Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision

Basel III Monitoring Report

September 2026

Queries regarding this document should be addressed to the Secretariat of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (email: qis@bis.org).

The analyses that were previously presented in the detailed sections of the Basel III Monitoring Report have been published as Tableau dashboards. Please note that occasionally published data are updated to reflect revised data submissions in between the publication dates of the reports. Therefore, the dashboards should be used to view the most up-to-date data and analysis. The Basel Committee welcomes any feedback on the dashboards at qis@bis.org.

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Basel III Monitoring Report

September 2026

Conventions used in this report

billion thousand million
trillion thousand billion
lhs, rhs left-hand scale, right-hand scale

Group 1 banks are those that have Tier 1 capital of more than €3 billion and are internationally active. All other banks are considered Group 2 banks.

Components may not sum to totals because of rounding.

The term "country" as used in this publication also covers territorial entities that are not states as understood by international law and practice but for which data are separately and independently maintained.

All data, including for previous reporting dates, reflect revisions received up to 25 August 2026.

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of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision

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Highlights of the Basel III monitoring exercise as of 31 December 2025

Basel III risk-based capital and leverage ratios are stable while liquidity indicators show limited movements for large internationally active banks

To assess the impact of the Basel III framework on banks, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision monitors the effects and dynamics of the reforms. For this purpose, a semiannual monitoring framework has been set up for the risk-based capital ratio, the leverage ratio and liquidity metrics, using data collected by national supervisors on a representative sample of institutions in each country. Since the end-2017 reporting date, the analyses have also captured the effects of the Basel Committee's finalisation of the Basel III reforms.[1] This summary is based on aggregate results using data as of 31 December 2025 and compares them with the previous reporting period (June 2025). The Basel Committee believes that the information contained in this summary and the related dashboards will provide relevant stakeholders with a useful benchmark for analysis.

Information considered in the analysis was obtained from voluntary and confidential submissions of data from individual banks and their national supervisors. At the jurisdictional level, there may be ongoing mandatory data collection, which also feeds into this report. Data were included for 149 banks, including 106 large internationally active ("Group 1") banks, among them 29 global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), and 43 other ("Group 2") banks.[2] Members' coverage of their banking sector is very high for Group 1 banks, reaching 100% coverage for some countries, while coverage is lower for Group 2 banks and varies by country.

In general, these analyses do not consider any transitional arrangements such as grandfathering arrangements. Rather, the estimates presented assume full implementation of the Basel III requirements based on data as of 31 December 2025. No assumptions have been made about banks' profitability or behavioural responses, such as changes in bank capital or balance sheet composition, since this date or in the future. Furthermore, the report does not reflect any additional capital requirements under Pillar 2 of the Basel III framework.

[1] See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, *High-level summary of Basel III reforms*, December 2017, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424_hlsummary.pdf; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, *Basel III: finalising post-crisis reforms*, December 2017, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.htm.

[2] Group 1 banks are those that have Tier 1 capital of more than €3 billion and are internationally active. All other banks are considered Group 2 banks. Not all banks provided data relating to all parts of the Basel III framework.

Overview of results (unbalanced data set)

Table 1

	30 June 2025[1]			31 December 2025		
	Group 1	Of which: G-SIBs	Group 2	Group 1	Of which: G-SIBs	Group 2
Initial Basel III framework						
CET1 ratio (%)	13.9	13.4	18.8	13.9	13.6	17.6
Target total capital shortfalls (€ bn)[2]	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0
TLAC shortfall 2022 minimum (€ bn)	7.6	7.6		0.0	0.0	
Total accounting assets (€ bn)	58,897	44,570	3,039	69,214	49,901	2,976
Leverage ratio (%)[3]	6.1	6.0	6.8	6.0	5.9	6.8
LCR (%)	134.8	130.6	191.7	136.6	132.3	196.4
NSFR (%)	123.9	124.1	134.1	123.3	123.7	134.4
Fully phased-in final Basel III framework (2028)						
Change in Tier 1 MRC at the target level (%)	1.7	0.3	0.8	2.2	1.8	0.7
CET1 ratio (%)	13.4	13.2	17.6	13.6	13.3	16.8
Target capital shortfalls (€ bn); of which:	0.9	0.0	0.3	1.2	0.0	0.2
CET1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0
Additional Tier 1	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Tier 2	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.2
TLAC shortfall 2022 minimum (€ bn)	3.2	3.2		0.0	0.0	
Leverage ratio (%)[3]	6.1	6.0	6.8	6.0	5.9	6.8

See Table A.4 for the target level capital requirements.

