Private debt, monetary policy tightening and aggregate demand

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As the global economy slows, inflation is subsiding on the back of tighter monetary policy. Amid historically high private debt levels in many jurisdictions, should central banks expect that the effect of interest rate hikes on aggregate demand will be amplified, so that they get more bang for the buck? And how will the characteristics and the composition of private debt affect this impact?

Private debt and the impact of monetary policy on expenditures

The total private debt of households and non-financial corporations (NFCs) has trended upwards since at least the 1970s. Long-run financial deepening but also credit booms especially in the run-up to the Great

Graph 1

High debt paves the way to sharp increases in servicing costs as policy tightens

1 Total credit of the non-financial private sectors. 2 Sample of 20 AEs (US,JP,AU,CA,NZ,NO,SE,CH,DK,GB,AT,BE,DE,ES,FI,FR,IT,NL,PT) and eight EMEs (IN,KR,MY,SG,TH,HU,ZA,SA). Latest available quarter for 2022. 3 Non-financial private sectors. Sample of nine AEs and seven EMEs. Median figures. 4 Change over six quarters relative to tightening start. Tightening cycle dating based on Cavallino et al (2022), excluding the most recent and ongoing episode.

Sources: Cavallino et al (2022); IMF, BIS.
Financial Crisis (GFC) have been the main driving forces behind this steady increase (Graph 1.A). However, the GFC did put a stop to the global upward trend in debt levels, even if global debt has barely fallen since.

Flat debt at the global level hides considerable variations in the country by country trends. In those at the core of the GFC, notably the United States and the United Kingdom, debt-to-GDP ratios are far off historical peaks. But in several other jurisdictions, they are close to historical highs. For instance, current debt-to-GDP ratios exceed 150% in advanced economies (AEs), with levels above 200% in Sweden and Canada (Graph 1.B). In emerging market economies (EMEs), they tend to be lower, often below 100%, but Korea and China stand out at levels well above 200%.

Under these conditions, the current monetary policy tightening cycle is unprecedented, in that it coincides with significantly higher levels of private debt than in past cycles, particularly in AEs (Graph 1.C). By contrast, a decade of low interest rates has helped to keep debt service costs in check, although this could change rapidly as central banks proceed with tightening.

Separating household from NFC debt, some points stand out. First, household debt-to-GDP ratios are currently close to historical peaks in several jurisdictions. Yet in countries where household debt was at the heart of the financial stress during the GFC, such as the United Kingdom and the United States, deleveraging over the last decade has brought the ratio to lower levels (Graph 2.A). Moreover, in many countries, household net worth is currently greater than before the GFC, reflecting in part increased housing wealth (Graph 2.B). Regarding NFCs, their debt vis-à-vis GDP is now at historical highs or close to them in many of the major economies, including the United States (Graph 2.C).

High private debt makes aggregate demand more sensitive to tighter monetary policy through several channels. First, when debt is high, any increase in interest rates feeds through into larger debt service costs, putting additional pressure on disposable incomes, cash flows and expenditure (flow effect). Second, higher interest rates result in a larger income transfer from poorer households, who are typically net debtors and have a higher marginal propensity to spend, to wealthier savers with a lower propensity to spend (distributional effect). Third, high debts imply larger financial vulnerabilities, strengthening the...
impact of tighter monetary policy, possibly leading to financial stress (stock effect). Last, reliance on foreign currency-denominated debt, especially in EMEs, creates spillovers and spillbacks of interest rate increases globally, also via adverse balance sheet effects (FX effect). Together, the stock and FX effects can produce an even larger impact if the exchange rate serves to amplify market stress.

Empirical evidence suggests that the level of private debt has a non-negligible impact on the sensitivity of aggregate demand to monetary policy (see Hofmann and Peersman (2017)). In the wake of a policy rate increase, for instance, output falls by more in countries with higher private debt. This is due to both flow effects, through lower disposable income, and stock effects via a lower credit supply, as financial conditions are more sensitive to policy rates in high-debt environments. Household consumption also tends to drop significantly more in response to a policy rate hike when household debt is higher (Graph 3.A). Similarly, more highly indebted firms cut their capital spending more severely following a rate hike (Graph 3.B). Both consumption and investment remain persistently lower in a high-debt environment after a rate hike, pointing to a larger tightening in credit conditions. Furthermore, tighter monetary policy exposes firms to a greater risk of bankruptcy, and corporate spreads increase more steeply (Graph 3.C).

High private debt and interest rate exposure compound the effect of tightening

In per cent

A. With high debt, tighter policy curbs household consumption by more¹

B. When NFCs are highly indebted, hikes weigh more on investment...²

C. ...and credit spreads react more³

¹ Aggregate consumption response to a 25 bp tightening in the United Kingdom, when household debt to GDP is low (less than 75%) or high (above 75%). Red line statistically significant at 10% level, blue line insignificant. Estimation period: Q1 1983–Q4 2014. ² Aggregate investment response to a 25 bp tightening in the United States, when NFC debt to GDP is low (less than 60%) or high (above 60%). Difference between the red and blue lines statistically significant at the 10% level. Estimation period: Q1 1987–Q2 2016. Results qualitatively similar, but quantitatively larger for more indebted jurisdictions such as the euro area. ³ Peak responses relative to sample average of corporate bond (one- to three-year maturity) spreads to a 25 bp tightening, when NFC debt to GDP is low or high (debt cut-off: 65% for US, 90% for EA, 70% for GB). Estimation periods: Dec 1996–Jun 2016 for US, Jan 1991–Jun 2019 for EA and Dec 1996–Dec 2014 for GB.

