Has Asian emerging market monetary policy been too procyclical when responding to swings in commodity prices?

Andrew Filardo and Marco Lombardi¹

Commodity price fluctuations in recent years have led to wide swings in inflationary pressures across Asian emerging market economies and have revived the discussion on how monetary policy should best react. We argue that the conventional wisdom for emerging market economies of treating commodity price fluctuations as external supply shocks is misguided in the current policy environment. We first present new empirical evidence that global demand shocks have driven commodity prices and inflationary pressures in Asian economies. We then show that the incorrect diagnosis of global demand shocks as external supply shocks leads to suboptimal outcomes in a simple two-country monetary policy model with endogenously determined commodity prices. Given such misdiagnosis risk, the results in this paper strengthen the case for targeting headline inflation as part of a robust monetary policy framework for Asian emerging market economies.

Keywords: Monetary policy; commodity prices; inflation; demand shocks; policy coordination


JEL classification: E52, E31, Q43, F42, F68

¹ The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Bank for International Settlements. The authors would like to thank Claudio Borio and Luis Catão for insightful comments and Emese Kuruc for superb research assistance. This paper was prepared for the PBoC-BIS Research Conference on "Globalisation and Inflation Dynamics in Asia and the Pacific", 23–24 September 2013, Beijing, China.

I. Introduction

In the past 10 years, global commodity prices have experienced several pronounced swings, with some commodities reaching historically high price levels. Such heightened volatility translated into high inflationary pressures in Asian economies (Graph I.1), and clearly has presented a challenge to policymakers. To fully understand the policy trade-offs facing central banks, one needs to dig into the underlying sources of the shocks – for example, determine whether they are primarily demand or supply shocks.

The conventional wisdom about commodity price fluctuations and monetary policy is that each country should respond only to those fluctuations that lead to second-round inflationary effects. Practically, this suggests that monetary authorities should focus on core inflation and look through the initial impact of commodity price fluctuations on headline inflation. This conventional wisdom was largely built upon experiences in the 1970s and 1980s when oil supply shocks led to wide swings in energy prices. The more generalised swing in commodity prices in recent years, however, raises questions about the general relevance of this conventional wisdom in today's more globalised world.



¹ Quarterly averages. ² Year-on-year changes in consumer price index. Weighted averages based on the 2005 GDP and PPP exchange rates of Australia, China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Wholesale prices for India. ³ For Hong Kong SAR, Q4 2005–Q2 2013; for Indonesia, Q2 2000–Q2 2013; for Malaysia, Q1 2006–Q2 2013. ⁴ For Hong Kong SAR, Q4 2005–Q2 2013; for Indonesia, Q2 2000–Q2 2013; for Malaysia, Q1 2006–Q2 2013; for the Philippines, Q1 2007–Q2 2013. ⁵ For China and Malaysia, Q1 2006–Q2 2013; for Indonesia, Q2 2000–Q2 2013; for the Philippines, Q1 2007–Q2 2013.

To address these policy concerns, the paper first highlights global trends that help to explain the pronounced commodity price swings over the past decade. Section III presents statistical evidence supporting the case that global demand shocks have been a key driver of global commodity price swings and of domestic inflation dynamics in emerging market economies, especially in Asia. Section IV offers a new theoretical monetary policy model consistent with the empirical facts and supports the case that emerging market monetary policymakers should target headline inflation rather than core inflation. Section V concludes that emerging

Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook and International Financial Statistics; national data.

market central banks need to take an increasingly globe-centric view of the policy challenges associated with swings in commodity prices.

II. Understanding recent commodity price swings

What can we say about the changing nature of the economic and financial environment, with respect to the factors driving commodity prices? In this section, we highlight some of the arguments which suggest that a fundamental change in the policy environment has been under way for a while. Despite some retreat during the international financial crises, the overall trend is towards greater economic and financial globalisation. The section then highlights the broad monetary policy challenges from a globe-centric, rather than a country-centric, perspective for emerging market central banks facing volatile commodity prices.

II.1 A changing economic and financial landscape

At the time of writing, global food and energy price movements have been moderate compared with those of recent years, albeit with isolated price spikes in certain segments due to idiosyncratic factors. But one can point to a number of fundamental forces indicating a more permanent change in the state of affairs. Two interrelated factors are the relative shift in economic gravity away from the advanced economies to the emerging market and developing economies, and the spread of financial globalisation, to which we now turn.


Shifting economic gravity

The relative economic decline of the advanced economies and the corresponding increase in the importance of the emerging market and developing economies have been manifest in the past decade. By the end of 2012, emerging and developing economies accounted for over 25% of global output (Graph II.1). This shift has yielded important benefits. Per capita incomes in these economies and standards of living, for example, are rising at a much faster pace than imagined a few decades ago. However, these positive developments have had side effects. One of them is the impact on commodity prices.

One way to conceptualise the policy environment is to consider commodity supply and demand curves. The global economic growth shifted global commodity demand out along an increasingly steeply sloped commodity supply curve. Two key arguments support this view (Inamura et al (2011), G20 (2011)). First, a greater share of global demand is accounted for by emerging market economies. Second, emerging and developing economies tend to be more commodity-intensive than the advanced economies. The higher commodity intensity means that for every dollar of global output produced in the emerging and developing economies, relative to the advanced economies, there is a greater demand for commodities.²

² It is also the case that the international financial crisis has accelerated the shift of production of commodity-intensive products and demand from the advanced economies to the emerging market and developing economies. In addition, the increased demand for commodities by the emerging and developing economies, of course, could be offset eventually by greater efforts in exploration

In terms of volatility, emerging and developing economies, however, tend to be "higher beta" economies; that is, they are much more volatile than the advanced economies during global business cycles. This sensitivity helps account for some of the volatility in commodity prices in recent years. It is useful to note that the string of financial crises affecting the advanced economies since mid-2007 has contributed to the volatility in demand for commodities. Demand for commodities has been affected especially by the waves of global risk aversion. Spikes in global risk aversion have been found to drive capital flows to emerging and developing economies, with significant impacts on financial stability conditions (see eg Forbes and Warnock (2011), Bruno and Shin (2012), Filardo (2013) and Rey (2013)).