[1] The values for the previous period may differ slightly from those published in the previous report. This is due to data resubmissions for previous periods to improve the underlying data quality and enlarge the time series sample. [2] These use the 2017 definition of the leverage ratio exposure measure. [3] The leverage ratios reflect temporary exclusions from leverage exposures introduced in some jurisdictions.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.

- Compared with June 2025, the average Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital ratio under the current Basel III framework remained stable at 13.9% for the unbalanced sample of Group 1 banks.
- The average impact of the Basel III framework on the Tier 1 minimum required capital (MRC) was 2.2% for Group 1 banks and 1.8% for G-SIBs. The impact of final Basel III standards on Group 1 banks is slightly higher compared with the previous exercise, driven by a bigger sample of banks.
- In contrast, Group 2 banks show an increase of only 0.7% which reflects the fundamental difference in balance sheet composition, business models and regulatory sensitivities relative to their larger, internationally active counterparts.
- Banks in the H2 2025 sample show a cumulative capital shortfall of €1.4 billion under the final Basel III framework.
- The average Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) of Group 1 banks improved slightly by 1.7 percentage points compared with June 2025, due to a contraction in net outflows compared with the previous period. The average Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) decreased slightly (–0.6 percentage points) in the same period because of a smaller decrease in required stable funding (RSF) compared with available stable funding (ASF).

Current Basel III Tier 1 capital ratios show a slight increase, driven by Europe and the rest of the world

Group 1 banks, balanced data set

Graph 1



[1] The solid lines depict the relevant minimums, the dotted lines the minimums plus the capital conservation buffer. See Table A.4 for the relevant levels. [2] Exchange rates as at the current reporting date.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- The balanced data set for Group 1 banks showed a marginal decrease (–0.2 percentage points) in current Basel III total capital ratios in December 2025 in comparison with June 2025, while Tier 1 capital ratios increased slightly in Europe and the rest of the world. This increase was driven by a growth in Tier 1 capital which was outpacing the increase in risk-weighted assets (RWA). The overall CET1 capital ratio for Group 1 banks in the balanced data set was 14.2% in December 2025.

- Europe currently maintains the highest Tier 1 capital ratios relative to the Americas and the rest of the world. Between December 2024 and December 2025, Tier 1 capital ratios in the rest of the world showed an upward trend, while the Americas exhibited the opposite trend over the same period.

The impact of final Basel III standards on Group 1 banks is slightly higher compared with the previous exercise, driven by a bigger sample of banks

Change in Tier 1 MRC at the target level due to the final Basel III standards | Graph 2



CVA = credit valuation adjustment.

Credit risk shows the change in MRC due to revised standardised and internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches, including securitisation. Operational risk figures may not show supervisor-imposed capital add-ons under Pillar 2. Therefore, changes in MRC may be overestimated. Output floor results are net of the existing Basel I-based floor according to national implementation of the Basel II framework. The target level accounts for Tier 1 minimum capital requirements and the capital conservation buffer (ie resulting in an 8.5% Tier 1 capital requirement) as well as any applicable G-SIB surcharge, any countercyclical capital buffer requirements and any other higher domestic Pillar 1 requirements to the extent these have been reported. The analysis also reflects any additional Pillar 1 RWA as reported by banks and their supervisors.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- For Group 1 banks, Tier 1 MRC would increase by 2.2% following the full phase-in of the final Basel III standards. The increase in MRC is underpinned by the incremental impact of the risk-based requirements of 3.2%, offset by the reduction in leverage ratio requirements by –1.0 percentage points. The increase in risk-based components is mainly driven by the output floor (+1.9%) and market risk (+1.7%).
- The impact on MRC across regions varies for Group 1 banks. There is a low impact for European banks (+0.8%) and the Americas (+1.2%) while the rest of the world exhibits a greater impact (+3.6%).
- For Group 2 banks, the overall 0.7% impact on Tier 1 MRC is driven by a 3.5% increase in the risk-based measures, stemming mainly from the output floor (+3.3%), which is partially offset by a reduction in leverage ratio MRC (–2.8%).
- This is the second period in which banks in the European Union reported results under their national final Basel III standards for all risk types but market risk. Banks with full implementation of the final Basel III standards for all risk types may still contribute to the change in MRC shown in the impact analysis due to any remaining phase-in arrangements, for example regarding the level of the output floor. Considering the overall report sample of 106 Group 1 banks for the December 2025 reporting period, 102 banks (of which 34 banks for Europe, 16 banks for the Americas and 52 banks for the rest of the world) were included in the Group 1 banks' impact analysis.

