



Comparison between the 2006 and 2011 versions of the Core Principles assessment methodology

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Principle 1: Objectives, independence, powers, transparency and cooperation

An effective system of banking supervision will have clear responsibilities and objectives for each authority involved in the supervision of banks.⁵ Each such authority should possess operational independence, transparent processes, sound governance and adequate resources, and be accountable for the discharge of its duties. A suitable legal framework for banking supervision is also necessary, including provisions relating to authorisation of banking establishments and their ongoing supervision; powers to address compliance with laws as well as safety and soundness concerns; and legal protection for supervisors. Arrangements for sharing information between supervisors and protecting the confidentiality of such information should be in place.

Note: CP 1 is divided into six component parts. Three of the component parts are not repeated elsewhere in the CPs. However, two parts (3 and 4) are developed in greater detail in one or more of the subsequent CPs. For these two, since the criteria will be developed further elsewhere, this section identifies only the most fundamental and crucial ones. Part 6 is enhanced in CPs 18, 24 and 25.

5. Such authority is called “the supervisor” throughout this paper, except where the longer form “the banking supervisor” has been necessary for clarification.

Note: The current Principle 1 with six component parts is split into three separate stand-alone Principles.

Principle 1(1): Responsibilities and objectives

An effective system of banking supervision will have clear responsibilities and objectives for each authority involved in the supervision of banks.

Principle 1(3): Legal framework

A suitable legal framework for banking supervision is also necessary, including provisions relating to authorisation of banking establishments and their ongoing supervision.⁸

Principle 1: Responsibilities, objectives and powers

An effective system of banking supervision has clear responsibilities and objectives for each authority involved in the supervision of banks and banking groups¹⁹. A suitable legal framework for banking supervision is in place to provide each responsible authority with the necessary legal powers to authorise banks, conduct ongoing supervision, address compliance with laws and undertake timely corrective actions to address safety and soundness concerns.²⁰

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<p>8. This component of Principle 1 is amplified in the subsequent Principles.</p> <p>Principle 1(4): Legal powers</p> <p>A suitable legal framework for banking supervision is also necessary, including powers to address compliance with laws as well as safety and soundness concerns.⁹</p> <p>9. This component of Principle 1 is amplified in the Principle which addresses “Corrective and remedial powers of supervisors” (23).</p>	<p>19. In this document, “banking group” includes the holding company, the bank and its offices, subsidiaries, affiliates and joint ventures, both domestic and foreign. Risks from other entities in the wider group, for example non-bank (including non-financial) entities, may also be relevant. This group-wide approach to supervision goes beyond accounting consolidation.</p> <p>20. The activities of authorising bank, ongoing supervision and corrective actions are elaborated in the subsequent Principles.</p>
<p>Essential criteria</p> <p>EC1, CP1(1). Laws are in place for banking, and for the authority (each of the authorities) involved in banking supervision. The responsibilities and objectives of each of the authorities are clearly defined and publicly disclosed.</p>	<p>Essential Criteria</p> <p>1. The responsibilities and objectives of each of the authorities involved in banking supervision²¹ are clearly defined in legislation and publicly disclosed. Where more than one authority is responsible for supervising the banking system, a credible and publicly available framework is in place to avoid regulatory and supervisory gaps.</p> <p>21. Such authority is called “the supervisor” throughout this paper, except where the longer form “the banking supervisor” has been necessary for clarification.</p>
<p>No text.</p>	<p>2. The primary objective of banking supervision is to promote the safety and soundness of banks and the banking system. If the banking supervisor is assigned broader responsibilities, these are subordinate to the primary objective and do not conflict with it.</p>
<p>EC2, CP1(1). The laws and supporting regulations provide a framework of minimum prudential standards that banks must meet.</p> <p>EC2, CP1(3). The law empowers the supervisor to set prudential rules (without changing laws)...</p> <p>EC4, CP24. The supervisor has the power to impose prudential standards on a consolidated basis for the banking group...</p>	<p>3. Laws and regulations provide a framework for the supervisor to set and enforce minimum prudential standards for banks and banking groups. The supervisor has the power to increase the prudential requirements for individual banks and banking groups based on their risk profile²² and systemic importance²³.</p> <p>22. In this document, “risk profile” refers to the nature and scale of the risk exposures undertaken by a bank.</p> <p>23. In this document, “systemic importance” is determined by the size, interconnectedness, substitutability, global or cross-jurisdictional activity (if any), and complexity of the bank, as set out in the BCBS paper on <i>Global systemically important banks: assessment methodology and the additional loss absorbency requirement</i>, November 2011.</p>

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<p>EC3, CP1(1). Banking laws and regulations are updated as necessary to ensure that they remain effective and relevant to changing industry and regulatory practices.</p> <p>EC2, CP1(3). ...The supervisor consults publicly and in a timely way on proposed changes, as appropriate.</p>	<p>4. Banking laws, regulations and prudential standards are updated as necessary to ensure that they remain effective and relevant to changing industry and regulatory practices. These are subject to public consultation, as appropriate.</p>
<p>EC2, CP1(4). The supervisor has full access to banks' Board, management, staff and records in order to review compliance with internal rules and limits as well as external laws and regulations.</p> <p>EC2, CP24. The supervisor has the power to review the overall activities of a banking group, both domestic and cross-border. The supervisor has the power to supervise the foreign activities of banks incorporated within its jurisdiction.</p>	<p>5. The supervisor has the power to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) have full access to banks' and banking groups' Boards, management, staff and records in order to review compliance with internal rules and limits as well as external laws and regulations; (b) review the overall activities of a banking group, both domestic and cross-border; and (c) supervise the foreign activities of banks incorporated in its jurisdiction.
<p>EC1, CP1(4). The law and regulations enable the supervisor to address compliance with laws and the safety and soundness of the banks under its supervision. The law and regulations permit the supervisor to apply qualitative judgment in safeguarding the safety and soundness of the banks within its jurisdiction.</p> <p>EC3, CP1(4). When, in a supervisor's judgment, a bank is not complying with laws or regulations, or it is or is likely to be engaged in unsafe or unsound practices, the supervisor has the power to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • take (and/or require a bank to take) prompt remedial action; and • impose a range of sanctions (including the revocation of the banking licence). 	<p>6. When, in a supervisor's judgment, a bank is not complying with laws or regulations, or it is or is likely to be engaging in unsafe or unsound practices or actions that have the potential to jeopardise the bank or the banking system, the supervisor has the power to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) take (and/or require a bank to take) timely corrective action; (b) impose a range of sanctions; (c) revoke the bank's licence; and (d) cooperate and collaborate with relevant authorities to achieve an orderly resolution of the bank, including triggering resolution where appropriate.
<p>AC1, CP24. For those countries that allow corporate ownership of banking companies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the supervisor has the power to review the activities of parent companies and of companies affiliated with the parent companies, and uses the power in practice to determine the safety and soundness of the bank; and... 	<p>7. The supervisor has the power to review the activities of parent companies and of companies affiliated with the parent companies to determine their impact on the safety and soundness of the bank and the banking group.</p>
<p>Principle 1(2): Independence, accountability and transparency</p> <p>Each such authority should possess operational independence, transparent processes, sound governance and adequate resources, and be</p>	<p>Principle 2: Independence, accountability, resourcing and legal protection for supervisors</p> <p>The supervisor possesses operational independence, transparent processes, sound</p>

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<p>accountable for the discharge of its duties.</p> <p>Principle 1(5): Legal protection</p> <p>A suitable legal framework for banking supervision is also necessary, including legal protection for supervisors.</p>	<p>governance and adequate resources, and is accountable for the discharge of its duties. The legal framework for banking supervision includes legal protection for the supervisor.</p>
<p>Essential criteria</p> <p>EC1, CP1(2). The operational independence, accountability and governance structures of each supervisory authority are prescribed by law and publicly disclosed. There is, in practice, no evidence of government or industry interference which compromises the operational independence of each authority...</p>	<p>Essential criteria</p> <p>1. The operational independence, accountability and governance structures of the supervisor are prescribed in legislation and publicly disclosed. There is no government or industry interference which compromises the operational independence of the supervisor. The supervisor has full discretion to take any supervisory actions or decisions on banks and banking groups under its supervision.</p>
<p>EC1, CP1(2). ...The head(s) of the supervisory authority can be removed from office during his (their) term only for reasons specified in law. The reason(s) for removal should be publicly disclosed.</p> <p>AC1, CP1(2). The head(s) of the supervisory authority is (are) appointed for a minimum term.</p>	<p>2. The process for the appointment and removal of the head(s) of the supervisory authority and members of its governing body is transparent. The head(s) of the supervisory authority is (are) appointed for a minimum term and is removed from office during his/her term only for reasons specified in law or if (s)he is not physically or mentally capable of carrying out the role or has been found guilty of misconduct. The reason(s) for removal is publicly disclosed.</p>
<p>EC2, CP1(2). The supervisor publishes objectives and is accountable through a transparent framework for the discharge of its duties in relation to those objectives.⁷</p> <p>7. Please refer to CP 1(1), EC 1.</p>	<p>3. The supervisor publishes its objectives and is accountable through a transparent framework for the discharge of its duties in relation to those objectives.²⁴</p> <p>24. Please refer to Principle 1, Essential Criterion 1.</p>
<p>No text.</p>	<p>4. The supervisor has effective internal governance and communication processes that enable supervisory decisions to be taken at a level appropriate to the significance of the issue and timely decisions to be taken in the case of an emergency. The governing body is structured to avoid any real or perceived conflicts of interest.</p>

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<p>EC3, CP1(2). The supervisory authority and its staff have credibility based on their professionalism and integrity.</p>	<p>5. The supervisor and its staff have credibility based on their professionalism and integrity. There are rules on how to avoid conflicts of interest and on the appropriate use of information obtained through work, with sanctions in place if these are not followed.</p>
<p>EC1, CP1(2). ...There is, in practice, no evidence of government or industry interference ... in each authority's ability to obtain and deploy the resources needed to carry out its mandate...</p> <p>EC4, CP1(2). The supervisor is financed in a manner that does not undermine its autonomy or independence and permits it to conduct effective supervision and oversight. This includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • a budget that provides for staff in sufficient numbers and with skills commensurate with the size and complexity of the institutions supervised; • salary scales that allow it to attract and retain qualified staff; • the ability to commission outside experts with the necessary professional skills and independence, and subject to necessary confidentiality restrictions to conduct supervisory tasks; • a training budget and programme that provide regular training opportunities for staff; • a budget for computers and other equipment sufficient to equip its staff with the tools needed to review the banking industry and assess individual banks and banking groups; and • a travel budget that allows appropriate on-site work. 	<p>6. The supervisor has adequate resources for the conduct of effective supervision and oversight. It is financed in a manner that does not undermine its autonomy or operational independence. This includes:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (a) a budget that provides for staff in sufficient numbers and with skills commensurate with the risk profile and systemic importance of the banks and banking groups supervised; (b) salary scales that allow it to attract and retain qualified staff; (c) the ability to commission external experts with the necessary professional skills and independence, and subject to necessary confidentiality restrictions to conduct supervisory tasks; (d) a training budget and programme that provide regular technical training for staff; (e) a technology budget sufficient to equip its staff with the tools needed to review the banking industry and assess individual banks and banking groups; and (f) a travel budget that allows appropriate on-site work, effective cross-border cooperation and participation in domestic and international meetings of significant relevance (eg supervisory colleges).
<p>No text.</p>	<p>7. As part of their annual resource planning exercise, supervisors regularly take stock of existing skills and projected requirements over the short- and medium-term, and review and implement measures to bridge any gaps in numbers and/or skill-sets.</p>
<p>AC1, CP1(1). In determining supervisory programmes and allocating resources, supervisors take into account the risks posed by individual banks and banking groups and the different approaches available to mitigate those risks.⁶</p> <p>6. The concept of risk-based supervision has been adopted by some supervisory authorities since the Core Principles were introduced in 1997. As there is no international consensus on the concept of a risk-based supervisory approach, the Core</p>	<p>8. In determining supervisory programmes and allocating resources, supervisors take into account the risk profile and systemic importance of individual banks and banking groups, and the different mitigation approaches available.</p>

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Principles do not define or require authorities to adopt such an approach. Nevertheless, the 2006 revision of the Core Principles recognises the growing supervisory practice of determining supervisory programmes and allocating resources taking into account the risks posed by individual banks and banking groups.

EC1, CP1(5). The law provides protection to the supervisory authority and its staff against lawsuits for actions taken and/or omissions made while discharging their duties in good faith.

EC2, CP1(5). The supervisory authority and its staff are adequately protected against the costs of defending their actions and/or omissions made while discharging their duties in good faith.

9. Laws provide protection to the supervisor and its staff against lawsuits for actions taken and/or omissions made while discharging their duties in good faith. The supervisor and its staff are adequately protected against the costs of defending their actions and/or omissions made while discharging their duties in good faith.

Principle 1(6): Cooperation

Arrangements for sharing information between supervisors and protecting the confidentiality of such information should be in place.¹⁰

10. This component of Principle 1 is developed further in the Principles dealing with "Abuse of financial services" (18), "Consolidated supervision" (24) and "Home-host relationships" (25).

Principle 3: Cooperation and collaboration

Laws, regulations or other arrangements provide a framework for cooperation and collaboration with relevant domestic authorities and foreign supervisors. These arrangements reflect the need to protect confidential information.²⁵

25. Principle 3 is developed further in the Principles dealing with "Consolidated supervision" (12), "Home-host relationships" (13) and "Abuse of financial services" (29).

Essential criteria

1. Arrangements, formal or informal, are in place for cooperation and information sharing between all domestic authorities with responsibility for the soundness of the financial system, and there is evidence that these arrangements work in practice, where necessary.

EC5, CP24. The supervisor has arrangements with other relevant supervisors, domestic and cross-border, to receive information on the financial condition and adequacy of risk management and controls of the different entities of the banking group.

Essential criteria

1. Arrangements, formal or informal, are in place for cooperation, including analysis and sharing of information, and undertaking joint work, with all domestic authorities with responsibility for the safety and soundness of banks and/or the stability of the financial system. There is evidence that these arrangements work in practice, where necessary.

2. Arrangements, formal or informal, are in place, where relevant, for cooperation and information sharing with foreign financial sector supervisors of banks and banking groups of material interest to the home or host supervisor, and there is evidence that these arrangements work in practice, where necessary.

2. Arrangements, formal or informal, are in place for cooperation, including analysis and sharing of information, and undertaking joint work, with relevant foreign supervisors of banks and banking groups. There is evidence that these arrangements work in practice, where necessary.

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<p>3. The supervisor may provide confidential information to another domestic or foreign financial sector supervisor. The supervisor is required to take reasonable steps to ensure that any confidential information released to another supervisor will be used only for supervisory purposes and will be treated as confidential by the receiving party...</p>	<p>3. The supervisor may provide confidential information to another domestic authority or foreign supervisor but must take reasonable steps to determine that any confidential information so released will be used only for bank-specific or system-wide supervisory purposes and will be treated as confidential by the receiving party.</p>
<p>3. ...The supervisor receiving confidential information from other supervisors is also required to take reasonable steps to ensure that the confidential information will be used only for supervisory purposes and will be treated as confidential.</p> <p>4. The supervisor is able to deny any demand (other than a court order or mandate from a legislative body) for confidential information in its possession.</p>	<p>4. The supervisor receiving confidential information from other supervisors uses the confidential information for bank-specific or system-wide supervisory purposes only. The supervisor does not disclose confidential information received to third parties without the permission of the supervisor providing the information and is able to deny any demand (other than a court order or mandate from a legislative body) for confidential information in its possession. In the event that the supervisor is legally compelled to disclose confidential information it has received from another supervisor, the supervisor promptly notifies the originating supervisor, indicating what information it is compelled to release and the circumstances surrounding the release. Where consent to passing on confidential information is not given, the supervisor uses all reasonable means to resist such a demand or protect the confidentiality of the information.</p>
<p>No text.</p>	<p>5. Processes are in place for the supervisor to support resolution authorities (eg central banks and finance ministries as appropriate) to undertake recovery and resolution planning and actions.</p>
<p>Principle 2: Permissible activities</p> <p>The permissible activities of institutions that are licensed and subject to supervision as banks must be clearly defined and the use of the word “bank” in names should be controlled as far as possible.</p>	<p>Principle 4: Permissible activities</p> <p>The permissible activities of institutions that are licensed and subject to supervision as banks are clearly defined and the use of the word “bank” in names is controlled.</p>
<p>Essential criteria</p> <p>1. The term “bank” is clearly defined in laws or regulations.</p>	<p>Essential criteria</p> <p>1. The term “bank” is clearly defined in laws or regulations.</p>
<p>2. The permissible activities of institutions that are licensed and subject to supervision as banks are</p>	<p>2. The permissible activities of institutions that are licensed and subject to supervision as banks are</p>

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clearly defined either by supervisors, or in laws or regulations.	clearly defined either by supervisors, or in laws or regulations.
<p>3. The use of the word “bank” and any derivations such as “banking” in a name is limited to licensed and supervised institutions in all circumstances where the general public might otherwise be misled.</p>	<p>3. The use of the word “bank” and any derivations such as “banking” in a name, including domain names, is limited to licensed and supervised institutions in all circumstances where the general public might otherwise be misled.</p>
<p>4. The taking of deposits from the public is generally¹¹ reserved for institutions that are licensed and subject to supervision as banks.</p> <p>11. The word “generally” allows for the presence in some countries of non-banking financial institutions which may be regulated differently from banks but do take deposits and provide lending services, given these institutions collectively do not hold a significant proportion of deposits in a financial system. These institutions should be subject to a form of regulation commensurate to the type and size of their transactions.</p>	<p>4. The taking of deposits from the public is reserved for institutions that are licensed and subject to supervision as banks.²⁶</p> <p>26. The Committee recognises the presence in some countries of non-banking financial institutions that take deposits but may be regulated differently from banks. These institutions should be subject to a form of regulation commensurate to the type and size of their business and, collectively, should not hold a significant proportion of deposits in the financial system.</p>
<p>5. The supervisory or licensing authority publishes, and keeps current, a list of licensed banks and branches of foreign banks operating within its jurisdiction.</p>	<p>5. The supervisor or licensing authority publishes or otherwise makes available a current list of licensed banks, including branches of foreign banks, operating within its jurisdiction in a way that is easily accessible to the public.</p>
<p>Principle 3: Licensing criteria</p> <p>The licensing authority must have the power to set criteria and reject applications for establishments that do not meet the standards set. The licensing process, at a minimum, should consist of an assessment of the ownership structure and governance of the bank and its wider group, including the fitness and propriety of Board members and senior management, its strategic and operating plan, internal controls and risk management, and its projected financial condition, including its capital base. Where the proposed owner or parent organisation is a foreign bank, the prior consent of its home country supervisor should be obtained.</p>	<p>Principle 5: Licensing criteria</p> <p>The licensing authority has the power to set criteria and reject applications for establishments that do not meet the criteria. At a minimum, the licensing process consists of an assessment of the ownership structure and governance (including the fitness and propriety of Board members and senior management²⁷) of the bank and its wider group, and its strategic and operating plan, internal controls, risk management and projected financial condition (including capital base). Where the proposed owner or parent organisation is a foreign bank, the prior consent of its home supervisor is obtained.</p> <p>27. This document refers to a governance structure composed of a board and senior management. The Committee recognises that there are significant differences in the legislative and regulatory frameworks across countries regarding these functions. Some countries use a two-tier board structure, where the supervisory function of the board is performed by a separate entity known as a supervisory board, which has no executive functions. Other countries, in contrast, use a one-tier board structure in which the board has a broader role. Owing to these differences, this document does not advocate a specific board structure. Consequently, in this document, the terms “board” and “senior management” are</p>

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only used as a way to refer to the oversight function and the management function in general and should be interpreted throughout the document in accordance with the applicable law within each jurisdiction.

