PFMI implementation database
This is an online data repository of jurisdictions' implementation measures for the Principles for financial market infrastructures and associated CPMI and IOSCO assessment principle ratings. It complements the Level 2 assessment programme on the extent to which jurisdictions' implementation measures are complete and consistent with the international standards for payment systems, central securities depositories, securities settlement systems, central counterparties and trade repositories.
Note that authorities may have updated their rules, regulations and policies since the assessment. For current implementation measures, please contact the relevant authority.
JP-BOJ,FSA
- Principle ID 6.6
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
A CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants for all products through an effective margin system that is risk-based and regularly reviewed.
Implementation measures
FSA - Policy statement on supervision of FMIs Supervisory Guidelines section III-2-5 on Margin System BOJ - Policy on Oversight of Financial Market Infrastructures
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
The Supervisory Guidelines differ in language from the PFMIs with respect to the range of parameters and assumptions that is used in assessing the performance of the margin calculation model.
JP-BOJ,FSA
- Principle ID 6.7
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
A CCP should cover its credit exposures to its participants for all products through an effective margin system that is risk-based and regularly reviewed.
Implementation measures
FSA - Policy statement on supervision of FMIs Supervisory Guidelines section III-2-2 on Comprehensive Risk Management Framework Supervisory Guidelines section III-2-5 on Margin System BOJ - Policy on Oversight of Financial Market Infrastructures
JP-BOJ,FSA
- Principle ID 7.0
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
While the Supervisory Guidelines differ in language from the PFMIs, the various statements and guidance put out by both Japanese authorities, taken together, convey the authorities’ intent to fully implement the PFMIs in a consistent manner. Recommendation: Where there are inconsistencies in language or requirements between the Supervisory Guidelines and the PFMIs, the FSA should provide clarity to CCPs with respect to minimum standards.
JP-BOJ,FSA
- Principle ID 7.1
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
FSA - Policy statement on supervision of FMIs Supervisory Guidelines section III-2-4 on Liquidity Risk Management BOJ - Policy on Oversight of Financial Market Infrastructures
JP-BOJ,FSA
- Principle ID 7.10
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
FSA - Policy statement on supervision of FMIs Supervisory Guidelines section III-3-5 on Procedures to Deal with Participant Default, etc. BOJ - Policy on Oversight of Financial Market Infrastructures
JP-BOJ,FSA
- Principle ID 7.2
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
FSA - Policy statement on supervision of FMIs Supervisory Guidelines section III-2-4 on Liquidity Risk Management BOJ - Policy on Oversight of Financial Market Infrastructures
JP-BOJ,FSA
- Principle ID 7.4
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
FSA - Policy statement on supervision of FMIs Supervisory Guidelines section III-2-4 on Liquidity Risk Management BOJ - Policy on Oversight of Financial Market Infrastructures
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
The Supervisory Guidelines differ in language from the PFMIs in a few important ways. Liquidity resources for CCPs are not explicit about covering “a wide range of potential stress scenarios.” The Supervisory Guidelines require a CCP to maintain liquidity resources to cover any of the following stress scenarios in consideration of extreme but plausible market conditions: (a) default of two participants that would generate the largest aggregate payment obligation or (b) default of the participant that would generate the largest aggregate payment obligation. This language is narrower than what is provided in the PFMIs, which state, “maintain sufficient liquid resources… to meet… payment obligations on time… under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of [one/two participants]….” However, the liquidity stress testing requirement in the Supervisory Guidelines require a CCP to regularly test the sufficiency of liquidity resources through stress-testing that considers “a variety of extreme but plausible market conditions,” consistent with the PFMIs. While not explicit in the Supervisory Guidance, the FSA has indicated that a CCP would be required to maintain liquidity resources that would consider a wide range of scenarios. Lack of a requirement to hold relevant currencies. The Supervisory Guidelines do not reference explicitly the need to maintain sufficient liquid resources in all currencies. The FSA expects a CCP to hold a CCP to maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to make its payment obligations, consistent with the PFMIs. Furthermore, no CCPs currently clear or settle in foreign currencies.