Fully phased-in Basel III leverage ratios[1] of large internationally active banks were slightly lower in H2 2025

Group 1 banks, balanced data set, exchange rates as at the current reporting date — Graph 3





[1] Data points from H1 2011 to H2 2012 use the original definition of the leverage ratio. Data points from H1 2013 to H1 2017 use the definition of the leverage ratio set out in the 2014 version of the framework. Note that the data points for H1 2013 use an approximation for the initial definition of the Basel III leverage ratio exposure which uses gross instead of adjusted gross securities financing transaction values. Data points from H2 2017 onwards use the final definition of the leverage ratio to the extent data are available. Temporary exclusions from the leverage ratio exposure measure in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic have not been added back.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- For the balanced data set of Group 1 banks, leverage ratios have remained flat over the past two years in Europe and the rest of the world, while those in the Americas have gradually declined since peaking in Q4 2020.
- Leverage ratios for Group 1 banks are still lower in Europe (5.1%) than in the Americas (5.6%) and the rest of the world (7.0%).
- For the unbalanced data set at the end-December 2025 reporting date, the average fully phased-in final Basel III Tier 1 leverage ratios are 6.0% for Group 1 banks, 5.9% for G-SIBs and 6.8% for Group 2 banks.

Minimal overall capital shortfall at the target level under the fully phased-in final Basel III standards

Fully phased-in final Basel III standards,[1] sample and exchange rates as at the reporting dates | Graph 4



[1] Results for H2 2015 are based on the Basel Committee's cumulative quantitative impact study and are not fully comparable from a methodological point of view. Compared with H2 2017 and H1 2018, the results since H2 2018 include the revised market risk framework as finalised in January 2019.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- For this reporting date, non-GSIB Group 1 and Group 2 banks in the sample reported an aggregated regulatory capital shortfall of €1.4 billion.

Capital for large internationally active banks increased

Group 1 banks, balanced data set, exchange rates as at the current reporting date Graph 5



[1] The dividend payout ratio is calculated as common share dividends divided by profits after tax using a rolling 12-month window.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- From end-June 2011 to end-December 2025, the level of Group 1 banks' CET1 capital increased by 162.5% from €1,320 billion to €3,465 billion. Since end-June 2025, Group 1 CET1 capital has increased by €84.5 billion (or +2.5%).
- Over H2 2025, CET1 capital increased across all regions, with the most notable increment in the rest of the world (+3.2%).
- Overall, profits after tax increased for the Group 1 banks from €174.2 billion to €177.8 billion between June and December 2025. The dividend payout ratio stood at 32.7%.

Dividend payout ratios varied across regions

Group 1 banks, balanced data set, exchange rates as at the current reporting date — Graph 6



The dividend payout ratio is calculated as common share dividends divided by profits after tax using a rolling 12-month window.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- Annual after-tax profits for Group 1 banks, aggregated over two consecutive reporting dates, rose in Europe (+8.3%) and the rest of the world (+2.3%), while the Americas were broadly unchanged at –0.1% compared with the 12-month period ending December 2024.
- Compared with the previous reporting date, the annual dividend payout ratio has decreased in the rest of the world and in Europe, while it has increased in the Americas. It remains below the record high ratios observed in 2020 in the Americas, while it is at pre-pandemic levels in Europe and the rest of the world.

Analysis of the share of MRC by asset class[1] according to current rules shows slightly increasing credit risk MRC

Balanced data set | Graph 7



CVA = credit valuation adjustment.

