

DEBT OVERHANG AND SLUGGISH GROWTH

Response to Stephanie Lo and Kenneth Rogoff

BIS Conference

Lucerne 27 June 2014

Adair Turner


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
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Sectoral financial surpluses/deficits as % of GDP: Japan 1990 – 2012




Source: IMF, Bank of Japan Flow of Funds Accounts

Japanese government and corporate debt: 1990 – 2010




Source: BoJ Flow of Funds Accounts, IMF WEO database (April 2011), FSA calculations


Shifting leverage: private and public debt-to-GDP




Source: OECD National Accounts



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


Public and private leverage : G7 total 2003 – 2013




Source: BIS, IMF

Total German private sector leverage: 1991 - 2010




China: total social finance to GDP



Shifting leverage: private to public


UK Debt-to-GDP 2002 - 2012




Source: OECD National Accounts

Shifting leverage: back to private again

Public net debt as % of GDP:
2009 - 2019



Household gross debt as % of income:
2009 - 2019



Source: OBR Economic and Fiscal Outlook, March 2014

The Dilemma

Pre-crisis path of nominal
GDP growth

~ 4% - 5%



~ 2% real growth

~ 2% inflation

Pre-crisis path of credit
growth

~ 10% - 15%


If central banks had raised interest rates to slow credit growth

.... this would presumably mean slower nominal GDP growth?

We seem to need $\dot{C} > \dot{NGDP}$ to ensure adequate $\dot{NGDP}$

... but this produces financial instability and post-crisis recession

Share of real estate lending in total bank lending



Source: *The Great Mortgaging*, Professor Alan Taylor, University of California, Davis