<p>Essential criteria</p> <p>1. The licensing authority could be the banking supervisor or another competent authority. If the licensing authority and the supervisory authority are not the same, the supervisor has the right to have its views considered on each specific application. In addition, the licensing authority provides the supervisor with any information that may be material to the supervision of the licensed institution.</p> <p>EC1, CP1(3). 1. The law identifies the authority (or authorities) responsible for granting and withdrawing banking licences.</p>	<p>Essential criteria</p> <p>1. The law identifies the authority responsible for granting and withdrawing a banking licence. The licensing authority could be the banking supervisor or another competent authority. If the licensing authority and the supervisor are not the same, the supervisor has the right to have its views on each application considered, and its concerns addressed. In addition, the licensing authority provides the supervisor with any information that may be material to the supervision of the licensed bank. The supervisor imposes prudential conditions or limitations on the newly licensed bank, where appropriate.</p>
<p>2. The licensing authority has the power to set criteria for licensing banks. These may be based on criteria set in laws or regulations.</p> <p>4. The licensing authority has the power to reject an application if the criteria are not fulfilled or if the information provided is inadequate.</p> <p>12. If the licensing, or supervisory, authority determines that the licence was based on false information, the licence can be revoked.</p>	<p>2. Laws or regulations give the licensing authority the power to set criteria for licensing banks. If the criteria are not fulfilled or if the information provided is inadequate, the licensing authority has the power to reject an application. If the licensing authority or supervisor determines that the licence was based on false information, the licence can be revoked.</p>
<p>3. The criteria for issuing licences are consistent with those applied in ongoing supervision.</p>	<p>3. The criteria for issuing licences are consistent with those applied in ongoing supervision.</p>
<p>5. The licensing authority determines that the proposed legal, managerial, operational and ownership structures of the bank and its wider group will not hinder effective supervision on both a solo and a consolidated basis.¹²</p> <p>12. Therefore, shell banks shall not be licensed. (Reference document: <i>BCBS paper on shell banks</i>, 2003).</p>	<p>4. The licensing authority determines that the proposed legal, managerial, operational and ownership structures of the bank and its wider group will not hinder effective supervision on both a solo and a consolidated basis.²⁸ The licensing authority also determines, where appropriate, that these structures will not hinder effective implementation of corrective measures in the future.</p> <p>28. Therefore, shell banks shall not be licensed. (Reference document: <i>BCBS paper on shell banks</i>, January 2003.)</p>
<p>6. The licensing authority identifies and determines the suitability of major shareholders, including the ultimate beneficial owners, and</p>	<p>5. The licensing authority identifies and determines the suitability of the bank's major shareholders, including the ultimate beneficial</p>

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<p>others that may exert significant influence. It also assesses the transparency of the ownership structure and the sources of initial capital.</p> <p>AC1. The assessment of the application includes the ability of the shareholders to supply additional financial support, if needed.</p>	<p>owners, and others that may exert significant influence. It also assesses the transparency of the ownership structure, the sources of initial capital and the ability of shareholders to provide additional financial support, where needed.</p>
<p>7. A minimum initial capital amount is stipulated for all banks.</p>	<p>6. A minimum initial capital amount is stipulated for all banks.</p>
<p>8. The licensing authority, at authorisation, evaluates proposed directors and senior management as to expertise and integrity (fit and proper test), and any potential for conflicts of interest. The fit and proper criteria include: (i) skills and experience in relevant financial operations commensurate with the intended activities of the bank; and (ii) no record of criminal activities or adverse regulatory judgments that make a person unfit to uphold important positions in a bank.¹³</p> <p>13. Please refer to CP 17, EC 4.</p> <p>13. The Board, collectively, must have a sound knowledge of each of the types of activities the bank intends to pursue and the associated risks.</p>	<p>7. The licensing authority, at authorisation, evaluates the bank's proposed Board members and senior management as to expertise and integrity (fit and proper test), and any potential for conflicts of interest. The fit and proper criteria include: (i) skills and experience in relevant financial operations commensurate with the intended activities of the bank; and (ii) no record of criminal activities or adverse regulatory judgments that make a person unfit to uphold important positions in a bank.²⁹ The licensing authority determines whether the bank's Board has collective sound knowledge of the material activities the bank intends to pursue, and the associated risks.</p> <p>29. Please refer to Principle 14, Essential Criterion 8.</p>
<p>9. The licensing authority reviews the proposed strategic and operating plans of the bank. This includes determining that an appropriate system of corporate governance, risk management and internal controls, including those related to the detection and prevention of criminal activities, as well as the oversight of proposed outsourced functions, will be in place. The operational structure is required to reflect the scope and degree of sophistication of the proposed activities of the bank.¹⁴</p> <p>14. Please refer to CP 18.</p>	<p>8. The licensing authority reviews the proposed strategic and operating plans of the bank. This includes determining that an appropriate system of corporate governance, risk management and internal controls, including those related to the detection and prevention of criminal activities, as well as the oversight of proposed outsourced functions, will be in place. The operational structure is required to reflect the scope and degree of sophistication of the proposed activities of the bank.³⁰</p> <p>30. Please refer to Principle 29.</p>
<p>10. The licensing authority reviews pro forma financial statements and projections for the proposed bank. This includes an assessment of the adequacy of the financial strength to support the proposed strategic plan as well as financial information on the principal shareholders of the bank.</p>	<p>9. The licensing authority reviews pro forma financial statements and projections of the proposed bank. This includes an assessment of the adequacy of the financial strength to support the proposed strategic plan as well as financial information on the principal shareholders of the bank.</p>

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<p>11. In the case of foreign banks establishing a branch or subsidiary, before issuing a licence, the host supervisor establishes that no objection (or a statement of no objection) from the home supervisor has been received. For purposes of the licensing process, as well as ongoing supervision of cross-border banking operations in its country, the host supervisor assesses whether the home supervisor practices global consolidated supervision.</p> <p>EC6, CP25. Before issuing a license, the host supervisor establishes that no objection (or a statement of no objection) from the home supervisor has been received. For purposes of the licensing process, as well as ongoing supervision of cross-border banking operations in its country, the host supervisor assesses whether the home supervisor practises global consolidated supervision.</p>	<p>10. In the case of foreign banks establishing a branch or subsidiary, before issuing a licence, the host supervisor establishes that no objection (or a statement of no objection) from the home supervisor has been received. For cross-border banking operations in its country, the host supervisor determines whether the home supervisor practices global consolidated supervision.</p>
<p>AC2. The licensing or supervisory authority has policies and processes in place ... to determine that supervisory requirements outlined in the licence approval are being met.</p>	<p>11. The supervisor has policies and processes to determine that supervisory requirements outlined in the licence approval are being met.</p>
<p>AC2. The licensing or supervisory authority has policies and processes in place to monitor the progress of new entrants in meeting their business and strategic goals...</p>	<p>Additional criterion</p> <p>1. The licensing authority or supervisor has policies and processes to monitor the progress of new entrants in meeting their business and strategic goals.</p>
<p>Principle 4: Transfer of significant ownership</p> <p>The supervisor has the power to review and reject any proposals to transfer significant ownership or controlling interests held directly or indirectly in existing banks to other parties.</p> <p>(Reference documents: <i>Parallel-owned banking structures</i>, January 2003; and <i>Shell banks and booking offices</i>, January 2003.)</p>	<p>Principle 6: Transfer of significant ownership</p> <p>The supervisor³¹ has the power to review, reject and impose prudential conditions on any proposals to transfer significant ownership or controlling interests held directly or indirectly in existing banks to other parties.</p> <p>(Reference documents: <i>Parallel-owned banking structures</i>, January 2003; and <i>Shell banks and booking offices</i>, January 2003.)</p> <p>31. While the term “supervisor” is used throughout Principle 6, the Committee recognises that in a few countries these issues might be addressed by a separate licensing authority.</p>

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Essential criteria	Essential criteria
1. Laws or regulations contain clear definitions of “significant” ownership and “controlling interest”.	1. Laws or regulations contain clear definitions of “significant” ownership and “controlling interest”.
2. There are requirements to obtain supervisory approval or provide immediate notification of proposed changes that would result in a change in ownership, including beneficial ownership, or the exercise of voting rights over a particular threshold or change in controlling interest.	2. There are requirements to obtain supervisory approval or provide immediate notification of proposed changes that would result in a change in ownership, including beneficial ownership, or the exercise of voting rights over a particular threshold or change in controlling interest.
3. The supervisor has the power to reject any proposal for a change in significant ownership, including beneficial ownership, or controlling interest, or prevent the exercise of voting rights in respect of such investments, if they do not meet criteria comparable to those used for approving new banks.	3. The supervisor has the power to reject any proposal for a change in significant ownership, including beneficial ownership, or controlling interest, or prevent the exercise of voting rights in respect of such investments to ensure that any change in significant ownership meets criteria comparable to those used for licensing banks. If the supervisor determines that the change in significant ownership was based on false information, the supervisor has the power to reject, modify or reverse the change in significant ownership.
4. The supervisor obtains from banks, through periodic reporting or on-site examinations, the names and holdings of all significant shareholders or those that exert controlling influence, including the identities of beneficial owners of shares being held by nominees, custodians and through vehicles which might be used to disguise ownership.	4. The supervisor obtains from banks, through periodic reporting or on-site examinations, the names and holdings of all significant shareholders or those that exert controlling influence, including the identities of beneficial owners of shares being held by nominees, custodians and through vehicles which might be used to disguise ownership.
5. The supervisor has the power to take appropriate action to modify, reverse or otherwise address a change of control that has taken place without the necessary notification to or approval from the supervisor.	5. The supervisor has the power to take appropriate action to modify, reverse or otherwise address a change of control that has taken place without the necessary notification to or approval from the supervisor.
AC1. Laws or regulations provide, or the supervisor ensures, that banks must notify the supervisor as soon as they become aware of any material information which may negatively affect the suitability of a major shareholder.	6. Laws or regulations or the supervisor require banks to notify the supervisor as soon as they become aware of any material information which may negatively affect the suitability of a major shareholder or a party that has a controlling interest.
Principle 5: Major acquisitions	Principle 7: Major acquisitions
The supervisor has the power to review major acquisitions or investments by a bank, against	The supervisor has the power to approve or reject (or recommend to the responsible authority the

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<p>prescribed criteria, including the establishment of cross-border operations, and confirming that corporate affiliations or structures do not expose the bank to undue risks or hinder effective supervision.</p>	<p>approval or rejection of), and impose prudential conditions on, major acquisitions or investments by a bank, against prescribed criteria, including the establishment of cross-border operations, and to determine that corporate affiliations or structures do not expose the bank to undue risks or hinder effective supervision.</p>
<p>Essential criteria</p> <p>1. Laws or regulations clearly define what types and amounts (absolute and/or in relation to a bank's capital) of acquisitions and investments need prior supervisory approval.</p> <p>5. Laws or regulations clearly define for which cases notification after the acquisition or investment is sufficient. Such cases should primarily refer to activities closely related to banking and the investment being small relative to the bank's capital.</p>	<p>Essential criteria</p> <p>1. Laws or regulations clearly define:</p> <p>(a) what types and amounts (absolute and/or in relation to a bank's capital) of acquisitions and investments need prior supervisory approval; and</p> <p>(b) cases for which notification after the acquisition or investment is sufficient. Such cases are primarily activities closely related to banking and where the investment is small relative to the bank's capital.</p>
<p>2. Laws or regulations provide criteria by which to judge individual proposals.</p>	<p>2. Laws or regulations provide criteria by which to judge individual proposals.</p>
<p>3. Consistent with the licensing requirements, among the objective criteria that the supervisor uses is that any new acquisitions and investments do not expose the bank to undue risks or hinder effective supervision. The supervisor can prohibit banks from making major acquisitions/investments (including the establishment of foreign branches or subsidiaries) in countries with secrecy laws or other regulations prohibiting information flows deemed necessary for adequate consolidated supervision.</p> <p>AC1. When a bank wishes to acquire a significant holding in a financial institution in another country, the supervisor should take into consideration the quality of supervision in that country and its own ability to exercise supervision on a consolidated basis.</p>	<p>3. Consistent with the licensing requirements, among the objective criteria that the supervisor uses is that any new acquisitions and investments do not expose the bank to undue risks or hinder effective supervision. The supervisor also determines, where appropriate, that these new acquisitions and investments will not hinder effective implementation of corrective measures in the future³². The supervisor can prohibit banks from making major acquisitions/investments (including the establishment of cross-border banking operations) in countries with laws or regulations prohibiting information flows deemed necessary for adequate consolidated supervision. The supervisor takes into consideration the effectiveness of supervision in the host country and its own ability to exercise supervision on a consolidated basis.</p> <p>32. In the case of major acquisitions, this determination may take into account whether the acquisition or investment creates obstacles to the orderly resolution of the bank.</p>
<p>4. The supervisor determines that the bank has, from the outset, adequate financial and organisational resources to handle the acquisition/investment.</p>	<p>4. The supervisor determines that the bank has, from the outset, adequate financial, managerial and organisational resources to handle the acquisition/investment.</p>

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<p>6. The supervisor is aware of the risks that non-banking activities can pose to a banking group and has the means to take action to mitigate those risks.</p>	<p>5. The supervisor is aware of the risks that non-banking activities can pose to a banking group and has the means to take action to mitigate those risks. The supervisor considers the ability of the bank to manage these risks prior to permitting investment in non-banking activities.</p>
<p>No text.</p>	<p>Additional criterion</p> <p>1. The supervisor reviews major acquisitions or investments by other entities in the banking group to determine that these do not expose the bank to any undue risks or hinder effective supervision. The supervisor also determines, where appropriate, that these new acquisitions and investments will not hinder effective implementation of corrective measures in the future.³³ Where necessary, the supervisor is able to effectively address the risks to the bank arising from such acquisitions or investments.</p> <p>33. Please refer to footnote 32 under Principle 7, Essential Criterion 3.</p>
<p>Principle 19: Supervisory approach</p> <p>An effective banking supervisory system requires that supervisors develop and maintain a thorough understanding of the operations of individual banks and banking groups, and also of the banking system as a whole, focusing on safety and soundness, and the stability of the banking system.</p>	<p>Principle 8: Supervisory approach</p> <p>An effective system of banking supervision requires the supervisor to develop and maintain a forward-looking assessment of the risk profile of individual banks and banking groups, proportionate to their systemic importance; identify, assess and address risks emanating from banks and the banking system as a whole; have a framework in place for early intervention; and have plans in place, in partnership with other relevant authorities, to take action to resolve banks in an orderly manner if they become non-viable.</p>
<p>Essential criteria</p> <p>3. The supervisor uses a methodology for determining and assessing on an ongoing basis the nature, importance and scope of the risks to which individual banks or banking groups are exposed. The methodology should cover, inter alia, the business focus, the risk profile and the internal control environment, and should permit relevant comparisons between banks. Supervisory work is prioritised based on the results of these assessments.³³</p> <p>33. Please refer to the footnote to CP 1(1), AC 1.</p>	<p>Essential criteria</p> <p>1. The supervisor uses a methodology for determining and assessing on an ongoing basis the nature, impact and scope of the risks:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) which banks or banking groups are exposed to, including risks posed by entities in the wider group; and (b) which banks or banking groups present to the safety and soundness of the banking system. <p>The methodology addresses, among other things, the business focus, group structure, risk profile, internal control environment and the resolvability of banks, and permits relevant comparisons between banks. The frequency and intensity of supervision of banks and banking groups reflect</p>

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the outcome of this analysis.

<p>1. The supervisor has policies and processes in place to develop and maintain a thorough understanding of the risk profile of individual banks and banking groups.</p> <p>AC1. The supervisor employs a well defined methodology designed to establish a forward-looking view on the risk profile of banks...</p>	<p>2. The supervisor has processes to understand the risk profile of banks and banking groups and employs a well defined methodology to establish a forward-looking view of the profile. The nature of the supervisory work on each bank is based on the results of this analysis.</p>
<p>4. The supervisor confirms banks' and banking groups' compliance with prudential regulations and other legal requirements.</p>	<p>3. The supervisor assesses banks' and banking groups' compliance with prudential regulations and other legal requirements.</p>
<p>2. ...The supervisor also takes into account developments in non-bank financial institutions through frequent contact with their regulators.</p>	<p>4. The supervisor takes the macroeconomic environment into account in its risk assessment of banks and banking groups. The supervisor also takes into account cross-sectoral developments, for example in non-bank financial institutions, through frequent contact with their regulators.</p>
<p>2. The supervisor monitors and assesses trends, developments and risks for the banking system as a whole...</p> <p>AC1. ...positioning the supervisor better to address proactively any serious threat to the stability of the banking system from any current or emerging risks.</p>	<p>5. The supervisor, in conjunction with other relevant authorities, identifies, monitors and assesses the build-up of risks, trends and concentrations within and across the banking system as a whole. This includes, among other things, banks' problem assets and sources of liquidity (such as domestic and foreign currency funding conditions, and costs). The supervisor incorporates this analysis into its assessment of banks and banking groups and addresses proactively any serious threat to the stability of the banking system. The supervisor communicates any significant trends or emerging risks identified to banks and to other relevant authorities with responsibilities for financial system stability.</p>
<p>No text.</p>	<p>6. Drawing on information provided by the bank and other national supervisors, the supervisor, in conjunction with the resolution authority, assesses the bank's resolvability where appropriate, having regard to the bank's risk profile and systemic importance. When bank-specific barriers to orderly resolution are identified, the supervisor requires, where necessary, banks to adopt appropriate measures, such as changes to business strategies, managerial, operational and ownership structures, and internal procedures. Any such measures take into account their effect on the</p>

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soundness and stability of ongoing business.

No text.

7. The supervisor has a clear framework or process for handling banks in times of stress, such that any decisions to require or undertake recovery or resolution actions are made in a timely manner.

No text.

8. Where the supervisor becomes aware of bank-like activities being performed fully or partially outside the regulatory perimeter, the supervisor takes appropriate steps to draw the matter to the attention of the responsible authority. Where the supervisor becomes aware of banks restructuring their activities to avoid the regulatory perimeter, the supervisor takes appropriate steps to address this.

Principle 20: Supervisory techniques

An effective banking supervisory system should consist of on-site and off-site supervision and regular contacts with bank management.

Principle 9: Supervisory techniques and tools

The supervisor uses an appropriate range of techniques and tools to implement the supervisory approach and deploys supervisory resources on a proportionate basis, taking into account the risk profile and systemic importance of banks.

Essential criteria

1. The supervisor employs an appropriate mix of on-site and off-site supervision to evaluate the condition of banks, their inherent risks, and the corrective measures necessary to address supervisory concerns. The specific mix may be determined by the particular conditions and circumstances of the country. The supervisor has policies and processes in place to assess the quality, effectiveness and integration of on-site and off-site functions, and to address any weaknesses that are identified.

Essential criteria

1. The supervisor employs an appropriate mix of on-site³⁴ and off-site³⁵ supervision to evaluate the condition of banks and banking groups, their risk profile, and the corrective measures necessary to address supervisory concerns. The specific mix between on-site and off-site supervision may be determined by the particular conditions and circumstances of the country and the bank. The supervisor regularly assesses the quality, effectiveness and integration of its on-site and off-site functions, and amends its approach, as needed.

34. On-site work is used as a tool to provide independent verification that adequate policies, procedures and controls exist at banks, determine that information reported by banks is reliable, obtain additional information on the bank and its related companies needed for the assessment of the condition of the bank, monitor the bank's follow-up on supervisory concerns, etc.

35. Off-site work is used as a tool to regularly review and analyse the financial condition of banks, follow up on matters requiring further attention, identify and evaluate developing risks and help identify the priorities, scope of further off-site and on-site work, etc.

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<p>2. The supervisor has in place a coherent process for planning and executing on-site and off-site activities. There are policies and processes in place to ensure that such activities are conducted on a thorough and consistent basis with clear responsibilities, objectives and outputs, and that there is effective coordination and information sharing between the on-site and off-site functions.</p>	<p>2. The supervisor has a coherent process for planning and executing on-site and off-site activities. There are policies and processes to ensure that such activities are conducted on a thorough and consistent basis with clear responsibilities, objectives and outputs, and that there is effective coordination and information sharing between the on-site and off-site functions.</p>
<p>3. On-site work, conducted either by the supervisor's own staff or through the work of external experts,³⁴ is used as a tool to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ... • determine that information provided by banks is reliable;³⁵ • obtain additional information on the bank and its related companies needed for the assessment of the condition of the bank, the evaluation of material risks, and the identification of necessary remedial actions and supervisory actions, including enhanced off-site monitoring; and • monitor the bank's follow-up on supervisory concerns. <p>34. May be external auditors or other qualified external parties, commissioned with an appropriate mandate, and subject to appropriate confidentiality restrictions.</p> <p>35. Please refer to CP 21.</p> <p>4. Off-site work is used as a tool to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • regularly review and analyse the financial condition of individual banks using prudential reports, statistical returns and other appropriate information, including publicly available information; • ... 	<p>3. The supervisor uses a variety of information to regularly review and assess the safety and soundness of banks, the evaluation of material risks, and the identification of necessary corrective actions and supervisory actions. This includes information, such as prudential reports, statistical returns, information on a bank's related entities, and publicly available information. The supervisor determines that information provided by banks is reliable³⁶ and obtains, as necessary, additional information on the banks and their related entities.</p> <p>36. Please refer to Principle 10.</p>
<p>3. On-site work, conducted either by the supervisor's own staff or through the work of external experts,³⁴ is used as a tool to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • provide independent verification that adequate corporate governance (including risk management and internal control systems) exists at individual banks; • ... <p>34. May be external auditors or other qualified external parties, commissioned with an appropriate mandate, and subject to appropriate confidentiality restrictions.</p>	<p>4. The supervisor uses a variety of tools to regularly review and assess the safety and soundness of banks and the banking system, such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) analysis of financial statements and accounts; (b) business model analysis; (c) horizontal peer reviews; (d) review of the outcome of stress tests undertaken by the bank; and (e) analysis of corporate governance, including risk management and internal control systems. <p>The supervisor communicates its findings to the bank as appropriate and requires the bank to take action to mitigate any particular vulnerabilities that have the potential to affect its</p>

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	<p>safety and soundness. The supervisor uses its analysis to determine follow-up work required, if any.</p>
<p>4. Off-site work is used as a tool to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ... • follow up on matters requiring further attention, evaluate developing risks and help identify the priorities and scope of further work; and • help determine the priorities and scope of on-site work. 	<p>5. The supervisor, in conjunction with other relevant authorities, seeks to identify, assess and mitigate any emerging risks across banks and to the banking system as a whole, potentially including conducting supervisory stress tests (on individual banks or system-wide). The supervisor communicates its findings as appropriate to either banks or the industry and requires banks to take action to mitigate any particular vulnerabilities that have the potential to affect the stability of the banking system where appropriate. The supervisor uses its analysis to determine follow-up work required, if any.</p>
<p>7. The supervisor evaluates the work of the bank's internal audit function, and determines whether, and to what extent, it may rely on the internal auditors' work to identify areas of potential risk.</p>	<p>6. The supervisor evaluates the work of the bank's internal audit function, and determines whether, and to what extent, it may rely on the internal auditors' work to identify areas of potential risk.</p>
<p>5. Based on the risk profile of individual banks, the supervisor maintains sufficiently frequent contacts as appropriate with the bank's Board, non-executive directors, Audit Committee and senior and middle management (including heads of individual business units and control functions) to develop an understanding of and assess such matters as strategy, group structure, corporate governance, performance, capital adequacy, liquidity, asset quality and risk management systems.</p>	<p>7. The supervisor maintains sufficiently frequent contacts as appropriate with the bank's Board, non-executive Board members and senior and middle management (including heads of individual business units and control functions) to develop an understanding of and assess matters such as strategy, group structure, corporate governance, performance, capital adequacy, liquidity, asset quality, risk management systems and internal controls. Where necessary, the supervisor challenges the bank's Board and senior management on the assumptions made in setting strategies and business models.</p>
<p>8. The supervisor communicates to the bank the findings of its on- and off-site supervisory analyses by means of written reports or through discussions or meetings with management.</p> <p>AC1. The supervisor meets periodically with senior management and the Board to discuss the results of supervisory examinations and the external audit. The supervisor should also meet separately with the independent Board members, as necessary.</p>	<p>8. The supervisor communicates to the bank the findings of its on- and off-site supervisory analyses by means of written reports or through discussions or meetings with the bank's management. The supervisor meets with the bank's senior management and the Board to discuss the results of supervisory examinations and the external audits as appropriate. The supervisor also meets separately with the bank's independent Board members, as necessary.</p>
<p>No text.</p>	<p>9. The supervisor undertakes appropriate and timely follow-up to check that banks have</p>