[1] "Other credit" includes exposures subject to partial use of the standardised approach for credit risk that cannot be assigned to a specific asset class, past-due items under the standardised approach, capital requirements specified in Part 1 of the Basel II framework, capital requirements for other assets, and additional capital requirements due to regulatory calculation differences if there is a shortfall of provisions over expected loss amounts for exposures subject to the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach for credit risk. The category "other" includes Pillar 1 capital requirements in member countries for risks not covered by the Basel Framework and reconciliation differences (ie shortfalls of provisions over expected loss amounts for exposures subject to the IRB approach for credit risk). The term "reconciliation differences" refers to the difference between MRC reported at the entire bank level and the sum of MRC reported for the individual asset classes.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- As of December 2025 and for Group 1 banks, non-securitisation credit risk[3] continues to be the dominant portion of overall MRC, on average covering 72.2% of total MRC. Among the non-securitisation credit risk asset classes, the share of MRC for corporate exposures has returned to the averages between 2011 and 2015 of around 32%. In addition to this, the share of other credit exposure has experienced the biggest increase (+1.1 percentage points) and the share of corporate exposure has experienced the most significant decrease (–1.4 percentage points), in comparison with December 2024.
- The evolution of MRC across CVA and market risk between end-2024 and end-2025 reflects the interplay of structural regulatory drivers and market-driven effects. On a year-on-year basis, the share of CVA rose by 0.1 percentage points which is largely attributable to the first application of the Basel III CVA framework in European Union countries. During the H2 2025, the share of CVA declined by 0.1 percentage points reflecting the natural moderation of the transition effect.
- On the other hand, the share of market risk MRC decreased by 0.2 percentage points between June and December 2025. The decrease reflects easing global financial conditions in the second half of 2025 that reduced market volatility, and in turn, VaR and stressed VaR inputs.
- The share of MRC for securitisation exposures has experienced a steady increase (+0.2 percentage points) between December 2024 and December 2025.

[3] Here, non-securitisation credit risk is defined as the sum of corporate, bank, sovereign, retail, equity and other credit, as illustrated in the graph.

All banks exceeded the 100% threshold for LCR and NSFR [1]

Overall distribution

Graph 8



[1] The median value is represented by a horizontal line, with 50% of the values falling in the 25th to 75th percentile range shown by the box. The upper and lower endpoints of the thin vertical lines show the range of the entire sample. In some cases, arrows at the top of the vertical line indicate banks with ratios outside the range shown in the graph. The dots represent weighted averages. The horizontal red lines represent the 100% minimums. [2] The sample is capped at 400%, meaning that all banks with an LCR above 400% were set to 400%.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- The weighted average LCR for Group 1 banks was 136.6% and 196.4% for Group 2 banks at end-December 2025.
- In the current reporting period, all banks reported an LCR above 100%. No bank reported a shortfall since June 2025, while an aggregated €18.3 billion shortfall was reported for three banks in December 2024.
- The weighted average NSFR was 123.3% for Group 1 banks and 134.4% for Group 2 banks at end-December 2025.
- All banks reported an NSFR above 100%.

For Group 1 banks, the LCR increased while the NSFR remained stable, with no shortfall in either measure

Group 1 banks, balanced data set[1]

Graph 9



ASF = available stable funding; HQLA = high-quality liquid assets; RSF = required stable funding.

[1] This graph depicts the NSFR as calculated under different versions of the NSFR framework released in December 2010, January 2014 and October 2014. Calculations performed according to the final standard approved by the Basel Committee in October 2014 start with the end-December 2014 reporting period. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, *Basel III: the net stable funding ratio*, October 2014, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d295.htm. Since the Basel Committee did not collect NSFR data through its Basel III monitoring exercise for the end-June 2020 reporting date, the relevant data points show the same values as for end-December 2019. [2] Exchange rates as at the reporting dates. [3] Exchange rates as at the current reporting date.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- For a balanced data set of Group 1 banks, all banks met a 100% LCR at end-December 2025. As at end-December 2024 and June 2025, this results in no shortfall. The average LCR for this sample increased to 134.8% at end-December 2025 compared with 134.3% in the previous reporting period.
- There was no aggregate NSFR shortfall for the balanced data set of Group 1 banks. The average NSFR for the same sample of banks remained stable, shifting slightly to 122.1% as of December 2025 from 122.5% in June 2025.
- Both the LCR and NSFR were above pre-pandemic levels at the reporting date.

Group 2 banks showed a decreasing LCR and a slightly increasing NSFR, with no shortfall in either measure

Group 2 banks, balanced data set[1] Graph 10



ASF = available stable funding; HQLA = high-quality liquid assets; RSF = required stable funding.

[1] As described in footnote 1 to Graph 9, the NSFR time series depicts data reflecting NSFR standards released in December 2010, January 2014 and October 2014. [2] Exchange rates as at the reporting dates. [3] Exchange rates as at the current reporting date.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- For a balanced data set of Group 2 banks, there has been no LCR shortfall since June 2017. As on December 2025, the average LCR for the same sample of banks decreased by 3.5 percentage points from the last reporting date to 183.6%. The decline in the LCR is due to a greater increase in net cash outflows compared with the increase in HQLA.
- The aggregate NSFR shortfall also remained at zero for the balanced data set of Group 2 banks. The average NSFR for the same sample of banks increased by 0.8 percentage points in comparison with the previous reporting date to 138.7% in December 2025.

