Gabriel Makhlouf: Institutions, anchors, and their discontents - the role of central banks
Speech by Mr Gabriel Makhlouf, Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland, to Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford, 18 February 2026.
The views expressed in this speech are those of the speaker and not the view of the BIS.
It is a pleasure to be here in Oxford1 While I'm aware that this is a school of government and I'm a central banker, the two are inextricably linked. Societies and indeed economies are shaped by their institutions, specifically the legal, social, cultural, formal and informal norms that impact the way citizens interact with each other. Successful institutions are those that are trusted by the societies that created them and for which they ultimately serve.
Today I am going to resist the opportunity to deliver a lecture on institutional economics. I will instead concentrate on central banks as institutions, their mandates, the way they deliver their responsibilities, the way they hold themselves accountable and some of the challenges ahead.
It is not a particular surprise that central banking finds itself in the news. In the normal course of events, decisions taken and judgements exercised by central banks affect economies and financial systems in individual countries and across the world. What has been relatively recent, at least in advanced economies, is the resurfacing of questions around the independence of central banks, in some countries at least. I want to approach this subject not as a defence of technocracy, but as a reflection on institutional design: why certain arrangements persist, why others fail and why independence, properly understood, has become a defining feature of modern monetary frameworks.
Institutions
Let me begin by briefly considering institutions more broadly.
A large and influential body of economic research shows that institutions matter profoundly for long run economic performance.