Central Banks as Dollar Lenders of Last Resort: Implications for Regulation and Reserve Holdings*

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Abstract: This paper explores how non-U.S. central banks behave when firms in their economies engage in currency mismatch, borrowing more heavily in dollars than justified by their operating exposures. We begin by documenting that, in a panel of 53 countries, central bank holdings of dollar reserves are correlated with the dollar-denominated bank borrowing of their non-financial corporate sectors, controlling for a number of known covariates of reserve accumulation. We then build a model in which the central bank can deal with private-sector mismatch, and the associated risk of a domestic financial crisis, in two ways: (i) by imposing ex ante financial regulations such as bank capital requirements; or (ii) by building a stockpile of dollar reserves that allow it to serve as an ex post dollar lender of last resort. The model highlights a novel externality: individual central banks may over-accumulate dollar reserves, relative to what a global planner would choose. This is because, in the presence of imperfect regulation of currency mismatch, individual central banks do not internalize that their hoarding of reserves exacerbates a global scarcity of dollar-denominated safe assets, which lowers dollar interest rates and encourages firms to further increase the currency mismatch of their liabilities. Relative to the decentralized outcome, a global planner may therefore prefer higher capital requirements and reduced holdings of dollar reserves.

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1. Introduction

Central banks around the world hold large balances of foreign currency reserves, with the U.S. dollar accounting for the dominant share of these reserves, at about 59% of the total.\(^1\) In the aggregate, foreign official accounts held $6.74 trillion of dollar securities in July of 2023, with $3.76 trillion of this in the form of U.S. Treasury securities.\(^2\) This makes foreign reserve managers among the most important players in the Treasury market, a fact that is often argued to be a key determinant of the level of U.S. interest rates.\(^3\) The implications of these reserve balances for market outcomes were also dramatically highlighted in the COVID-pandemic-induced “dash for cash” in March of 2020, when heavy foreign central bank selling of Treasuries played a major role in the dislocations seen in that market.\(^4\)

What explains the large appetite of global central banks for foreign currency reserves, and for dollar reserves in particular? In this paper, we focus on one potential motive, arising out of the fact that firms in many countries run a significant currency mismatch in their capital structures, borrowing heavily in dollars even when they have largely domestic operating exposures.\(^5\) We argue that in the face of such mismatch, a central bank will have a natural incentive to stockpile dollars, so that it can more effectively serve as a lender of last resort in a state of the world where the local economy and banking system are under stress and need to be bailed out. We then go on to explore the normative implications of this behavior, showing how the reserve-accumulation decisions of individual central banks can be excessive relative to a global optimum to the extent that they do not internalize the general-equilibrium impact of their choices on the aggregate supply of safe dollar assets and on the dollar interest rate.

We begin by presenting some simple empirical relationships to motivate our subsequent theoretical work. We document that in a panel of 53 countries, central bank holdings of dollar reserves (relative to GDP) are significantly correlated with the dollar-denominated bank borrowing

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1 Source: IMF COFER data.
2 Source: Treasury International Capital data.
3 Early analyses of the impact of foreign demand for U.S. dollar assets and its effect on interest rates include Bernanke (2005), and Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008).
5 This tendency is documented in Du and Schreger (2022).
of the non-financial corporate sector (again relative to GDP), controlling for a number of known covariates of reserve accumulation. The interpretation we have in mind is that the latter variable is a rough proxy for the currency mismatch of the corporate sector, which in turn drives the currency exposure of the banking system and ultimately the dollar lender-of-last-resort motive in our theory.