For Group 1 banks, LCRs and NSFRs increased slightly in the Americas, decreased slightly in Europe and remained stable in the rest of the world

Group 1 banks, balanced data set

Graph 11



[1] The NSFR time series depicts data reflecting NSFR standards released in December 2010, January 2014 and October 2014.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- Since 2020, the weighted average LCRs have consistently remained above 140% in Europe and around 140% in the rest of the world, while the Americas have maintained an average LCR of approximately 120%. This trend has persisted during the current reporting period. However, a more recent decline in the LCR for Europe has been observed. Notably, the previously steady upward trajectory of Europe's LCR reversed after June 2021.
- At end-December 2025 the weighted average NSFR for Group 1 banks in each of the three regions was well above 100% and stable compared with the previous period. After a significant drop during H1 2022, the NSFR of banks in the Americas continues to slowly revert, reaching 119.8% at December 2025.

Annex A: Basel III standards and phase-in arrangements

Basel III minimum requirements and buffers

Table A.1

	As of 1 January 2019
Leverage ratio	3.0%
Minimum CET1 ratio	4.5%
Capital conservation buffer	2.50%
G-SIB surcharge	1.0%–2.5%
Minimum common equity plus capital conservation buffer	7.0%
Phase-in of deductions from CET1 (including amounts exceeding the limit for DTAs, MSRs and financials)	100%
Minimum Tier 1 capital	6.0%
Minimum total capital	8.0%
Minimum total capital plus capital conservation buffer	10.5%
Capital instruments that no longer qualify as Tier 1 capital or Tier 2 capital	Phased out over 10-year horizon beginning 2013
Liquidity Coverage Ratio	100%
Net Stable Funding Ratio	100%[1]

DTA = deferred tax assets; MSR = mortgage servicing rights.

[1] Note that as of September 2023, a final rule for the Net Stable Funding Ratio is in force in 26 out of 27 Basel Committee member jurisdictions. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, *RCAP: Basel III implementation dashboard*, October 2023, www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation/rcap_reports.htm.

Final Basel III phase-in arrangements

Shading indicates transition periods – all dates are as of 1 January.

Table A.2

	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028
Revisions to the standardised and internal ratings-based approaches to credit risk	Introduce					
Revised CVA and market risk frameworks	Introduce					
Revised operational risk framework	Introduce					
Output floor	50%	55%	60%	65%	70%	72.5%
	Increase in RWA subject to 25% cap at national discretion.					
Leverage ratio exposure measure and G-SIB surcharge	Introduce					

Definition of different Basel III regimes

Table A.3

	Initial Basel III framework	Transitional final Basel III framework	Fully phased-in final Basel III framework
Definition of capital	*Basel III: A global framework for more resilient banks and the banking system*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm		
Credit risk	*Basel III: A global framework for more resilient banks and the banking system*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm; *Capital requirements for bank exposures to central counterparties*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs227.htm	*Basel III: finalising post-crisis reforms*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.htm; *Capital requirements for bank exposures to central counterparties*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs227.htm; *Capital requirements for banks' equity investments in funds*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs266.htm	
Operational risk	Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.htm	*Basel III: finalising post-crisis reforms*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.htm	
Market risk	*Revisions to the Basel II market risk framework*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs158.htm; *Guidelines for computing capital for incremental risk in the trading book*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs159.htm	*Minimum capital requirements for market risk*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d457.htm	
Counterparty credit risk	*Basel III: A global framework for more resilient banks and the banking system*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm	*The standardised approach for measuring counterparty credit risk exposures*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs279.htm	
CVA	*Basel III: A global framework for more resilient banks and the banking system*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm	*Basel III: finalising post-crisis reforms*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.htm; Targeted revisions to the revised CVA framework published in July 2020 are **not** yet considered for the end-December 2019 reporting date. They will be reflected in the exercise on the end-2020 reporting date, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d507.htm	
Securitisation	*Basel III: A global framework for more resilient banks and the banking system*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm	*Revisions to the securitisation framework*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d374.htm	
Floor	*Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.htm	Output floor of 50%, *Basel III: finalising post-crisis reforms*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.htm	Output floor of 72.5%, *Basel III: finalising post-crisis reforms*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.htm
Leverage ratio	*Basel III: A global framework for more resilient banks and the banking system*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm; *Basel III leverage ratio framework and disclosure requirements*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs270.htm	*Basel III: finalising post-crisis reforms*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.htm; *Leverage ratio treatment of client cleared derivatives*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d467.htm	

