PFMI implementation database
This is an online data repository of jurisdictions' implementation measures for the Principles for financial market infrastructures and associated CPMI and IOSCO assessment principle ratings. It complements the Level 2 assessment programme on the extent to which jurisdictions' implementation measures are complete and consistent with the international standards for payment systems, central securities depositories, securities settlement systems, central counterparties and trade repositories.
Note that authorities may have updated their rules, regulations and policies since the assessment. For current implementation measures, please contact the relevant authority.
CH-FINMA,SNB
- Principle ID 18.2
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Jan-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Jun-2017
Principle
An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.
Implementation measures
Art. 24(2–3) NBO Art. 23a(1d) NBO
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
The approach taken by the SNB for the central bank-owned RTGS is consistent with paragraph 1.23 of the PFMI, as elaborated in the CPMI-IOSCO guidance note Application of the Principles for financial market infrastructures to central bank FMIs.
CH-FINMA,SNB
- Principle ID 18.3
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Jan-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Jun-2017
Principle
An FMI should have objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access.
CH-FINMA,SNB
- Principle ID 19.0
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Jan-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Jun-2017
Principle
An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.
Implementation measures
Art. 22(2) NBO Art. 33 NBO
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
The implementation measures of the Swiss regulators are partly consistent with Principle 19. The overall rating has been influenced by the significant gaps or shortcomings regarding KCs 1, 2, 3 and 4. Switzerland is recommended to implement measures which address the identified gaps or inconsistencies related to KCs 1, 2, 3 and 4.
CH-FINMA,SNB
- Principle ID 19.1
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Jan-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Jun-2017
Principle
An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.
Implementation measures
Art. 33 NBO Art. 22(2) NBO
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
There is a significant gap regarding the requirement that FMIs should ensure that their rules, procedures, and agreements allow them to gather basic information about all indirect participation, regardless of the type of indirect participant. The NBO only requires FMIs to gather this information for indirect participants that are identifiable to the FMI. Further, SNB only requires SIC AG to gather information and monitor and manage indirect participation insofar as SIC AG can identify the sender/receiver in the payment message.
CH-FINMA,SNB
- Principle ID 19.2
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Jan-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Jun-2017
Principle
An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.
Implementation measures
Art. 33 NBO SNB’s explanatory note to the NBO
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
There is a significant gap regarding the requirement that FMIs should ensure that their rules, procedures, and agreements allow them to gather basic information about all indirect participation, regardless of the type of indirect participant. The NBO only requires FMIs to gather this information for indirect participants that are identifiable to the FMI. Further, SNB only requires SIC AG to gather information and monitor and manage indirect participation insofar as SIC AG can identify the sender/receiver in the payment message.
CH-FINMA,SNB
- Principle ID 19.3
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Jan-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Jun-2017
Principle
An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.
Implementation measures
Art. 33 NBO SNB’s explanatory note to the NBO
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
There is a significant gap regarding the requirement that FMIs should ensure that their rules, procedures, and agreements allow them to gather basic information about all indirect participation, regardless of the type of indirect participant. The NBO only requires FMIs to gather this information for indirect participants that are identifiable to the FMI. Further, SNB only requires SIC AG to gather information and monitor and manage indirect participation insofar as SIC AG can identify the sender/receiver in the payment message.
CH-FINMA,SNB
- Principle ID 19.4
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Jan-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Jun-2017
Principle
An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the FMI arising from tiered participation arrangements.
Implementation measures
Art. 33 NBO
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
There is a gap in the NBO regarding the requirement that FMIs should regularly review risks arising from tiered participation arrangements and should take mitigating action when appropriate. However, there are general risk provisions that may capture this.
CH-FINMA,SNB
- Principle ID 2.0
- Rating Broadly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Jan-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Jun-2017
Principle
An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.
Implementation measures
Art. 22 NBO Art. 22a NBO Art. 22b NBO Art. 23a NBO Art. 27 NBO Art. 620 et seq. Swiss Code of Obligations (CO)
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
The implementation measures for PSs are broadly consistent with Principle 2. The overall rating has been influenced by the minor gaps or shortcomings in the implementation measures for KCs 3 and 6. Switzerland is recommended to implement measures which address the identified gaps or inconsistencies related to KCs 3 and 6.