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	addressed supervisory concerns or implemented requirements communicated to them. This includes early escalation to the appropriate level of the supervisory authority and to the bank's Board if action points are not addressed in an adequate or timely manner.
EC5, CP19. The supervisor requires banks to notify it of any substantive changes in their activities, structure and overall condition, or as soon as they become aware of any material adverse developments, including breach of legal or prudential requirements.	10. The supervisor requires banks to notify it of any substantive changes in their activities, structure and overall condition, or as soon as they become aware of any material adverse developments, including breach of legal or prudential requirements.
No text.	11. The supervisor may make use of independent third parties, such as auditors, provided there is a clear and detailed mandate for the work. However, the supervisor cannot outsource its prudential responsibilities to third parties. When using third parties, the supervisor assesses whether the output can be relied upon to the degree intended and takes into consideration the biases that may influence third parties.
EC6, CP19. The supervisor has an adequate information system which facilitates the processing, monitoring and analysis of prudential information. The system aids the identification of areas requiring follow-up action.	12. The supervisor has an adequate information system which facilitates the processing, monitoring and analysis of prudential information. The system aids the identification of areas requiring follow-up action.
No text.	Additional criterion 1. The supervisor has a framework for periodic independent review, for example by an internal audit function or third party assessor, of the adequacy and effectiveness of the range of its available supervisory tools and their use, and makes changes as appropriate.
<p>Principle 21: Supervisory reporting</p> <p>Supervisors must have a means of collecting, reviewing and analysing prudential reports and statistical returns from banks on both a solo and a consolidated basis, and a means of independent verification of these reports, through either on-site examinations or use of external experts.³⁶</p> <p>36. In the context of this CP, "prudential reports and statistical returns" are distinct from and in addition to required accounting reports. The former are addressed by this CP, and the latter are addressed in CP 22.</p>	<p>Principle 10: Supervisory reporting</p> <p>The supervisor collects, reviews and analyses prudential reports and statistical returns from banks on both a solo and a consolidated basis, and independently verifies these reports, through either on-site examinations or use of external experts.³⁷</p> <p>37. In the context of this Principle, "prudential reports and statistical returns" are distinct from and in addition to required accounting reports. The former are addressed by this Principle, and the latter are addressed in Principle 27.</p>

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<p>Essential criteria</p> <p>1. The supervisor has the power³⁷ to require banks to submit information, on both a solo and a consolidated basis, on their financial condition, performance, and risks, at regular intervals. These reports provide information on such matters as on- and off-balance sheet assets and liabilities, profit and loss, capital adequacy, liquidity, large exposures, asset concentrations (including by economic sector, geography and currency), asset quality, loan loss provisioning, related party transactions, interest rate risk and market risk.</p> <p>37. Please refer to CP 1(3).</p> <p>EC3, CP1(3). The law or regulations empower the supervisor to obtain information from the banks and banking groups in the form and frequency it deems necessary.</p>	<p>Essential criteria</p> <p>1. The supervisor has the power³⁸ to require banks to submit information, on both a solo and a consolidated basis, on their financial condition, performance, and risks, on demand and at regular intervals. These reports provide information such as on- and off-balance sheet assets and liabilities, profit and loss, capital adequacy, liquidity, large exposures, risk concentrations (including by economic sector, geography and currency), asset quality, loan loss provisioning, related party transactions, interest rate risk, and market risk.</p> <p>38. Please refer to Principle 2.</p>
<p>2. The supervisor provides report instructions that clearly describe the accounting standards to be used in preparing supervisory reports. Such standards are based on accounting principles and rules that are widely accepted internationally.</p>	<p>2. The supervisor provides reporting instructions that clearly describe the accounting standards to be used in preparing supervisory reports. Such standards are based on accounting principles and rules that are widely accepted internationally.</p>
<p>3. The supervisor requires banks to utilise valuation rules that are consistent, realistic and prudent, taking account of current values where relevant.</p>	<p>3. The supervisor requires banks to have sound governance structures and control processes for methodologies that produce valuations. The measurement of fair values maximises the use of relevant and reliable inputs and are consistently applied for risk management and reporting purposes. The valuation framework and control procedures are subject to adequate independent validation and verification, either internally or by an external expert. The supervisor assesses whether the valuation used for regulatory purposes is reliable and prudent. Where the supervisor determines that valuations are not sufficiently prudent, the supervisor requires the bank to make adjustments to its reporting for capital adequacy or regulatory reporting purposes.</p>
<p>4. The supervisor collects and analyses information from banks at a frequency (eg monthly, quarterly and annually) commensurate with the nature of the information requested, and the size, activities and risk profile of the individual bank.</p>	<p>4. The supervisor collects and analyses information from banks at a frequency commensurate with the nature of the information requested, and the risk profile and systemic importance of the bank.</p>

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<p>5. In order to make meaningful comparisons between banks and banking groups, the supervisor collects data from all banks and all relevant entities covered by consolidated supervision on a comparable basis and related to the same dates (stock data) and periods (flow data).</p>	<p>5. In order to make meaningful comparisons between banks and banking groups, the supervisor collects data from all banks and all relevant entities covered by consolidated supervision on a comparable basis and related to the same dates (stock data) and periods (flow data).</p>
<p>6. The supervisor has the power to request and receive any relevant information from banks, as well as any of their related companies, irrespective of their activities, where the supervisor believes that it is material to the financial situation of the bank or banking group, or to the assessment of the risks of the bank or banking group. This includes internal management information.</p>	<p>6. The supervisor has the power to request and receive any relevant information from banks, as well as any entities in the wider group, irrespective of their activities, where the supervisor believes that it is material to the condition of the bank or banking group, or to the assessment of the risks of the bank or banking group or is needed to support resolution planning. This includes internal management information.</p>
<p>7. The supervisor has the power of full access³⁸ to all bank records for the furtherance of supervisory work. The supervisor also has similar access to the bank's Board, management and staff, when required.</p>	<p>7. The supervisor has the power to access³⁹ all bank records for the furtherance of supervisory work. The supervisor also has similar access to the bank's Board, management and staff, when required.</p>
<p>38. Please refer to CP 1(4).</p>	<p>39. Please refer to Principle 1, Essential Criterion 5.</p>
<p>8. The supervisor has a means of enforcing compliance with the requirement that the information be submitted on a timely and accurate basis. The supervisor determines that the appropriate level of senior management is responsible for the accuracy of supervisory returns, can impose penalties for misreporting and persistent errors, and can require that inaccurate information be amended.</p>	<p>8. The supervisor has a means of enforcing compliance with the requirement that the information be submitted on a timely and accurate basis. The supervisor determines—the appropriate level of the bank's senior management is responsible for the accuracy of supervisory returns, imposes sanctions for misreporting and persistent errors, and requires that inaccurate information be amended.</p>
<p>9. The supervisor utilises policies and processes to confirm the validity and integrity of supervisory information. This includes a programme for the periodic verification of supervisory returns by means either of the supervisor's own staff or of external experts.³⁹</p>	<p>9. The supervisor utilises policies and procedures to determine the validity and integrity of supervisory information. This includes a programme for the periodic verification of supervisory returns by means either of the supervisor's own staff or of external experts.⁴⁰</p>
<p>39. May be external auditors or other qualified external parties, commissioned with an appropriate mandate, and subject to appropriate confidentiality restrictions.</p>	<p>40. May be external auditors or other qualified external parties, commissioned with an appropriate mandate, and subject to appropriate confidentiality restrictions.</p>
<p>10. The supervisor clearly defines and documents the roles and responsibilities of external experts,⁴⁰ including the scope of the work, when they are appointed to conduct supervisory tasks and monitors the quality of the work. External experts may be utilised for routine validation or to</p>	<p>10. The supervisor clearly defines and documents the roles and responsibilities of external experts,⁴¹ including the scope of the work, when they are appointed to conduct supervisory tasks. The supervisor assesses the suitability of experts for the designated task(s) and the quality of the</p>

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examine specific aspects of banks' operations.

40. May be external auditors or other qualified external parties, commissioned with an appropriate mandate, and subject to appropriate confidentiality restrictions. External experts may conduct reviews used by the supervisor, yet it is ultimately the supervisor that must be comfortable with the results of the reviews conducted by such external experts.

work and takes into consideration conflicts of interest that could influence the output/recommendations by external experts. External experts may be utilised for routine validation or to examine specific aspects of banks' operations.

41. May be external auditors or other qualified external parties, commissioned with an appropriate mandate, and subject to appropriate confidentiality restrictions. External experts may conduct reviews used by the supervisor, yet it is ultimately the supervisor that must be comfortable with the results of the reviews conducted by such external experts.

11. The supervisor requires that external experts bring to its attention promptly any material shortcomings identified during the course of any work undertaken by them for supervisory purposes.

11. The supervisor requires that external experts bring to its attention promptly any material shortcomings identified during the course of any work undertaken by them for supervisory purposes.

Principle 23: Corrective and remedial powers of supervisors

Supervisors must have at their disposal an adequate range of supervisory tools to bring about timely corrective actions. This includes the ability, where appropriate, to revoke the banking licence or to recommend its revocation.

(Reference document: *Parallel-owned banking structures, January 2003*)

Principle 11: Corrective and sanctioning powers of supervisors⁴²

The supervisor acts at an early stage to address unsafe and unsound practices or activities that could pose risks to banks or to the banking system. The supervisor has at its disposal an adequate range of supervisory tools to bring about timely corrective actions. This includes the ability to revoke the banking licence or to recommend its revocation.

(Reference document: *Parallel-owned banking structures, January 2003*.)

42. For purposes of clarity, corrective and remedial powers are considered to be one and the same.

Essential criteria

1. The supervisor raises supervisory concerns with management or, where appropriate, the Board, at an early stage, and requires that these concerns are addressed in a timely manner. Where the supervisor requires the bank to take significant remedial actions, these are addressed in a written document to the Board. The supervisor requires the bank to submit regular written progress reports and checks that remedial actions are completed satisfactorily.

Essential criteria

1. The supervisor raises supervisory concerns with the bank's management or, where appropriate, the bank's Board, at an early stage, and requires that these concerns be addressed in a timely manner. Where the supervisor requires the bank to take significant corrective actions, these are addressed in a written document to the bank's Board. The supervisor requires the bank to submit regular written progress reports and checks that corrective actions are completed satisfactorily. The supervisor follows through conclusively and in a timely manner on matters that are identified.

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<p>2. The supervisor participates in deciding when and how to effect the orderly resolution of a problem bank situation (which could include closure, or assisting in restructuring, or merger with a stronger institution).</p>	<p>2. The supervisor cooperates and collaborates with relevant authorities in deciding when and how to effect the orderly resolution of a problem bank situation (which could include closure, or assisting in restructuring, or merger with a stronger institution).</p>
<p>3. The supervisor has available⁴² an appropriate range of supervisory tools for use when, in the supervisor's judgment, a bank is not complying with laws, regulations or supervisory decisions, or is engaged in unsafe or unsound practices, or when the interests of depositors are otherwise threatened...</p> <p>42. Please refer to CP 1(4).</p>	<p>3. The supervisor has available⁴³ an appropriate range of supervisory tools for use when, in the supervisor's judgement, a bank is not complying with laws, regulations or supervisory actions, is engaged in unsafe or unsound practices or in activities that could pose risks to the bank or the banking system, or when the interests of depositors are otherwise threatened.</p> <p>43. Please refer to Principle 1.</p>
<p>4. The supervisor has available a broad range of possible measures to address such scenarios as described in EC 3 above and provides clear prudential objectives or sets out the actions to be taken, which may include restricting the current activities of the bank, withholding approval of new activities or acquisitions, restricting or suspending payments to shareholders or share repurchases, restricting asset transfers, barring individuals from banking, replacing or restricting the powers of managers, Board directors or controlling owners, facilitating a takeover by or merger with a healthier institution, providing for the interim management of the bank, and revoking or recommending the revocation of the banking licence.</p> <p>3. ...These tools include the ability to require a bank to take prompt remedial action and to impose penalties. In practice, the range of tools is applied in accordance with the gravity of a situation.</p> <p>EC4, CP17. The supervisor has the power to require changes in the composition of ... senior management to address any prudential concerns related to the satisfaction of these criteria.</p>	<p>4. The supervisor has available a broad range of possible measures to address, at an early stage, such scenarios as described in essential criterion 3 above. These measures include the ability to require a bank to take timely corrective action or to impose sanctions expeditiously. In practice, the range of measures is applied in accordance with the gravity of a situation. The supervisor provides clear prudential objectives or sets out the actions to be taken, which may include restricting the current activities of the bank, imposing more stringent prudential limits and requirements, withholding approval of new activities or acquisitions, restricting or suspending payments to shareholders or share repurchases, restricting asset transfers, barring individuals from the banking sector, replacing or restricting the powers of managers, Board members or controlling owners, facilitating a takeover by or merger with a healthier institution, providing for the interim management of the bank, and revoking or recommending the revocation of the banking licence.</p>
<p>5. The supervisor has the power to take measures should a bank fall below the minimum capital ratio, and seeks to intervene at an early stage to prevent capital from falling below the minimum. The supervisor has a range of options to address such scenarios.</p> <p>EC6, CP6. Laws or regulations clearly give the</p>	<p>5. The supervisor has the power to act where a bank falls below established regulatory threshold requirements, including prescribed regulatory ratios or measurements. The supervisor also has the power to intervene at an early stage to require a bank to prevent its regulatory requirements from reaching the threshold. The supervisor has a range of options to address such scenarios.</p>

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<p>supervisor authority to take measures should a bank fall below the minimum capital ratio.</p>	
<p>6. The supervisor applies penalties and sanctions not only to the bank but, when and if necessary, also to management and/or the Board, or individuals therein.</p>	<p>6. The supervisor applies sanctions not only to the bank but, when and if necessary, also to management and/or the Board, or individuals therein.</p>
<p>AC2. The supervisor has the power to take remedial actions, including ring-fencing of the bank from the actions of parent companies, subsidiaries, parallel-owned banking structures and other related companies in matters that could impair the safety and soundness of the bank.</p>	<p>7. The supervisor has the power to take corrective actions, including ring-fencing of the bank from the actions of parent companies, subsidiaries, parallel-owned banking structures and other related entities in matters that could impair the safety and soundness of the bank or the banking system.</p>
<p>Additional criteria</p> <p>1. Laws or regulations guard against the supervisor unduly delaying appropriate corrective actions.</p>	<p>Additional criteria</p> <p>1. Laws or regulations guard against the supervisor unduly delaying appropriate corrective actions.</p>
<p>3. When taking formal remedial action in relation to a bank, the supervisor ensures that the regulators of non-bank related financial entities are aware of its actions and, where appropriate, coordinates its actions with them.</p>	<p>2. When taking formal corrective action in relation to a bank, the supervisor informs the supervisor of non-bank related financial entities of its actions and, where appropriate, coordinates its actions with them.</p>
<p>Principle 24: Consolidated supervision</p> <p>An essential element of banking supervision is that supervisors supervise the banking group on a consolidated basis, adequately monitoring and, as appropriate, applying prudential norms to all aspects of the business conducted by the group worldwide.⁴³</p> <p>(Reference documents: <i>Consolidated supervision of banks' international activities</i>, March 1979; <i>Principles for the supervision of banks' foreign establishments</i>, May 1983; <i>Minimum standards for the supervision of international banking groups and their cross-border establishments</i>, July 1992; and <i>The supervision of cross-border banking</i>, October 1996; <i>Home-host information sharing for effective Basel II implementation</i>, June 2006⁴⁴.)</p> <p>43. For the purposes of consolidated supervision according to CP 24, a banking group includes the bank and its offices, subsidiaries, affiliates and joint ventures, both domestic and foreign. Other entities, for example parent companies and non-bank (including non-financial) group entities, may also be</p>	<p>Principle 12: Consolidated supervision</p> <p>An essential element of banking supervision is that the supervisor supervises the banking group on a consolidated basis, adequately monitoring and, as appropriate, applying prudential standards to all aspects of the business conducted by the banking group worldwide.⁴⁴</p> <p>(Reference documents: <i>Home-host information sharing for effective Basel II implementation</i>, June 2006⁴⁵; <i>The supervision of cross-border banking</i>, October 1996; <i>Minimum standards for the supervision of international banking groups and their cross-border establishments</i>, July 1992; <i>Principles for the supervision of banks' foreign establishments</i>, May 1983; and <i>Consolidated supervision of banks' international activities</i>, March 1979.)</p> <p>44. Please refer to footnote 19 under Principle 1.</p> <p>45. When assessing compliance with the Core Principles, this reference document is only relevant for banks and countries which have implemented Basel II.</p>

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relevant. This group-wide approach to supervision, whereby all risks run by a banking group are taken into account, wherever they are booked, goes beyond accounting consolidation.

44. When assessing BCP compliance, this reference document is only relevant for banks and countries which have implemented Basel II.

Essential criteria

1. The supervisor is familiar with the overall structure of banking groups and has an understanding of the activities of all material parts of these groups, domestic and cross-border.

3. The supervisor has a supervisory framework that evaluates the risks that non-banking activities conducted by a bank or banking group may pose to the bank or banking group.

4. ...The supervisor uses its power to establish prudential standards on a consolidated basis to cover such areas as capital adequacy, large exposures, exposures to related parties and lending limits. The supervisor collects consolidated financial information for each banking group.

7. The supervisor determines that management is maintaining proper oversight of the bank's foreign operations, including branches, joint ventures and subsidiaries. The supervisor also determines that banks' policies and processes ensure that the local management of any cross-border operations has the necessary expertise to manage those operations in a safe and sound manner and in compliance with supervisory and regulatory requirements.

8. The supervisor determines that oversight of a bank's foreign operations by management (of the parent bank or head office and, where relevant, the holding company) includes: (i) information reporting on its foreign operations that is adequate in scope and frequency to manage their overall risk profile and is periodically verified; (ii) assessing in an appropriate manner compliance with internal controls; and (iii) ensuring effective local oversight of foreign operations.

For the purposes of consolidated risk management and supervision, there should be no

Essential criteria

1. The supervisor understands the overall structure of the banking group and is familiar with all the material activities (including non-banking activities) conducted by entities in the wider group, both domestic and cross-border. The supervisor understands and assesses how group-wide risks are managed and takes action when risks arising from the banking group and other entities in the wider group, in particular contagion and reputation risks, may jeopardise the safety and soundness of the bank and the banking system.

2. The supervisor imposes prudential standards and collects and analyses financial and other information on a consolidated basis for the banking group, covering areas such as capital adequacy, liquidity, large exposures, exposures to related parties, lending limits and group structure.

3. The supervisor reviews whether the oversight of a bank's foreign operations by management (of the parent bank or head office and, where relevant, the holding company) is adequate having regard to their risk profile and systemic importance and there is no hindrance in host countries for the parent bank to have access to all the material information from their foreign branches and subsidiaries. The supervisor also determines that banks' policies and processes require the local management of any cross-border operations to have the necessary expertise to manage those operations in a safe and sound manner, and in compliance with supervisory and regulatory requirements. The home supervisor takes into account the effectiveness of supervision conducted in the host countries in which its banks have material operations.

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<p>hindrance in host countries for the parent bank to have access to all the material information from their foreign branches and subsidiaries. Transmission of such information is on the understanding that the parent bank itself undertakes to maintain the confidentiality of the data submitted and to make them available only to the parent supervisory authority.</p> <p>10. The supervisor confirms that oversight of a bank's foreign operations by management (of the parent bank or head office and, where relevant, the holding company) is particularly close when the foreign activities have a higher risk profile or when the operations are conducted in jurisdictions or under supervisory regimes differing fundamentally from those of the bank's home country.</p> <p>AC2. The home supervisor assesses the quality of supervision conducted in the countries in which its banks have material operations.</p>	
<p>AC3. The supervisor arranges to visit the foreign locations periodically, the frequency being determined by the size and risk profile of the foreign operation. The supervisor meets the host supervisors during these visits. The supervisor has a policy for assessing whether it needs to conduct on-site examinations of a bank's foreign operations, or require additional reporting, and has the power and resources to take those steps as and when appropriate.</p>	<p>4. The home supervisor visits the foreign offices periodically, the location and frequency being determined by the risk profile and systemic importance of the foreign operation. The supervisor meets the host supervisors during these visits. The supervisor has a policy for assessing whether it needs to conduct on-site examinations of a bank's foreign operations, or require additional reporting, and has the power and resources to take those steps as and when appropriate.</p>
<p>No text.</p>	<p>5. The supervisor reviews the main activities of parent companies, and of companies affiliated with the parent companies, that have a material impact on the safety and soundness of the bank and the banking group, and takes appropriate supervisory action.</p>
<p>6. The supervisor has the power to limit the range of activities the consolidated group may conduct and the locations in which activities can be conducted; the supervisor uses this power to determine that the activities are properly supervised and that the safety and soundness of the bank are not compromised.</p> <p>9. The home supervisor has the power to require the closing of foreign offices, or to impose limitations on their activities, if:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • it determines that oversight by the bank and/or 	<p>6. The supervisor limits the range of activities the consolidated group may conduct and the locations in which activities can be conducted (including the closing of foreign offices) if it determines that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) the safety and soundness of the bank and banking group is compromised because the activities expose the bank or banking group to excessive risk and/or are not properly managed; (b) the supervision by other supervisors is not adequate relative to the risks the activities

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<p>supervision by the host supervisor is not adequate relative to the risks the office presents; and/or</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> it cannot gain access to the information required for the exercise of supervision on a consolidated basis. 	<p>present; and/or</p> <p>(c) the exercise of effective supervision on a consolidated basis is hindered.</p>
<p>No text.</p>	<p>7. Notwithstanding consolidated supervision, supervisors must not lose sight of the legal status of individual banks in the group. The responsible supervisor supervises each bank on a stand-alone basis and understands its relationship with other members of the group.⁴⁶</p> <p>46. Please refer to Principle 16, Additional Criterion 2.</p>
<p>Additional criterion</p> <p>1. For those countries that allow corporate ownership of banking companies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ... the supervisor has the power to establish and enforce fit and proper standards for owners and senior management of parent companies. 	<p>Additional criterion</p> <p>1. For countries which allow corporate ownership of banks, the supervisor has the power to establish and enforce fit and proper standards for owners and senior management of parent companies.</p>
<p>Principle 25: Home-host relationships</p> <p>Cross-border consolidated supervision requires cooperation and information exchange⁴⁵ between home supervisors and the various other supervisors involved, primarily host banking supervisors. Banking supervisors must require the local operations of foreign banks to be conducted to the same standards as those required of domestic institutions.</p> <p>(Reference documents: <i>Principles for the supervision of banks' foreign establishments (Concordat)</i>, May 1983; <i>Information flows between Banking Supervisory Authorities</i>, April 1990; <i>Report on Cross-Border Banking Supervision</i>, June 1996; <i>Shell banks and booking offices</i>, January 2003; and <i>The high-level principles for the cross-border implementation of the New Accord</i>, August 2003; <i>Home-host information sharing for effective Basel II implementation</i>, June 2006⁴⁶.)</p> <p>45. Information exchange is covered in more detail in CP 1(6), which underpins the standards set out in this CP.</p> <p>46. When assessing BCP compliance, this reference document is only relevant for banks and countries which have implemented Basel II.</p> <p>EC5, CP24. The supervisor has arrangements</p>	<p>Principle 13: Home-host relationships</p> <p>Home and host supervisors of cross-border banking groups share information and cooperate for effective supervision of the group and group entities, and effective handling of crisis situations. Supervisors require the local operations of foreign banks to be conducted to the same standards as those required of domestic banks.</p> <p>(Reference documents: <i>FSB Key Attributes for Effective Resolution Regimes</i>, November 2011; <i>Good practice principles on supervisory colleges</i>, October 2010; <i>Home-host information sharing for effective Basel II implementation</i>, June 2006⁴⁷; <i>The high-level principles for the cross-border implementation of the New Accord</i>, August 2003; <i>Shell banks and booking offices</i>, January 2003; <i>Report on Cross-Border Banking Supervision</i>, June 1996; <i>Information flows between Banking Supervisory Authorities</i>, April 1990; and <i>Principles for the supervision of banks' foreign establishments (Concordat)</i>, May 1983.)</p> <p>47. When assessing compliance with the Core Principles, this reference document is only relevant for banks and countries which have implemented Basel II.</p>

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with other relevant supervisors, domestic and cross-border, to receive information on the financial condition and adequacy of risk management and controls of the different entities of the banking group.

