle

An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.

Implementation measures

The standards set forth in Principle 3 are addressed in CFTC regulations 17 C.F.R. 39.13, 39.14, 39.18, 39.33, and 39.39. These regulations are available at the following links: Regulation 39.13: http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/retrieveECFR?gp=1&SID=22f77fcf888b8732ca305462f985b01d&ty=HTML&h=L&r=SECTION&n=17y1.0.1.1.32.2.7.5 Regulation 39.14: http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/retrieveECFR?gp=1&SID=22f77fcf888b8732ca305462f985b01d&ty=HTML&h=L&r=SECTION&n=17y1.0.1.1.32.2.7.6 Regulation 39.18: http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/retrieveECFR?gp=1&SID=22f77fcf888b8732ca305462f985b01d&ty=HTML&h=L&r=SECTION&n=17y1.0.1.1.32.2.7.10 Regulation 39.33: http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/retrieveECFR?gp=1&SID=22f77fcf888b8732ca305462f985b01d&ty=HTML&h=L&r=SECTION&n=17y1.0.1.1.32.3.7.4 Regulation 39.39: http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/retrieveECFR?gp=1&SID=22f77fcf888b8732ca305462f985b01d&ty=HTML&h=L&r=SECTION&n=17y1.0.1.1.32.3.7.10

Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)

The implementation measures of the CFTC are consistent with Principle 3, although there are some gaps or shortcomings with key consideration 2 that have no material impact on completeness or consistency. Recommendation: The CFTC is recommended to make public the intended interpretation of matters identified in the course of this assessment, and other matters as they may come to light, that rely on regulation 39.40 to clarify their consistency with the Principles.

United States CCP
US-CFTC
  • Principle ID 3.1
  • Rating Consistent

Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014

Principle

An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.

Implementation measures

CFTC regulations 17 C.F.R. 39.13(a), (b), (e), (f), (g)

United States CCP
US-CFTC
  • Principle ID 3.2
  • Rating Consistent

Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014

Principle

An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.

Implementation measures

CFTC regulations 17 C.F.R. 39.13(e), (f), (g), (h)

Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)

The CFTC rules do not explicitly cover the provision of incentives to a CCP’s participants and customers to manage and contain the risks they pose to the CCP. This shortcoming may be addressed by CFTC regulation 39.40 which states that Part 39 of the CFTC’s regulations is intended to establish standards that are consistent with the Principles and should be interpreted in that context.

United States CCP
US-CFTC
  • Principle ID 3.3
  • Rating Consistent

Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014

Principle

An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.

Implementation measures

CFTC regulations 17 C.F.R. 39.13(h)(5)(i)-(ii); 39.14(c)(3); 39.18(e), (f), (j), (k); 39.33(d)(2); 39.36(c)

United States CCP
US-CFTC
  • Principle ID 3.4
  • Rating Consistent

Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014

Principle

An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.

Implementation measures

CFTC regulations 17 C.F.R. 39.39(b); 39.39(c)(1); 39.39(c)(2)

United States CCP
US-CFTC
  • Principle ID 4.0
  • Rating Consistent

Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014

Principle

An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.

Implementation measures

The standards set forth in Principle 4 are addressed in Section 5b of the Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC regulations 17 C.F.R. 39.11, 39.13, 39.16, 39.33, 39.35, and 39.36. The statute and regulations are available at the following links: Commodity Exchange Act, Section 5b, 7 U.S.C. 7a-1: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title7/pdf/USCODE-2011-title7-chap1-sec7a-1.pdf Regulation 39.11: http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/retrieveECFR?gp=1&SID=22f77fcf888b8732ca305462f985b01d&ty=HTML&h=L&r=SECTION&n=17y1.0.1.1.32.2.7.3 Regulation 39.13: http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/retrieveECFR?gp=1&SID=22f77fcf888b8732ca305462f985b01d&ty=HTML&h=L&r=SECTION&n=17y1.0.1.1.32.2.7.5 Regulation 39.16: http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/retrieveECFR?gp=1&SID=2126a23d5ef85fab6ef10a3a898280b8&ty=HTML&h=L&r=SECTION&n=17y1.0.1.1.32.2.7.8 Regulation 39.33: http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/retrieveECFR?gp=1&SID=22f77fcf888b8732ca305462f985b01d&ty=HTML&h=L&r=SECTION&n=17y1.0.1.1.32.3.7.4 Regulation 39.35: http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/retrieveECFR?gp=1&SID=0219c263077a29de96ebfe3534f53338&h=L&r=SECTION&n=17y1.0.1.1.32.3.7.6 Regulation 39.36: http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/retrieveECFR?gp=1&SID=0219c263077a29de96ebfe3534f53338&ty=HTML&h=L&r=SECTION&n=17y1.0.1.1.32.3.7.7

Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)

The implementation measures of the CFTC are consistent with Principle 4; however, there are gaps or shortcomings with key considerations 1 and 4. These shortcomings are not fully addressed by CFTC rule 39.40. Recommendation: The CFTC is recommended to implement measures which address the gaps or inconsistencies identified, specifically those related to key considerations 1 and 4.