Rising share of global output outside the advanced economies


The impact of the international financial crises on commodity markets also brings up a concern about the future. It is important to note that recent commodity price booms have ended primarily because of crises. This happened in late 2008 in the wake of the Lehman collapse and again in 2011–12 as the sovereign debt crisis in Europe intensified. These episodes have left us wondering what might have happened if these adverse international spillovers had not come along and acted as powerful headwinds against the commodity booms and inflation (Graph II.2).

Financial globalisation and the financialisation of commodity markets

Greater financial globalisation has raised the prospects that commodity markets have become much more volatile because of increasing activity in the commodity futures market. It is true that, over the past decade, there has been a fundamental transformation in commodity trading, ie a shift from participants primarily interested in physical delivery to those interested in commodities as an asset class.

for new sources of commodities as well as the introduction of new technologies that are less commodity-intensive. The oil shale development in the United States in recent years demonstrates this potential. However, over "short" periods such as a decade, the supply inelasticity of commodities and the steady increase in global demand are likely to keep the average level of commodity prices high (Adams (2009)). This has helped and will continue to help commodity-producing Asian economies.

Along with greater financial globalisation, financialisation is thought to have boosted asset return correlations across asset classes. Indeed, commodity prices in recent years have been rather sensitive to swings in generalised risk perceptions in markets. According to Lombardi and Ravazzolo (2013), from the early 2000s correlations between commodity price returns and stock market returns went from around zero to above 0.4 by 2012. It is no wonder policymakers have become more sensitive to possible links between excessive speculation (and herding behaviour) and commodity prices.



¹ Year-on-year changes in consumer prices, in per cent. ² Weighted averages based on 2005 GDP and PPP exchange rates of Brazil, China, Chinese Taipei, the Czech Republic, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey. Wholesale prices for India. ³ Weighted averages based on 2005 GDP and PPP exchange rates of Canada, Denmark, the euro area, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. ⁴ Major advanced and emerging economies. ⁵ Based on a world aggregate; trend calculated using Hodrick-Prescott filter with standard specification. ⁶ Aggregation of national output gaps. ⁷ For 2006, excluding the Philippines.

Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook; OECD, Economic Outlook; Datastream; national data.

But how much of the commodity price volatility is due to the financialisation of commodity markets? This is not an easy question to answer. Some evidence suggests that financialisation of commodity markets has increased the frothiness in some commodity prices, but the size and breadth of the impact have been limited (Kilian and Murphy (2012), Lombardi and Van Robays (2011)). Irwin and Sanders (2010) document that the activity of exchange-traded funds in commodity futures markets did not increase commodity price volatility. One additional piece of corroborating evidence for this view is that the volatility of commodity prices that are not actively traded on organised exchanges has been similar to the volatility of prices on organised exchanges where financial speculation is present. Hence, while some of the frothiness in commodity prices can be linked to the financialisation of commodity markets, a good share of the volatility is probably not.³

³ This evidence would also suggest that this aspect of the commodity price issue has limited financial stability implications for central banks. Nonetheless, public calls for specific anti-speculation measures, such as financial transaction taxes, have been heard with increasing frequency in recent years.

Overall, these factors help to explain why we have seen greater swings in a wide range of commodity prices in recent years and the correlation in cross-sectional EM inflation dynamics, especially in Asia (Graph II.3). The swings have been wider and more frequent than in the prior years. The nature of the trends suggests that these forces will continue to influence the policy environment going forward.

II.2 Are EM monetary policy responses contributing to commodity price procyclicality?

For policymakers, it is also important to consider the possibility that existing monetary policy frameworks have contributed to the amplitude of the boom-bust commodity cycles. It is possible that the traditional country-centric view of central banking is becoming less relevant as economies around the world are becoming more globalised economically and financially. Globalisation trends call for consideration of more globe-centric policy frameworks. In this section, we first review the country-centric and globe-centric views before addressing the empirical evidence and policy implications.

Country-centric versus globe-centric perspectives


This section lays out two conceptual perspectives within which to frame the current policy debate about commodity prices. The first perspective is a country-centric one; the other a globe-centric one (Borio and Filardo (2007)). To highlight the different policy implications of the two perspectives, we sketch a simplified typology of the two views before turning to the policy implications.

First, consider the country-centric perspective. This is the traditional approach to policymaking. The organising principle is the national economy. In the case of inflation and financial stability issues arising from commodity price developments, excess demand and supply conditions are assessed at the country level, as would be the analysis of wages, capital formation etc. External price developments would be assessed by looking at import prices, assuming there are sufficient statistics to summarise the relevant regional and global factors.⁴

In contrast, the organising principle of the globe-centric perspective takes the global economy as the starting point of the analysis. In the case of commodity prices, the globe-centric perspective makes particular sense since most commodities are highly traded goods and have their benchmark prices determined in a global marketplace. In this perspective, the critical determinants of prices would be global excess supply and demand. Moreover, wages and capital formation would be influenced not only by domestic forces but also global ones.⁵

⁴ In addition, the country-centric perspective would assume limited cross-border substitutability of goods and very limited mobility of capital and labour. This is consistent with a closed-economy type of analysis found in most traditional macroeconomic textbooks.

⁵ In the extreme, labour and capital would be assumed to be highly mobile across geographical boundaries, so that global, or regional, developments play a larger role than local factors in pricing the efficient allocation of goods.



Monetary policy considerations

Relative price shifts associated with commodity prices, theory tells us, should have only transitory impacts on inflation dynamics. To get commodity prices to have longer-lasting impact on inflation dynamics, relative price shifts would have to influence the setting of monetary policy in a systematic way. This begs the question: is it possible that wide swings in global commodity prices have contributed to procyclical monetary policy in emerging market economies?

The answer to this question depends, in an important sense, on the source of the shocks driving commodity prices. If a surge in commodity prices is driven by a supply shock, the lessons learned during the experiences of the 1970s and 1980s apply: central bankers must focus on the impact of the rise in commodity prices on inflation expectations. There have been numerous examples of central banks successfully looking through the gyrations of commodity price shocks, as long as the increase in prices did not appear to feed an increase in medium-term inflation expectations – the so-called second-round effects. This is consistent with a country-centric approach.⁶

However, as noted above, soaring global commodity prices in recent years appear to have been rather the result of a sequence of global demand shocks. In other words, the higher prices have been the result of a shift in global demand along a more steeply sloped aggregate supply curve. One tell-tale sign that it is mainly demand, and not supply, driving up commodity prices is that output grew robustly, even as prices of all types of commodities rose.⁷ The globe-centric approach has much to offer in this situation.