Essential criteria

No text.

Essential criteria

1. The home supervisor identifies and establishes bank-specific supervisory colleges for banking groups with material cross-border operations to enhance its effective oversight, taking into account the risk profile and systemic importance of the banking group and the corresponding needs of its supervisors. In its broadest sense, the host supervisor who has a relevant subsidiary or a significant branch in its jurisdiction and who, therefore, has a shared interest in the effective supervisory oversight of the banking group, is included in the college. The structure of the college reflects the nature of the banking group and the needs of its supervisors, and includes, for example, a core college, a general college and/or other variable structures such as according to business lines.

1. Information to be exchanged by home and host supervisors should be adequate for their respective roles and responsibilities.

2. For material cross-border operations of its banks, the supervisor identifies all other relevant supervisors and establishes informal or formal arrangements (such as memoranda of understanding) for appropriate information sharing, on a confidential basis, on the financial condition and performance of such operations in the home or host country. Where formal cooperation arrangements are agreed, their existence should be communicated to the banks and banking groups affected.

3. The home supervisor provides information to host supervisors, on a timely basis, concerning:

- the overall framework of supervision in which the banking group operates;
- the bank or banking group, to allow a proper perspective of the activities conducted within the host country's borders;
- the specific operations in the host country; and
- where possible and appropriate, significant problems arising in the head office or other parts of the banking group if these are likely to have a material effect on the safety and soundness of subsidiaries or branches in host

2. Home and host supervisors share appropriate information on a timely basis in line with their respective roles and responsibilities, both bilaterally and through colleges. This includes information both on the material risks and risk management practices of the banking group⁴⁸ and on the supervisors' assessments on the safety and soundness of the relevant entity under their jurisdiction. Informal or formal arrangements (such as memoranda of understanding) are in place to enable the exchange of confidential information.

48. See *Illustrative example of information exchange in colleges* of the October 2010 BCBS *Good practice principles on supervisory colleges* for further information on the extent of information sharing expected.

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countries.

A minimum level of information on the bank or banking group will be needed in most circumstances, but the overall frequency and scope of this information will vary depending on the materiality of a bank's or banking group's activities to the financial sector of the host country. In this context, the host supervisor will inform the home supervisor when a local operation is material to the financial sector of the host country.

4. The host supervisor provides information to home supervisors, on a timely basis, concerning:

- material or persistent non-compliance with relevant supervisory requirements, such as capital ratios or operational limits, specifically applied to a bank's operations in the host country;
- adverse or potentially adverse developments in the local operations of a bank or banking group regulated by the home supervisor;
- adverse assessments of such qualitative aspects of a bank's operations as risk management and controls at the offices in the host country; and
- any material remedial action it takes regarding the operations of a bank regulated by the home supervisor.

A minimum level of information on the bank or banking group, including the overall supervisory framework in which they operate, will be needed in most circumstances, but the overall frequency and scope of this information will vary depending on the materiality of the cross-border operations to the bank or banking group and financial sector of the home country. In this context, the home supervisor will inform the host supervisor when the cross-border operation is material to the bank or banking group and financial sector of the home country.

No text.

3. Home and host supervisors coordinate and plan supervisory activities or undertake joint work if common areas of interest are identified in order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of supervision of cross-border banking groups.

AC1. Where necessary, the home supervisor develops an agreed communication strategy with the relevant host supervisors. The scope and nature of the strategy should reflect the size and complexity of the cross-border operations of the bank or banking group.

4. The home supervisor develops an agreed communication strategy with the relevant host supervisors. The scope and nature of the strategy reflects the risk profile and systemic importance of the cross-border operations of the bank or banking group. Home and host supervisors also agree on the communication of views and

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outcomes of joint activities and college meetings to banks where appropriate to ensure consistency of messages on group-wide issues.

No text.

5. Where appropriate, due to the bank's risk profile and systemic importance, the home supervisor, working with its national resolution authorities, develops a framework for cross-border crisis cooperation and coordination among the relevant home and host authorities. The relevant authorities share information on crisis preparations from an early stage in a way that does not materially compromise the prospect of a successful resolution and subject to the application of rules on confidentiality.

No text.

6. Where appropriate, due to the bank's risk profile and systemic importance, the home supervisor, working with its national resolution authorities and relevant host authorities, develops a group resolution plan. The relevant authorities share any information necessary for the development and maintenance of a credible resolution plan. Supervisors also alert and consult relevant authorities and supervisors (both home and host) promptly when taking any recovery and resolution measures.

5. A host supervisor's national laws or regulations require that the cross-border operations of foreign banks are subject to prudential, inspection and regulatory reporting requirements similar to those for domestic banks.

7. The host supervisor's national laws or regulations require that the cross-border operations of foreign banks are subject to prudential, inspection and regulatory reporting requirements similar to those for domestic banks.

7. Home country supervisors are given on-site access to local offices and subsidiaries of a banking group in order to facilitate their assessment of the group's safety and soundness and compliance with KYC requirements. Home supervisors should inform host supervisors of intended visits to local offices and subsidiaries of banking groups.

8. The home supervisor is given on-site access to local offices and subsidiaries of a banking group in order to facilitate their assessment of the group's safety and soundness and compliance with customer due diligence requirements. The home supervisor informs host supervisors of intended visits to local offices and subsidiaries of banking groups.

8. The host supervisor supervises shell banks,⁴⁷ where they still exist, and booking offices in a manner consistent with internationally agreed standards.

9. The host supervisor supervises booking offices in a manner consistent with internationally agreed standards. The supervisor does not permit shell banks or the continued operation of shell banks.

47. Reference document: *BCBS paper on shell banks*; 2003. See also footnote on CP3 EC5.

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<p>9. A supervisor that takes consequential action on the basis of information received from another supervisor consults with that supervisor, to the extent possible, before taking such action.</p>	<p>10. A supervisor that takes consequential action on the basis of information received from another supervisor consults with that supervisor, to the extent possible, before taking such action.</p>
<p>No text.</p>	<p>Principle 14: Corporate governance</p> <p>The supervisor determines that banks and banking groups have robust corporate governance policies and processes covering, for example, strategic direction, group and organisational structure, control environment, responsibilities of the banks' Boards and senior management⁴⁹, and compensation. These policies and processes are commensurate with the risk profile and systemic importance of the bank.</p> <p>(Reference documents: <i>Principles for enhancing corporate governance</i>, October 2010 and <i>Compensation principles and standards assessment methodology</i>, January 2010.)</p> <p>49. Please refer to footnote 27 under Principle 5.</p>
<p>EC1, CP17. Laws, regulations or the supervisor establish the responsibilities of the Board and senior management with respect to corporate governance to ensure that there is effective control over a bank's entire business.</p>	<p>1. Laws, regulations or the supervisor establish the responsibilities of the bank's Board and senior management with respect to corporate governance to ensure there is effective control over the bank's entire business. The supervisor provides guidance to banks and banking groups on expectations for sound corporate governance.</p>
<p>No text.</p>	<p>2. The supervisor regularly assesses a bank's corporate governance policies and practices, and their implementation, and determines that the bank has robust corporate governance policies and processes commensurate with its risk profile and systemic importance. The supervisor requires banks and banking groups to correct deficiencies in a timely manner.</p>
<p>AC1, CP17. In those countries with a unicameral Board structure (as opposed to a bicameral structure with a Supervisory Board and a Management Board), the supervisor requires the Board to include a number of experienced non-executive directors.</p> <p>AC3, CP17. In those countries with a unicameral Board structure, the supervisor requires the audit committee to include experienced non-executive directors.</p>	<p>3. The supervisor determines that governance structures and processes for nominating and appointing a Board member are appropriate for the bank and across the banking group. Board membership includes experienced non-executive members, where appropriate. Commensurate with the risk profile and systemic importance Board structures include audit, risk oversight and remuneration committees⁵⁰ with experienced non-executive members.</p>

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50. The need for and the mandate of Board sub-committees are commensurate with the risk profile and systemic importance of the bank.

EC6, CP20. On an ongoing basis during on-site and off-site supervisory activities, the supervisor considers the quality of the Board...

4. Board members are suitably qualified, effective and exercise their “duty of care” and “duty of loyalty”⁵¹.

51. The OECD (OECD glossary of corporate governance-related terms in “Experiences from the Regional Corporate Governance Roundtables”, 2003, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/26/23742340.pdf.) defines “duty of care” as “The duty of a board member to act on an informed and prudent basis in decisions with respect to the company. Often interpreted as requiring the board member to approach the affairs of the company in the same way that a ‘prudent man’ would approach their own affairs. Liability under the duty of care is frequently mitigated by the business judgement rule.” The OECD defines “duty of loyalty” as “The duty of the board member to act in the interest of the company and shareholders. The duty of loyalty should prevent individual board members from acting in their own interest, or the interest of another individual or group, at the expense of the company and all shareholders.”

EC3, CP17. Laws, regulations or the supervisor place the responsibility for the control environment on the Board and senior management of the bank...

5. The supervisor determines that the bank’s Board approves and oversees implementation of the bank’s strategic direction, risk appetite⁵² and strategy, and related policies, establishes and communicates corporate culture and values (eg through a code of conduct), and establishes conflicts of interest policies and a strong control environment.

52. “Risk appetite” reflects the level of aggregate risk that the bank’s Board is willing to assume and manage in the pursuit of the bank’s business objectives. For the purposes of this document, the terms “risk appetite” and “risk tolerance” are treated synonymously.

EC6, CP20. On an ongoing basis during on-site and off-site supervisory activities, the supervisor considers the quality of ... management.

6. The supervisor determines that the bank’s Board, except where required otherwise by laws or regulations, has established fit and proper standards in selecting senior management, plans for succession, and actively and critically oversees senior management’s execution of Board strategies, including monitoring senior management’s performance against standards established for them.

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No text.	7. The supervisor determines that the bank's Board actively oversees the design and operation of the bank's and banking group's compensation system, and that it has appropriate incentives, which are aligned with prudent risk taking. The compensation system, and related performance standards, are consistent with long-term objectives and financial soundness of the bank and is rectified if there are deficiencies.
EC3, CP17. ...The supervisor requires that the Board and senior management understand the underlying risks in their business and are committed to a strong control environment.	8. The supervisor determines that the bank's Board and senior management know and understand the bank's and banking group's operational structure and its risks, including those arising from the use of structures that impede transparency (eg special-purpose or related structures). The supervisor determines that risks are effectively managed and mitigated, where appropriate.
EC4, CP17. The supervisor has the power to require changes in the composition of the Board ... to address any prudential concerns related to the satisfaction of these criteria.	9. The supervisor has the power to require changes in the composition of the bank's Board if it believes that any individuals are not fulfilling their duties related to the satisfaction of these criteria.
Additional criterion AC4, CP17. Laws or regulations provide, or the supervisor ensures, that banks must notify the supervisor as soon as they become aware of any material information which may negatively affect the fitness and propriety of a Board member or a member of the senior management.	Additional criterion 1. Laws, regulations or the supervisor require banks to notify the supervisor as soon as they become aware of any material and bona fide information which may negatively affect the fitness and propriety of a bank's Board member or a member of the senior management.
<p>Principle 7: Risk management process</p> <p>Supervisors must be satisfied that banks and banking groups have in place a comprehensive risk management process (including Board¹⁶ and senior management oversight) to identify, evaluate, monitor and control or mitigate¹⁷ all material risks and to assess their overall capital adequacy in relation to their risk profile. These processes should be commensurate with the size and complexity of the institution.¹⁸</p> <p>(Reference document: <i>Enhancing corporate governance for banking organisations</i>, February 2006)</p> <p>16. The Basel Core Principles refer to a management structure composed of a Board of Directors (ie the Board) and senior management. The Committee is aware that there are</p>	<p>Principle 15: Risk management process</p> <p>The supervisor determines that banks⁵³ have a comprehensive risk management process (including effective Board and senior management oversight) to identify, measure, evaluate, monitor, report and control or mitigate⁵⁴ all material risks on a timely basis and to assess the adequacy of their capital and liquidity in relation to their risk profile and market and macroeconomic conditions. This extends to development and review of robust and credible recovery plans, which take into account the specific circumstances of the bank. The risk management process is commensurate with the risk profile and systemic importance of the bank.⁵⁵</p>

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significant differences in legislative and regulatory frameworks across countries as regards the functions of the Board and senior management. In some countries, the Board has the main, if not exclusive, function of supervising the executive body (senior management, general management) so as to ensure that the latter fulfils its tasks. For this reason, in some cases, it is known as a Supervisory Board. This means that the Board has no executive functions. In other countries, by contrast, the Board has a broader competence in that it lays down the general framework for the management of the bank. Owing to these differences, the notions of the Board and senior management are used in this paper not to identify legal constructs but rather to label two decision-making functions within a bank.

17. To some extent the precise requirements may vary from risk type to risk type (Core Principles 7 to 16) as reflected by the underlying reference documents.

18. It should be noted that while, in this and other CPs, the supervisor is required to confirm that banks' risk management policies and processes are being adhered to, the responsibility for ensuring adherence remains with a bank's Board and senior management.

(Reference documents: *Principles for enhancing corporate governance*, October 2010; *Enhancements to the Basel II framework*, July 2009; and *Principles for sound stress testing practices and supervision*, May 2009.)

53. For the purposes of assessing risk management by banks in the context of Principles 15 to 25, a bank's risk management framework should take an integrated "bank-wide" perspective of the bank's risk exposure, encompassing the bank's individual business lines and business units. Where a bank is a member of a group of companies, the risk management framework should in addition cover the risk exposure across and within the "banking group" (see footnote 19 under Principle 1) and should also take account of risks posed to the bank or members of the banking group through other entities in the wider group.

54. To some extent the precise requirements may vary from risk type to risk type (Principles 15 to 25) as reflected by the underlying reference documents.

55. It should be noted that while, in this and other Principles, the supervisor is required to determine that banks' risk management policies and processes are being adhered to, the responsibility for ensuring adherence remains with a bank's Board and senior management.

Essential criteria

2. The supervisor confirms that banks and banking groups have appropriate risk management strategies that have been approved by the Board. The supervisor also confirms that the Board ensures that policies and processes for risk-taking are developed, appropriate limits are established, and senior management takes the steps necessary to monitor and control all material risks consistent with the approved strategies.

Essential criteria

1. The supervisor determines that banks have appropriate risk management strategies that have been approved by the banks' Boards and that the Boards set a suitable risk appetite to define the level of risk the banks are willing to assume or tolerate. The supervisor also determines that the Board ensures that:

- (a) a sound risk management culture is established throughout the bank;
- (b) policies and processes are developed for risk-taking, that are consistent with the risk management strategy and the established risk appetite;
- (c) uncertainties attached to risk measurement are recognised;
- (d) appropriate limits are established that are consistent with the bank's risk appetite, risk profile and capital strength, and that are understood by, and regularly communicated to, relevant staff; and
- (e) senior management takes the steps necessary to monitor and control all material risks consistent with the approved strategies and risk appetite.

1. Individual banks and banking groups are required to have in place comprehensive risk management policies and processes to identify, evaluate, monitor and control or mitigate material

2. The supervisor requires banks to have comprehensive risk management policies and processes to identify, measure, evaluate, monitor, report and control or mitigate all material risks.

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<p>risks. The supervisor determines that these processes are adequate for the size and nature of the activities of the bank and banking group and are periodically adjusted in the light of the changing risk profile of the bank or banking group and external market developments. If the supervisor determines that the risk management processes are inadequate, it has the power to require a bank or banking group to strengthen them.</p>	<p>The supervisor determines that these processes are adequate:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) to provide a comprehensive “bank-wide” view of risk across all material risk types; (b) for the risk profile and systemic importance of the bank; and (c) to assess risks arising from the macroeconomic environment affecting the markets in which the bank operates and to incorporate such assessments into the bank’s risk management process.
<p>3. The supervisor determines that risk management strategies, policies, processes and limits are properly documented, reviewed and updated, communicated within the bank and banking group, and adhered to in practice. The supervisor determines that exceptions to established policies, processes and limits receive the prompt attention of and authorisation by the appropriate level of management and the Board where necessary.</p>	<p>3. The supervisor determines that risk management strategies, policies, processes and limits are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) properly documented; (b) regularly reviewed and appropriately adjusted to reflect changing risk appetites, risk profiles and market and macroeconomic conditions; and (c) communicated within the bank. <p>The supervisor determines that exceptions to established policies, processes and limits receive the prompt attention of, and authorisation by, the appropriate level of management and the bank’s Board where necessary.</p>
<p>4. The supervisor determines that senior management and the Board understand the nature and level of risk being taken by the bank and how this risk relates to adequate capital levels. The supervisor also determines that senior management ensures that the risk management policies and processes are appropriate in the light of the bank’s risk profile and business plan and that they are implemented effectively. This includes a requirement that senior management regularly reviews and understands the implications (and limitations) of the risk management information that it receives. The same requirement applies to the Board in relation to risk management information presented to it in a format suitable for Board oversight.</p> <p>EC3, CP14. The supervisor determines that a bank’s senior management has defined (or established) appropriate policies and processes to monitor, control and limit liquidity risk; implements effectively such policies and processes; and understands the nature and level of liquidity risk being taken by the bank.</p>	<p>4. The supervisor determines that the bank’s Board and senior management obtain sufficient information on, and understand, the nature and level of risk being taken by the bank and how this risk relates to adequate levels of capital and liquidity. The supervisor also determines that the Board and senior management regularly review and understand the implications and limitations (including the risk measurement uncertainties) of the risk management information that they receive.</p>
<p>5. The supervisor determines that banks have an internal process for assessing their overall capital</p>	<p>5. The supervisor determines that banks have an appropriate internal process for assessing their</p>

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<p>adequacy in relation to their risk profile, and reviews and evaluates banks' internal capital adequacy assessments and strategies. The nature of the specific methodology used for this assessment will depend on the size, complexity and business strategy of a bank. Non-complex banks may opt for a more qualitative approach to capital planning.</p>	<p>overall capital and liquidity adequacy in relation to their risk appetite and risk profile. The supervisor reviews and evaluates banks' internal capital and liquidity adequacy assessments and strategies.</p>
<p>6. Where banks and banking groups use models to measure components of risk, the supervisor determines that banks perform periodic and independent validation and testing of the models and systems.</p>	<p>6. Where banks use models to measure components of risk, the supervisor determines that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) banks comply with supervisory standards on their use; (b) the banks' Boards and senior management understand the limitations and uncertainties relating to the output of the models and the risk inherent in their use; and (c) banks perform regular and independent validation and testing of the models. <p>The supervisor assesses whether the model outputs appear reasonable as a reflection of the risks assumed.</p>
<p>7. The supervisor determines that banks and banking groups have adequate information systems for measuring, assessing and reporting on the size, composition and quality of exposures. It is satisfied that these reports are provided on a timely basis to the Board or senior management and reflect the bank's risk profile and capital needs.</p>	<p>7. The supervisor determines that banks have information systems that are adequate (both under normal circumstances and in periods of stress) for measuring, assessing and reporting on the size, composition and quality of exposures on a bank-wide basis across all risk types, products and counterparties. The supervisor also determines that these reports reflect the bank's risk profile and capital and liquidity needs, and are provided on a timely basis to the bank's Board and senior management in a form suitable for their use.</p>
<p>8. The supervisor determines that banks have policies and processes in place to ensure that new products and major risk management initiatives are approved by the Board or a specific committee of the Board.</p>	<p>8. The supervisor determines that banks have adequate policies and processes to ensure that the banks' Boards and senior management understand the risks inherent in new products,⁵⁶ material modifications to existing products, and major management initiatives (such as changes in systems, processes, business model and major acquisitions). The supervisor determines that the Board and senior management are able to monitor and manage these risks on an ongoing basis. The supervisor also determines that the bank's policies and processes require the undertaking of any major activities of this nature to be approved by the Board or a specific committee of the Board.</p> <p><small>56. New products include those developed by the bank or by a third party and purchased or distributed by the bank.</small></p>

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9. The supervisor determines that banks and banking groups have risk evaluation, monitoring, and control or mitigation functions with duties clearly segregated from risk-taking functions in the bank, and which report on risk exposures directly to senior management and the Board.

AC1. ...The supervisor confirms that this unit (these units) is (are) subject to periodic review by the internal audit function.

AC4, CP16. The supervisor requires banks to assign responsibility for interest rate risk management to individuals independent of and with reporting lines separate from those responsible for trading and/or other risk-taking activities. In the absence of an independent risk management function that covers interest rate risk, the supervisor requires the bank to ensure that there is a mechanism in place to mitigate a possible conflict of interest for managers with both risk management and risk-taking responsibilities.

AC1. The supervisor requires larger and more complex banks to have a dedicated unit(s) responsible for risk evaluation, monitoring, and control or mitigation for material risk areas...

10. The supervisor issues standards related to, in particular, credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk, interest rate risk in the banking book and operational risk.

No text.

9. The supervisor determines that banks have risk management functions covering all material risks with sufficient resources, independence, authority and access to the banks' Boards to perform their duties effectively. The supervisor determines that their duties are clearly segregated from risk-taking functions in the bank and that they report on risk exposures directly to the Board and senior management. The supervisor also determines that the risk management function is subject to regular review by the internal audit function.

10. The supervisor requires larger and more complex banks to have a dedicated risk management unit overseen by a Chief Risk Officer or equivalent function.