Minimum and target risk-based capital and leverage ratio requirements

Fully phased-in final Basel III standards, in per cent — Table A.4

	Fully implemented risk-based requirement			Fully implemented leverage ratio requirement	
	Minimum	Target non-G-SIBs	Target G-SIBs	Minimum all banks and target non-G-SIBs	Target G-SIBs
CET1 capital	4.5	7.0	8.0–9.5		
Tier 1 capital	6.0	8.5	9.5–11.0	3.0	3.5–4.25
Total capital	8.0	10.5	11.5–13.0		

Annex B: Previous monitoring reports published by the Basel Committee

December 2010	*Results of the comprehensive quantitative impact study*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs186.htm	
April 2012	*Results of the Basel III monitoring exercise as of 30 June 2011*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs217.htm	
September 2012	*Results of the Basel III monitoring exercise as of 31 December 2011*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs231.htm	
March 2013	*Results of the Basel III monitoring exercise as of 30 June 2012*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs243.htm	
September 2013	*Results of the Basel III monitoring exercise as of 31 December 2012*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs262.htm	
March 2014	*Results of the Basel III monitoring exercise as of 30 June 2013*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs278.htm	
September 2014	*Basel III monitoring report as of 31 December 2013*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs289.htm	
	Main findings of the trading book hypothetical portfolio exercise	Diana Iercosan, Derek Nesbitt and Arnaud Sandrin
March 2015	*Basel III monitoring report*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d312.htm	
	Analysis of the QIS for the fundamental review of the trading book	
September 2015	*Basel III monitoring report*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d334.htm	
March 2016	*Basel III monitoring report*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d354.htm	
	Comprehensive QIS on interest rate risk in the banking book	Ethan Goh, Kamil Pliszka and Davy Reinard
September 2016	*Basel III monitoring report*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d378.htm	
	Results of the quantitative impact study on the large exposures review clause	Marie-Céline Bard, Ken Taniguchi and Lynnette Withfield
February 2017	*Basel III monitoring report*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d397.htm	
	Impact of the revised minimum capital requirements for market risk	Scott Nagel
	Results of the survey on the interaction of regulatory instruments	Diana Hancock and Doriana Ruffino
September 2017	*Basel III monitoring report*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d416.htm	
	Impact of the revised minimum capital requirements for market risk	Scott Nagel
	Impact of the revised securitisation framework	Bernardo D'Alessandro, Thomas Morck and Emanuela Piani
December 2017	*Basel III monitoring report – Results of the cumulative quantitative impact study*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d426.htm	

March 2018	*Basel III monitoring report*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d433.htm	
	Impact of the revised securitisation framework	Bernardo D'Alessandro, Thomas Morck and Emanuela Piani
October 2018	*Basel III monitoring report*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d449.htm	
March 2019	*Basel III monitoring report,* www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d461.htm	
September 2019	*Basel III monitoring report,* www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d477.htm	
	Counterparty credit risk and credit valuation adjustment risk	Alexandra Gebauer, Evariste Beigneux and Giulio Malberti
April 2020	*Basel III monitoring report,* www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d500.htm	
	Counterparty credit risk and credit valuation adjustment risk	Thomas Blumentritt
December 2020	*Basel III monitoring report,* www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d512.htm	
	Counterparty credit risk and credit valuation adjustment risk	Thomas Blumentritt and Alexandra Gebauer
September 2021	*Basel III monitoring report,* www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d524.htm	
	Exclusions from the leverage ratio exposure measure due to Covid-19	Renzo Corrias
February 2022	*Basel III monitoring report,* www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d531.htm	
September 2022	*Basel III monitoring report,* www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d541.htm	
	Banks' exposures to cryptoassets – a novel dataset	Renzo Corrias
	Capital buffers and total CET1 requirements including Pillar 2	Irina Barakova and Roberto Ottolini
February 2023	*Basel III monitoring report,* www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d546.htm	
	Regional distributions of Group 1 and Group 2 banks and their impact on results in the Basel III monitoring reports	Martin Birn, Lea Charlotte Neugebauer and Verena Seidl
September 2023	*Basel III monitoring report,* www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d554.htm	
March 2024	*Basel III monitoring report*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d570.htm	
October 2024	*Basel III monitoring report*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d581.htm	
March 2025	*Basel III monitoring report*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d592.htm	
October 2025	*Basel III monitoring report*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d599.htm	
March 2026	*Basel III monitoring report*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d609.htm	