PFMI implementation database
This is an online data repository of jurisdictions' implementation measures for the Principles for financial market infrastructures and associated CPMI and IOSCO assessment principle ratings. It complements the Level 2 assessment programme on the extent to which jurisdictions' implementation measures are complete and consistent with the international standards for payment systems, central securities depositories, securities settlement systems, central counterparties and trade repositories.
Note that authorities may have updated their rules, regulations and policies since the assessment. For current implementation measures, please contact the relevant authority.
AU-ASIC
- Principle ID 2.1
- Rating Broadly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 16-Dec-2015
Assessment rating date: 14-May-2015
Principle
An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.
Implementation measures
ASIC’s Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.1(1)
AU-ASIC
- Principle ID 2.2
- Rating Broadly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 16-Dec-2015
Assessment rating date: 14-May-2015
Principle
An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.
Implementation measures
ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.1(2) and 2.5.2(1) ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.130-131
AU-ASIC
- Principle ID 2.3
- Rating Broadly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 16-Dec-2015
Assessment rating date: 14-May-2015
Principle
An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.
Implementation measures
ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.1(1)-(2), 2.4.2, and 2.4.3(2) ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.131(b), RG 249.134, RG 249.138, and RG 249.139
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
It is unclear how the cited rule texts (2.4.1(2) and 2.4.3(2)) can be interpreted to mean that the board is required to review the performance of the overall board and individual members. It does not seem like the “board” or its individual members falls under any of the categories requiring review (“arrangements, rules, procedures, policies, plans, systems and controls”). Although RG 249.131(b) require the TR to include in their application a description of […] performance evaluation of Board Members, the KC puts the onus on the board to conduct the review of the overall and individual member performance, whereas this rule is addressed to the “Operator.”
AU-ASIC
- Principle ID 2.4
- Rating Broadly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 16-Dec-2015
Assessment rating date: 14-May-2015
Principle
An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.
Implementation measures
Corporation Act 2001, Section 904C(3) ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.5 and 2.4.6 ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.131 and RG 249.134
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
The cited rule (2.4.6) requiring officers of the TR to be “fit for office” do not fully capture the requirement that the board members should have the appropriate incentives to fulfil its multiple roles. “Fit for office,” as described in the rule, seems to focus on whether the officer would have the appropriate skillset only. Although one can make the argument that if the rules required the inclusion of non-executive board members, there might be an implicit requirement for board members to have the right incentives to fulfil their roles. However, as stated by ASIC, there is no requirement for non-executive board members. Although the wording in the KC for the inclusion of non-executive board member(s) is more generic (by the use of “typically” as opposed to “should”), the lack of a requirement for the board to have appropriate incentives creates a minor gap.
AU-ASIC
- Principle ID 2.5
- Rating Broadly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 16-Dec-2015
Assessment rating date: 14-May-2015
Principle
An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.
Implementation measures
ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.1(1)-(2) and Rule 2.4.6 ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.134(b)
AU-ASIC
- Principle ID 2.6
- Rating Broadly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 16-Dec-2015
Assessment rating date: 14-May-2015
Principle
An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.
Implementation measures
ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.1(2)(a), (c)(i), and (d) Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.175, RG 249.132, and RG 249.192
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
Board for risk management: Because the rule cited (2.4.1(2)) addresses both the board (i.e., governing body) and the management – it’s unclear whether the responsibility for establishing a risk management framework would fall to the board or to management. Risk-management function having sufficient authority, independence, etc: Having sufficient human, tech and financial resources does not mean having sufficient authority, independence and access to the board, as in 2.4.1(2)(d) for internal control functions
AU-ASIC
- Principle ID 2.7
- Rating Broadly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 16-Dec-2015
Assessment rating date: 14-May-2015
Principle
An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.
Implementation measures
ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.1(2)(c)(ii), 2.2.3(2), 2.5.1, and 2.5.2
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
Rule 2.4.1(2)(c) only refers to users, and not indirect participants and other relevant stakeholders. It is also unclear from the rules whether the board itself is responsible for ensuring that the FMI’s design, rules, overall strategy, and major decisions meet the appropriate parties’ interests. A gap is created by the lack of requirements that would specifically compel the TR board to ensure the TR’s design, rules, overall strategy, and major decisions reflect appropriately the interest of the indirect participants and other various stakeholders.
AU-ASIC
- Principle ID 20.0
- Rating Broadly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 16-Dec-2015
Assessment rating date: 14-May-2015
Principle
An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.