⁶ One additional possibility is that low interest rates at the global level have increased commodity prices through a financial portfolio rebalancing channel, which at the country level would look like a cost-push shock (Ito and Rose 2011).

⁷ Recent empirical evidence from Lee and Rhee (2013) finds some evidence in Asian economies that rising food prices tend to have a bigger impact on core inflation than energy prices. In addition,

A useful thought experiment

The following thought experiment highlights the nature of the policy trade-offs in the case of a positive global demand shock. We might imagine the existence of a hypothetical global monetary authority. This authority has the power to coordinate monetary policy actions across existing monetary jurisdictions. Asking the following question helps us to understand the implications of the globe-centric approach: how would this global monetary authority respond to commodity price booms and busts, and would this response deviate significantly from what we have seen?


In many respects, the policy prescription for the hypothetical global monetary authority is quite straightforward when the commodity price boom is driven by strong global aggregate demand. This hypothetical global monetary authority would tighten monetary policy by raising the average real policy rate sufficiently to counteract the underlying shift in aggregate demand. If calibrated correctly across jurisdictions, non-inflationary sustainable growth would be achieved and commodity price pressures would reverse. Indeed, if the global monetary authority was sufficiently credible and economic agents forward-looking, the prospect of a tightening of monetary policy might forestall the initiation of a commodity price boom in the first place.

So, how does the policy prescription for this hypothetical global monetary authority compare with the behaviour of central banks during the run-up in commodity prices in 2006–08 and in 2011? Graphs II.4 and II.5 illustrate that the actual responses stand in sharp contrast to theoretical considerations. Across EM Asia, and most jurisdictions around the globe, nominal rates were not raised sufficiently quickly, if at all, to boost real policy rates. In other words, global monetary policy became more, not less, accommodative during the commodity price booms and resulted in higher inflation.⁸

What might account for this discrepancy between theory and practice? One difficulty in operationalising this theoretical policy prescription at the national level is that a global demand shock looks in many respects like an external supply shock to national policymakers.⁹ This would be particularly the case when an economy is a large net importer of commodities.


core inflation shows a tendency to move towards headline inflation rather than vice versa. This evidence provides support for the view that monetary authorities should put greater weight on headline inflation in emerging and developing economies than on core inflation in the conduct of monetary policy.

- ⁸ Of course, if the commodity price increases represented a supply shock, this policy response would have been appropriate, based on the experience of the 1970s and 1980s.
- ⁹ This may sound like pure semantics, but there is an important distinction in terms of communicating to the public the accurate conceptual framework being used by central banks; this may also be valuable for internal deliberations inside the central bank. Filardo (2012b) discusses this policy challenge.



¹ In per cent. Policy target rates or their proxies. For Australia, Reserve Bank of Australia cash target rate; for China, benchmark one-year lending rate; for the euro area, ECB main refinancing rate; for India, repo rate; for Indonesia, one-month official discount rate; for Japan, target policy rate; for Korea, target for the overnight call rate; for Malaysia, overnight policy rate; for New Zealand, official cash daily rate; for the Philippines, overnight reverse repo rate; for Thailand, one-day repo rate; for the United States, target federal funds rate.

Source: National data.



¹ In per cent. Policy target rates or their proxies minus average of year-on-year change in CPI and consensus inflation forecast for the year. Wholesale prices for India. For Australia, Reserve Bank of Australia cash target rate; for China, benchmark one-year lending rate; for the euro area, ECB main refinancing rate; for India, repo rate; for Indonesia, one-month official discount rate; for Japan, target policy rate; for Korea, target for the overnight call rate; for Malaysia, overnight policy rate; for New Zealand, official cash daily rate; for the Philippines, overnight reverse repo rate; for Thailand, one-day repo rate; for the United States, target federal funds rate.

Sources: National data; BIS calculations.

It is important to emphasise the distinction between reality and perception when thinking about commodity price shocks. When commodity prices rise and fall significantly, there is a temptation for national central banks, as well as others, to dwell on the external nature of the shock, both in terms of their internal discussions at the time of policy meetings and in terms of communication with the public. There is an underlying logic to categorising commodity price movements as external supply shocks from a country-centric point of view. In the case of a small, open economy, it might be difficult to see how the policy response alone would materially influence global demand. And, given that commodities are important inputs into production, the higher prices are contractionary from a comparative statics point of view. However, from a general equilibrium perspective at a global level, the commodity prices are really driven by global demand shocks, not supply shocks. There is a growing consensus that this distinction is important from a policy point of view.

The misdiagnosis of the source of the shocks opens up the risk of administering the wrong medicine to the problem. If the shock is misdiagnosed as a supply shock, policymakers may find themselves heeding the monetary policy lessons of the 1970s and 1980s. The oil price experience in the 1970s and 1980s taught monetary policymakers a key lesson: it is important to take strong policy actions to prevent second-round inflation effects, but otherwise to ignore the gyrations in the price level. When this advice about first-round versus second-round effects was taken during the second oil crisis, central banks such as the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Bank of Japan and the Swiss National Bank achieved much better macroeconomic and financial outcomes.

As a result of a misdiagnosis, a monetary authority could find itself behind the curve because it has an incentive to wait until surging commodity prices push up inflation expectations. Of course, if all economies are more or less subject to the same incentives, this would lead to accommodative monetary policy at the global level and a surfeit of global liquidity which would, in turn, feed upward pressure on global commodity prices and spur more global demand expansion. In other words, global monetary policy settings would tend to be too accommodative during the upswing in commodity prices.