Next, building on the framework in Gopinath and Stein (2018), we develop a model of optimal reserve accumulation for a small open-economy central bank that faces a risk of a banking crisis, a risk which is exacerbated when the non-financial corporate sector runs a currency-mismatched capital structure. Importantly, while reserve holdings can help to mitigate the fallout from a banking crisis ex post, they are not the only policy tool available. We consider the possibility that the central bank can also deploy ex ante financial-regulatory tools, such as bank-capital regulation. The optimal mix of these tools depends on a straightforward tradeoff. On the one hand, when ex ante regulation is too stringent, this reduces the profitability of the local banking sector and hence social welfare; this effect tends to favor reserve accumulation. On the other hand, there is a carrying cost associated with reserve holdings, which is greater when dollar interest rates are lower. When this carrying cost increases, the balance tips back towards using more heavy-handed financial regulation, and less reserve accumulation.

While this small open-economy version of the model helps to make sense of the basic cross-sectional empirical patterns we see in the data, a primary contribution of the paper is in fleshing out the model’s normative properties. In particular, suppose we have a global economy in which many central banks act as price-takers in the market for safe dollar assets. If each of these central banks sets their regulatory and reserve-holding policies individually, so as to maximize own-country welfare, how does the outcome compare to one in which a global central planner aims to maximize global welfare?

Here the model highlights a novel externality: individual central banks may tend to over-accumulate dollar reserves, relative to what the global planner would choose. This is because individual central banks do not internalize the fact that their hoarding of reserves exacerbates a global scarcity of dollar-denominated safe assets and puts downward pressure on dollar interest rates. This downward pressure on dollar rates in turn intensifies the tendency of private-sector firms to engage in currency mismatch, increasing their exposure to a dollar appreciation. Relative
to the decentralized outcome, a global planner may therefore prefer a different mix of policy tools, with stricter financial regulation (i.e., higher bank capital requirements) and reduced holdings of dollar reserves.

However, it should be noted that this externality only arises when financial regulation is imperfect, in the following specific sense. If regulators can not only set bank capital requirements, but can also directly control the currency mismatch of all non-financial firms in the economy, then there is no longer an externality, and the decisions of individual central banks will align with those of a global planner. Or said differently, a global planner will seek to reduce reserve hoarding only as a second-best way of dealing with currency mismatch—via the influence of dollar interest rates on mismatch incentives—when this mismatch cannot be addressed directly via a more surgical form of financial regulation. We believe that this second-best/imperfect-regulation scenario is an accurate description of reality in most countries, but it is important to understand its key role in our model. Indeed, the idea that influencing interest rates can be a second-best mechanism for dealing with financial-stability problems when regulation is imperfect is a familiar theme in other settings.6

The literature on central-bank reserve holdings is well-developed, and has identified a number of potential motives, which can be grouped into two broad categories, sometimes referred to as the “mercantilist” and “precautionary” views.7 According to the mercantilist view, a central bank that seeks to protect its tradable sector—and hence to prevent its exchange rate from appreciating—will tend to accumulate reserves when it is running a trade surplus.8

The precautionary view encompasses several mechanisms that can lead a central bank to stockpile reserves as a buffer against the risk of a future adverse shock. One version focuses on the potential for “sudden stops” in emerging markets—i.e., rapid reversals of external capital

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6 Kashyap and Stein (2023) argue that monetary policy should take account of its potential to contribute to overheating in credit markets when macroprudential regulation is imperfect. Greenwood, Hanson and Stein (2015) suggest that the Federal Reserve or the Treasury department should aim to reduce steepness at the front end of the yield curve in light of regulators’ inability to perfectly contain excessive short-term funding by financial intermediaries.

7 This terminology follows Aizenman and Lee (2007).

flows—and the role of reserves in mitigating the damage from such episodes. Another instead emphasizes the possibility that *domestic* depositors might attempt to flee the banking system by converting their local-currency-denominated deposits into foreign currency.

Our starting premise—that central banks hold dollar reserves to deal with the potential consequences arising from a currency mismatch on the part of their corporate sectors—can also be thought of as fitting within the broad precautionary view. In this regard, we are perhaps closest to recent work by Bocola and Lorenzoni (2020), who emphasize the same currency-mismatch motive. We differ from their paper in highlighting the joint roles of financial regulation and reserve holdings in shoring up financial stability, and in showing how the decisions of individual central banks lead to too little of the former and too much of the latter, relative to what a global planner would choose.

