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PFMI implementation database

This is an online data repository of jurisdictions' implementation measures for the Principles for financial market infrastructures and associated CPMI and IOSCO assessment principle ratings. It complements the Level 2 assessment programme on the extent to which jurisdictions' implementation measures are complete and consistent with the international standards for payment systems, central securities depositories, securities settlement systems, central counterparties and trade repositories.

Note that authorities may have updated their rules, regulations and policies since the assessment. For current implementation measures, please contact the relevant authority.

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Australia CCP
AU-RBA,ASIC
  • Principle ID 14.4
  • Rating Consistent

Implementation measure cut-off date: 16-Dec-2015
Assessment rating date: 14-May-2015

Principle

A CCP should have rules and procedures that enable the segregation and portability of positions of a participant’s customers and the collateral provided to the CCP with respect to those positions.

Implementation measures

RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standards 13.4 and 20.1 Guidance issued in relation to the RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Guidance on Standard 13.4.1

Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)

The RBA rules cover almost all of this KC explicitly – RBA CCP Standard 13.4 listed here covers all the elements of the KC with the exception of the requirement to disclose the rules/policies/ procedures for portability. The guidance to RBA CCP Standard 13.4 (which is intended to assist the interpretation of the standard) is broader than the KC in this respect and clarifies that portability arrangements should be disclosed in the CCP’s rules/policies/procedures. Furthermore, Standard 20.1 provides for disclosure of rules/policies and procedures to participants. So the remaining element is disclosure of the rules/policies/procedures for portability to the public. Standard 20.1 does provide for public disclosure of relevant rules/policies/procedures – this cross refers to Standard 13.4.

Australia CCP
AU-RBA,ASIC
  • Principle ID 15.0
  • Rating Broadly consistent

Implementation measure cut-off date: 16-Dec-2015
Assessment rating date: 14-May-2015

Principle

An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.

Implementation measures

RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 14

Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)

The RBA has modified the Principle to address a concern that, given the Australian legal regime, assets held by an FMI are not bankruptcy remote and therefore would be at risk of being drawn upon in the event that a participant default exhausted pre-funded default resources. The guidance to the RBA Standards envisages arrangements under which assets would be held on behalf of the CCP by an affiliate/group entity of the CCP, and clarifies the safeguards necessary to support such an arrangement, including consultation with the RBA and demonstration of legal certainty. There nevertheless remains a risk that the liquid assets will not be accessible when needed. The Australian Government has recently consulted on legislation that would provide the RBA with directive powers over related entities that provide critical services/funding to a CCP. Such powers, while intended to have broader application, would allow the RBA to direct a parent to disperse funds held on behalf of the CCP and thereby strengthen such an arrangement in an effort to make it functionally equivalent to the CCP itself holding the assets. Recommendation: The RBA is recommended to implement measures that address the gaps or inconsistencies identified, particularly those related to KC2 and KC3.

Australia CCP
AU-RBA,ASIC
  • Principle ID 15.1
  • Rating Broadly consistent

Implementation measure cut-off date: 16-Dec-2015
Assessment rating date: 14-May-2015

Principle

A CCP should have rules and procedures that enable the segregation and portability of positions of a participant’s customers and the collateral provided to the CCP with respect to those positions.

Implementation measures

RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 14.1

Australia CCP
AU-RBA,ASIC
  • Principle ID 15.2
  • Rating Broadly consistent

Implementation measure cut-off date: 16-Dec-2015
Assessment rating date: 14-May-2015

Principle

An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.

Implementation measures

RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 14.2 Guidance issued in relation to the RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Guidance on Standard 14.2.1.

Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)

The RBA has modified the Principle to address a concern that, given the Australian legal regime, assets held by an FMI are not bankruptcy remote and therefore would be at risk of being drawn upon in the event that a participant default exhausted pre-funded default resources. The guidance to the RBA Standards envisages arrangements under which assets would be held on behalf of the CCP by an affiliate/group entity of the CCP, and clarifies the safeguards necessary to support such an arrangement, including consultation with the RBA and demonstration of legal certainty. There nevertheless remains a risk that the liquid assets will not be accessible when needed. The Australian Government has recently consulted on legislation that would provide the RBA with directive powers over related entities that provide critical services/funding to a CCP. Such powers, while intended to have broader application, would allow the RBA to direct a parent to disperse funds held on behalf of the CCP and thereby strengthen such an arrangement in an effort to make it functionally equivalent to the CCP itself holding the assets.

Australia CCP
AU-RBA,ASIC
  • Principle ID 15.3
  • Rating Broadly consistent

Implementation measure cut-off date: 16-Dec-2015
Assessment rating date: 14-May-2015

Principle

An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.