Traditionally, such liquidity expansion and economic overheating would conjure up images of upward inflation spirals which central banks focused on price stability would naturally combat. However, this empirical lead-lag relationship between credit growth and inflation has broken down in many economies that have achieved a high level of credibility for price stability. Recent studies of credit booms gone bad (see eg Schularick and Taylor (2012)) have taught us that credit booms often lead to credit busts and financial instability without a sharp deterioration in the short-term inflation picture. Indeed, these longer lags between excess liquidity provision by central banks and inflation have put a premium on complementing traditional monetary policy tools with macroprudential ones in order to curb the tendency for boom-bust credit and asset price cycles. This has also called for central banks to focus on policy horizons much longer than the conventional two-year one (Borio and Zhu (2008), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)).

What is the empirical foundation of this perspective? The global trends support the case. The sheer size of emerging market economies as a share of global activity raises the possibility that correlated EM policy responses to commodity price swings are having a non-trivial feedback on global activity and hence commodity prices. If truly a reflection of global demand conditions, the policy responses may be feeding inflationary pressures. To assess the empirical relevance of this, we dig into the empirical record and explore the theoretical nature of the monetary transmission mechanism implied by misperceptions of global demands as country-centric supply shocks.

Insights from the literature on commodity prices and monetary policy

The literature on commodity prices and monetary policy has highlighted the tradeoffs central banks face as a result of large swings in commodity prices. Large commodity price swings have been seen as making it more complicated for central banks to not only achieve price stability but also stabilise the real economy. Bernanke et al (1997) argued, for example, that the US recessions of 1974 and 1982 were exacerbated by the Federal Reserve's reaction to oil price shocks.

For decades, much of the literature has supported the conventional wisdom that monetary authorities should "look through" first-round relative price effects of commodity prices but respond once second-round effects kick in. The IMF (2011) re-examined the issue in light of recent swings in commodity prices and largely affirmed the conventional wisdom of looking through commodity price shocks, ie targeting core inflation rather than headline inflation; this is consistent with theoretical findings going back to Aoki (2001). Coletti et al (2012) argue that price-level targeting worsens the trade-off between inflation and output stabilisation when compared with inflation targeting; they treat commodity price movements as cost-push shocks.

From the perspective of emerging market economies, gyrations in food prices have taken on greater prominence in the literature, leading to different arguments for putting more weight on headline versus core inflation in monetary policy frameworks. First, given the share food has in consumption baskets of emerging economies, the inflationary consequences of commodity price movements are much greater than in the advanced economies.¹⁰ Second, rising food prices have significant social implications that policymakers confront; Catão and Chang (2010) examine the case of a small, open economy in which food has a large role in the utility function. In such a setting, they find support for targeting consumer prices rather than targeting producer prices when food price shocks are volatile. Credit constraints are also likely to affect consumers in emerging economies; Anand and Prasad (2010) argue that, with incomplete markets and financial frictions, targeting headline inflation is optimal.

The papers above generally start their analysis from the assumption that commodity price movements are largely exogenous developments from a small, open economy's perspective. Indeed, the exogenous nature of commodity price developments has been a long-standing assumption in macroeconomic models. For example, in his seminal paper, Hamilton (1983) argued that almost all post-WWII US recessions were preceded by exogenous oil supply-driven price increases. Early theoretical models featuring energy prices (see eg Kim and Loungani (1992)) were also built on the assumption that energy price shocks are exogenous to the rest of the economy. Whereas treating commodity prices as exogenous may be reasonable from a narrow small, open economy perspective, it is not tenable from a global perspective. As a consequence, what might look like an appropriate country-centric response may no longer be the best way to fully analyse the policy environment, especially if other economies are responding in a correlated fashion.

The broad-based surge in commodity prices of the 2000s spurred academic interest in the demand, rather than the supply, shock implications of commodity price developments. Since the influential paper by Kilian (2009), a growing empirical literature has supported the contention that commodity price fluctuations in the past decade have been heavily influenced by demand side developments, which are

¹⁰ Cutler et al (2005), for example, report evidence that the pass-through of commodity prices to consumer prices in Hong Kong SAR and mainland China is higher than in mature economies. Bank of Thailand (2011) also finds that the correlations between domestic price indices and international food prices increased in the 2000s. Tang (2008) argues that monetary authorities in East Asia responded slowly to commodity price increases during the mid-2000s.

in turn associated with the growing importance of commodity-hungry emerging economies. This has spurred on interest in the state-contingent nature of the monetary policy response. Bodenstein et al (2012) employ a two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with endogenous oil production, and show that the optimal monetary policy response to an increase in the price of oil depends on the nature and the location of the shock that produced the price increase. Robust control issues associated with alternative shocks driving commodity price fluctuations have received less attention in the literature despite relevance for policymakers.

Finally, the literature has also drawn links between commodity price developments and monetary policy settings. This raises the issue of the extent to which monetary policy can itself influence commodity prices via its impact on demand. On this point, Barsky and Kilian (2002) reported evidence that high oil prices in the 1970s and early 1980s may have been caused by loose monetary policy rather than supply shocks; the link to monetary policy was also highlighted by global monetarists in the early 1980s (eg McKinnon (1982)). Anzuini et al (2013) also find evidence that monetary policy can contribute to commodity price fluctuations by generating expectations of higher demand.

III. Commodity prices and EM inflation – empirical role of global supply and demand¹¹

In this section, we examine the empirical evidence supporting the notion that recent commodity price developments have been driven significantly by global demand shocks. We begin by identifying global supply and demand shocks from a smallscale global macroeconomic model using a Blanchard-Quah identification scheme.

This Blanchard-Quah model and identification strategy yield global demand and supply shocks, denoted respectively with D_t and S_t . Graph III.1 plots the estimated global demand shocks from 2000 to 2012. The crisis and its immediate aftermath stand out. Starting in late 2008, demand shocks were persistently negative until one positive shock at the end of 2009, followed by smaller negative supply shocks. Prior to 2008, the demand shocks exhibited less amplitude in swings and were less correlated, but tended to be positive in the run-up to the crisis.

