



Regulatory Capital Charges for Too-Connected-to-Fail Institutions: A Practical Proposal

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Background: ongoing international regulatory reform

- Supplement the microprudential regulation with a macroprudential overlay
- Systemic risk perspective
 - “... additional capital, liquidity or other supervisory measures to reduce the externalities created by systemically important institutions” (BCBS Proposal, December 2009)



The contribution of this paper:

- This paper proposes a practical approach to imposing capital surcharges on SIFIs
 - A measure on each bank's incremental contribution to systemic risk: CoVaR approach
 - Which determines the level of capital surcharge on individual banks



Comment 1

- The idea of linking capital charges to systemic risk contribution was not absent in Basel II
- Theoretic underpinning of Basel II: ASRF model
 - Granularity assumption: each loan (portfolio/bank) is infinitely small in a portfolio (banking system)
 - A single common factor
- Portfolio invariant property under these two assumptions

$$k = \sum_i k_i = \sum_i F(PD_i, \rho_i, LGD_i)$$

- Systemic risk contribution is additive and is portfolio(system)-independent
- i.e. **macroprudential and microprudential are consistent**



- Macroprudential overlay is important and necessary if either of the two assumptions is violated
 - Bank level: concentration risk adjustment under Pillar 2 (BCBS WP no 15, 2006)
 - System level: capital surcharge for systemically important banks
 - Externality: too-big-to-fail, too-connected-to-fail



Comment 2

- How to measure systemic importance of each bank?
- BIS-FSB-IMF joint survey: “Guidance to assess the systemic importance of financial institutions, markets and instruments” (2009)
 - Size
 - Substitutability
 - Interconnectedness






Recently proposed market-based measures

- Spillover effect: failure of one bank → impact on the system
 - CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier)
- Risk allocation: system in distress → losses from each bank
 - Marginal expected shortfall (MES) (Acharya)
 - Sharply value approach (Tarashev, Borio and Tsatsaronis)
 - Distress Insurance Premium (DIP) (Huang, Zhou and Zhu)
- These measures can have very different results!






End-2008 results for major US banks





Compared with SCAP results





- It is dangerous to impose capital surcharges based on one particular measure
- Take CoVaR for example
 - Focus too much on interconnectedness
 - Mediobanca faces the highest capital surcharge (as a % of assets) – how comfortable is the result?
 - Not additive



Minor comment

- Definition
 - Incremental contribution = VaR (when J defaults) – VAR (unconditional rather than when J survives)
 - The two-bank example
 - $\text{VaR}(B) = \text{VaR}(A) = 5$ million
 - $\text{VaR}(B|A \text{ defaults}) = 6$ million
 - $\text{VaR}(B|A \text{ survives}) \neq 5$ million



Overall

- A very nice, well-written paper: topical issue, practical proposal and thought-provoking
- Recommend to read!