Sources: Refinitiv Datastream; ICE Bank of America Merrill Lynch; BIS.

The role of debt composition

Beyond aggregate debt levels, granular information can shed further light on the transmission strength.

Starting with households and focusing on housing debt, the share of home owners with mortgages varies considerably from country to country, from about 10% in Mexico and Italy to more than 40% in the Netherlands and Sweden (Graph 4.A), even though overall home ownership differs less (above 60% in most jurisdictions except for Switzerland and Germany). Second, adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) account for a small share of total mortgages (well below 20%) in major AEs, including the United States, Germany, France or the United Kingdom (Graph 4.B). Conversely, they represent a large fraction of
outstanding mortgages in several jurisdictions, particularly in EMEs, with ARMs representing the vast majority of household mortgages. That said, looking at changes since the GFC, the prevalence of variable-rate debt has generally fallen, which probably reflects the desire to lock in the low rates that prevailed during the last decade.

These differences in the type and composition of household debt can have material effects on the transmission of monetary policy to consumption. A stylised, model-based comparison of two economies with realistic differences in home ownership and debt structures can be used for illustration (Graph 4.C). In an economy where most households are renters or homeowners holding fixed rate mortgages (FRMs), an increase in the policy rate has only a minor effect on consumption (about –0.5% after two years). By contrast, in an economy where households are mostly owners and have ARMs, the fall in consumption is about three times larger, reflecting a larger and faster pass-through of policy rates to effective borrowing costs.

The distribution of debt across households is also relevant for monetary policy transmission. Data for the euro area and the United States show that low-income households tend to spend a larger fraction of their income on debt repayments, making such households more sensitive to interest rate hikes (Graph 4.D). Simulations confirm that, following a tightening in monetary policy, debt servicing costs increase by more at the low end of the income distribution, which would compound the drag on consumption for such low-income households with their high marginal propensity to consume.

Turning to NFCs, their debt composition has also changed significantly over the last two decades. Just as in the case of household debt, the variable-rate component has generally fallen since the mid-2000s (Graph 5.A). Similarly, the short-term components of NFC debt have declined across major jurisdictions (Graph 5.B), except for emerging Asia excluding China, where it has remained broadly stable since the GFC.

Sources: Agarwal et al (2022); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Survey of Consumer Finances (2019); ECB, Household Finance and Consumption Survey (2017); European Mortgage Federation; Refinitiv Datastream; OECD; national data; BIS.
Among the largest declines, China stands out, as the share of short-term debt in the total debt of Chinese NFCs fell from more than 90% to less than 60%. In the United States and the euro area, the drop has been more modest, at around 10 percentage points. That said, substantial debt amounts are expected to mature over the next two years and will have to be rolled over at prevailing interest rates (Graph 5.C). Considering the countries listed in Graph 5.C, such debts account on average for about 18% of outstanding NFC debt in AEs, while in EMEs about 28% of NFC debt is expected to come due by the end of 2024.

The role of variable-rate debt for the transmission of monetary policy to corporate investment is similar to the one for household consumption. Firms with more unhedged variable-rate debt scale back investment following a monetary policy tightening while those which face the same exposure to variable-rate debt but use interest rate risk hedging instruments do not (Graph 5.D). This probably reflects a stronger pass-through from policy rates to the effective costs of external financing. Similarly, firms with large up-front financing needs and correspondingly high debt levels, as in the construction sector, could also be expected to scale investment back more forcefully in response to higher interest rates.

Where does that leave us?

High private debt levels tend to raise the economy’s sensitivity to monetary policy tightening. With more bang for the buck, will central banks need to tighten less to bring inflation down? If so, by how much less?

Following a decade of low interest rates, the shares of variable-rate and short-term debt for households and NFCs have fallen, which limits the pass-through of policy rate hikes, reduces the flow effect of tighter monetary policy and increases its transmission lags. This arguably counteracts the higher...
sensitivity of aggregate demand to monetary policy stemming from elevated debt levels, so that the impact of tighter monetary policy will take more time to be fully transmitted.3

But several other aspects need to be considered. First, over the last decade, NFCs have significantly stepped up their borrowing from non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), particularly in jurisdictions outside Asia. This diversification has some benefits for firms in terms of risk and funding sources, as it provides a “spare tyre”.4 However, NBFIs can have leverage and liquidity mismatches, often hidden, increasing their vulnerability to strains and making their credit supply more procyclical than that of banks.5 This can complicate firms’ debt (re)-financing in periods of rising interest rates.

Second, public debt levels are also at historical highs. As monetary policy tightening percolates through and government funding costs rise, fiscal space will eventually shrink, especially in jurisdictions where debt is high and fiscal sustainability at risk. This is likely to force governments to tighten their fiscal position, placing an additional drag on aggregate demand that high private debt could amplify.

Last, even if aggregate demand is now more sensitive to monetary policy, this is no assurance that central banks will be able to bring inflation back to target with less tightening. Tighter policy on the back of elevated debt levels could increase financial vulnerabilities, particularly in the corporate sector, leading firms to jack up prices even in the face of weakening demand. Central banks would then face harder trade-offs in the form of higher sacrifice ratios, as output would need to fall by more to achieve a given disinflation.

References


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3 Another important aspect relates to household savings. In jurisdictions where they are still high, they could reduce the sensitivity of aggregate demand to tighter monetary policy.

4 Elliott et al (2022) show that higher policy rates shift credit supply from banks to non-banks, thereby dampening any associated drop in consumption and investment.

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