Having identified the global demand and supply shocks, we can now use them to estimate the components of commodity price inflation (π_t^{cp}) attributed to demand and supply shocks, respectively¹²:


$$\pi_{t}^{cp} = \alpha^{cp} + \sum_{k=0}^{4} \left(\beta_{k}^{cp} D_{t-k} + \theta_{k}^{cp} S_{t-k} \right) + \sum_{k=1}^{4} \gamma_{k}^{cp} \pi_{t-k}^{cp} + \varepsilon_{t}^{cp}$$
(III.1)


¹² The statistical issue of generated regressors applies here. While the coefficient estimators in this case are theoretically unbiased, the estimator of the variance-covariance is biased and may lead to an overstating of significance levels. Establishing the power and size of the tests is left for future research.

¹¹ Further details on the empirical analysis and simulation results can be found in a forthcoming *BIS Working Paper* by the authors.

where
$$\pi_t^{cp,d} \equiv \sum_{k=0}^4 \hat{\beta}_k^{cp} D_{t-k}$$
 and $\pi_t^{cp,s} \equiv \sum_{k=0}^4 \hat{\theta}_k^{cp} S_{t-k}$.

Graph III.2 highlights the relative importance of global demand shocks in driving commodity price fluctuations. The red bars represent the demand component of commodity price inflation. They show that the demand component was typically negative in the early part of the 2000s, indicating that demand was acting as a headwind at the time. This component then turned around in the mid-2000s and was mainly positive. The most dramatic contributions for the demand component came at the depth of the international financial crisis when it was highly negative and persistent.¹³





Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; Datastream; BIS calculations.

¹³ See BIS (2010) for more detail on the international financial crisis impact on Asia-Pacific economies.

We now turn to the pass-through of commodity price inflation to domestic headline inflation (π_t^h) and assess the relative contributions coming from the demand and supply components of commodity price inflation. The following equation is estimated for various economies:

$$\pi_{t}^{h} = \alpha + \sum_{k=0}^{4} \left(\beta_{k}^{h} \pi_{t-k}^{cp,d} + \theta_{k}^{h} \pi_{t-k}^{cp,s} \right) + \sum_{k=1}^{4} \gamma_{k} \pi_{t-k}^{h} + \varepsilon_{t}^{h}$$
(III.2)

Graph III.3 succinctly summarises the findings from equation (III.2). The sum of the coefficients on the demand shocks is presented in the left-hand panel and on the supply shocks in the right-hand panel. What immediately becomes apparent is that the coefficients on the demand shocks are generally positive and exceed those on the supply shocks. The sum of the coefficients is generally statistically significant, as indicated by the red bars.

In addition, the sum of the coefficients appears to be larger and more statistically significant than the average result for the emerging markets as a whole (designated by EME) or for Latin American economies (designated by LAT). The individual Asian emerging market economies exhibit a fair amount of diversity, but headline inflation is much more sensitive to global demand side commodity price inflation than the global supply side commodity price inflation.


In a similar way, we now estimate the influence of the components of commodity price inflation due to global demand and supply shocks on core inflation (π_t^c), economy by economy:

$$\pi_{t}^{c} = \alpha + \sum_{k=0}^{4} \left(\beta_{k}^{c} \pi_{t-k}^{cp,d} + \theta_{k}^{c} \pi_{t-k}^{cp,s} \right) + \sum_{k=1}^{4} \gamma_{k} \pi_{t-k}^{c} + \varepsilon_{t}^{c}$$
(III.3)

The regression uses autoregressive lags as well as four lags of the demand- and supply-driven components. Statistical tests are used to assess the adequacy of the fit.

As might be expected, the influence of commodity price inflation on core inflation is generally smaller than in the case of headline inflation. Graph III.4 is designed in an analogous way to that of Graph III.3. A similar pattern emerges: the global demand component of commodity price inflation appears to be more often statistically significant and with a somewhat larger sum of coefficients than the global supply component of commodity price inflation.

Overall, this section has documented the important role that global demand shocks play in determining EM domestic inflation dynamics. We have found that global demand shocks are correlated with swings in commodity prices and the global demand-driven component of commodity price inflation is an important factor driving emerging market economy inflation dynamics.




Pass-through of global commodity price inflation to domestic headline inflation¹ Graph III.3


ADV = Australia, Canada, euro area, Japan, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States; ASI = China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand; EME = Asia, Latin America, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, South Africa and Turkey; LAT = Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru. CN = China; HK = Hong Kong SAR; ID = Indonesia; IN = India; KR = Korea; MY = Malaysia; PH = Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand.

¹ Regression estimation of equation: $\pi_t^h = \alpha + \sum_{k=0}^n (\beta_k^h \pi_{t-k}^{cp,d} + \theta_k^h \pi_{t-k}^{cp,s}) + \sum_{k=1}^n \gamma_k \pi_{t-k}^h + \varepsilon_t^h$. Q1 2000–Q1 2012. Wholesale prices for India. ² 1–4 lags. ³ According to the Wald test.

Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook; CEIC; Datastream; national data; BIS calculations.

Pass-through of global commodity price inflation to domestic core inflation¹ Graph III.4





Sum of the coefficients of the supply component

ADV = Australia, Canada, euro area, Japan, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States; ASI = China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, where data are available; EME = Asia, Latin America, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, South Africa and Turkey, where data are available; LAT = Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru, where data are available. CN = China; HK = Hong Kong SAR; ID = Indonesia; IN = India; KR = Korea; MY = Malaysia; PH = Philippines; SG = Singapore; TH = Thailand.

¹ Regression estimation of equation: $\pi_t^c = \alpha + \sum_{k=0}^n (\beta_k^c \pi_{t-k}^{cp,d} + \theta_k^c \pi_{t-k}^{cp,s}) + \sum_{k=1}^n \gamma_k \pi_{t-k}^c + \varepsilon_t^c$. Q1 2000–Q1 2012; for China and Malaysia, Q1 2006–Q1 2012; for Indonesia, Q3 2000–Q1 2012; for the Philippines, Q1 2007–Q1 2012. Wholesale prices for India. ² 1–4 lags. ³ According to the Wald test.

Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook; CEIC; Datastream; national data; BIS calculations.

IV. Global commodity price swings and domestic inflation dynamics: a misperceptions modelling perspective

This section explores the question: do we need to rethink EM monetary policy frameworks when global demand shocks drive global commodity price swings and in turn EM domestic inflation dynamics? And, what are the implications for EM central bank monetary policy frameworks going forward in a more globalised world?