Our normative analysis also connects to the literature on international coordination in financial regulation. For example, we share the conclusion of Clayton and Schaab (2022) that individual countries acting on their own will tend to impose lower capital requirements on their domestic banks than is globally efficient. This externality motivates the need for international cooperation on the regulatory front, of the sort seen in the so-called Basel Process. However, a key distinction is that in our framework, such regulatory cooperation is not sufficient—there also needs to be a separate mechanism to restrain excessive reserve accumulation by central banks.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present some motivating evidence on the relationship between central bank holdings of dollar reserves and the dollar-denominated bank borrowing of their corporate sectors. In Section 3, we develop a single-country model in which the central bank can deal with the risks created by currency mismatch in one of two ways: by imposing stricter financial regulation, or by accumulating foreign-exchange

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10 This idea is developed in Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2010), who use M2/GDP as a proxy for the vulnerability of the domestic banking sector to such an “internal capital drain”.

11 Fanelli and Straub (2021) also build a model in which individual countries over-accumulate reserves relative to a global planner’s optimum. However, the mechanism in their model is quite different, and more “mercantilist” in nature—central bank reserve holdings are driven by a desire to stabilize exchange rate fluctuations.
reserves. In Section 4, we consider a global economy consisting of many such individual countries and explore the externalities that arise when regulatory policy and reserve holdings are determined at the country level, rather than by a global planner. Section 5 discusses some further extensions of our framework, and Section 6 concludes.

2. Motivating Evidence

Unlike much of the empirical work on foreign-exchange reserve holdings, our focus is on dollar reserves, as opposed to total reserves. This presents something of a data challenge, as the composition of central-bank reserves by currency is not available for all countries. Thus we begin with a panel of 53 non-U.S. and non-Eurozone countries for which we are able to break out the currency composition of reserve holdings, as well as compile a small set of covariates. We exclude the Eurozone countries because, to the extent that they all benefit from either explicit or implicit ECB support, it does not make sense to relate dollar reserve holdings measured at the individual-country level (e.g., dollar reserves on the books of the Bank of Italy) to country level measures of corporate-sector mismatch. The data on dollar reserve holdings is constructed from the union of data in IMF (2020) and Chinn et al (2021); Table A1 in Appendix A lists all of our data sources. Our unbalanced panel of 53 countries has 365 observations, covering the period 2013-2020. Of these 53 countries, 13 are classified by the IMF as advanced economies, 29 are classified as emerging economies, and 11 are classified as developing economies. Table A2 gives a full listing of the countries broken down by these categories.

Our basic objective is to relate a country’s dollar reserves to a measure of its private sector’s foreign currency mismatch. In thinking about how to best proxy for foreign currency mismatch, we are informed by the following observation: as a general matter, and likely in part as the result of regulation, banks tend not to run large outright currency mismatches on their own books; there is an extremely tight correlation between their dollar-denominated assets and liabilities. Rather,

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12 This number comes after discarding two observations that appear to be data errors—where the ratio of dollar reserves to total reserves is coded as either negative or as exceeding 100%.

13 For example, in our 365-observation panel, the correlation between the ratio of dollar-denominated bank assets to GDP and the ratio of dollar-denominated bank liabilities to GDP is 0.965. If we instead look at the 53 observations of
currency mismatch shows up to a greater extent on the balance sheets of the non-financial sector. As discussed in Gopinath and Stein (2021) and Gutiérrez, Ivashina and Salomao (2023), one way to think about this is that the exogenous variation in the data comes from the fact that the preference on the part of households for dollar-denominated assets is greater in some countries than others. And when a bank finds itself awash in dollar deposits, it seeks to reduce its own currency exposure by cutting the rates on dollar loans, thereby creating an incentive for the non-financial sector to borrow more aggressively in dollars.\footnote{Of course, in this case, while the banking sector may appear to be nominally currency hedged, it still bears a significant economic exposure to the dollar—when the dollar appreciates, more of its currency-mismatched borrowers will tend to default on their loans. However, for the purposes of measuring mismatch in the data, this line of argument suggests that we need to look to the balance sheets of the non-financial sector.}