11. The supervisor issues standards related to, in particular, credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk, interest rate risk in the banking book and operational risk.

12. The supervisor requires banks to have appropriate contingency arrangements, as an integral part of their risk management process, to address risks that may materialise and actions to be taken in stress conditions (including those that will pose a serious risk to their viability). If warranted by its risk profile and systemic importance, the contingency arrangements include robust and credible recovery plans, which take into account the specific circumstances of the bank. The supervisor, working with resolution authorities as appropriate, assesses the adequacy of banks' contingency arrangements in the light of their risk profile and systemic importance (including reviewing any recovery plans) and their likely feasibility during periods of stress. The supervisor seeks improvements if deficiencies are identified.

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AC2. The supervisor requires banks to conduct rigorous, forward-looking stress testing that identifies possible events or changes in market conditions that could adversely impact the bank.

AC3, CP16. The supervisor requires stress tests to be based on reasonable worst case scenarios and to capture all material sources of risk, including a breakdown of critical assumptions. Senior management is required to consider these results when establishing and reviewing a bank's policies, processes and limits for interest rate risk.

13. The supervisor requires banks to have forward-looking stress testing programmes, commensurate with their risk profile and systemic importance, as an integral part of their risk management process. The supervisor regularly assesses a bank's stress testing programme and determines that it captures material sources of risk and adopts plausible adverse scenarios. The supervisor also determines that the bank integrates the results into its decision-making, risk management processes (including contingency arrangements) and the assessment of its capital and liquidity levels. Where appropriate, the scope of the supervisor's assessment includes the extent to which the stress testing programme:

- (a) promotes risk identification and control, on a bank-wide basis;
- (b) adopts suitably severe assumptions and seeks to address feedback effects and system-wide interaction between risks;
- (c) benefits from the active involvement of the Board and senior management; and
- (d) is appropriately documented and regularly maintained and updated.

The supervisor requires corrective action if material deficiencies are identified in a bank's stress testing programme or if the results of stress-tests are not adequately taken into consideration in the bank's decision-making process.

No text.

14. The supervisor assesses whether banks appropriately account for risks (including liquidity impacts) in their internal pricing, performance measurement and new product approval process for all significant business activities.

Additional criterion

3. The supervisor requires banks and banking groups to have in place appropriate policies and processes for assessing other material risks not directly addressed in the subsequent CPs, such as reputational and strategic risks.

Additional criterion

1. The supervisor requires banks to have appropriate policies and processes for assessing other material risks not directly addressed in the subsequent Principles, such as reputational and strategic risks.

Principle 6: Capital adequacy

Supervisors must set prudent and appropriate minimum capital adequacy requirements for banks that reflect the risks that the bank undertakes, and must define the components of capital, bearing in mind its ability to absorb

Principle 16: Capital adequacy⁵⁷

The supervisor sets prudent and appropriate capital adequacy requirements for banks that reflect the risks undertaken by, and presented by, a bank in the context of the markets and macroeconomic conditions in which it operates.

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losses. At least for internationally active banks, these requirements must not be less than those established in the applicable Basel requirement.¹⁵

(Reference documents: *International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards*, July 1988; and *International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards: a revised framework*, June 2004.)

15. The Basel Capital Accord was designed to apply only to internationally active banks, which must calculate and apply capital adequacy ratios on a consolidated basis, including subsidiaries undertaking banking and financial business. Jurisdictions adopting the new capital adequacy framework would apply such ratios on a fully consolidated basis to all internationally active banks and their holding companies; in addition, supervisors must test that banks are adequately capitalised on a standalone basis.

The supervisor defines the components of capital, bearing in mind their ability to absorb losses.

(Reference documents: *Revisions to the Basel II market risk framework (updated as of 31 December 2010)*, February 2011; *Minimum requirements to ensure loss absorbency at the point of non-viability*, January 2011; Consultative document on *Capitalisation of bank exposures to central counterparties*, December 2010 [**to be updated when finalised**]; *Sound practices for backtesting counterparty credit risk models*, December 2010; *Guidance for national authorities operating the countercyclical capital buffer*, December 2010; *Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems*, December 2010; *Guidelines for computing capital for incremental risk in the trading book*, July 2009; *Enhancements to the Basel II framework*, July 2009; *Range of practices and issues in economic capital frameworks*, March 2009; *International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards: a revised framework, comprehensive version*, June 2006; and *International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards*, July 1988.)

57. The Core Principles do not require a jurisdiction to comply with the capital adequacy regimes of Basel I, Basel II and/or Basel III although, at least for internationally active banks, capital requirements should not be less than the applicable Basel standard. The Committee does not consider implementation of the Basel-based framework a prerequisite for compliance with the Core Principles, and compliance with one of the regimes is only required of those jurisdictions which have declared that they have voluntarily implemented it.

Essential criteria

1. Laws or regulations require all banks to calculate and consistently maintain a minimum capital adequacy ratio. Laws, regulations or the supervisor define the components of capital, ensuring that emphasis is given to those elements of capital available to absorb losses.

Essential criteria

1. Laws, regulations or the supervisor require banks to calculate and consistently observe prescribed capital requirements, including thresholds by reference to which a bank might be subject to supervisory action. Laws, regulations or the supervisor define the qualifying components of capital, ensuring that emphasis is given to those elements of capital permanently available to absorb losses on a going concern basis.

2. At least for internationally active banks, the definition of capital, the method of calculation and the ratio required are not lower than those established in the applicable Basel requirement.

2. At least for internationally active banks⁵⁸, the definition of capital, the risk coverage, the method of calculation and thresholds for the prescribed requirements are not lower than those established in the applicable Basel standard.

58. The Basel Capital Accord was designed to apply to

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internationally active banks, which must calculate and apply capital adequacy ratios on a consolidated basis, including subsidiaries undertaking banking and financial business. Jurisdictions adopting the Basel II and Basel III capital adequacy frameworks would apply such ratios on a fully consolidated basis to all internationally active banks and their holding companies; in addition, supervisors must test that banks are adequately capitalised on a stand-alone basis.

3. The supervisor has the power to impose a specific capital charge and/or limits on all material risk exposures.

4. ...Both on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet risks are included.

3. The supervisor has the power to impose a specific capital charge and/or limits on all material risk exposures, if warranted, including in respect of risks which the supervisor considers not to have been adequately transferred or mitigated through transactions (eg securitisation transactions⁵⁹) entered into by the bank. Both on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet risks are included in the calculation of prescribed capital requirements.

59. Reference documents: *Enhancements to the Basel II framework*, July 2009 and: *International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards: a revised framework, comprehensive version*, June 2006.

4. The required capital ratio reflects the risk profile of individual banks...

5. Capital adequacy requirements take into account the conditions under which the banking system operates. Consequently, laws and regulations in a particular jurisdiction may set higher capital adequacy standards than the applicable Basel requirement.

AC5. The supervisor may require an individual bank or banking group to maintain capital above the minimum to ensure that individual banks or banking groups are operating with the appropriate level of capital.

4. The prescribed capital requirements reflect the risk profile and systemic importance of banks⁶⁰ in the context of the markets and macroeconomic conditions in which they operate and constrain the build-up of leverage in banks and the banking sector. Laws and regulations in a particular jurisdiction may set higher overall capital adequacy standards than the applicable Basel requirements.

60. In assessing the adequacy of a bank's capital levels in light of its risk profile, the supervisor critically focuses, among other things, on (a) the potential loss absorbency of the instruments included in the bank's capital base, (b) the appropriateness of risk weights as a proxy for the risk profile of its exposures, (c) the adequacy of provisions and reserves to cover loss expected on its exposures and (d) the quality of its risk management and controls. Consequently, capital requirements may vary from bank to bank to ensure that each bank is operating with the appropriate level of capital to support the risks it is running and the risks it poses.

7. Where the supervisor permits banks to use internal assessments of risk as inputs to the calculation of regulatory capital, such assessments must adhere to rigorous qualifying standards and be subject to the approval of the supervisor. If banks do not continue to meet these qualifying standards on an ongoing basis, the supervisor may revoke its approval of the internal assessments.

5. The use of banks' internal assessments of risk as inputs to the calculation of regulatory capital is approved by the supervisor. If the supervisor approves such use:

- (a) such assessments adhere to rigorous qualifying standards;
- (b) any cessation of such use, or any material modification of the bank's processes and models for producing such internal assessments, are subject to the approval of the supervisor;

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- (c) the supervisor has the capacity to evaluate a bank's internal assessment process in order to determine that the relevant qualifying standards are met and that the bank's internal assessments can be relied upon as a reasonable reflection of the risks undertaken;
- (d) the supervisor has the power to impose conditions on its approvals if the supervisor considers it prudent to do so; and
- (e) if a bank does not continue to meet the qualifying standards or the conditions imposed by the supervisor on an ongoing basis, the supervisor has the power to revoke its approval.

AC3. The supervisor has the power to require banks to adopt a forward-looking approach to capital management and set capital levels in anticipation of possible events or changes in market conditions that could have an adverse effect.

6. The supervisor has the power to require banks to adopt a forward-looking approach to capital management (including the conduct of appropriate stress testing).⁶¹ The supervisor has the power to require banks:
- (a) to set capital levels and manage available capital in anticipation of possible events or changes in market conditions that could have an adverse effect; and
 - (b) to have in place feasible contingency arrangements to raise capital or reduce exposures in times of stress, as appropriate in the light of the risk profile and systemic importance of the bank.

61. "Stress testing" comprises a range of activities from simpler sensitivity analysis to more complex scenario analyses and reverse stress testing.

Additional criteria

- 1. For non-internationally active banks, the definition of capital, the method of calculation and the capital required are broadly consistent with the principles of applicable Basel requirements relevant to internationally active banks.
- 2. For non-internationally active banks and their holding companies, capital adequacy ratios are calculated and applied in a manner generally consistent with the applicable Basel requirement, as set forth in the footnote to the Principle.

Additional criteria

- 1. For non-internationally active banks capital requirements, including the definition of capital, the risk coverage, the method of calculation, the scope of application and the capital required, are broadly consistent with the principles of the applicable Basel standard relevant to internationally active banks.

4. The supervisor requires adequate distribution of capital within different entities of a banking group according to the allocation of risks.

2. The supervisor requires adequate distribution of capital within different entities of a banking group according to the allocation of risks.⁶²

62. Please refer to Principle 12, Essential Criterion 7.

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Principle 8: Credit risk

Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have a credit risk management process that takes into account the risk profile of the institution, with prudent policies and processes to identify, measure, monitor and control credit risk (including counterparty risk). This would include the granting of loans and making of investments, the evaluation of the quality of such loans and investments, and the ongoing management of the loan and investment portfolios.¹⁹

(Reference documents: *Principles for the management of credit risk*, September 2000 and *Sound credit risk assessment and valuation for loans*, June 2006.)

19. Principle 8 covers the evaluation of assets in greater detail; Principle 9 covers the management of problem assets.

Principle 17: Credit risk⁶³

The supervisor determines that banks have an adequate credit risk management process that takes into account their risk appetite, risk profile and market and macroeconomic conditions. This includes prudent policies and processes to identify, measure, evaluate, monitor, report and control or mitigate credit risk⁶⁴ (including counterparty credit risk⁶⁵) on a timely basis. The full credit lifecycle is covered including credit underwriting, credit evaluation, and the ongoing management of the bank's loan and investment portfolios.

(Reference documents: *Sound practices for backtesting counterparty credit risk models*, December 2010; *FSB Report on Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings*, October 2010; *Enhancements to the Basel II framework*, July 2009; *Sound credit risk assessment and valuation for loans*, June 2006; and *Principles for the management of credit risk*, September 2000.)

63. Principle 17 covers the evaluation of assets in greater detail; Principle 18 covers the management of problem assets.

64. Credit may result from the following activities: on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet exposures, including loans and advances, investments, inter-bank lending, derivative transactions, securities financing transactions and trading activities.

65. Counterparty credit risk includes credit risk exposures arising from OTC derivative and other financial instruments.

Essential criteria

No text.

Essential criteria

1. Laws, regulations or the supervisor require banks to have appropriate credit risk management processes that provide a comprehensive bank-wide view of credit risk exposure. The supervisor determines that the processes are consistent with the risk appetite, risk profile, systemic importance and capital strength of the bank, take into account market and macroeconomic conditions and result in prudent standards of credit underwriting, evaluation, administration and monitoring.

1. The supervisor determines, and periodically confirms, that a bank's Board approves, and periodically reviews, the credit risk management strategy and significant policies and processes for assuming,²⁰ identifying, measuring, controlling and reporting on credit risk (including counterparty risk). The supervisor also

2. The supervisor determines that a bank's Board approves, and regularly reviews, the credit risk management strategy and significant policies and processes for assuming⁶⁶, identifying, measuring, evaluating, monitoring, reporting and controlling or mitigating credit risk (including counterparty credit risk and associated potential future

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determines, and periodically confirms, that senior management implements the credit risk strategy approved by the Board and develops the aforementioned policies and processes.

20. "Assuming" includes the assumption of all types of risk that give rise to credit risk, including credit risk or counterparty risk associated with various financial instruments.

AC2. The supervisor determines that banks have in place policies and processes to identify, measure, monitor and control counterparty credit risk exposure, including potential future exposure sufficient to capture the material risks inherent in individual products or transactions. These processes should be commensurate with the size or complexity of the individual bank.

exposure) and that these are consistent with the risk appetite set by the Board. The supervisor also determines that senior management implements the credit risk strategy approved by the Board and develops the aforementioned policies and processes.

66. "Assuming" includes the assumption of all types of risk that give rise to credit risk, including credit risk or counterparty risk associated with various financial instruments.

2. The supervisor requires, and periodically confirms, that such policies and processes establish an appropriate and properly controlled credit risk environment, including:

- a well documented strategy and sound policies and processes for assuming credit risk;
- well defined criteria and policies and processes for approving new exposures as well as renewing and refinancing existing exposures, identifying the appropriate approval authority for the size and complexity of the exposures;
- effective credit administration policies and processes, including continued analysis of a borrower's ability and willingness to repay under the terms of the debt, monitoring of documentation, legal covenants, contractual requirements and collateral, and a classification system that is consistent with the nature, size and complexity of the bank's activities or, at the least, with the asset grading system prescribed by the supervisor;
- comprehensive policies and processes for reporting exposures on an ongoing basis;
- comprehensive policies and processes for identifying problem assets; and
- prudent lending controls and limits, including policies and processes for monitoring exposures in relation to limits, approvals and exceptions to limits.

3. The supervisor requires, and regularly determines, that such policies and processes establish an appropriate and properly controlled credit risk environment, including:

- (a) a well documented and effectively implemented strategy and sound policies and processes for assuming credit risk, without undue reliance on external credit assessments;
- (b) well defined criteria and policies and processes for approving new exposures (including prudent underwriting standards) as well as for renewing and refinancing existing exposures, and identifying the appropriate approval authority for the size and complexity of the exposures;
- (c) effective credit administration policies and processes, including continued analysis of a borrower's ability and willingness to repay under the terms of the debt (including review of the performance of underlying assets in the case of securitisation exposures); monitoring of documentation, legal covenants, contractual requirements, collateral and other forms of credit risk mitigation; and an appropriate asset grading or classification system;
- (d) effective information systems for accurate and timely identification, aggregation and reporting of credit risk exposure to the bank's Board and senior management on an ongoing basis;
- (e) prudent and appropriate credit limits, consistent with the bank's risk appetite, risk profile and capital strength, which are understood by, and regularly communicated to, relevant staff;
- (f) exception tracking and reporting processes which ensure prompt action at the appropriate

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	<p>level of the bank's senior management or Board where necessary; and</p> <p>(g) effective controls (including in respect of the quality, reliability and relevancy of data and in respect of validation procedures) around the use of models to identify and measure credit risk and set limits.</p>
<p>AC3. The supervisor determines that banks have policies and processes to monitor the total indebtedness of entities to which they extend credit.</p>	<p>4. The supervisor determines that banks have policies and processes to monitor the total indebtedness of entities to which they extend credit and any risk factors that may result in default including significant unhedged foreign exchange risk.</p>
<p>3. The supervisor requires, and periodically confirms, that banks make credit decisions free of conflicts of interest and on an arm's length basis.</p>	<p>5. The supervisor requires that banks make credit decisions free of conflicts of interest and on an arm's length basis.</p>
<p>AC1. The supervisor requires that the credit policy prescribes that major credit risk exposures exceeding a certain amount or percentage of the bank's capital are to be decided by the bank's senior management. The same applies to credit risk exposures that are especially risky or otherwise not in line with the mainstream of the bank's activities.</p>	<p>6. The supervisor requires that the credit policy prescribes that major credit risk exposures exceeding a certain amount or percentage of the bank's capital are to be decided by the bank's senior management. The same applies to credit risk exposures that are especially risky or otherwise not in line with the mainstream of the bank's activities.</p>
<p>4. The supervisor has full access to information in the credit and investment portfolios and to the bank officers involved in assuming, managing, controlling and reporting on credit risk.</p>	<p>7. The supervisor has full access to information in the credit and investment portfolios and to the bank officers involved in assuming, managing, controlling and reporting on credit risk.</p>
<p>No text.</p>	<p>8. The supervisor requires banks to include their credit risk exposures into their stress testing programmes for risk management purposes.</p>
<p>Principle 9: Problem assets, provisions and reserves</p> <p>Supervisors must be satisfied that banks establish and adhere to adequate policies and processes for managing problem assets and evaluating the adequacy of provisions and reserves.²¹</p> <p>(Reference documents: <i>Principles for the management of credit risk</i>, September 2000 and <i>Sound credit risk assessment and valuation for loans</i>, June 2006.)</p>	<p>Principle 18: Problem assets, provisions and reserves⁶⁷</p> <p>The supervisor determines that banks have adequate policies and processes for the early identification and management of problem assets, and the maintenance of adequate provisions and reserves.⁶⁸</p> <p>(Reference documents: <i>Sound credit risk assessment and valuation for loans</i>, June 2006 and <i>Principles for the management of credit risk</i>, September 2000.)</p>

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<p>21. Principle 8 covers the evaluation of assets in greater detail; Principle 9 covers the management of problem assets.</p>	<p>67. Principle 17 covers the evaluation of assets in greater detail; Principle 18 covers the management of problem assets.</p> <p>68. Reserves for the purposes of this Principle are "below the line" non-distributable appropriations of profit required by a supervisor in addition to provisions ("above the line" charges to profit).</p>
<p>Essential criteria</p>	<p>Essential criteria</p>
<p>1. Laws, regulations or the supervisor require banks to formulate specific policies and processes for identifying and managing problem assets. In addition, laws, regulations or the supervisor require periodic review by banks of their problem assets (at an individual level or at a portfolio level for credits with homogenous characteristics) and asset classification, provisioning and write-offs.</p>	<p>1. Laws, regulations or the supervisor require banks to formulate policies and processes for identifying and managing problem assets. In addition, laws, regulations or the supervisor require regular review by banks of their problem assets (at an individual level or at a portfolio level for credits with homogenous characteristics) and asset classification, provisioning and write-offs.</p>
<p>2. The supervisor confirms the adequacy of the classification and provisioning policies and processes of a bank and their implementation; the reviews supporting this opinion may be conducted by external experts.²²</p> <p>22. External experts may be external auditors or other qualified external parties, commissioned with an appropriate mandate, and subject to appropriate confidentiality restrictions. Although supervisors may use such external reviews, it is the supervisor that must be satisfied with a bank's classification and provisioning policies and processes.</p>	<p>2. The supervisor determines the adequacy of a bank's policies and processes for grading and classifying its assets and establishing appropriate and robust provisioning levels. The reviews supporting the supervisor's opinion may be conducted by external experts, with the supervisor reviewing the work of the external experts to determine as to the adequacy of the bank's policies and processes.</p>
<p>3. The system for classification and provisioning takes into account off-balance sheet exposures.²³</p> <p>23. It is recognised that there are two different types of off-balance sheet exposures: those that can be unilaterally cancelled by the bank (based on contractual arrangements and therefore may not be subject to provisioning), and those that cannot be unilaterally cancelled.</p>	<p>3. The supervisor determines that the bank's system for classification and provisioning takes into account off-balance sheet exposures.⁶⁹</p> <p>69. It is recognised that there are two different types of off-balance sheet exposures: those that can be unilaterally cancelled by the bank (based on contractual arrangements and therefore may not be subject to provisioning), and those that cannot be unilaterally cancelled.</p>
<p>4. The supervisor determines that banks have appropriate policies and processes to ensure that provisions and write-offs reflect realistic repayment and recovery expectations.</p>	<p>4. The supervisor determines that banks have appropriate policies and processes to ensure that provisions and write-offs are timely and reflect realistic repayment and recovery expectations, taking into account market and macroeconomic conditions.</p>
<p>5. The supervisor determines that banks have appropriate policies and processes, and organisational resources for the early identification of deteriorating assets, for ongoing oversight of problem assets, and for collecting on</p>	<p>5. The supervisor determines that banks have appropriate policies and processes, and organisational resources for the early identification of deteriorating assets, for ongoing oversight of problem assets, and for collecting on</p>

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<p>past due obligations.</p> <p>AC1. Loans are required to be classified when payments are contractually a minimum number of days in arrears (eg 30, 60, 90 days). Refinancing of loans that would otherwise fall into arrears does not lead to improved classification for such loans.</p>	<p>past due obligations. For portfolios with uniform characteristics, loans are classified when payments are contractually in arrears for a minimum number of days (eg 30, 60, 90 days). The supervisor tests banks' treatment of assets with a view to identifying any material circumvention of the classification and provisioning standards (eg rescheduling, refinancing or reclassification of loans).</p>
<p>6. The supervisor is informed on a periodic basis, and in relevant detail, or has access to information concerning the classification of credits and assets and provisioning.</p>	<p>6. The supervisor obtains information on a regular basis, and in relevant detail, or has full access to information concerning the classification of credits and assets and provisioning. The supervisor requires banks to have adequate documentation to support their classification and provisioning levels.</p>
<p>7. The supervisor has the power to require a bank to increase its levels of provisions and reserves and/or overall financial strength if it deems the level of problem assets to be of concern.</p> <p>8. The supervisor assesses whether the classification of the credits and assets and the provisioning is adequate for prudential purposes. If provisions are deemed to be inadequate, the supervisor has the power to require additional provisions or to impose other remedial measures.</p>	<p>7. The supervisor assesses whether the classification of the credits and assets and the provisioning is adequate for prudential purposes. If asset classifications are inaccurate or provisions are deemed to be inadequate for prudential purposes (eg if the supervisor considers existing or anticipated deterioration in asset quality to be of concern or if the provisions do not fully reflect losses expected to be incurred), the supervisor has the power to require the bank to adjust its classifications of individual assets, increase its levels of provisioning, reserves or capital and, if necessary, impose other remedial measures.</p>
<p>9. The supervisor requires banks to have appropriate mechanisms in place for periodically assessing the value of risk mitigants, including guarantees and collateral. The valuation of collateral is required to reflect the net realisable value.</p>	<p>8. The supervisor requires banks to have appropriate mechanisms in place for regularly assessing the value of risk mitigants, including guarantees, credit derivatives and collateral. The valuation of collateral reflects the net realisable value, taking into account prevailing market conditions.</p>
<p>10. Laws, regulations or the supervisor establish criteria for assets to be identified as impaired, eg loans are identified as impaired when there is reason to believe that all amounts due (including principal and interest) will not be collected in accordance with the contractual terms of the loan agreement.</p>	<p>9. Laws, regulations or the supervisor establish criteria for assets to be:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) identified as impaired (eg loans are identified as impaired when there is reason to believe that all amounts due (including principal and interest) will not be collected in accordance with the contractual terms of the loan agreement); and (b) reclassified as performing (eg loans are reclassified as performing when all arrears have been cleared and the loan has been brought fully current, repayments have been