To address these questions, we explore a simple two-country monetary policy model in which commodity prices evolve endogenously and also play an important role influencing inflation dynamics. This is solved for the optimal monetary policy response given the array of possible shocks. The novel use of this model is to simulate the consequences of a central bank observing an increase in commodity prices due to buoyant global demand, but treating this as a commodity supply shock. This model demonstrates how misperceptions can lead a monetary authority to unwittingly induce procyclical monetary policy.

In terms of monetary policy framework implications, such misperceptions argue for EM central banks putting more weight on headline inflation rather than core inflation in monetary policy frameworks oriented towards price stability. This model also supports the case for greater regional and global cooperation as the global economy becomes increasingly integrated economically and financially.

IV.1 Simple monetary policy model

For each economy $i \in \{EM, ROW\}$, the following equations describe the macroeconomic setting.

Macroeconomic block - output and inflation

The macro block comprises four equations describing the dynamics of output, core inflation, headline inflation and global commodity price inflation. The output equation takes forward-looking specification and the coefficients may differ across economies:

IS curve:
$$y_{i,t} = -\beta_i r_{i,t} + \theta_i y_{i,t-1} + (1 - \theta_i) E y_{i,t+1} - \kappa_i \pi_t^{cp} + \varepsilon_{i,t}^y$$
 (IV.1)

Output (*y*) is determined by the real interest rate (*r*), past and expected output, global commodity price inflation (π^{cp}) and an error term (\mathcal{E}). Global commodity price inflation adversely affects output in a manner consistent with a supply shock.

Inflation dynamics take on a dynamic Phillips curve specification in which the difference between headline and core inflation is highlighted.

Core inflation:
$$\pi_{i,t}^{c} = \tilde{\pi}_{i,t-1}^{c^{*}} + \zeta_{i}E\pi_{i,t+1}^{c} + \gamma_{i}y_{i,t-1} + \alpha_{i}(\pi_{i,t-1}^{c} - \pi_{i,t-1}^{h}) + \varepsilon_{i,t}^{\pi^{c}}$$
 (IV.2)

$$= (1 - \mu_{i})\pi_{i,t-1}^{c} + \zeta_{i}E\pi_{i,t+1}^{c} + \gamma_{i}y_{i,t-1} + \alpha_{i}(\pi_{i,t-1}^{c} - \pi_{i,t-1}^{h}) + \varepsilon_{i,t}^{\pi^{h}};$$
where $\tilde{\pi}_{i,t-1}^{c^{*}} = \mu_{i}\pi_{i}^{*} + (1 - \mu_{i})\pi_{i,t-1}^{c}$ and $\pi_{i}^{*} = 0$

In this equation, core inflation is a function of backward- and forward-looking inflation as well as the output gap, the gap between core inflation and headline inflation and an error term. The backward-looking component of core inflation is adjusted to take into account the strength of the anchoring of long-run inflation. In this case, the long-run inflation target is zero and μ calibrates the strength of this anchor.

Headline inflation:
$$\pi_{i,t}^h = \pi_{i,t}^c + \tau \pi_{i,t-1}^h + \iota_i \pi_t^{cp} + \varepsilon_{i,t}^{\pi^h}$$
 (IV.3)

Global commodity price inflation is by definition taken as a common variable that influences both economies. It is assumed to be driven by global demand and idiosyncratic supply shocks:

Global commodity price inflation:

$$\pi_t^{cp} = \phi \pi_{t-1}^{cp} + \omega_{EM} y_{EM,t} + \omega_{ROW} y_{ROW,t} + \varepsilon_t^{\pi^{cp}}$$
(IV.4)

This specification allows the coefficients on country-specific output to differ. A larger weight on EM reflects the greater commodity intensity of emerging market economies per unit of output. In other words, a given unit of output in EM has a larger demand impact on commodities than a similarly sized increase for the rest of the world (ROW). Implicitly, the contemporaneous output terms capture the impact of the central banks' reaction function.

For completeness, the error terms $(\varepsilon_{i,t}^{y}, \varepsilon_{i,t}^{\pi^{c}}, \varepsilon_{i,t}^{\pi^{h}}, \varepsilon_{t}^{\pi^{cp}})$ are assumed to be i.i.d. normally distributed random variables with constant variances.

Monetary policy block

Monetary policy is assumed to follow a Taylor-type rule assuming policy rate inertia:

$$r_t = R_t - \pi_t^h = \lambda \pi_t^c + \delta y_t + \eta r_{t-1}$$
(IV.5)

In each economy, the monetary authority sets the interest rate so as to minimise the losses associated with the variance of output, inflation and the volatility of interest rate changes. In particular, the central bank's decision problem is a conventional one. The loss function for each central bank is $L_i = \operatorname{var}(\pi_i) + v_y \operatorname{var}(y_i) + v_r \operatorname{var}(r_i - r_{i,-1})$, where the preference parameters are assumed (without loss of generality) to be the same. The decision for each central bank is:

$$\underset{\{\lambda_i,\delta_i,\eta_i\}}{Min} L_i = \operatorname{var}(\pi_i) + \nu_y \operatorname{var}(y_i) + \nu_r \operatorname{var}(r_i - r_{i,-1})$$
(IV.6)

subject to equations (IV.1) to (IV.5). The resulting dynamic two-country model is the baseline model for the simulations.¹⁴

IV.2 Results

In this section, we first present the baseline results from the model under the assumption of complete information. We then compare the impulse response from

¹⁴ The model is solved using Dynare by iterating over equation (IV.6) for each economy. The calibrated parameters in the baseline model are listed in Table A1 in the Annex.

the baseline model with the impulse responses from a model in which the EM monetary authority misinterprets an increase in commodity prices as a global commodity supply shock instead of global demand shock. We highlight how this misdiagnosis leads to (ex post) procyclical monetary policies relative to the baseline.


