PFMI implementation database
This is an online data repository of jurisdictions' implementation measures for the Principles for financial market infrastructures and associated CPMI and IOSCO assessment principle ratings. It complements the Level 2 assessment programme on the extent to which jurisdictions' implementation measures are complete and consistent with the international standards for payment systems, central securities depositories, securities settlement systems, central counterparties and trade repositories.
Note that authorities may have updated their rules, regulations and policies since the assessment. For current implementation measures, please contact the relevant authority.
CH-FINMA,SNB
- Principle ID 7.3
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Jan-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Jun-2017
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
Art. 62(5) FMIA, Art. 67(1) FMIA Art. 58(2) FMIO Art. 29(2) and (6) NBO
CH-FINMA,SNB
- Principle ID 7.5
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Jan-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Jun-2017
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
Art. 67(1) FMIA Art. 58(1) FMIO Art. 29(4) NBO
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
While the Swiss regulations explicitly address what types of resources an FMI can use for the purpose of meeting its minimum liquid resource requirement, they do not explicitly specify the requirement for FMIs to put in place pre-arranged and highly reliable funding arrangements for converting FX balances or liquidating non-cash collateral through sales. This shortcoming is assessed to be material. Switzerland is recommended to make explicit that its definition of qualifying liquid resources includes cash balances in foreign currencies only if that have corresponding “prearranged and highly reliable“ funding arrangements.
CH-FINMA,SNB
- Principle ID 7.6
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Jan-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Jun-2017
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
Art. 67(1) FMIA Art. 58(1) FMIO
CH-FINMA,SNB
- Principle ID 7.7
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Jan-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Jun-2017
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
Art. 29(3) NBO
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
Inconsistency in language: The Swiss regulations address the need for FMIs to conduct due diligence on liquidity providers’ creditworthiness and ability to meet their obligations, but do not explicitly address the need to conduct due diligence to obtain a high degree of confidence that liquidity providers have sufficient information to understand and manage their associated risks. However, this inconsistency in the language between the Swiss regulations and the PFMI is assessed to be immaterial, having taken into consideration that the Swiss authorities rely on the Swiss Regulatory Notes to support their interpretation of the Swiss regulations in a manner that is consistent with the PFMI.
CH-FINMA,SNB
- Principle ID 7.8
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Jan-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Jun-2017
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
Art. 65 FMIA
CH-FINMA,SNB
- Principle ID 7.9
- Rating Partly consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Jan-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Jun-2017
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
Art. 8(3), Art. 67(1) FMIA Art. 8(3), Art. 58(2) FMIO Art. 29(2), Art. 29(6) NBO
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
The Swiss regulations do not explicitly address the need for FMIs to have clear procedures to report the results of their stress tests to appropriate decision-makers at the FMI, and to use these results to evaluate and adjust their liquidity risk management framework. Inconsistency in language: In addition, it was found that the language of Swiss regulations is not entirely consistent with the PFMI, in particular, not all parameters of liquidity stress testing are explicitly mentioned in the Swiss regulations. However, this inconsistency in the language between the Swiss regulations and the PFMI is assessed to be immaterial, having taken into consideration that the Swiss authorities rely on the Swiss Regulatory Notes to support their interpretation of the Swiss regulations in a manner that is consistent with the PFMI.
CH-FINMA,SNB
- Principle ID 8.0
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Jan-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Jun-2017
Principle
An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.
Implementation measures
Art. 62, Art. 89 FMIA Art. 53, Art. 66, Art. 73 FMIO
CH-FINMA,SNB
- Principle ID 8.1
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Jan-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Jun-2017
Principle
An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.
Implementation measures
Art. 62, Art. 89(2), 89(3) FMIA Art. 53, Art. 66, Art. 73 FMIO
CH-FINMA,SNB
- Principle ID 8.2
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Jan-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Jun-2017
Principle
An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.
Implementation measures
Art. 62(5) FMIA
CH-FINMA,SNB
- Principle ID 8.3
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 29-Jan-2019
Assessment rating date: 29-Jun-2017
Principle
An FMI should provide clear and certain final settlement, at a minimum by the end of the value date. Where necessary or preferable, an FMI should provide final settlement intraday or in real time.
Implementation measures
Art. 62(4) FMIA Art. 66(2)(a), Art. 73(2) FMIO
Description of filters
Jurisdiction
This filter limits the search results to selected jurisdictions. The available jurisdictions represent assessments that have been completed to date. The table below provides also a pdf of key conclusions and recommendations for all Principles of a given jurisdiction.
| Jurisdiction and relevant authorities | Assessments and comments |
|---|---|
Australia RBA: Reserve Bank of Australia | |
Brazil BCB: Central Bank of Brazil | |
Canada | |
European Union ESMA: European Securities and Markets Authority | |
Hong Kong SAR HKMA: Hong Kong Monetary Authority | |
Japan | |
Singapore | |
Switzerland FINMA: Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority | |
Turkey CMB: Capital Markets Board of Türkiye | |
United Kingdom | |
United States CFTC: Commodity Futures Trading Commission |
FMI type
This filter limits the search results to the selected FMI types. FMIs may be subject to different regulatory, supervisory and oversight regimes depending on their organisation, function and design.
PS: Payment system
A set of instruments, procedures and rules for the transfer of funds between or among participants; the system includes the participants and the entity operating the arrangement.
CSD/SSS: Central securities depository / Securities settlement system
CSDs are entities that provide securities accounts, central safekeeping services and asset services, which may include the administration of corporate actions and redemptions, and play an important role in helping to ensure the integrity of securities issues (that securities are not accidentally or fraudulently created or destroyed or their details changed). The precise activities of a CSD vary based on jurisdiction and market practices.
SSS are entities that enable securities to be transferred and settled by book entry according to a set of predetermined multilateral rules. Such systems allow transfers of securities either free of payment or against payment. Typically, a CSD also operates an SSS.
CCP: Central counterparty
An entity that interposes itself between counterparties to contracts traded in one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer and thereby ensuring the performance of open contracts.
TR: Trade repository
An entity that maintains a centralised electronic record (database) of transaction data.
Principle or key consideration ID
This filter limits the search results to selected principles and key considerations. Each principle includes a headline standard and a list of key considerations that further explain the headline standard. The principles are listed below. A detailed list of key considerations is available in the CPMI-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures.
Principle rating
This filter limits the search results to selected principle rating(s) used in the L2 assessments. The ratings reflect conditions at the time of the assessment, and are built on key conclusions that reflect CPMI and IOSCO's collective expert judgment regarding the impact of identified gaps and/or shortcomings. Ratings are determined for each principle after the jurisdiction's legislative and regulatory framework, including policy statements, as relevant, was compared against the corresponding content of the PFMI.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified no gaps or shortcomings, or only a few gaps and/or shortcomings that have no material impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is broadly consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a minor impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is partly consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a significant impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is not consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a major impact on completeness and/or consistency.
This status corresponds to the case where no relevant FMI exists that is within the scope of the Principles. A rating of “NA” will be indicated only if no relevant regulatory measures are being taken and no such FMI is expected to develop within the jurisdiction.