United States CCP
US-CFTC
  • Principle ID 4.1
  • Rating Consistent

Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014

Principle

An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.

Implementation measures

CFTC regulations 17 C.F.R. 39.11(a), (b), (c), (d); 39.33(a)(1)

Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)

Regulation 39.33(b) states that assessments for additional guaranty fund contributions (i.e. guaranty fund contributions that are not pre-funded) shall not be included in calculating the financial resources available to meet a systemically important derivatives or subpart C derivatives clearing organization’s obligations under Regulation 39.11(a)(1) or Regulation 39.33(a). Regulation 39.33(b) does not explicitly exclude default insurance (which is a contingent and not pre-funded resource) from the calculation. Regulation 39.40 might mitigate this gap, but does not fully address it. To date, the CFTC has received no applications to include financial resources that might be covered by “(vi) Any other financial resource deemed acceptable by the Commission”. The CFTC has advised that the intention would be to determine acceptability with reference to Regulation 39.40.

United States CCP
US-CFTC
  • Principle ID 4.2
  • Rating Consistent

Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014

Principle

An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.

Implementation measures

CFTC regulations 17 C.F.R. 39.13(a), (b), (e). (g)(1)-(2), (g)(6)-(7), (h)(2)-(3); 39.14(c); 39.33(d)(2); 39.36(c), (g)

United States CCP
US-CFTC
  • Principle ID 4.4
  • Rating Consistent

Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014

Principle

An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.

Implementation measures

CFTC regulations 17 C.F.R. 39.11(a)(1), (f)(3)(i); 39.33(a)(1), (e)

Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)

Regulation 39.11(b)(1) specifies the types of financial resources that a CCP can use to satisfy the financial resources requirement of Regulation 39.11(a)(1), including margins, the CCP’s own capital, guaranty fund deposits, default insurance, potential assessments for additional guaranty fund contributions and any other financial resource deemed acceptable by the CFTC. Regulation 39.33(b) states that assessments for additional guaranty fund contributions (i.e. guaranty fund contributions that are not pre-funded) shall not be included in calculating the financial resources available to meet a systemically important derivatives or subpart C derivatives clearing organization’s obligations under Regulation 39.11(a)(1) or Regulation 39.33(a). However, in deviation to the objective of key consideration 4 to count only pre-funded financial resources, Regulation 39.33(b) does not explicitly exclude default insurance (which is a contingent and not pre-funded resource) from the calculation. This shortcoming is not fully addressed by CFTC rule 39.40.

Description of filters

Jurisdiction

This filter limits the search results to selected jurisdictions. The available jurisdictions represent assessments that have been completed to date. The table below provides also a pdf of key conclusions and recommendations for all Principles of a given jurisdiction.

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FMI type

This filter limits the search results to the selected FMI types. FMIs may be subject to different regulatory, supervisory and oversight regimes depending on their organisation, function and design.

PS: Payment system

A set of instruments, procedures and rules for the transfer of funds between or among participants; the system includes the participants and the entity operating the arrangement.

CSD/SSS: Central securities depository / Securities settlement system

CSDs are entities that provide securities accounts, central safekeeping services and asset services, which may include the administration of corporate actions and redemptions, and play an important role in helping to ensure the integrity of securities issues (that securities are not accidentally or fraudulently created or destroyed or their details changed). The precise activities of a CSD vary based on jurisdiction and market practices.

SSS are entities that enable securities to be transferred and settled by book entry according to a set of predetermined multilateral rules. Such systems allow transfers of securities either free of payment or against payment. Typically, a CSD also operates an SSS.

CCP: Central counterparty

An entity that interposes itself between counterparties to contracts traded in one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer and thereby ensuring the performance of open contracts.

TR: Trade repository

An entity that maintains a centralised electronic record (database) of transaction data.

Principle or key consideration ID

This filter limits the search results to selected principles and key considerations.   Each principle includes a headline standard and a list of key considerations that further explain the headline standard.  The principles are listed below. A detailed list of key considerations is available in the CPMI-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures.

Principle rating

This filter limits the search results to selected principle rating(s) used in the L2 assessments. The ratings reflect conditions at the time of the assessment, and are built on key conclusions that reflect CPMI and IOSCO's collective expert judgment regarding the impact of identified gaps and/or shortcomings. Ratings are determined for each principle after the jurisdiction's legislative and regulatory framework, including policy statements, as relevant, was compared against the corresponding content of the PFMI.

The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified no gaps or shortcomings, or only a few gaps and/or shortcomings that have no material impact on completeness and/or consistency.

The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is broadly consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a minor impact on completeness and/or consistency.

The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is partly consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a significant impact on completeness and/or consistency.

The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is not consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a major impact on completeness and/or consistency.

This status corresponds to the case where no relevant FMI exists that is within the scope of the Principles. A rating of “NA” will be indicated only if no relevant regulatory measures are being taken and no such FMI is expected to develop within the jurisdiction.

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