Baseline results

In Graph IV.1, we report the response of commodity prices, headline inflation, output and the real interest rate to a global demand shock (red line) and a commodity supply shock (blue line). Starting from the left-hand panel, we report the responses of commodity prices to the two different shocks: the responses are quite similar. Also the impact of the two shocks on the dynamic responses of headline inflation are similar, although the degree of pass-through differs somewhat. The responses of output to the shocks, however, are quite different: the demand shock has an expansionary impact, whereas a commodity supply shock has a contractionary one. As a consequence, it is not surprising that the optimal monetary policy responses differ as well: in the presence of a commodity supply shock, the central bank accommodates the decline in output, whereas it tightens in the presence of a demand shock.

Response to demand and supply shocks¹








¹ Responses of selected variables to a unit shock to global demand and to commodity supply. ² Calibrated parameters as in Table A1. Source: Authors' calculations.

This indicates the importance of correctly identifying the source of shocks in the formulation of monetary policy. However, it should be noted that distinguishing the source of the shocks may not be straightforward – for example, by merely observing the behaviour of commodity prices or inflation. Because the responses of commodity prices (and headline inflation) to the two types of shocks are similar, the only way to pin them down in this setting is to look at output dynamics. However, data on output are noisy, subject to significant revision and only available after a delay. All these considerations highlight the risk of ex post policy mistakes due to the misdiagnosis of the source of shocks. Accounting for misdiagnosis risk – misdiagnosing a global demand shock as an external supply shock

Armed with these simulation results, we now turn our attention to the implications of central bank misperceptions. The scenario we have in mind is one in which the monetary authority mistakenly interprets a change in commodity price inflation due to a global demand shock as a commodity supply shock. In the baseline, it is assumed the monetary authority correctly diagnoses the source of the shocks. In the misdiagnosis case, we assume the monetary authority does not realise its mistake throughout the simulation.¹⁵

Results of this counterfactual simulation are found in Graph IV.2. In the righthand panel, the blue line represents the response under misdiagnosis. Initially, the blue line coincides with the optimal response to a commodity supply shock. This policy mistake is procyclical, stimulating more output and inflation than otherwise. In the second period and afterwards, the policy rate response reflects both the implied inherent persistence of a policy response to the initial commodity supply shock as seen in the baseline case and also the consequences of the policy error. This explains why the blue line deviates from the dashed blue line (ie from the baseline) across the simulation horizon.



¹ Cumulated response to a sequence of policy mistakes. The dashed lines show responses of selected variables to a unit shock to global demand and to commodity supply, baseline scenario.

Source: authors' calculations.


Response to a policy misdiagnosis¹

The consequences of the misdiagnosis of the shock on headline inflation and output are reported, respectively, in the second and third panels. The additional stimulus due to the misdiagnosis does indeed stimulate the economy, and results in much higher and persistent inflation. The procyclical monetary policy also feeds

¹⁵ In this model, we assume that the monetary authorities follow the implied policy response assuming a supply shock. In future research, we will explore this problem in an environment where the monetary authorities take account of possible misperceptions and optimally learn from the way the economy evolves.

back and fuels commodity price inflation (left-hand panel), thereby elongating the swing in commodity prices.

Finally, it should be noted that, in the presence of misdiagnosis risks of the type described above, targeting headline inflation (versus core inflation) generates more favourable monetary policy trade-offs. Graph IV.3 illustrates this by comparing the impulse responses under a headline inflation reaction function for the central bank and under a core inflation one. Both inflation and output return to the steady state more quickly under the headline rule.



Source: authors' calculations.

V. Policy implications and conclusions

This paper offers new evidence on the role of global demand and supply factors in driving global commodity prices and, in turn, the influence of these factors on domestic inflation dynamics in Asian emerging market economies. We have found that global demand shocks play an important role in domestic inflation dynamics in emerging markets and therefore have implications for the design of monetary policy frameworks in emerging market economies such as those in Asia. We have explored the policy trade-offs within the framework of a stylised monetary policy model, investigating the implied welfare losses from misdiagnosing the source of commodity price fluctuations, and building the case for putting greater weight on headline versus core inflation in economies subject to misdiagnosis risk.

The results in this paper turn the conventional wisdom about how to respond to commodity price developments on its head. The conventional wisdom that came out of the experiences of the 1970s and 1980s suggested that central banks should "look through" commodity price increases. This prescription in our model leads to poor macroeconomic outturns when there is uncertainty over the source of the shocks hitting the economies. In this respect, our experiment has also underscored the importance for central banks of identifying the source of commodity price fluctuations in pursuit of price stability. Some have suggested that small, open economies cannot influence global economic conditions and therefore should treat global commodity price increases as an external supply shock. This country-centric perspective, however, ignores the global dimension and potential feedbacks of the problem. If all emerging market economies respond in the same way to global commodity prices as external supply shocks, the aggregate response will matter.

All this points to the conclusion that even small, open emerging market economies cannot afford to adopt a country-centric perspective in an increasingly globalised world. The collective actions have implications that spill over geographical borders and include feedbacks from the others which, when taken together, lead to suboptimal outcomes.¹⁶ In this respect, efforts in Asia to promote regional cooperation and information-sharing are positive trends.

Beyond explicit monetary policy coordination, central banks can adopt various practices to mitigate the risk of monetary policy procyclicality with respect to commodity price swings. As highlighted in the policy simulations, greater focus on headline inflation targeting versus core inflation targeting would produce better outturns when there is misdiagnosis risk associated with commodity price movements. Of course, this is a second best outcome. The first best is based on an accurate assessment of both the nature of the shocks and the cross-border spillovers of policy actions.

Finally, to the extent that global forces are playing a more dominant role today and will continue to do so in the future, central banks have a role in ensuring that the public fully understands the changing nature of the monetary policy environment. This could be a communication challenge vis-à-vis commodity prices. It would require tearing down the conventional wisdom built up over the decades that "looking through" commodity price movements is the appropriate policy approach.

¹⁶ See Taylor (2013) for a discussion of other types of coordination failures in the presence of global policy spillovers. See Filardo (2012a) for issues associated with global spillovers arising from monetary policy tail risks associated with asset price swings.