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	made in a timely manner over a continuous repayment period and continued collection, in accordance with the contractual terms, is expected).
<p>11. The supervisor determines that the Board receives timely and appropriate information on the condition of the bank's asset portfolio, including classification of credits, the level of provisioning and major problem assets.</p>	<p>10. The supervisor determines that the bank's Board obtains timely and appropriate information on the condition of the bank's asset portfolio, including classification of credits and assets, the level of provisions and reserves and major problem assets. The information includes, at the minimum, summary results of the latest loan review process, comparative trends in the overall quality of problem assets, and measurements of existing or anticipated deterioration in asset quality and losses expected to be incurred.</p>
<p>12. The supervisor requires that valuation, classification and provisioning for large exposures are conducted on an individual item basis.</p>	<p>11. The supervisor requires that valuation, classification and provisioning at least for significant exposures are conducted on an individual item basis. For this purpose, supervisors require banks to set an appropriate threshold for the purpose of identifying significant exposures and to regularly review the level of the threshold.</p>
<p>No text.</p>	<p>12. The supervisor regularly assesses any trends and concentrations in risk and risk build-up across the banking sector in relation to banks' problem assets and takes into account any observed concentration in the risk mitigation strategies adopted by banks and the potential effect on the efficacy of the mitigant in reducing loss. The supervisor considers the adequacy of provisions and reserves at bank and banking system level in the light of this assessment.</p>
<p>Principle 10: Large exposure limits</p> <p>Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have policies and processes that enable management to identify and manage concentrations within the portfolio, and supervisors must set prudential limits to restrict bank exposures to single counterparties or groups of connected counterparties.²⁴</p> <p>(Reference documents: <i>Measuring and controlling large credit exposures</i>, January 1991; and <i>Principles for managing credit risk</i>, September 2000.)</p> <p>24. Connected counterparties may include natural persons as</p>	<p>Principle 19: Concentration risk and large exposure limits</p> <p>The supervisor determines that banks have adequate policies and processes to identify, measure, evaluate, monitor, report and control or mitigate concentrations of risk on a timely basis. Supervisors set prudential limits to restrict bank exposures to single counterparties or groups of connected counterparties.⁷⁰</p> <p>(Reference documents: <i>Joint Forum Cross-sectoral review of group-wide identification and management of risk concentrations</i>, April 2008; <i>Sound credit risk assessment and valuation for loans</i>, June 2006; <i>Principles for managing credit</i></p>

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well as a group of companies related financially or by common ownership, management or any combination thereof.

risk, September 2000; and *Measuring and controlling large credit exposures*, January 1991.)

70. Connected counterparties may include natural persons as well as a group of companies related financially or by common ownership, management or any combination thereof.

Essential criteria

No text.

Essential criteria

1. Laws, regulations or the supervisor require banks to have policies and processes that provide a comprehensive bank-wide view of significant sources of concentration risk.⁷¹ Exposures arising from off-balance sheet as well as on-balance sheet items and from contingent liabilities are captured.

71. This includes credit concentrations through exposure to: single counterparties and groups of connected counterparties both direct and indirect (such as through exposure to collateral or to credit protection provided by a single counterparty), counterparties in the same industry, economic sector or geographic region and counterparties whose financial performance is dependent on the same activity or commodity as well as off-balance sheet exposures (including guarantees and other commitments) and also market and other risk concentrations where a bank is overly exposed to particular asset-classes; products; collateral; and currencies.

3. The supervisor determines that a bank's management information systems identify and aggregate on a timely basis exposure to individual counterparties and groups of connected counterparties.

2. The supervisor determines that a bank's information systems identify and aggregate on a timely basis, and facilitate active management of, exposures creating risk concentrations and large exposures⁷² to single counterparties or groups of connected counterparties.

72. The measure of credit exposure, in the context of large exposures to single counterparties and groups of connected counterparties, should reflect the maximum possible loss from their failure (ie it should encompass actual claims and potential claims as well as contingent liabilities). The risk weighting concept adopted in the Basel capital standards should not be used in measuring credit exposure for this purpose as the relevant risk weights were devised as a measure of credit risk on a basket basis and their use for measuring credit concentrations could significantly underestimate potential losses (see "*Measuring and controlling large credit exposures*, January 1991).

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<p>4. The supervisor confirms that a bank's risk management policies and processes establish thresholds for acceptable concentrations of credit and require that all material concentrations be reviewed and reported periodically to the Board.</p>	<p>3. The supervisor determines that a bank's risk management policies and processes establish thresholds for acceptable concentrations of risk, reflecting the bank's risk appetite, risk profile and capital strength, which are understood by, and regularly communicated to, relevant staff. The supervisor also determines that the bank's policies and processes require all material concentrations to be regularly reviewed and reported to the bank's Board.</p>
<p>5. The supervisor regularly obtains information that enables concentrations within a bank's portfolio, including sectoral, geographical and currency exposures, to be reviewed...</p>	<p>4. The supervisor regularly obtains information that enables concentrations within a bank's portfolio, including sectoral, geographical and currency exposures, to be reviewed.</p>
<p>1. Laws or regulations explicitly define, or the supervisor has the power to define, a "group of connected counterparties" to reflect actual risk exposure. The supervisor may exercise discretion in applying this definition on a case by case basis.</p>	<p>5. In respect of credit exposure to single counterparties or groups of connected counterparties, laws or regulations explicitly define, or the supervisor has the power to define, a "group of connected counterparties" to reflect actual risk exposure. The supervisor may exercise discretion in applying this definition on a case by case basis.</p>
<p>2. Laws, regulations or the supervisor set prudent limits on large exposures to a single counterparty or a group of connected counterparties. "Exposures" include all claims and transactions, on-balance sheet as well as off-balance sheet. The supervisor confirms that senior management monitors these limits and that they are not exceeded on a solo or consolidated basis.</p>	<p>6. Laws, regulations or the supervisor set prudent limits on large credit exposures to a single counterparty or a group of connected counterparties. "Exposures" for this purpose include all claims and transactions, on-balance sheet as well as off-balance sheet. The supervisor determines that senior management monitors these limits and that they are not exceeded on a solo or consolidated basis.</p>
<p>No text</p>	<p>7. The supervisor requires banks to include the impact of significant risk concentrations into their stress testing programmes for risk management purposes.</p>
<p>Additional criterion</p> <p>1. Banks are required to adhere to the following definitions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ten per cent or more of a bank's capital is defined as a large exposure; and • twenty-five per cent of a bank's capital is the limit for an individual large exposure to a private sector non-bank counterparty or a group of connected counterparties. <p>Minor deviations from these limits may be acceptable, especially if explicitly temporary or</p>	<p>Additional criterion</p> <p>1. In respect of credit exposure to single counterparties or groups of connected counterparties, banks are required to adhere to the following definitions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) ten per cent or more of a bank's capital is defined as a large exposure; and (b) twenty-five per cent of a bank's capital is the limit for an individual large exposure to a private sector non-bank counterparty or a group of connected counterparties.

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<p>related to very small or specialised banks.</p>	<p>Minor deviations from these limits may be acceptable, especially if explicitly temporary or related to very small or specialised banks.</p>
<p>Principle 11: Exposures to related parties</p> <p>In order to prevent abuses arising from exposures (both on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet) to related parties²⁵ and to address conflict of interest, supervisors must have in place requirements that banks extend exposures to related companies and individuals on an arm's length basis; these exposures are effectively monitored; appropriate steps are taken to control or mitigate the risks; and write-offs of such exposures are made according to standard policies and processes.</p> <p>(Reference document: <i>Principles for the management of credit risk</i>, September 2000.)</p> <p>25. Related parties can include, inter alia, the bank's subsidiaries and affiliates, and any party that the bank exerts control over or that exerts control over the bank. It may also include the bank's major shareholders, directors, senior management and key staff, their direct and related interests, and their close family members as well as corresponding persons in affiliated companies.</p>	<p>Principle 20: Transactions with related parties</p> <p>In order to prevent abuses arising in transactions with related parties⁷³ and to address the risk of conflict of interest, the supervisor requires banks to enter into any transactions with related parties on an arm's length basis; to monitor these transactions; to take appropriate steps to control or mitigate the risks; and to write off exposures to related parties in accordance with standard policies and processes.</p> <p>(Reference document: <i>Principles for the management of credit risk</i>, September 2000.)</p> <p>73. (i) Related parties can include, among other things, the bank's subsidiaries, affiliates, and any party (including their subsidiaries, affiliates and special purpose entities) that the bank exerts control over or that exerts control over the bank, the bank's major shareholders, Board members, senior management and key staff, their direct and related interests, and their close family members as well as corresponding persons in affiliated companies. (ii) Related party transactions include on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet credit exposures and claims, as well as, dealings such as service contracts, asset purchases and sales, construction contracts, lease agreements, derivative transactions, borrowings, and write-offs. The term transaction should be interpreted broadly to incorporate not only transactions that are entered into with related parties but also situations in which an unrelated party (with whom a bank has an existing exposure) subsequently becomes a related party.</p>
<p>Essential criteria</p> <p>1. Laws or regulations explicitly provide, or the supervisor has the power to provide, a comprehensive definition of "related parties". This should consider the parties identified in the footnote to the Principle. The supervisor may exercise discretion in applying this definition on a case by case basis.</p> <p>2. Laws, regulations or the supervisor require that exposures to related parties may not be granted on more favourable terms (ie for credit assessment, tenor, interest rates, amortisation schedules, requirement for collateral) than corresponding²⁶ exposures to non-related counterparties.</p> <p>26. An exception may be appropriate for beneficial terms that are part of overall remuneration packages (eg staff receiving credit at favourable rates).</p>	<p>Essential criteria</p> <p>1. Laws or regulations provide, or the supervisor has the power to prescribe, a comprehensive definition of "related parties". This considers the parties identified in the footnote to the Principle. The supervisor may exercise discretion in applying this definition on a case by case basis.</p> <p>2. Laws, regulations or the supervisor require that transactions with related parties are not undertaken on more favourable terms (eg in credit assessment, tenor, interest rates, fees, amortisation schedules, requirement for collateral) than corresponding transactions with non-related counterparties.⁷⁴</p> <p>74. Loans provided at favourable terms and that are part of overall remuneration packages for staff might also be extended to senior management and the Board members.</p>

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<p>3. The supervisor requires that transactions with related parties and the write-off of related-party exposures exceeding specified amounts or otherwise posing special risks are subject to prior approval by the bank's Board. The supervisor requires that Board members with conflicts of interest are excluded from the approval process.</p>	<p>3. The supervisor requires that transactions with related parties and the write-off of related-party exposures exceeding specified amounts or otherwise posing special risks are subject to prior approval by the bank's Board. The supervisor requires that Board members with conflicts of interest are excluded from the approval process of granting and managing related party transactions.</p>
<p>4. The supervisor requires that banks have policies and processes in place to prevent persons benefiting from the exposure and/or persons related to such a person from being part of the process of granting and managing the exposure.</p>	<p>4. The supervisor determines that banks have policies and processes to prevent persons benefiting from the transaction and/or persons related to such a person from being part of the process of granting and managing the transaction.</p>
<p>5. Laws or regulations set, or the supervisor has the power to set on a general or case by case basis, limits for exposures to related parties, to deduct such exposures from capital when assessing capital adequacy, or to require collateralisation of such exposures. When limits are set on aggregate exposures to related parties those are at least as strict as those for single counterparties, or groups of connected counterparties.</p>	<p>5. Laws or regulations set, or the supervisor has the power to set on a general or case by case basis, limits for exposures to related parties, to deduct such exposures from capital when assessing capital adequacy, or to require collateralisation of such exposures. When limits are set on aggregate exposures to related parties, those are at least as strict as those for single counterparties or groups of connected counterparties⁷⁵.</p> <p>75. The concept of connected parties is also applicable to related parties.</p>
<p>6. The supervisor requires banks to have policies and processes to identify individual exposures to related parties as well as the total amount of such exposures, and to monitor and report on them through an independent credit review process. The supervisor confirms that exceptions to policies, processes and limits are reported to the appropriate level of senior management and, if necessary, to the Board, for timely action. The supervisor also confirms that senior management monitors related party transactions on an ongoing basis, and that the Board also provides oversight of these transactions.</p>	<p>6. The supervisor determines that banks have policies and processes to identify individual exposures to and transactions with related parties as well as the total amount of exposures, and to monitor and report on them through an independent credit review or audit process. The supervisor determines that exceptions to policies, processes and limits are reported to the appropriate level of the bank's senior management and, if necessary, to the Board, for timely action. The supervisor also determines that senior management monitors related party transactions on an ongoing basis, and that the Board also provides oversight of these transactions.</p>
<p>7. The supervisor obtains and reviews information on aggregate exposures to related parties.</p>	<p>7. The supervisor obtains and reviews information on aggregate exposures to related parties.</p>

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Principle 12: Country and transfer risks

Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have adequate policies and processes for identifying, measuring, monitoring and controlling country risk and transfer risk in their international lending and investment activities, and for maintaining adequate provisions and reserves against such risks.

(Reference document: *Management of banks' international lending*, March 1982.)

Principle 21: Country and transfer risks

The supervisor determines that banks have adequate policies and processes to identify, measure, evaluate, monitor, report and control or mitigate country risk⁷⁶ and transfer risk⁷⁷ in their international lending and investment activities on a timely basis.

(Reference document: *Management of banks' international lending*, March 1982.)

76. Country risk is the risk of exposure to loss caused by events in a foreign country. The concept is broader than sovereign risk as all forms of lending or investment activity whether to/with individuals, corporates, banks or governments are covered.

77. Transfer risk is the risk that a borrower will not be able to convert local currency into foreign exchange and so will be unable to make debt service payments in foreign currency. The risk normally arises from exchange restrictions imposed by the government in the borrower's country. (Reference document: *External Debt Statistics – Guide for compilers and users*, 2003.)

Essential criteria

1. The supervisor determines that a bank's policies and processes give due regard to the identification, measurement, monitoring and control of country risk and transfer risk. Exposures are identified and monitored on an individual country basis (in addition to the end-borrower/end-counterparty basis). Banks are required to monitor and evaluate developments in country risk and in transfer risk and apply appropriate countermeasures.

Essential criteria

1. The supervisor determines that a bank's policies and processes give due regard to the identification, measurement, evaluation, monitoring, reporting and control or mitigation of country risk and transfer risk. The supervisor also determines that the processes are consistent with the risk profile, systemic importance and risk appetite of the bank, take into account market and macroeconomic conditions and provide a comprehensive bank-wide view of country and transfer risk exposure. Exposures are identified, monitored and managed on a regional and an individual country basis (in addition to the end-borrower/end-counterparty basis). Banks are required to monitor and evaluate developments in country risk and in transfer risk and apply appropriate countermeasures.

2. The supervisor confirms that banks have information systems, risk management systems and internal control systems that accurately monitor and report country exposures and ensure adherence to established country exposure limits.

2. The supervisor determines that banks have information systems, risk management systems and internal control systems that accurately aggregate, monitor and report country exposures on a timely basis; and ensure adherence to established country exposure limits.

3. There is supervisory oversight of the setting of appropriate provisions against country risk and transfer risk. There are different international practices which are all acceptable as long as they

3. There is supervisory oversight of the setting of appropriate provisions against country risk and transfer risk. There are different international practices which are all acceptable as long as they

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lead to risk-based results. These include:

- The supervisor (or some other official authority) decides on appropriate minimum provisioning by setting fixed percentages for exposures to each country.
- The supervisor (or some other official authority) sets percentage ranges for each country, and the banks may decide, within these ranges, which provisioning to apply for the individual exposures.
- The bank itself (or some other body such as the national bankers' association) sets percentages or guidelines or even decides for each individual loan on the appropriate provisioning. The provisioning will then be judged by the external auditor and/or by the supervisor.

lead to risk-based results. These include:

- (a) The supervisor (or some other official authority) decides on appropriate minimum provisioning by regularly setting fixed percentages for exposures to each country taking into account prevailing conditions. The supervisor reviews minimum provisioning levels where appropriate.
- (b) The supervisor (or some other official authority) regularly sets percentage ranges for each country, taking into account prevailing conditions and the banks may decide, within these ranges, which provisioning to apply for the individual exposures. The supervisor reviews percentage ranges for provisioning purposes where appropriate.
- (c) The bank itself (or some other body such as the national bankers association) sets percentages or guidelines or even decides for each individual loan on the appropriate provisioning. The adequacy of the provisioning will then be judged by the external auditor and/or by the supervisor.

4. The supervisor obtains and reviews sufficient information on a timely basis on the country risk and transfer risk of individual banks.

4. The supervisor regularly obtains and reviews sufficient information on a timely basis on the country risk and transfer risk of banks. The supervisor also has the power to obtain additional information, as needed (eg in crisis situations).

Principle 13: Market risk

Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have in place policies and processes that accurately identify, measure, monitor and control market risks; supervisors should have powers to impose specific limits and/or a specific capital charge on market risk exposures, if warranted.

(Reference document: *Amendment to the Capital Accord to incorporate market risks*, January 1996.)

Principle 22: Market risk

The supervisor determines that banks have an adequate market risk management process that takes into account their risk appetite, risk profile, and market and macroeconomic conditions and the risk of a significant deterioration in market liquidity. This includes prudent policies and processes to identify, measure, evaluate, monitor, report and control or mitigate market risks on a timely basis.

(Reference documents: *Revisions to the Basel II market risk framework (updated as of 31 December 2010)*, February 2011; *Interpretive issues with respect to the revisions to the market risk framework*, February 2011; *Guidelines for computing capital for incremental risk in the trading book*, July 2009; *Supervisory guidance for assessing banks' financial instrument fair value practices*, April 2009; and *Amendment to the Capital Accord to incorporate market risks*, January 2005.)

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<p>Essential criteria</p> <p>1 The supervisor determines that a bank has suitable policies and processes that clearly articulate roles and responsibilities related to the identification, measuring, monitoring and control of market risk...</p>	<p>Essential criteria</p> <p>1. Laws, regulations or the supervisor require banks to have appropriate market risk management processes that provide a comprehensive bank-wide view of market risk exposure. The supervisor determines that these processes are consistent with the risk appetite, risk profile, systemic importance and capital strength of the bank; take into account market and macroeconomic conditions and the risk of a significant deterioration in market liquidity, and clearly articulate the roles and responsibilities for identification, measuring, monitoring and control of market risk.</p>
<p>1. ...The supervisor is satisfied that policies and processes are adhered to in practice and are subject to appropriate Board and senior management oversight.</p>	<p>2. The supervisor determines that banks' strategies, policies and processes for the management of market risk have been approved by the banks' Boards and that the Boards oversee management in a way that ensures that these policies and processes are implemented effectively and fully integrated into the banks' overall risk management process.</p>
<p>2. The supervisor determines that the bank has set market risk limits that are commensurate with the institution's size and complexity and that reflect all material market risks. Limits should be approved by the Board or senior management. The supervisor confirms that any limits (either internal or imposed by the supervisor) are adhered to.</p>	<p>3. The supervisor determines that the bank's policies and processes establish an appropriate and properly controlled market risk environment including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) effective information systems for accurate and timely identification, aggregation, monitoring and reporting of market risk exposure to the bank's Board and senior management; (b) appropriate market risk limits consistent with the bank's risk appetite, risk profile and capital strength, and with management's ability to manage market risk and which are understood by, and regularly communicated to, relevant staff; (c) exception tracking and reporting processes which ensure prompt action at the appropriate level of the bank's senior management or Board, where necessary; (d) effective controls around the use of models to identify and measure market risk, and set limits; and (e) sound policies and processes for allocation of exposures to the trading book.
<p>3. The supervisor is satisfied that there are systems and controls in place to ensure that all transactions are captured on a timely basis, and that the banks' marked to market positions are</p>	<p>4. The supervisor determines that there are systems and controls to ensure that banks' marked to market positions are revalued frequently. The supervisor also determines that</p>

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<p>revalued frequently, using reliable and prudent market data (or, in the absence of market prices, internal or industry-accepted models). The supervisor requires banks to establish and maintain policies and processes for considering valuation adjustments/reserves for positions that otherwise cannot be prudently valued, including concentrated, less liquid, and stale positions.</p> <p>AC1. The supervisor requires that market data used to value trading book positions are verified by a function independent of the lines of business. To the extent that the bank relies on modelling for the purposes of valuation, the bank is required to ensure that the model is independently tested.</p>	<p>all transactions are captured on a timely basis and that the valuation process uses consistent and prudent practices, and reliable market data verified by a function independent of the relevant risk-taking business units (or, in the absence of market prices, internal or industry-accepted models). To the extent that the bank relies on modelling for the purposes of valuation, the bank is required to ensure that the model is validated by a function independent of the relevant risk-taking businesses units. The supervisor requires banks to establish and maintain policies and processes for considering valuation adjustments/reserves for positions that otherwise cannot be prudently valued, including concentrated, less liquid, and stale positions.</p>
<p>No text.</p>	<p>5. The supervisor determines that banks hold appropriate levels of capital and/or reserves against unexpected losses in the event of a significant change in marked-to-market valuations.</p>
<p>4. The supervisor determines that banks perform scenario analysis, stress testing and contingency planning, as appropriate, and periodic validation or testing of the systems used to measure market risk. The supervisor confirms that the approaches are integrated into risk management policies and processes, and results are taken into account in the bank's risk-taking strategy.</p>	<p>6. The supervisor requires banks to include market risk exposure into their stress testing programmes for risk management purposes.</p>
<p>Principle 16: Interest rate risk in the banking book</p> <p>Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have effective systems in place to identify, measure, monitor and control interest rate risk in the banking book, including a well defined strategy that has been approved by the Board and implemented by senior management; these should be appropriate to the size and complexity of such risk.</p> <p>(Reference document: <i>Principles for the management and supervision of interest rate risk</i>, July 2004.)</p>	<p>Principle 23: Interest rate risk in the banking book</p> <p>The supervisor determines that banks have adequate systems to identify, measure, evaluate, monitor, report and control or mitigate interest rate⁷⁸ risk in the banking book on a timely basis. These systems take into account the bank's risk appetite, risk profile and market and macroeconomic conditions.</p> <p>(Reference document: <i>Principles for the management and supervision of interest rate risk</i>, July 2004.)</p> <p>78. Wherever "interest rate risk" is used in this Principle the term refers to interest rate risk in the banking book. Interest rate risk in the trading book is covered under Principle 22.</p>
<p>Essential criteria</p> <p>No text.</p>	<p>Essential criteria</p> <p>1. Laws, regulations or the supervisor require</p>

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banks to have an appropriate interest rate risk strategy and interest rate risk management framework that provides a comprehensive bank-wide view of interest rate risk. This includes policies and processes to identify, measure, evaluate, monitor, report and control or mitigate material sources of interest rate risk. The supervisor determines that the bank's strategy, policies and processes are consistent with the risk appetite, risk profile and systemic importance of the bank, take into account market and macroeconomic conditions, and are regularly reviewed and appropriately adjusted, where necessary, with the bank's changing risk profile and market developments.