Implementation measures

RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 14.3

Assessment comments (key conclusions and recommendations)

The RBA has modified the Principle to address a concern that, given the Australian legal regime, assets held by an FMI are not bankruptcy remote and therefore would be at risk of being drawn upon in the event that a participant default exhausted pre-funded default resources. The guidance to the RBA Standards envisages arrangements under which assets would be held on behalf of the CCP by an affiliate/group entity of the CCP, and clarifies the safeguards necessary to support such an arrangement, including consultation with the RBA and demonstration of legal certainty. There nevertheless remains a risk that the liquid assets will not be accessible when needed. The Australian Government has recently consulted on legislation that would provide the RBA with directive powers over related entities that provide critical services/funding to a CCP. Such powers, while intended to have broader application, would allow the RBA to direct a parent to disperse funds held on behalf of the CCP and thereby strengthen such an arrangement in an effort to make it functionally equivalent to the CCP itself holding the assets.

Australia CCP
AU-RBA,ASIC
  • Principle ID 15.4
  • Rating Broadly consistent

Implementation measure cut-off date: 16-Dec-2015
Assessment rating date: 14-May-2015

Principle

An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.

Implementation measures

RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 14.4

Australia CCP
AU-RBA,ASIC
  • Principle ID 15.5
  • Rating Broadly consistent

Implementation measure cut-off date: 16-Dec-2015
Assessment rating date: 14-May-2015

Principle

An FMI should identify, monitor, and manage its general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialise. Further, liquid net assets should at all times be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services.

Implementation measures

RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 14.5

Australia CCP
AU-RBA,ASIC
  • Principle ID 16.0
  • Rating Consistent

Implementation measure cut-off date: 16-Dec-2015
Assessment rating date: 14-May-2015

Principle

An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants’ assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI’s investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.

Implementation measures

RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 15

Australia CCP
AU-RBA,ASIC
  • Principle ID 16.1
  • Rating Consistent

Implementation measure cut-off date: 16-Dec-2015
Assessment rating date: 14-May-2015

Principle

An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants’ assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI’s investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.

Implementation measures

RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 15.1

Australia CCP
AU-RBA,ASIC
  • Principle ID 16.2
  • Rating Consistent

Implementation measure cut-off date: 16-Dec-2015
Assessment rating date: 14-May-2015

Principle

An FMI should safeguard its own and its participants’ assets and minimise the risk of loss on and delay in access to these assets. An FMI’s investments should be in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.

Implementation measures

RBA Financial Stability Standards for Central Counterparties: Standard 15.2

Description of filters

Jurisdiction

This filter limits the search results to selected jurisdictions. The available jurisdictions represent assessments that have been completed to date. The table below provides also a pdf of key conclusions and recommendations for all Principles of a given jurisdiction.

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FMI type

This filter limits the search results to the selected FMI types. FMIs may be subject to different regulatory, supervisory and oversight regimes depending on their organisation, function and design.

PS: Payment system

A set of instruments, procedures and rules for the transfer of funds between or among participants; the system includes the participants and the entity operating the arrangement.

CSD/SSS: Central securities depository / Securities settlement system

CSDs are entities that provide securities accounts, central safekeeping services and asset services, which may include the administration of corporate actions and redemptions, and play an important role in helping to ensure the integrity of securities issues (that securities are not accidentally or fraudulently created or destroyed or their details changed). The precise activities of a CSD vary based on jurisdiction and market practices.

SSS are entities that enable securities to be transferred and settled by book entry according to a set of predetermined multilateral rules. Such systems allow transfers of securities either free of payment or against payment. Typically, a CSD also operates an SSS.

CCP: Central counterparty

An entity that interposes itself between counterparties to contracts traded in one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer and thereby ensuring the performance of open contracts.

TR: Trade repository

An entity that maintains a centralised electronic record (database) of transaction data.

Principle or key consideration ID

This filter limits the search results to selected principles and key considerations.   Each principle includes a headline standard and a list of key considerations that further explain the headline standard.  The principles are listed below. A detailed list of key considerations is available in the CPMI-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures.

Principle rating

This filter limits the search results to selected principle rating(s) used in the L2 assessments. The ratings reflect conditions at the time of the assessment, and are built on key conclusions that reflect CPMI and IOSCO's collective expert judgment regarding the impact of identified gaps and/or shortcomings. Ratings are determined for each principle after the jurisdiction's legislative and regulatory framework, including policy statements, as relevant, was compared against the corresponding content of the PFMI.

The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified no gaps or shortcomings, or only a few gaps and/or shortcomings that have no material impact on completeness and/or consistency.

The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is broadly consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a minor impact on completeness and/or consistency.

The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is partly consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a significant impact on completeness and/or consistency.

The jurisdiction’s regulatory framework is not consistent with the Principle. The assessment has identified gaps and/or shortcomings that have a major impact on completeness and/or consistency.

This status corresponds to the case where no relevant FMI exists that is within the scope of the Principles. A rating of “NA” will be indicated only if no relevant regulatory measures are being taken and no such FMI is expected to develop within the jurisdiction.

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