With this observation in mind, one simple way to measure mismatch might be to look at the ratio of the dollar-denominated borrowing of the nonfinancial corporate sector to GDP. This would clearly be an imperfect proxy to the extent that it incorporates dollar-denominated borrowing by those firms (e.g., exporters) who may not actually be mismatched. It would in principle be better to capture only dollar-denominated borrowing by purely domestic non-tradable firms; unfortunately, we have been unable to create such a measure.

Moreover, even if we look at the aggregate nonfinancial sector, thereby blurring over this distinction, we face a further limitation: for our sample of 53 countries, we have available from the BIS complete data only on those dollar-denominated bank loans to the corporate sector that come from cross-border banks, i.e., banks headquartered outside the country in question. To get total dollar-denominated bank lending to the corporate sector in a given country, we need to add loans from local banks, but unfortunately, we only are able to obtain this local-lending data by currency for a smaller subsample of 21 countries, 10 of which are advanced economies and 11 of which are emerging economies.\footnote{The currency composition of banks’ local (as opposed to cross-border) claims is in many cases either not available or is treated as confidential by the BIS. Of the 46 countries that report banks’ local dollar claims to the BIS, only 8 are non-euro area countries whose data are non-confidential and where we also have the currency breakdown of reserves. For the remaining countries, the breakdown of local claims by currency is made available to the IMF from national monetary authorities.}

country-level averages, the correlation is 0.974. The data on total dollar-denominated bank assets and liabilities is from BIS Table A6.1.
As an admittedly second-best approach, and one that allows us to work with the larger 53-country sample, we use the cross-border lending data in what follows. In doing so, we draw some comfort from the fact that for the 21 countries where we can construct the preferred total (i.e., cross-border plus local) measure of dollar-denominated lending to the nonfinancial corporate sector, it has a correlation of 0.66 with cross-border dollar lending. If we break the data down further into advanced-economy and emerging-economy subsamples, the correlations are higher, at 0.89 and 0.73, respectively. Thus the cross-border lending data may be a tolerably good proxy for total dollar-denominated bank lending.

One reason why this might be the case is that if, say, the U.S.-based subsidiary of a U.K. bank holding company (for example, HSBC Bank USA, which is a subsidiary of U.K.-headquartered HSBC) makes a loan to a U.K. firm, this will be counted in the BIS data as a cross-border loan to the U.K. corporate sector, even though it is in effect a U.K.-headquartered bank holding company lending to a U.K.-domiciled firm. So some of what are categorized by the BIS Locational Banking Statistics as cross-border loans may be more closely connected to the domestic banking sector than the label might otherwise suggest. Nevertheless, the imperfect nature of our approach suggests caution in interpreting the results that follow; we cannot be sure that they would continue to hold with a more complete measure of dollar-denominated lending.16

With these caveats in mind, Figure 1 presents a first simple univariate visualization of our basic result. For each of the 53 countries in our baseline sample, we plot on the horizontal axis the time-averaged value of cross-border dollar bank loans to GDP, and on the vertical axis the time-averaged value of dollar reserves to GDP. As can be seen, there is a strong positive correlation between these two variables. The R-squared of the regression is 0.53, and the coefficient on the dollar bank loan variable is 5.3, with a t-statistic of 7.6, so that a one-percentage point increase in dollar loans to GDP is associated with a 5.3 percentage point increase in dollar reserves to GDP.

