

# The Rise of Shadow Banking: Evidence from Capital Regulation

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
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# Dramatic $\Delta$ in Lending Landscape in last Decade

- Shadow banks have increased across segments around the world
- A 10 Trillion \$ market in the US
  - The Rise of “Shadow Banks”

FIGURE 1: RISE OF SHADOW BANKS



## This Paper

### ❑ Why the Rise?

- Regulation ✓
- Less-capitalized banks reduce loan retention; loans with higher capital requirements and at times when capital is scarce.
- Non-banks step in following the sale of loans from less-capitalized banks.

### ❑ Why do we care?

- Stability ✓
- Loans by nonbanks experience greater sales and price volatility during the 2008 crisis

### ❑ Discussion

- Mechanisms
- Questions
- Broader Issues

# D

iscussion

# Mechanisms

- ❑ How much of the growth driven by Regulation? And how much by Technology?
  - Regulation: capital costs, scrutiny/supervision burden
  - Technology: lower costs, better/higher quality products

FIGURE 2A: INCREASED REGULATION?




FIGURE 2B: BETTER TECHNOLOGY?






# Discussion

## Regulation?

- Assess bank responses to increases in regulatory burden
  - Shocks to Regulatory Burden (BMPS 2017)
  - Banks retreated and shadow banks entered in markets where regulatory burden increased
  - Substitution less than 1 for 1? (more later)

FIGURE 3: ROLE OF REGULATION



$$\Delta \text{Shadow Bank Lending Share}_c = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta \text{Regulatory Burden}_c + X'_c \Gamma + \epsilon_c$$

# Technology?


## Interest Rates

- Higher interest rates, all else equal → premium for convenience
- Different Models: How much do residuals explain interest rates?  $R_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_i + \epsilon_i$

## Faster Loan Sale (16 days), Flexibility to adjust (BMPS, Fuster et al.)

FIGURE 4: ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY

	(1) Interest Rate	(2) Interest Rate	(3) Interest Rate	(4) Interest Rate
Sample	All Lenders			
Shadow Bank	0.00665*** (5.19)	0.00714*** (8.33)	- -	- -
Non-Fintech Shadow Bank	-	-	-0.0281*** (-20.48)	-0.0242*** (-27.42)
Fintech Shadow Bank	-	-	0.143*** (87.68)	0.129*** (101.99)
Borrower and Loan Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Zip x Quarter FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Quarter FE	Yes	No	Yes	No
<i>N</i>	8,485,573	8,480,376	8,485,573	8,480,376
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.598	0.808	0.601	0.811



**D**iscussion

# Funding?

## □ Who finances?

- Monetary policy pass through deposits (DSS 2017/18; Xiao 2017)
- Liquidity of OTD (BMPS 2018)

# D

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# Questions

- ❑ Stability results due to fire sales or riskier loans?
  - Non banks could be acquiring worse loans
  - ...and then forced to sell them

FIGURE 5: FIRE SALES?





# Discussion Questions


- ❑ Where does the non bank funding come from?
  - Where does the risk reside?
    - Banks? (Acharya et al.), GSEs? (BMPS 2017)
  - What policies shape shadow banks?
    - Households/Deposits/Capital Constraints/OTD...

FIGURE 6: FUNDING?

## Banking the Nonbanks

The biggest U.S. banks have made billions of dollars in loans to nonbank lenders.


Source: FDIC Dec. 2017 Call Reports



## Big Banks Find a Back Door to Finance Subprime Loans

Lending to nonbank financial firms surges to record as banks avoid direct exposure


## Shadow Banks



## Broader Connection

- ❑ Market structure impacts liquidity of OTD, which shapes where SB operate (BMPS 2018)
  - Conforming liquid OTD
  - Jumbo needs to be retained on balance-sheet

FIGURE 7: HETEROGENEOUS PENETRATION



## Broader Connection

- ❑ Market structure impacts liquidity of OTD, which shapes where SB operate (BMPS 2018)
  - Conforming liquid OTD
  - Jumbo needs to be retained on balance-sheet
- ❑ Capital position of banks and regulation impacts price and quantity

FIGURE 8: SPREAD AND MARKET SHARE



# D

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## Broader Connection

- ❑ Market structure impacts liquidity of OTD, which shapes where SB operate (BMPS 2018)
  - Conforming liquid OTD
  - Jumbo needs to be retained on balance-sheet
- ❑ Capital position of banks and regulation impacts "pass-through"

FIGURE 9A: BANK MARKET SHARE





FIGURE 9B: BALANCE SHEET FINANCING




## Discussion

# Broader Connection

- ❑ Market structure impacts liquidity of OTD, which shapes where SB operate (BMPS 2018)
  - Conforming liquid OTD
  - Jumbo needs to be retained on balance-sheet
- ❑ Capital position of banks and regulation impacts "pass-through"

FIGURE 10: CAPITALIZATION AND BALANCE SHEET LENDING



# B


## roader Connection

CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 6% → 7.5%

Lender	Loan Type	Financing Source	Change
Total	-	-	-\$52b
Bank	Jumbo	Portfolio	-\$79b
Bank	Conforming	Portfolio	-\$201b
Bank	Conforming	GSE	+\$211b
Shadow Bank	Conforming	GSE	+\$16b

- ❑ Substitution not 1 for 1
- ❑ Differential effects across income distribution

LENDING VOLUMES (\$B)



# Conclusion

- ❑ Very interesting paper that establishes regulation an important force in expansion of SB
- ❑ Some questions remain
  - Other factors?
  - Bad quality or fire sales?...important for stability
  - Who funds shadow banks?...where does the risk reside?
- ❑ Broader Implications
  - Aggregate bank capitalization can change relative prices/quantities and penetration across segments
  - Policies such as bank capital regulation, credit subsidies, and QE interventions can push lending into shadows in non-obvious ways and impact policy “pass-through”