PFMI implementation database
This is an online data repository of jurisdictions' implementation measures for the Principles for financial market infrastructures and associated CPMI and IOSCO assessment principle ratings. It complements the Level 2 assessment programme on the extent to which jurisdictions' implementation measures are complete and consistent with the international standards for payment systems, central securities depositories, securities settlement systems, central counterparties and trade repositories.
Note that authorities may have updated their rules, regulations and policies since the assessment. For current implementation measures, please contact the relevant authority.
GB-BOE
- Principle ID 23.4
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Sep-2023
Assessment rating date: 29-Sep-2023
Principle
An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.
Implementation measures
The UK Central Securities Depositories Regulation (UK CSDR)
GB-BOE
- Principle ID 23.5
- Rating Broadly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Sep-2023
Assessment rating date: 29-Sep-2023
Principle
An FMI should have clear and comprehensive rules and procedures and should provide sufficient information to enable participants to have an accurate understanding of the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the FMI. All relevant rules and key procedures should be publicly disclosed.
Implementation measures
Financial Services Update – Statement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on 23 June 2020
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
There is a gap where UK firms are directed to apply an existing industry-led framework as regards settlement discipline as the implementation measure; There is no requirement under UK law or through explicit regulators’ policy statements to require firms to meet these disclosure requirements.
GB-BOE
- Principle ID 3.0
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Sep-2023
Assessment rating date: 29-Sep-2023
Principle
An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.
Implementation measures
The UK Central Securities Depositories Regulation (UK CSDR) UK BTS 2017/392 (onshoring Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/392 of 11 November 2016)
GB-BOE
- Principle ID 3.1
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Sep-2023
Assessment rating date: 29-Sep-2023
Principle
An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.
Implementation measures
The UK Central Securities Depositories Regulation (UK CSDR) UK BTS 2017/392 (onshoring Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/392 of 11 November 2016)
GB-BOE
- Principle ID 3.2
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Sep-2023
Assessment rating date: 29-Sep-2023
Principle
An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.
Implementation measures
The UK Central Securities Depositories Regulation (UK CSDR) UK BTS 2017/392 (onshoring Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/392 of 11 November 2016)
GB-BOE
- Principle ID 3.3
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Sep-2023
Assessment rating date: 29-Sep-2023
Principle
An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.
Implementation measures
The UK Central Securities Depositories Regulation (UK CSDR) UK BTS 2017/392 (onshoring Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/392 of 11 November 2016)
GB-BOE
- Principle ID 3.4
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Sep-2023
Assessment rating date: 29-Sep-2023
Principle
An FMI should have a sound risk-management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, and other risks.
Implementation measures
The UK Central Securities Depositories Regulation (UK CSDR) UK BTS 2017/390 (onshoring Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/390 of 11 November 2016) UK BTS 2017/392 (onshoring Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/392 of 11 November 2016)
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
There is no specific implementation measure with respect to the following part of KC 4: “Where applicable, an FMI should also provide relevant authorities with the information needed for purposes of resolution planning.” Instead, it is up to the UK authorities to ensure that the UK CSDR requirement is duly implemented under the relevant national rules.
GB-BOE
- Principle ID 4.0
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Sep-2023
Assessment rating date: 29-Sep-2023
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
The UK Central Securities Depositories Regulation (UK CSDR) UK BTS 2017/390 (onshoring Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/390 of 11 November 2016) Financial Services Update – Statement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on 23 June 2020 Note - rated as "consistent" for CSDs/SSSs that provide banking-type ancillary services
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
A CSD/SSS that employs DvP2/DvP3 settlement models and that does not provide any settlement guarantee should effectively measure, monitor and manage the credit risk exposures arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes as well as maintain, at a minimum, sufficient resources to cover the exposures of the two participants and their affiliates that would create the largest aggregate credit exposure in the system. In this case there are no implementation measures. The UK authorities are recommended to implement measures to address the gaps or inconsistencies related to KCs 1, 2, 3, and 7.