However, as Figure 1 also makes clear, this relationship is driven in important part by one data point—Hong Kong—which is an extreme outlier, with very large values of both dollar bank

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16 Also missing from our measure is dollar-denominated bond-market borrowing, which again we have not been able to assemble for many of the countries in our baseline sample. Though here the theoretical case for including it is arguably murkier, as it is less obvious that the central bank will find itself compelled to bail out bond-market investors as compared to commercial banks.
loans to GDP and dollar reserves to GDP. In Figure 2, we repeat the plot, this time excluding Hong Kong. While there is still a statistically significant relationship, it is considerably attenuated. Now the R-squared of the regression is only 0.083, and the slope coefficient falls to 1.3, with a t-statistic of 2.5. Thus to be conservative in the rest of what follows, we focus on a modified sample that excludes Hong Kong. To be clear, we have no compelling economic reason to do so, and, as the two figures suggest, our results would be stronger with Hong Kong included, but they would be less representative of the general tendencies in the data. Table 1 presents some basic summary statistics for this modified 52-country sample.

To get a better sense of where the correlation between dollar borrowing and dollar reserve holdings is coming from, in Figure 3 we repeat the graphical exercise for each of three subsamples separately: advanced, emerging and developing economies. As can be seen, the relationships are significant for both the advanced-economy (coefficient estimate of 3.7, t-statistic of 2.2, R-squared of 0.31) and emerging-economy subsamples (coefficient estimate of 2.4, t-statistic of 2.5, R-squared of 0.18). However, in the developing-economy subsample, there is no significant correlation, and the point estimate goes slightly in the wrong direction. Thus, our story does not seem to apply to the poorest countries. Of course, in a value-weighted sense, these countries loom less large than they do in our equal-weighted regressions, suggesting that we may nevertheless have something to say about the behavior of the most important holders of dollar reserves.

Table 2 explores these relationships in a series of regressions that exploit the full panel structure of our data, rather than just focusing on country averages. In columns (1)-(4), we run univariate panel regressions of dollar reserves to GDP against the ratio of cross-border dollar loans to nonfinancial firms divided by GDP, for the full sample, and the advanced, emerging and developing-economy subsamples, respectively. Consistent with the impressions from Figures 2 and 3, the results for the full sample and the advanced-economy subsample are significant at the

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17 It should be noted that the significant result for the advanced-economy subsample disappears if, in addition to removing Hong Kong, we also remove Switzerland from the sample. However, given the relatively small number of countries in this subsample, it is perhaps not surprising that the two most influential observations carry a lot of the explanatory weight.
10% level, while that for the emerging-economy subsample is significant at the 5% level.\textsuperscript{18} The developing-economy subsample by contrast yields a completely insignificant result.

In columns (5)-(8) we re-run the same regressions, adding several controls familiar from the literature on central-bank reserve holdings: the ratio of M2 to GDP following Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2010); a measure of financial openness following Chinn and Ito (2006); bilateral trade with the U.S. scaled by GDP; GDP per capita; and the log of population. Although these controls add substantially to the explanatory power of the regressions, they leave the coefficient estimates close to those in columns (1)-(4).

Finally, in columns (9)-(12), we add country fixed effects (this entails dropping China from the sample, as we only have one observation for China). Because all of the controls in columns (5)-(8) are nearly time-invariant for each country, we omit them in the fixed-effects regressions; however, this makes no meaningful difference to the results.\textsuperscript{19} However, because we are now isolating the time-variation in the data, we add a control for the nominal exchange rate, which turns out to be strongly significant in columns (9)-(11). However, even with this added control, the point estimates on our coefficient of interest are again quite similar and are now significant at the 5% level for the full sample as well as both the advanced and emerging-economy subsamples. In all three of these cases, the country fixed effects lead to R-squared values that are now in the neighborhood of 0.90. This suggests—not surprisingly—that the lion’s share of the variation in the data is between, rather than within countries.