Implementation measures
ASIC Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.4 ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.187 and RG 249.188
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
The implementation measures of ASIC are broadly consistent with Principle 20. The overall rating has been influenced by the absence of implementation measures for key considerations 1 and 2. Recommendation: ASIC is recommended to implement measures that address the gaps or inconsistencies identified particularly those related to KC1 and KC2.
AU-ASIC
- Principle ID 20.1
- Rating Broadly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 16-Dec-2015
Assessment rating date: 14-May-2015
Principle
An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.
Implementation measures
ASIC’s Derivative Trade Repository Rules 2013, Rule 2.4.4(1), and 2.4.4(2)(b) ASIC’s Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.187, RG 249.188(a)
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
ASIC’s rules do not require the licensed TR (ie one side of the link) to consider the design and the effects of the arrangement holistically (i.e., both sides of the link). Specifically the TR is not required to ensure that there is no limitation built into the linked arrangement that would prevent the linked FMIs in other jurisdictions from complying with the Principles.
AU-ASIC
- Principle ID 20.2
- Rating Broadly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 16-Dec-2015
Assessment rating date: 14-May-2015
Principle
An FMI that establishes a link with one or more FMIs should identify, monitor, and manage link-related risks.
Implementation measures
ASIC Regulatory Guide 249: Derivative Trade Repositories, RG 249.188(b)
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
ASIC’s rules do not require the TR to ensure that the link has a well-founded legal basis in all relevant jurisdictions that provides adequate protection for all the FMIs involved in the link.
Description of filters
Jurisdiction
This filter limits the search results to selected jurisdictions. The available jurisdictions represent assessments that have been completed to date. The table below provides also a pdf of key conclusions and recommendations for all Principles of a given jurisdiction.
| Jurisdiction and relevant authorities | Assessments and comments |
|---|---|
Australia RBA: Reserve Bank of Australia | |
Brazil BCB: Central Bank of Brazil | |
Canada | |
European Union ESMA: European Securities and Markets Authority | |
Hong Kong SAR HKMA: Hong Kong Monetary Authority | |
Japan | |
Singapore | |
Switzerland FINMA: Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority | |
Turkey CMB: Capital Markets Board of Türkiye | |
United Kingdom | |
United States CFTC: Commodity Futures Trading Commission |
FMI type
This filter limits the search results to the selected FMI types. FMIs may be subject to different regulatory, supervisory and oversight regimes depending on their organisation, function and design.
PS: Payment system
A set of instruments, procedures and rules for the transfer of funds between or among participants; the system includes the participants and the entity operating the arrangement.
CSD/SSS: Central securities depository / Securities settlement system
CSDs are entities that provide securities accounts, central safekeeping services and asset services, which may include the administration of corporate actions and redemptions, and play an important role in helping to ensure the integrity of securities issues (that securities are not accidentally or fraudulently created or destroyed or their details changed). The precise activities of a CSD vary based on jurisdiction and market practices.
SSS are entities that enable securities to be transferred and settled by book entry according to a set of predetermined multilateral rules. Such systems allow transfers of securities either free of payment or against payment. Typically, a CSD also operates an SSS.
CCP: Central counterparty
An entity that interposes itself between counterparties to contracts traded in one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer and thereby ensuring the performance of open contracts.
TR: Trade repository
An entity that maintains a centralised electronic record (database) of transaction data.
Principle or key consideration ID
This filter limits the search results to selected principles and key considerations. Each principle includes a headline standard and a list of key considerations that further explain the headline standard. The principles are listed below. A detailed list of key considerations is available in the CPMI-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures.
Principle rating
This filter limits the search results to selected principle rating(s) used in the L2 assessments. The ratings reflect conditions at the time of the assessment, and are built on key conclusions that reflect CPMI and IOSCO's collective expert judgment regarding the impact of identified gaps and/or shortcomings. Ratings are determined for each principle after the jurisdiction's legislative and regulatory framework, including policy statements, as relevant, was compared against the corresponding content of the PFMI.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified no gaps or shortcomings, or only a few gaps and/or shortcomings that have no material impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is broadly consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a minor impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is partly consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a significant impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is not consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a major impact on completeness and/or consistency.
This status corresponds to the case where no relevant FMI exists that is within the scope of the Principles. A rating of “NA” will be indicated only if no relevant regulatory measures are being taken and no such FMI is expected to develop within the jurisdiction.