JP-BOJ,FSA
- Principle ID 7.5
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
FSA - Policy statement on supervision of FMIs Supervisory Guidelines section III-2-4 on Liquidity Risk Management BOJ - Policy on Oversight of Financial Market Infrastructures
JP-BOJ,FSA
- Principle ID 7.6
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
FSA - Policy statement on supervision of FMIs Supervisory Guidelines section III-2-4 on Liquidity Risk Management BOJ - Policy on Oversight of Financial Market Infrastructures
JP-BOJ,FSA
- Principle ID 7.7
- Rating Consistent
Implementation measure cut-off date: 25-Feb-2015
Assessment rating date: 17-Apr-2014
Principle
An FMI should effectively measure, monitor, and manage its liquidity risk. An FMI should maintain sufficient liquid resources in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of the participant and its affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity obligation for the FMI in extreme but plausible market conditions.
Implementation measures
FSA - Policy statement on supervision of FMIs Supervisory Guidelines section III-2-4 on Liquidity Risk Management Supervisory Guidelines section III-3-5 on Procedures to Deal with Participant Default, etc. BOJ - Policy on Oversight of Financial Market Infrastructures
Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)
The Supervisory Guidelines do not explicitly require a CCP “to regularly test its procedures for accessing its liquid resources at a liquidity provider.”
Description of filters
Jurisdiction
This filter limits the search results to selected jurisdictions. The available jurisdictions represent assessments that have been completed to date. The table below provides also a pdf of key conclusions and recommendations for all Principles of a given jurisdiction.
| Jurisdiction and relevant authorities | Assessments and comments |
|---|---|
Australia RBA: Reserve Bank of Australia | |
Brazil BCB: Central Bank of Brazil | |
Canada | |
European Union ESMA: European Securities and Markets Authority | |
Hong Kong SAR HKMA: Hong Kong Monetary Authority | |
Japan | |
Singapore | |
Switzerland FINMA: Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority | |
Turkey CMB: Capital Markets Board of Türkiye | |
United Kingdom | |
United States CFTC: Commodity Futures Trading Commission |
FMI type
This filter limits the search results to the selected FMI types. FMIs may be subject to different regulatory, supervisory and oversight regimes depending on their organisation, function and design.
PS: Payment system
A set of instruments, procedures and rules for the transfer of funds between or among participants; the system includes the participants and the entity operating the arrangement.
CSD/SSS: Central securities depository / Securities settlement system
CSDs are entities that provide securities accounts, central safekeeping services and asset services, which may include the administration of corporate actions and redemptions, and play an important role in helping to ensure the integrity of securities issues (that securities are not accidentally or fraudulently created or destroyed or their details changed). The precise activities of a CSD vary based on jurisdiction and market practices.
SSS are entities that enable securities to be transferred and settled by book entry according to a set of predetermined multilateral rules. Such systems allow transfers of securities either free of payment or against payment. Typically, a CSD also operates an SSS.
CCP: Central counterparty
An entity that interposes itself between counterparties to contracts traded in one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer and thereby ensuring the performance of open contracts.
TR: Trade repository
An entity that maintains a centralised electronic record (database) of transaction data.
Principle or key consideration ID
This filter limits the search results to selected principles and key considerations. Each principle includes a headline standard and a list of key considerations that further explain the headline standard. The principles are listed below. A detailed list of key considerations is available in the CPMI-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures.
Principle rating
This filter limits the search results to selected principle rating(s) used in the L2 assessments. The ratings reflect conditions at the time of the assessment, and are built on key conclusions that reflect CPMI and IOSCO's collective expert judgment regarding the impact of identified gaps and/or shortcomings. Ratings are determined for each principle after the jurisdiction's legislative and regulatory framework, including policy statements, as relevant, was compared against the corresponding content of the PFMI.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified no gaps or shortcomings, or only a few gaps and/or shortcomings that have no material impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is broadly consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a minor impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is partly consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a significant impact on completeness and/or consistency.
The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is not consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a major impact on completeness and/or consistency.
This status corresponds to the case where no relevant FMI exists that is within the scope of the Principles. A rating of “NA” will be indicated only if no relevant regulatory measures are being taken and no such FMI is expected to develop within the jurisdiction.