Annex

Calibrated parameters			Table A
quation	Parameter	EM	ROW
IS	β	0.10	0.10
	θ	0.50	0.50
	κ	0.05	0.02
PC	μ	0.55	0.55
	ζ	0.50	0.50
	γ	0.02	0.04
	α	-0.01	-0.01
Headline inflation	τ	0.34	0.12
	l	0.25	0.05
Taylor rule	λ	0.01	0.03
	δ	0.10	0.09
	φ	0.85	0.90
Commodity prices	ω	0.35	0.15
	φ	0.80	
Loss function	ν _y	3.00	3.00
	ν _r	5.00	5.00

References

Adams, F (2009): "Will economic recovery drive up world oil prices?", *World Economics*, June.

Anand, R and E Prasad (2010): "Optimal price indices for targeting inflation under incomplete markets", *NBER Working Papers*, no 16290, August.

Anzuini, A, M Lombardi and P Pagano (2013): "The impact of monetary policy shocks on commodity prices", *International Journal of Central Banking*, September.

Aoki, K (2001): "Optimal monetary policy responses to relative-price changes", *Journal of Monetary Economics*, August.

Bank for International Settlements (2010): "The international financial crisis and policy challenges in Asia and the Pacific", *BIS Papers*, no 52, July.

Bank of Thailand (2011): "Global commodity prices: implications on Thailand", *Inflation Report*, April.

Barsky, R and L Kilian (2002): "Do we really know that oil caused the great stagflation? A monetary alternative", *NBER Macroeconomics Annual*, January.

Bernanke, B, M Gertler and M Watson (1997): "Systematic monetary policy and the effects of oil price shocks", *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, no 1.

Blanchard, O and D Quah (1989): "The dynamic effects of aggregate demand and supply disturbances", *American Economic Review*, September.

Bodenstein, M, L Guerrieri and L Kilian (2012): "Monetary policy responses to oil price fluctuations", *CEPR Discussion Papers*, no 8928, April.

Borio, C and A Filardo (2007): "Globalisation and inflation: new cross-country evidence on the global determinants of domestic inflation", *BIS Working Papers*, no 227, May.

Borio, C and H Zhu (2008): "Capital regulation, risk-taking and monetary policy: a missing link in the transmission mechanism?", *BIS Working Papers*, no 268, December.

Bruno, V and H S Shin (2012): "Capital flows and the risk-taking channel of monetary policy", *BIS Working Papers*, no 400, December.

Catão, L and R Chang (2010): "World food prices and monetary policy", *NBER Working Papers*, no 16563, December.

Coletti, D, R Lalonde, P Masson, D Muir and S Snudden (2012): "Commodities and monetary policy: implications for inflation and price level targeting", *Bank of Canada Working Papers*, no 2012–16, June.

Cutler, J, C Chan and U Li (2005): "The relationship between commodity and consumer prices in mainland China and Hong Kong", *HKMA Quarterly Bulletin*, April.

Filardo, A (2012a): "The impact of the international financial crisis on Asia and the Pacific: highlighting monetary policy challenges from a negative asset price bubble perspective", in *New perspectives on asset price bubbles* (eds D Evanoff, G Kaufman and A G Malliaris), Oxford University Press.

(2012b): "Ensuring price stability in post-crisis Asia: lessons from the recovery", in *The implementation of monetary policy: lessons from the crisis and*

challenges for coming years, proceedings of the first SEACEN-CEMLA conference, published by CEMLA and the SEACEN centre.

——— (2013): "Managing stop-go capital flows in Asian emerging markets: lessons for CESEE economies", in *A new model for balanced growth and convergence: achieving economic sustainability in CESEE countries* (eds E Nowotny, P Mooslechner and D Ritzberger-Gruenwald), Edward Elgar Publishing.

Filardo, A and H Genberg (2010): "Targeting inflation in Asia and the Pacific: lessons from the recent past", in *Twenty years of inflation targeting: lessons learned and future prospects*, Cambridge University Press.

Filardo, A and J Yetman (2012): "The expansion of central bank balance sheets in emerging Asia: what are the risks?", *BIS Quarterly Review*, June.

Forbes, K and F Warnock (2011): "Capital flow waves", *Monetary Authority of Singapore Macroeconomic Review*, October.

G20 (2011): Report of the G20 Study Group on Commodities, November.

Hamilton, J (1983): "Oil and the macroeconomy since World War II", *Journal of Political Economy*, April.

Inamura, Y, T Kimata, T Kimura and T Muto (2011): "Recent surge in global commodity prices – impact of financialisation of commodities and globally accommodative monetary conditions", *Bank of Japan Review*, March.

International Monetary Fund (2011): "Target what you can hit: commodity price swings and monetary policy", *World Economic Outlook*, September.

Irwin, S and D Sanders (2010), "The impact of index and swap funds on commodity futures markets: preliminary results", *OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Working Papers*, no 27.

Ito, T and A Rose (2011): Commodity prices and markets, University of Chicago Press.

Kilian, L (2009): "Not all oil price shocks are alike: disentangling demand and supply in the crude oil market", *American Economic Review*, June.

Kilian, L and D Murphy (2012): "The role of inventories and speculative trading in the global market for crude oil", unpublished University of Michigan working paper, July.

Kim, I-M and P Loungani (1992): "The role of energy in real business cycle models", *Journal of Monetary Economics*, April.

Lee, H and C Rhee (2013): "Commodity price movements and monetary policy in Asia", *BIS Papers*, no 70, January.

Lombardi, M and F Ravazzolo (2013): "On the correlation between commodity and equity returns: implications for portfolio allocation", *BIS Working Papers*, no 420, July.

Lombardi, M and I van Robays (2011): "Do financial investors destabilize the oil price?", *ECB Working Papers*, no 1346, June. McKinnon, R (1982): "Currency substitution and instability in the world dollar standard", *American Economic Review*, June.

Reinhart, C and K Rogoff (2009): *This time is different: eight centuries of financial folly*, Princeton University Press.

Rey, H (2013): "Dilemma not trilemma: the global financial cycle and monetary policy independence", *Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Jackson Hole Symposium*, August, mimeo.

Schularick, M and AM Taylor (2012): "Credit booms gone bust: monetary policy, leverage cycles, and financial crises, 1870–2008", *American Economic Review*, April.

Tang, H (2008): "Commodity prices and monetary policy in Emerging East Asia", *ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration*, no 23, December.

Taylor, J (2013): "International monetary policy coordination: past, present and future", *BIS Working Papers*, no 437, December.