1. The supervisor determines that a bank's Board approves, and periodically reviews, the interest rate risk strategy and policies and processes for the identification, measuring, monitoring and control of interest rate risk. The supervisor also determines that management ensures that the interest rate risk strategy, policies and processes are developed and implemented.

2. The supervisor determines that a bank's strategy, policies and processes for the management of interest rate risk have been approved, and are regularly reviewed, by the bank's Board. The supervisor also determines that senior management ensures that the strategy, policies and processes are developed and implemented effectively.

2. The supervisor determines that banks have in place comprehensive and appropriate interest rate risk measurement systems and that any models and assumptions are validated on a regular basis. It confirms that banks' limits reflect the risk strategy of the institution and are understood by and regularly communicated to relevant staff. The supervisor also confirms that exceptions to established policies, processes and limits should receive the prompt attention of senior management, and the Board where necessary.

3. The supervisor determines that banks' policies and processes establish an appropriate and properly controlled interest rate risk environment including:

- (a) comprehensive and appropriate interest rate risk measurement systems;
- (b) regular review, and independent (internal or external) validation, of any models used by the functions tasked with managing interest rate risk (including review of key model assumptions);
- (c) appropriate limits, approved by the banks' Boards and senior management, that reflect the banks' risk appetite, risk profile and capital strength, and are understood by, and regularly communicated to, relevant staff;
- (d) effective exception tracking and reporting processes which ensure prompt action at the appropriate level of the banks' senior management or Boards where necessary; and
- (e) effective information systems for accurate and timely identification, aggregation, monitoring and reporting of interest rate risk exposure to the banks' Boards and senior management.

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<p>3. The supervisor requires that banks periodically perform appropriate stress tests to measure their vulnerability to loss under adverse interest rate movements.</p>	<p>4. The supervisor requires banks to include appropriate scenarios into their stress testing programmes to measure their vulnerability to loss under adverse interest rate movements.</p>
<p>Additional criteria</p> <p>1. The supervisor has the power to obtain from banks the results of their internal interest rate risk measurement systems, expressed in terms of the threat to economic value, including using a standardised interest rate shock on the banking book.</p>	<p>Additional criteria</p> <p>1. The supervisor obtains from banks the results of their internal interest rate risk measurement systems, expressed in terms of the threat to economic value, including using a standardised interest rate shock on the banking book.</p>
<p>2. The supervisor assesses whether the internal capital measurement systems of banks adequately capture the interest rate risk in the banking book.</p>	<p>2. The supervisor assesses whether the internal capital measurement systems of banks adequately capture the interest rate risk in the banking book.</p>
<p>Principle 14: Liquidity risk</p> <p>Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have a liquidity management strategy that takes into account the risk profile of the institution, with prudent policies and processes to identify, measure, monitor and control liquidity risk, and to manage liquidity on a day to day basis. Supervisors require banks to have contingency plans for handling liquidity problems.</p> <p>(Reference document: <i>Sound practices for managing liquidity in banking organisations</i>, February 2000.)</p>	<p>Principle 24: Liquidity risk</p> <p>The supervisor sets prudent and appropriate liquidity requirements (which can include either quantitative or qualitative requirements or both) for banks that reflect the liquidity needs of the bank. The supervisor determines that banks have a strategy that enables prudent management of liquidity risk and compliance with liquidity requirements. The strategy takes into account the bank's risk profile as well as market and macroeconomic conditions and includes prudent policies and processes, consistent with the bank's risk appetite, to identify, measure, evaluate, monitor, report and control or mitigate liquidity risk over an appropriate set of time horizons.</p> <p>(Reference documents: <i>Basel III: International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring</i>, December 2010 and <i>Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision</i>, September 2008.)</p>
<p>Essential criteria</p> <p>1. The supervisor sets liquidity guidelines for banks. These guidelines take into consideration undrawn commitments and other off-balance sheet liabilities, as well as existing on-balance sheet liabilities.</p>	<p>Essential criteria</p> <p>1. Laws, regulations or the supervisor require banks to consistently observe prescribed liquidity requirements including thresholds by reference to which a bank is subject to supervisory action. At least for internationally active banks, the prescribed requirements are not lower than, and the supervisor uses a range of liquidity monitoring tools no less extensive than, those prescribed in the applicable Basel standard.</p>

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No text.	2. The prescribed liquidity requirements reflect the liquidity risk profile of banks (including on- and off-balance sheet risks) in the context of the markets and macroeconomic conditions in which they operate.
2. The supervisor confirms that banks have a liquidity management strategy, as well as policies and processes for managing liquidity risk, which have been approved by the Board. The supervisor also confirms that the Board has an oversight role in ensuring that policies and processes for risk-taking are developed to monitor, control and limit liquidity risk, and that management effectively implements such policies and processes.	3. The supervisor determines that banks have a robust liquidity management framework that requires the banks to maintain sufficient liquidity to withstand a range of stress events, and includes appropriate policies and processes for managing liquidity risk which have been approved by the banks' Boards. The supervisor also determines that these policies and processes provide a comprehensive bank-wide view of liquidity risk and are consistent with the banks' risk profile and systemic importance.
No text.	4. The supervisor determines that banks' liquidity strategy, policies and processes establish an appropriate and properly controlled liquidity risk environment including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) clear articulation of an overall liquidity risk appetite that is appropriate for the banks' business and their role in the financial system and that is approved by the banks' Boards; (b) sound day-to-day, and where appropriate intraday, liquidity risk management practices; (c) effective information systems to enable active identification, aggregation, monitoring and control of liquidity risk exposures and funding needs (including active management of collateral positions) bank-wide; (d) adequate oversight by the banks' Boards in ensuring that management effectively implements policies and processes for the management of liquidity risk in a manner consistent with the bank's liquidity risk appetite; and (e) regular review by the banks' Boards (at least annually) and appropriate adjustment of the banks' strategy, policies and processes for the management of liquidity risk in the light of the banks' changing risk profile and external developments in the markets and macroeconomic conditions in which they operate.
4. The supervisor requires banks to establish policies and processes for the ongoing measurement and monitoring of net funding requirements. The policies and processes include considering how other risks (eg credit, market and operational risk) may impact the bank's	5. The supervisor requires banks to establish, and regularly review, funding strategies and policies and processes for the ongoing measurement and monitoring of funding requirements and the effective management of funding risk. The policies and processes include

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<p>overall liquidity strategy, and require an analysis of funding requirements under alternative scenarios, diversification of funding sources, a review of concentration limits, stress testing, and a frequent review of underlying assumptions to determine that they continue to be valid.</p> <p>AC2. The supervisor confirms that banks periodically review their efforts to establish and maintain relationships with liability holders, maintain the diversification of liabilities, and aim to ensure their capacity to sell assets.</p>	<p>consideration of how other risks (eg credit, market, operational and reputation risk) may impact the bank's overall liquidity strategy, and include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) an analysis of funding requirements under alternative scenarios; (b) the maintenance of a cushion of high quality, unencumbered, liquid assets which can be used, without impediment, to obtain funding in times of stress; (c) diversification in the sources (including counterparties, instruments, currencies and markets) and tenor of funding, and regular review of concentration limits; (d) regular efforts to establish and maintain relationships with liability holders; and (e) regular assessment of capacity to sell assets.
<p>6. The supervisor determines that banks have contingency plans in place for handling liquidity problems, including informing the supervisor.</p>	<p>6. The supervisor determines that banks have robust liquidity contingency funding plans to handle liquidity problems. The supervisor determines that the bank's contingency funding plan is formally articulated, adequately documented and sets out the bank's strategies for addressing liquidity shortfalls in a range of stress environments without placing reliance on Lender of Last Resort support. The supervisor also determines that the bank's contingency funding plan establishes clear lines of responsibility, includes clear communication plans (including communication with the supervisor) and is regularly tested and updated to ensure it is operationally robust. The supervisor assesses whether, in the light of the bank's risk profile and systemic importance, the bank's contingency funding plan is feasible and requires the bank to address any deficiencies.</p>
<p>No text.</p>	<p>7. The supervisor requires banks to include a variety of short-term and protracted bank-specific and market-wide liquidity stress scenarios (individually and in combination), using conservative and regularly reviewed assumptions, into their stress testing programmes for risk management purposes. The supervisor determines that the results of the stress-tests are used by the bank to adjust its liquidity risk management strategies, policies and positions and to develop effective contingency funding plans.</p>
<p>5. The supervisor obtains sufficient information to identify those institutions carrying out significant foreign currency liquidity transformation. Where a</p>	<p>8. The supervisor identifies those banks carrying out significant foreign currency liquidity transformation. Where a bank's foreign currency</p>

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<p>bank or banking group's foreign currency business, either directly, or indirectly through lending in foreign exchange to domestic borrowers, is significant, or where a particular currency in which the bank has material exposure is experiencing problems, the supervisor requires the bank to undertake separate analysis of its strategy for each currency individually and, where appropriate, set and regularly review limits on the size of its cash flow mismatches for foreign currencies in aggregate and for each significant individual currency.</p> <p>AC1. The supervisor determines that, where a bank conducts its business in multiple currencies, foreign currency liquidity strategy is separately stress-tested, and the results of such tests are a factor in determining the appropriateness of mismatches.</p>	<p>business is significant, or-the bank has significant exposure in a given currency, the supervisor requires the bank to undertake separate analysis of its strategy and monitor its liquidity needs separately for each such significant currency. This includes the use of stress testing to determine the appropriateness of mismatches in that currency and, where appropriate, the setting and regular review of limits on the size of its cash flow mismatches for foreign currencies in aggregate and for each significant currency individually. In such cases, the supervisor also monitors the bank's liquidity needs in each significant currency, and evaluates the bank's ability to transfer liquidity from one currency to another across jurisdictions and legal entities.</p>
<p>No text.</p>	<p>Additional criterion</p> <p>1. The supervisor determines that banks' levels of pledged balance-sheet assets are managed within acceptable limits to mitigate the risks posed by excessive levels of encumbrance in terms of the impact on the banks' cost of funding and the implications for the sustainability of their long-term liquidity position. The supervisor requires banks to commit to adequate disclosure and set appropriate limits to mitigate the identified risks.</p>
<p>Principle 15: Operational risk</p> <p>Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have in place risk management policies and processes to identify, assess, monitor and control/mitigate operational risk.²⁷ These policies and processes should be commensurate with the size and complexity of the bank.</p> <p>(Reference documents: <i>Sound practices for the management and supervision of operational risk</i>, February 2003; and <i>Outsourcing in financial services</i>, Joint Forum, February 2005.)</p> <p>27. The Basel Committee has defined operational risk as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events. The definition includes legal risk but excludes strategic and reputational risk.</p>	<p>Principle 25: Operational risk</p> <p>The supervisor determines that banks have an adequate operational risk management framework that takes into account their risk appetite, risk profile and market and macroeconomic conditions. This includes prudent policies and processes to identify, assess, evaluate, monitor, report and control or mitigate operational risk⁷⁹ on a timely basis.</p> <p>(Reference documents: <i>Principles for the Sound Management of Operational Risk</i>, June 2011; <i>Recognising the risk-mitigating impact of insurance in operational risk modelling</i>, October 2010; <i>High-level principles for business continuity</i>, August 2006; and <i>Joint Forum Outsourcing in financial services</i>, February 2005.)</p> <p>79. The Committee has defined operational risk as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events. The definition includes legal risk but excludes strategic and reputational risk.</p>

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<p>Essential criteria</p> <p>1. The supervisor requires individual banks to have in place risk management policies and processes to identify, assess, monitor and mitigate operational risk. These policies and processes are adequate for the size and complexity of the bank's operations, and the supervisor confirms that they are periodically adjusted in the light of the bank's changing risk profile and external market developments.</p> <p>AC1. The supervisor determines that the risk management policies and processes address the major aspects of operational risk, including an appropriate operational risk framework that is applied on a group-wide basis. The policies and processes should include additional risks prevalent in certain operationally intensive businesses, such as custody and correspondent banking, and should cover periods when operational risk could increase.</p>	<p>Essential criteria</p> <p>1. Law, regulations or the supervisor require banks to have appropriate operational risk management strategies, policies and processes to identify, assess, evaluate, monitor, report and control or mitigate operational risk. The supervisor determines that the bank's strategy, policies and processes are consistent with the bank's risk profile, systemic importance, risk appetite and capital strength, take into account market and macroeconomic conditions, and address all major aspects of operational risk prevalent in the businesses of the bank on a bank-wide basis (including periods when operational risk could increase).</p>
<p>2. The supervisor requires that banks' strategies, policies and processes for the management of operational risk have been approved and are periodically reviewed by the Board. The supervisor also requires that the Board oversees management in ensuring that these policies and processes are implemented effectively.</p>	<p>2. The supervisor requires banks' strategies, policies and processes for the management of operational risk (including the banks' risk appetite for operational risk) to be approved and regularly reviewed by the banks' Boards. The supervisor also requires that the banks' Boards oversees management in ensuring that these policies and processes are implemented effectively.</p>
<p>3. The supervisor is satisfied that the approved strategy and significant policies and processes for operational risk are implemented effectively by management.</p>	<p>3. The supervisor determines that the approved strategy and significant policies and processes for the management of operational risk are implemented effectively by management and fully integrated into the bank's overall risk management process.</p>
<p>4. The supervisor reviews the quality and comprehensiveness of the bank's business resumption and contingency plans to satisfy itself that the bank is able to operate as a going concern and minimise losses, including those that may arise from disturbances to payment and settlement systems, in the event of severe business disruption.</p>	<p>4. The supervisor reviews the quality and comprehensiveness of the bank's disaster recovery and business continuity plans to assess their feasibility in scenarios of severe business disruption which might plausibly affect the bank. In so doing, the supervisor determines that the bank is able to operate as a going concern and minimise losses, including those that may arise from disturbances to payment and settlement systems, in the event of severe business disruption.</p>
<p>5. The supervisor determines that banks have established appropriate information technology</p>	<p>5. The supervisor determines that banks have established appropriate information technology</p>

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<p>policies and processes that address areas such as information security and system development, and have made investments in information technology commensurate with the size and complexity of operations.</p>	<p>policies and processes to identify, assess, monitor and manage technology risks. The supervisor also determines that the bank has an appropriate and sound information technology infrastructure to meet its current and projected business requirements (under normal circumstances and in periods of stress), which ensures data and system integrity, security and availability and supports integrated and comprehensive risk management.</p>
<p>No text.</p>	<p>6. The supervisor determines that banks have appropriate and effective information systems to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) monitor operational risk; (b) compile and analyse operational risk data; and (c) facilitate appropriate reporting mechanisms at the banks' Boards, senior management and business line levels that support proactive management of operational risk.
<p>6. The supervisor requires that appropriate reporting mechanisms are in place to keep the supervisor apprised of developments affecting operational risk at banks in their jurisdictions.</p>	<p>7. The supervisor requires that banks have appropriate reporting mechanisms to keep the supervisor apprised of developments affecting operational risk at banks in their jurisdictions.</p>
<p>7. The supervisor confirms that legal risk is incorporated into the operational risk management processes of the bank.</p>	<p>8. The supervisor determines that legal risk is incorporated into the operational risk management processes of the bank.</p>
<p>8. The supervisor determines that banks have established appropriate policies and processes to assess, manage and monitor outsourced activities. The outsourcing risk management programme should cover:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • conducting appropriate due diligence for selecting potential service providers; • structuring the outsourcing arrangement; • managing and monitoring the risks associated with the outsourcing arrangement; • ensuring an effective control environment; and • establishing viable contingency planning. <p>Outsourcing policies and processes should require the institution to have comprehensive contracts and/or service level agreements with a clear allocation of responsibilities between the outsourcing provider and the bank.</p>	<p>9. The supervisor determines that banks have established appropriate policies and processes to assess, manage and monitor outsourced activities. The outsourcing risk management programme covers:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) conducting appropriate due diligence for selecting potential service providers; (b) structuring the outsourcing arrangement; (c) managing and monitoring the risks associated with the outsourcing arrangement; (d) ensuring an effective control environment; and (e) establishing viable contingency planning. <p>Outsourcing policies and processes require the bank to have comprehensive contracts and/or service level agreements with a clear allocation of responsibilities between the outsourcing provider and the bank.</p>

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No text.

Additional criterion

1. The supervisor regularly identifies any common points of exposure to operational risk or potential vulnerability (eg outsourcing of key operations by many banks to a common service provider or service provider disruption in payment and settlement activities).

Principle 17: Internal control and audit

Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have in place internal controls that are adequate for the size and complexity of their business. These should include clear arrangements for delegating authority and responsibility; separation of the functions that involve committing the bank, paying away its funds, and accounting for its assets and liabilities; reconciliation of these processes; safeguarding the bank’s assets; and appropriate independent internal audit and compliance functions to test adherence to these controls as well as applicable laws and regulations.

(Reference documents: *Framework for internal control systems in banking organisations*, September 1998; *Internal audit in banks and the supervisor’s relationship with auditors*, August 2001; and *Compliance and the compliance function in banks*, April 2005.)

Principle 26: Internal control and audit

The supervisor determines that banks have adequate internal controls to establish and maintain a properly controlled operating environment for the conduct of their business taking into account their risk profile. These include clear arrangements for delegating authority and responsibility; separation of the functions that involve committing the bank, paying away its funds, and accounting for its assets and liabilities; reconciliation of these processes; safeguarding the bank’s assets; and appropriate independent⁸⁰ internal audit and compliance functions to test adherence to these controls as well as applicable laws and regulations.

(Reference documents: Consultative document on *The internal audit function in banks*, December 2011 **[to be updated when finalised]**; *Enhancements to the Basel II framework*, July 2009; *Compliance and the compliance function in banks*, April 2005; and *Framework for internal control systems in banking organisations*, September 1998.)

80. In assessing independence, supervisors give due regard to the control systems designed to avoid conflicts of interest in the performance measurement of staff in the compliance, control and internal audit functions. For example, the remuneration of such staff should be determined independently of the business lines which they oversee.

Essential criteria

2. The supervisor determines that banks have in place internal controls that are adequate for the nature and scale of their business. These controls are the responsibility of the Board and/or senior management and deal with organisational structure, accounting policies and processes, checks and balances, and the safeguarding of assets and investments. More specifically, these controls address:

- Organisational structure: definitions of duties and responsibilities, including clear delegation of authority (for example, clear loan approval

Essential criteria

1. Laws, regulations or the supervisor require banks to have internal controls which are adequate to establish a properly controlled operating environment for the conduct of their business taking into account their risk profile. These controls are the responsibility of the bank’s Board and/or senior management and deal with organisational structure, accounting policies and processes, checks and balances, and the safeguarding of assets and investments (including measures for the prevention and early detection and reporting of misuse such as fraud,

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limits), decision-making policies and processes, separation of critical functions (for example, business origination, payments, reconciliation, risk management, accounting, audit and compliance).

- Accounting policies and processes: reconciliation of accounts, control lists, information for management.
- Checks and balances (or “four eyes principle”): segregation of duties, cross-checking, dual control of assets, double signatures.
- Safeguarding assets and investments: including physical control.

embezzlement unauthorised trading and computer intrusion). More specifically, these controls address:

- (a) organisational structure: definitions of duties and responsibilities, including clear delegation of authority (eg clear loan approval limits), decision-making policies and processes, separation of critical functions (eg business origination, payments, reconciliation, risk management, accounting, audit and compliance);
- (b) accounting policies and processes: reconciliation of accounts, control lists, information for management;
- (c) checks and balances (or “four eyes principle”): segregation of duties, cross-checking, dual control of assets, double signatures; and
- (d) safeguarding assets and investments: including physical control and computer access.

5. The supervisor determines that there is an appropriate balance in the skills and resources of the back office and control functions relative to the front office/business origination.

2. The supervisor determines that there is an appropriate balance in the skills and resources of the back office and control functions relative to the front office/business origination units. The supervisor also determines that the staff of the back office and control functions have sufficient expertise and authority within the organisation (and where appropriate, in the case of control functions, sufficient access to the bank’s Board) to be an effective check and balance to the front office/business origination units.

6. The supervisor determines that banks have a permanent compliance function²⁸ that assists senior management in managing effectively the compliance risks faced by the bank. The compliance function must be independent of the business activities of the bank. The supervisor determines that the Board exercises oversight of the management of the compliance function.

3. The supervisor determines that banks have an adequately staffed, permanent and independent compliance function⁸¹ that assists senior management in managing effectively the compliance risks faced by the bank. The supervisor determines that staff within the compliance function are suitably trained, have relevant experience and have sufficient authority within the bank to perform their role effectively. The supervisor determines that the bank’s Board exercises oversight of the management of the compliance function.

28. The term “compliance function” does not necessarily denote an organisational unit. Compliance staff may reside in operating business units or local subsidiaries and report up to operating business line management or local management, provided such staff also have a reporting line through to the head of compliance.