In sum, for both advanced and emerging economies—though not for developing economies—there appears to be a meaningful correlation in the data between dollar-denominated borrowing by their nonfinancial corporate sectors, and dollar reserve holdings by their central banks. Of course, such correlations by themselves do not allow us to say anything about causation. So our empirical results should at most be interpreted as suggestive patterns, which we hope provide some broad-brush motivation for the model that we turn to next; they are certainly not intended as tight tests of any particular causal theory.

\textsuperscript{18} Standard errors in these regressions are clustered by country.
\textsuperscript{19} Another control that is sometimes seen in the literature is an indicator for whether a country anchors its currency to the dollar. However, in our sample this variable has literally no time variation at all. So, it is perfectly subsumed by our country fixed effects.
3. Optimal Regulation and Reserve Holdings in a Small Open Economy

We begin with a model of central bank regulatory policy and reserve holdings in a single small open economy that takes the dollar interest rate as given. The model, which builds on that in Gopinath and Stein (2018), has three types of agents: households, banks, and the central bank. Importantly, however, the agents we call “banks” should be interpreted as an aggregation of the intermediary sector and the non-financial firms that these intermediaries lend to. And as noted above, when we refer to currency mismatch in the “banking” sector in the model, the real-world counterpart is predominantly mismatch in the capital structure of non-financial firms.

3.1. Households

There are two dates in the model, given by time 0 and time 1. Households have linear utility over consumption at both dates. These households can save in three types of assets at time 0: home-currency-denominated safe assets, $D_h$, dollar-denominated safe assets, $D_s$, and home-currency equity $K$. The representative household consumes only home goods, and has utility given by:

$$U \equiv C_0 + \beta E[C_1] + \frac{\theta_d(D_s + D_h)}{f(D_s)} + f'(D_s)$$

where $f'(\cdot) > 0$ and $f''(\cdot) \leq 0$. The budget constraints are:

$$C_0 = Z - Q_sD_s - Q_hD_h - Q_KK$$

$$C_1 = \tilde{e}D_s + D_h + \pi - S_KR_s - \Omega(\tau)$$

where $Z$ is the initial household endowment in units of home goods, $Q_s$ and $Q_h$ are the prices of dollar and home-currency safe assets at time 0 respectively, and $Q_K$ is the time-0 price of a share that delivers an expected payoff of one at time 1. Note that $Q_s$, $Q_h$, and $Q_K$ are the reciprocals of one plus the required returns on dollar safe assets, home-currency safe assets, and home-currency equity, respectively. In addition, $\tilde{e}$ is the time-1 nominal exchange rate, $\pi$ is the time-1 profit of the banking sector (net of payments to depositors), $S_KR_s$ is the net transfer to foreigners on the central bank’s reserve position, and $\Omega(\tau)$ are deadweight costs of taxation; we show how these latter values are determined below. In period 0, the nominal exchange rate is given by 1.
The time-1 exchange rate, denoted by $\tilde{e}$, takes on the values $(1 - z)$ and $(1 + z)$, each with probability $\frac{1}{2}$. Our convention is that a higher value of $\tilde{e}$ represents an appreciation of the dollar relative to the home currency. The exchange rate is assumed to be exogenously determined, perhaps as the outcome of financial flows outside the model interacting with limited arbitrage capacity on the part of foreign-exchange traders, as in Gabaix and Maggiori (2015).

We also take households’ extra preference for dollar assets, as represented by $f(D_s)$, to be exogenous, as our interest is in seeing how banks and the central bank respond to the lower interest rate on dollar assets. Given that households consume only home goods, one might rationalize this assumption by arguing that their demand for dollar assets reflects a belief that these assets are “extra safe” and can be counted to pay off in full even in an (unmodelled) severe-disaster state of the world when countries other than the U.S. are unable to bail out their banking sectors.\(^{20}\)

The first order conditions of the household utility maximization problem yield:

$$Q_K = \beta, \quad Q_h = \beta + \theta_d, \quad Q_s = \beta + \theta_d + f'(D_s)$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

Home-currency assets, $D_h$ and $K$, are both manufactured locally, as the liabilities of the domestic banking sector. On the other hand, the demand for dollar-denominated assets, $D_s$, is satisfied both by imported dollar bonds (e.g., U.S. Treasury bonds), $X_s$, and by domestically-issued dollar-denominated bank liabilities, $B_s$. A small open economy takes the price of dollar bonds, $Q_s > \beta + \theta_d$, as exogenously given. The quantity of dollar savings by households $D_s$ is then pinned down by the exogenous global price.