GB-BOE
- Principle ID 4.1
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Sep-2023
Assessment rating date: 29-Sep-2023
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
The UK Central Securities Depositories Regulation (UK CSDR) UK BTS 2017/390 (onshoring Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/390 of 11 November 2016) Financial Services Update – Statement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on 23 June 2020 Note - rated as "consistent" for CSDs/SSSs that provide banking-type ancillary services
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
A CSD/SSS that employs DvP2/DvP3 settlement models and that does not provide any settlement guarantee should adopt the measures prescribed above in relation to credit exposures that participants may incur vis-à-vis each other. In this case there are no implementation measures
GB-BOE
- Principle ID 4.2
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Sep-2023
Assessment rating date: 29-Sep-2023
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes. An FMI should maintain sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence. In addition, a CCP that is involved in activities with a more-complex risk profile or that is systemically important in multiple jurisdictions should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the two participants and their affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions. All other CCPs should maintain additional financial resources sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
The UK Central Securities Depositories Regulation (UK CSDR) UK BTS 2017/390 (onshoring Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/390 of 11 November 2016) Financial Services Update – Statement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on 23 June 2020 Note - rated as "consistent" for CSDs/SSSs that provide banking-type ancillary services
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
A CSD/SSS that employs DvP2/DvP3 settlement models and that does not provide any settlement guarantee should adopt the measures prescribed above in relation to credit exposures that participants may incur vis-à-vis each other. In this case there are no implementation measures.
Description of filters
Jurisdiction
This filter limits the search results to selected jurisdictions. The available jurisdictions represent assessments that have been completed to date. The table below provides also a pdf of key conclusions and recommendations for all Principles of a given jurisdiction.
| Jurisdiction and relevant authorities | Assessments and comments |
|---|---|
Australia RBA: Reserve Bank of Australia | |
Brazil BCB: Central Bank of Brazil | |
Canada | |
European Union ESMA: European Securities and Markets Authority | |
Hong Kong SAR HKMA: Hong Kong Monetary Authority | |
Japan | |
Singapore | |
Switzerland FINMA: Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority | |
Turkey CMB: Capital Markets Board of Türkiye | |
United Kingdom | |
United States CFTC: Commodity Futures Trading Commission |
FMI type
This filter limits the search results to the selected FMI types. FMIs may be subject to different regulatory, supervisory and oversight regimes depending on their organisation, function and design.
PS: Payment system
A set of instruments, procedures and rules for the transfer of funds between or among participants; the system includes the participants and the entity operating the arrangement.
CSD/SSS: Central securities depository / Securities settlement system
CSDs are entities that provide securities accounts, central safekeeping services and asset services, which may include the administration of corporate actions and redemptions, and play an important role in helping to ensure the integrity of securities issues (that securities are not accidentally or fraudulently created or destroyed or their details changed). The precise activities of a CSD vary based on jurisdiction and market practices.
SSS are entities that enable securities to be transferred and settled by book entry according to a set of predetermined multilateral rules. Such systems allow transfers of securities either free of payment or against payment. Typically, a CSD also operates an SSS.
CCP: Central counterparty
An entity that interposes itself between counterparties to contracts traded in one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer and thereby ensuring the performance of open contracts.
TR: Trade repository
An entity that maintains a centralised electronic record (database) of transaction data.
Principle or key consideration ID
This filter limits the search results to selected principles and key considerations. Each principle includes a headline standard and a list of key considerations that further explain the headline standard. The principles are listed below. A detailed list of key considerations is available in the CPMI-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures.
Principle rating
This filter limits the search results to selected principle rating(s) used in the L2 assessments. The ratings reflect conditions at the time of the assessment, and are built on key conclusions that reflect CPMI and IOSCO's collective expert judgment regarding the impact of identified gaps and/or shortcomings. Ratings are determined for each principle after the jurisdiction's legislative and regulatory framework, including policy statements, as relevant, was compared against the corresponding content of the PFMI.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified no gaps or shortcomings, or only a few gaps and/or shortcomings that have no material impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is broadly consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a minor impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is partly consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a significant impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is not consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a major impact on completeness and/or consistency.
This status corresponds to the case where no relevant FMI exists that is within the scope of the Principles. A rating of “NA” will be indicated only if no relevant regulatory measures are being taken and no such FMI is expected to develop within the jurisdiction.