81. The term “compliance function” does not necessarily denote an organisational unit. Compliance staff may reside in operating business units or local subsidiaries and report up to operating business line management or local management, provided such staff also have a reporting line through to the head of compliance who should be independent from business lines.

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<p>7. The supervisor determines that banks have an independent, permanent and effective internal audit function charged with (i) ensuring that policies and processes are complied with and (ii) reviewing whether the existing policies, processes and controls remain sufficient and appropriate for the bank's business.²⁹</p> <p>29. The term "internal audit function" does not necessarily denote an organisational unit. Some countries allow small banks to implement a system of independent reviews, eg conducted by external experts, of key internal controls as an alternative.</p>	<p>4. The supervisor determines that banks have an independent, permanent and effective internal audit function⁸² charged with:</p> <p>(a) assessing whether existing policies, processes and internal controls (including risk management, compliance and corporate governance processes) are effective, appropriate and remain sufficient for the bank's business; and</p> <p>(b) ensuring that policies and processes are complied with.</p> <p>82. The term "internal audit function" does not necessarily denote an organisational unit. Some countries allow small banks to implement a system of independent reviews, eg conducted by external experts, of key internal controls as an alternative.</p>
<p>8. The supervisor determines that the internal audit function:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • has sufficient resources, and staff that are suitably trained and have relevant experience to understand and evaluate the business they are auditing; • has appropriate independence, including reporting lines to the Board and status within the bank to ensure that senior management reacts to and acts upon its recommendations; • has full access to and communication with any member of staff as well as full access to records, files or data of the bank and its affiliates, whenever relevant to the performance of its duties; • employs a methodology that identifies the material risks run by the bank; • prepares an audit plan based on its own risk assessment and allocates its resources accordingly; and • has the authority to assess any outsourced functions. <p>AC2. The supervisor requires the internal audit function to report to an audit committee, or an equivalent structure.</p>	<p>5. The supervisor determines that the internal audit function:</p> <p>(a) has sufficient resources, and staff that are suitably trained and have relevant experience to understand and evaluate the business they are auditing;</p> <p>(b) has appropriate independence with reporting lines to the bank's Board or to an audit committee of the Board, and has status within the bank to ensure that senior management reacts to and acts upon its recommendations;</p> <p>(c) is kept informed in a timely manner of any material changes made to the bank's risk management strategy, policies or processes;</p> <p>(d) has full access to and communication with any member of staff as well as full access to records, files or data of the bank and its affiliates, whenever relevant to the performance of its duties;</p> <p>(e) employs a methodology that identifies the material risks run by the bank;</p> <p>(f) prepares an audit plan, which is reviewed regularly, based on its own risk assessment and allocates its resources accordingly; and</p> <p>(g) has the authority to assess any outsourced functions.</p>
<p>Principle 22: Accounting and disclosure</p> <p>Supervisors must be satisfied that each bank maintains adequate records drawn up in accordance with accounting policies and practices that are widely accepted internationally...</p> <p>(Reference document: <i>Enhancing bank transparency, September 1998.</i>)</p>	<p>Principle 27: Financial reporting and external audit</p> <p>The supervisor determines that banks and banking groups maintain adequate and reliable records, prepare financial statements in accordance with accounting policies and practices that are widely accepted internationally and annually publish information that fairly reflects their financial condition and performance and bears an independent external auditor's</p>

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opinion. The supervisor also determines that banks and parent companies of banking groups have adequate governance and oversight of the external audit function.

(Reference documents: *Supervisory guidance for assessing bank' financial instruments fair value practices*, April 2009; *External audit quality and banking supervision*, December 2008; and *The relationship between banking supervisors and banks' external auditors*, January 2002.)

Essential criteria

1. The supervisor has the power to hold bank management and the bank's Board responsible for ensuring that financial record-keeping systems and the data they produce are reliable.

Essential criteria

1. The supervisor⁸³ holds the bank's Board and management responsible for ensuring that financial statements are prepared in accordance with accounting policies and practices that are widely accepted internationally and that these are supported by recordkeeping systems in order to produce adequate and reliable data.

83. In this Principle, the supervisor is not necessarily limited to the banking supervisor. The responsibility for ensuring that financial statements are prepared in accordance with accounting policies and practices may also be vested with securities and market supervisors.

2. The supervisor has the power to hold bank management and the bank's Board responsible for ensuring that the financial statements issued annually to the public receive proper external verification and bear an external auditor's opinion.

2. The supervisor holds the bank's Board and management responsible for ensuring that the financial statements issued annually to the public bear an independent external auditor's opinion as a result of an audit conducted in accordance with internationally accepted auditing practices and standards.

7. The supervisor requires banks to produce annual audited financial statements based on accounting principles and rules that are widely accepted internationally and have been audited in accordance with internationally accepted auditing practices and standards.

3. The supervisor requires banks to utilise valuation rules that are consistent, realistic and prudent, taking account of current values where relevant, and to show profits net of appropriate provisions.

3. The supervisor determines that banks use valuation practices consistent with accounting standards widely accepted internationally. The supervisor also determines that the framework, structure and processes for fair value estimation are subject to independent verification and validation, and that banks report any significant differences between the valuations used for financial reporting purposes and for regulatory purposes.

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<p>4. Laws or regulations set, or the supervisor has the power, in appropriate circumstances, to establish, the scope of external audits of individual banks and the standards to be followed in performing such audits.</p>	<p>4. Laws or regulations set, or the supervisor has the power to establish the scope of external audits of banks and the standards to be followed in performing such audits. These require the use of a risk and materiality based approach in planning and performing the external audit.</p>
<p>5. Supervisory guidelines or local auditing standards determine that audits cover such areas as the loan portfolio, loan loss reserves, non-performing assets, asset valuations, trading and other securities activities, derivatives, asset securitisations, and the adequacy of internal controls over financial reporting.</p>	<p>5. Supervisory guidelines or local auditing standards determine that audits cover areas such as the loan portfolio, loan loss provisions, non-performing assets, asset valuations, trading and other securities activities, derivatives, asset securitisations, consolidation of and other involvement with off-balance sheet vehicles and the adequacy of internal controls over financial reporting.</p>
<p>6. The supervisor has the power to reject and rescind the appointment of an external auditor that is deemed to have inadequate expertise or independence, or not to be subject to or not to follow established professional standards.</p>	<p>6. The supervisor has the power to reject and rescind the appointment of an external auditor that is deemed to have inadequate expertise or independence, or is not subject to or does not adhere to established professional standards.</p>
<p>AC3. Laws, regulations or the supervisor require banks to rotate their external auditors (either the firm or individuals within the firm) from time to time.</p>	<p>7. The supervisor determines that banks rotate their external auditors (either the firm or individuals within the firm) from time to time.</p>
<p>AC1. The supervisor meets periodically with external audit firms to discuss issues of common interest relating to bank operations.</p>	<p>8. The supervisor meets periodically with external audit firms to discuss issues of common interest relating to bank operations.</p>
<p>AC2. External auditors, whether or not utilised by the supervisor for supervisory purposes, have the duty to report to the supervisor matters of material significance, for example failure to comply with the licensing criteria or breaches of banking or other laws, or other matters which they believe are likely to be of material significance to the functions of the supervisor. Laws or regulations ensure that auditors who make any such reports in good faith cannot be held liable for breach of a duty of confidentiality.</p>	<p>9. The supervisor requires the external auditor, directly or through the bank, to report to the supervisor matters of material significance, for example failure to comply with the licensing criteria or breaches of banking or other laws, significant deficiencies and control weaknesses in the bank's financial reporting process or other matters which they believe are likely to be of material significance to the functions of the supervisor. Laws or regulations provide that auditors who make any such reports in good faith cannot be held liable for breach of a duty of confidentiality.</p>
<p>Additional criterion</p> <p>5. The supervisor has the power to access external auditors' working papers, where necessary.</p>	<p>Additional criterion</p> <p>1. The supervisor has the power to access external auditors' working papers, where necessary.</p>

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<p>Principle 22: Accounting and disclosure</p> <p>Supervisors must be satisfied that each bank ... publishes, on a regular basis, information that fairly reflects its financial condition and profitability.</p> <p>(Reference document: <i>Enhancing bank transparency</i>, September 1998.)</p> <p>AC4. The supervisor requires banks to have a formal disclosure policy.</p>	<p>Principle 28: Disclosure and transparency</p> <p>The supervisor determines that banks and banking groups regularly publish information on a consolidated and, where appropriate, solo basis that is easily accessible and fairly reflects their financial condition, performance, risk exposures, risk management strategies and corporate governance policies and processes.</p> <p>(Reference documents: <i>Pillar 3 disclosure requirements for remuneration</i>, July 2011; <i>Enhancements to the Basel II framework</i>, July 2009; <i>Basel II: International measurement of capital measurement and capital standards</i>, June 2006; and <i>Enhancing bank transparency</i>, September 1998.)</p>
<p>Essential criteria</p> <p>8. Laws, regulations or the supervisor⁴¹ require periodic public disclosures of information by banks that adequately reflect the bank's true financial condition. The requirements imposed should promote the comparability, relevance, reliability and timeliness of the information disclosed.</p> <p>41. For the purposes of this EC, the disclosure requirement may be found in applicable accounting, stock exchange listing, or other similar rules, instead of or in addition to directives issued by the supervisor.</p>	<p>Essential criteria</p> <p>1. Laws, regulations or the supervisor require periodic public disclosures⁸⁴ of information by banks on a consolidated and, where appropriate, solo basis that adequately reflect the bank's true financial condition and performance, and adhere to standards promoting comparability, relevance, reliability and timeliness of the information disclosed.</p> <p>84. For the purposes of this Essential Criterion, the disclosure requirement may be found in applicable accounting, stock exchange listing, or other similar rules, instead of or in addition to directives issued by the supervisor.</p>
<p>9. The required disclosures include both qualitative and quantitative information on a bank's financial performance, financial position, risk management strategies and practices, risk exposures, transactions with related parties, accounting policies, and basic business, management and governance. The scope and content of information provided and the level of disaggregation and detail should be commensurate with the size and complexity of a bank's operations.</p>	<p>2. The supervisor determines that the required disclosures include both qualitative and quantitative information on a bank's financial performance, financial position, risk management strategies and practices, risk exposures, aggregate exposures to related parties, transactions with related parties, accounting policies, and basic business, management, governance and remuneration. The scope and content of information provided and the level of disaggregation and detail is commensurate with the risk profile and systemic importance of the bank.</p>
<p>No text.</p>	<p>3. Laws, regulations or the supervisor require banks to disclose all material entities in the group structure.</p>

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<p>10. Laws, regulations or the supervisor provide effective review and enforcement mechanisms designed to confirm compliance with disclosure standards.</p>	<p>4. The supervisor or another government agency effectively reviews and enforces compliance with disclosure standards.</p>
<p>11. The supervisor or other relevant bodies publish aggregate information on the banking system to facilitate public understanding of the banking system and the exercise of market discipline. Such information includes aggregate data on balance sheet indicators and statistical parameters that reflect the principal aspects of banks' operations (balance sheet structure, capital ratios, income earning capacity, and risk profiles).</p> <p>EC4, CP1(1). The supervisor confirms that information on the financial strength and performance of the industry under its jurisdiction is publicly available.</p>	<p>5. The supervisor or other relevant bodies regularly publish information on the banking system in aggregate to facilitate public understanding of the banking system and the exercise of market discipline. Such information includes aggregate data on balance sheet indicators and statistical parameters that reflect the principal aspects of banks' operations (balance sheet structure, capital ratios, income earning capacity, and risk profiles).</p>
<p>No text.</p>	<p>Additional criterion</p> <p>1. The disclosure requirements imposed promote disclosure of information that will help in understanding a bank's risk exposures during a financial reporting period, for example on average exposures or turnover during the reporting period.</p>
<p>Principle 18: Abuse of financial services</p> <p>Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have adequate policies and processes in place, including strict "know-your-customer" rules, that promote high ethical and professional standards in the financial sector and prevent the bank from being used, intentionally or unintentionally, for criminal activities.³⁰</p> <p>(Reference documents: <i>Prevention of criminal use of the banking system for the purpose of money-laundering</i>, December 1988; <i>Customer due diligence for banks</i>, October 2001; <i>Shell banks and booking offices</i>, January 2003; <i>Consolidated KYC risk management</i>, October 2004; <i>FATF 40 + IX</i>, 2003 and <i>FATF AML/CFT Methodology</i>, 2004, as updated.)</p> <p>30. The Committee is aware that, in some jurisdictions, other authorities, such as a financial intelligence unit (FIU), rather than a banking supervisor, may have primary responsibility for assessing compliance with laws and regulations regarding criminal activities in banks, such as fraud, money laundering and terrorist financing. Thus, in the context of this Principle, "the supervisor" might refer to such other authorities, in</p>	<p>Principle 29: Abuse of financial services</p> <p>The supervisor determines that banks have adequate policies and processes, including strict customer due diligence (CDD) rules to promote high ethical and professional standards in the financial sector and prevent the bank from being used, intentionally or unintentionally, for criminal activities.⁸⁵</p> <p>(Reference documents: <i>FATF AML/CFT Methodology</i>, 2004, as updated; <i>FATF 40 + IX</i>, 2003; <i>Consolidated KYC risk management</i>, October 2004; <i>Shell banks and booking offices</i>, January 2003; and <i>Customer due diligence for banks</i>, October 2001.)</p> <p>85. The Committee is aware that, in some jurisdictions, other authorities, such as a financial intelligence unit (FIU), rather than a banking supervisor, may have primary responsibility for assessing compliance with laws and regulations regarding criminal activities in banks, such as fraud, money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Thus, in the context of this Principle, "the supervisor" might refer to such other authorities, in particular in Essential Criteria 6, 7 and 9. In such jurisdictions, the banking supervisor cooperates with such authorities to achieve adherence with the criteria</p>

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<p>particular in ECs 6, 7 and 9. In such jurisdictions, the banking supervisor cooperates with such authorities to achieve adherence with the criteria mentioned in this CP.</p>	<p>mentioned in this Principle.</p>
<p>Essential criteria</p>	<p>Essential criteria</p>
<p>1. Laws or regulations clarify the duties, responsibilities and powers of the banking supervisor and other competent authorities, if any, related to the supervision of banks' internal controls and enforcement of the relevant laws and regulations regarding criminal activities.</p>	<p>1. Laws or regulations establish the duties, responsibilities and powers of the supervisor related to the supervision of banks' internal controls and enforcement of the relevant laws and regulations regarding criminal activities.</p>
<p>2. The supervisor must be satisfied that banks have in place adequate policies and processes that promote high ethical and professional standards and prevent the bank from being used, intentionally or unintentionally, for criminal activities. This includes the prevention and detection of criminal activity, and reporting of such suspected activities to the appropriate authorities.</p>	<p>2. The supervisor determines that banks have adequate policies and processes that promote high ethical and professional standards and prevent the bank from being used, intentionally or unintentionally, for criminal activities. This includes the prevention and detection of criminal activity, and reporting of such suspected activities to the appropriate authorities.</p>
<p>3. In addition to reporting to the financial intelligence unit or other designated authorities, banks report to the banking supervisor suspicious activities and incidents of fraud when they are material to the safety, soundness or reputation of the bank.³¹</p>	<p>3. In addition to reporting to the financial intelligence unit or other designated authorities, banks report to the banking supervisor suspicious activities and incidents of fraud when such activities/incidents are material to the safety, soundness or reputation of the bank.⁸⁶</p>
<p>31. Consistent with international standards, banks are to report suspicious activities involving cases of potential money laundering and terrorist financing to the relevant national centre, established either as an independent governmental authority or within an existing authority or authorities, that serves as an FIU.</p>	<p>86. Consistent with international standards, banks are to report suspicious activities involving cases of potential money laundering and the financing of terrorism to the relevant national centre, established either as an independent governmental authority or within an existing authority or authorities that serves as an FIU.</p>
<p>4. The supervisor is satisfied that banks establish "know-your-customer" (KYC) policies and processes which are well documented and communicated to all relevant staff. Such policies and processes must also be integrated into the bank's overall risk management. The KYC management programme, on a group-wide basis, has as its essential elements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • a customer acceptance policy that identifies business relationships that the bank will not accept; • a customer identification, verification and due diligence programme; this encompasses verification of beneficial ownership and includes risk-based reviews to ensure that records are updated and relevant; • policies and processes to monitor and recognise unusual or potentially suspicious 	<p>4. The supervisor determines that banks establish CDD policies and processes which are well documented and communicated to all relevant staff. The supervisor also determines that such policies and processes are integrated into the bank's overall risk management and there are appropriate steps to identify, assess, monitor, manage and mitigate risks of money laundering and the financing of terrorism with respect to customers, countries and regions, as well as to products, services, transactions and delivery channels on an ongoing basis. The CDD management programme, on a group-wide basis, has as its essential elements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) a customer acceptance policy that identifies business relationships that the bank will not accept based on identified risks; (b) a customer identification, verification and due

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<p>transactions, particularly of high-risk accounts;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • escalation to the senior management level of decisions on entering into business relationships with high-risk accounts, such as those for politically exposed persons, or maintaining such relationships when an existing relationship becomes high-risk; and • clear rules on what records must be kept on consumer identification and individual transactions and their retention period. Such records should have at least a five year retention period. 	<p>diligence programme on an ongoing basis; this encompasses verification of beneficial ownership, understanding the purpose and nature of the business relationship, and risk-based reviews to ensure that records are updated and relevant;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (c) policies and processes to monitor and recognise unusual or potentially suspicious transactions; (d) enhanced due diligence on high-risk accounts (eg escalation to the bank's senior management level of decisions on entering into business relationships with these accounts or maintaining such relationships when an existing relationship becomes high-risk); (e) enhanced due diligence on politically exposed persons (including, among other things, escalation to the bank's senior management level of decisions on entering into business relationships with these persons), and (f) clear rules on what records must be kept on CDD and individual transactions and their retention period. Such records have at least a five year retention period.
<p>5. The supervisor is satisfied that banks have enhanced due diligence policies and processes regarding correspondent banking. Such policies and processes encompass:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • gathering sufficient information about their respondent banks to understand fully the nature of their business and customer base, and how they are supervised; and • not establishing or continuing correspondent relationships with foreign banks that do not have adequate controls against criminal activities or that are not effectively supervised by the relevant authorities, or with those banks that are considered to be shell banks. 	<p>5. The supervisor determines that banks have in addition to normal due diligence, specific policies and processes regarding correspondent banking. Such policies and processes include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) gathering sufficient information about their respondent banks to understand fully the nature of their business and customer base, and how they are supervised; and (b) not establishing or continuing correspondent relationships with those that do not have adequate controls against criminal activities or that are not effectively supervised by the relevant authorities, or with those banks that are considered to be shell banks.
<p>6. The supervisor periodically confirms that banks have sufficient controls and systems in place for preventing, identifying and reporting potential abuses of financial services, including money laundering.</p>	<p>6. The supervisor determines that banks have sufficient controls and systems to prevent, identify and report potential abuses of financial services, including money laundering and the financing of terrorism.</p>
<p>7. The supervisor has adequate enforcement powers (regulatory and/or criminal prosecution) to take action against a bank that does not comply with its obligations related to criminal activities.</p>	<p>7. The supervisor has adequate powers to take action against a bank that does not comply with its obligations related to relevant laws and regulations regarding criminal activities.</p>

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<p>8. The supervisor must be satisfied that banks have:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • requirements for internal audit and/or external experts³² to independently evaluate the relevant risk management policies, processes and controls. The supervisor must have access to their reports; • established policies and processes to designate compliance officers at the management level, and appointed a relevant dedicated officer to whom potential abuses of the bank's financial services (including suspicious transactions) shall be reported; • adequate screening policies and processes to ensure high ethical and professional standards when hiring staff; and • ongoing training programmes for their staff on KYC and methods to detect criminal and suspicious activities. <p>32. May be external auditors or other qualified parties, commissioned with an appropriate mandate, and subject to appropriate confidentiality restrictions.</p>	<p>8. The supervisor determines that banks have:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (a) requirements for internal audit and/or external experts⁸⁷ to independently evaluate the relevant risk management policies, processes and controls. The supervisor has access to their reports; (b) established policies and processes to designate compliance officers at the banks' management level, and appoint a relevant dedicated officer to whom potential abuses of the banks' financial services (including suspicious transactions) is reported; (c) adequate screening policies and processes to ensure high ethical and professional standards when hiring staff; or when entering into agency or outsourcing relationship; and (d) ongoing training programmes for their staff, including on CDD and methods to monitor and detect criminal and suspicious activities. <p>87. These could be external auditors or other qualified parties, commissioned with an appropriate mandate, and subject to appropriate confidentiality restrictions.</p>
<p>9. The supervisor determines that banks have clear policies and processes for staff to report any problems related to the abuse of the banks' financial services to either local management or the relevant dedicated officer or to both. The supervisor also confirms that banks have adequate management information systems to provide managers and the dedicated officers with timely information on such activities.</p>	<p>9. The supervisor determines that banks have and follow clear policies and processes for staff to report any problems related to the abuse of the banks' financial services to either local management or the relevant dedicated officer or to both. The supervisor also determines that banks have and utilise adequate management information systems to provide the banks' Boards, management and the dedicated officers with timely and appropriate information on such activities.</p>
<p>10. Laws and regulations ensure that a member of a bank's staff who reports suspicious activity in good faith either internally or directly to the relevant authority cannot be held liable.</p>	<p>10. Laws provide that a member of a bank's staff who reports suspicious activity in good faith either internally or directly to the relevant authority cannot be held liable.</p>
<p>11. The supervisor is able to inform the financial intelligence unit and, if applicable, other designated authority of any suspicious transactions. In addition, it is able, directly or indirectly, to share with relevant judicial authorities information related to suspected or actual criminal activities.</p>	<p>11. The supervisor informs the financial intelligence unit and, if applicable, other designated authority of any suspicious transactions. In addition, it, directly or indirectly, shares information related to suspected or actual criminal activities with relevant authorities.</p>
<p>12. The supervisor is able, directly or indirectly, to cooperate with the relevant domestic and foreign financial sector supervisory authorities or share with them information related to suspected or</p>	<p>12. The supervisor, directly or indirectly, cooperates with the relevant domestic and foreign financial sector supervisory authorities or shares with them information related to suspected or</p>

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actual criminal activities where this information is for supervisory purposes.	actual criminal activities where this information is for supervisory purposes.
AC1. If not done by another authority, the supervisor has in-house resources with specialist expertise for addressing criminal activities.	13. Unless done by another authority, the supervisor has in-house resources with specialist expertise for addressing criminal activities. In this case, the supervisor regularly provides information on risks of money laundering and the financing of terrorism to the banks.