CH-FINMA,SNB
- Principle ID 2.1
- Rating Broadly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Jan-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Jun-2017
Principle
An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.
Implementation measures
Art. 22(1) NBO Art. 22(2) NBO
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
The approach taken by the SNB for the central bank-owned RTGS is consistent with paragraph 1.23 of the PFMI, as elaborated in the CPMI-IOSCO guidance note Application of the Principles for financial market infrastructures to central bank FMIs.
CH-FINMA,SNB
- Principle ID 2.2
- Rating Broadly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Jan-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Jun-2017
Principle
An FMI should have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent, promote the safety and efficiency of the FMI, and support the stability of the broader financial system, other relevant public interest considerations, and the objectives of relevant stakeholders.
Implementation measures
Art. 22(1) NBO Art. 22a(4) NBO Art. 22b NBO Art. 23a NBO Art. 620 et seq. CO Art. 716b CO
Description of filters
Jurisdiction
This filter limits the search results to selected jurisdictions. The available jurisdictions represent assessments that have been completed to date. The table below provides also a pdf of key conclusions and recommendations for all Principles of a given jurisdiction.
| Jurisdiction and relevant authorities | Assessments and comments |
|---|---|
Australia RBA: Reserve Bank of Australia | |
Brazil BCB: Central Bank of Brazil | |
Canada | |
European Union ESMA: European Securities and Markets Authority | |
Hong Kong SAR HKMA: Hong Kong Monetary Authority | |
Japan | |
Singapore | |
Switzerland FINMA: Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority | |
Turkey CMB: Capital Markets Board of Türkiye | |
United Kingdom | |
United States CFTC: Commodity Futures Trading Commission |
FMI type
This filter limits the search results to the selected FMI types. FMIs may be subject to different regulatory, supervisory and oversight regimes depending on their organisation, function and design.
PS: Payment system
A set of instruments, procedures and rules for the transfer of funds between or among participants; the system includes the participants and the entity operating the arrangement.
CSD/SSS: Central securities depository / Securities settlement system
CSDs are entities that provide securities accounts, central safekeeping services and asset services, which may include the administration of corporate actions and redemptions, and play an important role in helping to ensure the integrity of securities issues (that securities are not accidentally or fraudulently created or destroyed or their details changed). The precise activities of a CSD vary based on jurisdiction and market practices.
SSS are entities that enable securities to be transferred and settled by book entry according to a set of predetermined multilateral rules. Such systems allow transfers of securities either free of payment or against payment. Typically, a CSD also operates an SSS.
CCP: Central counterparty
An entity that interposes itself between counterparties to contracts traded in one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer and thereby ensuring the performance of open contracts.
TR: Trade repository
An entity that maintains a centralised electronic record (database) of transaction data.
Principle or key consideration ID
This filter limits the search results to selected principles and key considerations. Each principle includes a headline standard and a list of key considerations that further explain the headline standard. The principles are listed below. A detailed list of key considerations is available in the CPMI-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures.
Principle rating
This filter limits the search results to selected principle rating(s) used in the L2 assessments. The ratings reflect conditions at the time of the assessment, and are built on key conclusions that reflect CPMI and IOSCO's collective expert judgment regarding the impact of identified gaps and/or shortcomings. Ratings are determined for each principle after the jurisdiction's legislative and regulatory framework, including policy statements, as relevant, was compared against the corresponding content of the PFMI.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified no gaps or shortcomings, or only a few gaps and/or shortcomings that have no material impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is broadly consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a minor impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is partly consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a significant impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is not consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a major impact on completeness and/or consistency.
This status corresponds to the case where no relevant FMI exists that is within the scope of the Principles. A rating of “NA” will be indicated only if no relevant regulatory measures are being taken and no such FMI is expected to develop within the jurisdiction.