### 3.2. Banks

There is a continuum of banks, with measure equal to one. At time 0, a bank raises funding from households and provides financing for a fixed quantity of projects given by $I$. To raise funds

\(^{20}\) This approach differs from that in Gopinath and Stein (2021), who endogenize the preference for dollar deposits by assuming that households that purchase more dollar-invoiced imported goods will have a stronger preference for dollar assets, since these serve as a hedge for them against changes in exchange rates.
for these projects, a bank relies on three types of securities: \( B_h, B_s \) and \( K \). Here, \( B_h \) denotes deposits denominated in home currency, \( B_s \) denotes deposits denominated in dollars, and \( K \) represents outside equity capital. Thus, the bank’s balance sheet at time 0 must satisfy:

\[
Q_s B_s + Q_h B_h + Q_K K = I
\]  

(5)

With probability \( q \), there is a banking crisis at time 1. In a crisis, the revenues of a fraction \( p \) of banks fall to zero, while the remainder stay solvent. Those banks whose revenues fall to zero must be bailed out by the government, meaning that the government has to pay off all depositors in full. For the moment, we assume that the probability of a crisis is independent of the exchange rate. We will revisit this assumption below and allow for some correlation between banking crises and exchange rates.

Both in and out of the crisis state, those banks whose revenues do not fall to zero—i.e., banks that are solvent—have sufficient gross revenues from their projects, which we denote by \( Y \), to pay off all depositors, independent of the realization of the exchange rate. However, if a bank is solvent, but the home currency depreciates, which happens with probability \( (1 – pq)/2 \), the resulting currency mismatch leads to liquidity-constraint costs for the banks and their customers of \( \gamma I \left( \frac{B_s}{I} \right)^2 = \frac{\gamma B_s^2}{I} \). Concretely, one can think of a currency-mismatched operating firm as having to cut back on positive-NPV investments when its debt-service costs increase due to a depreciation of the home currency relative to the dollar. The logic behind the specific functional form is that such costs scale linearly with project size \( I \) but are convex in the degree of capital-structure mismatch—i.e., the proportion of funding coming from dollar deposits, which is given by \( \frac{B_s}{I} \).

Thus, the ex-ante expected costs of mismatch (in time-1 units) are given by \( \frac{(1-pq)\gamma B_s^2}{2I} \).

Given its fixed scale, the bank’s problem is simply to minimize the sum of its expected funding and mismatch costs. Note that the bank only pays such costs when it is solvent, which happens with probability \( (1 – pq) \). Thus the bank’s problem is given by:
\[
\min_{B_S, B_h, K} (1 - pq) E \left[ \left( \delta B_S + B_h + K + \frac{\gamma B_S^2}{2f} \right) \right]
\]

The only constraint faced by banks, unless additional capital requirements are imposed by the central bank, is the time-0 balance sheet condition in (5). Therefore, we have that, with no regulations in place, banks adopt the following capital structure in an interior optimum:

\[
B_S^* = \frac{s_I}{\gamma}, \quad B_h^* = \frac{I - Q_h B_S^*}{Q_h}, \quad K^* = 0
\]

with \( S \equiv \left( \frac{Q_S}{Q_h} - 1 \right) \) denoting the interest-rate spread between domestic-currency and dollar-denominated deposits. Here and in what follows, a single-asterisk superscript (*) refers to a choice made by an unconstrained bank. Intuitively, dollar deposits are attractive to a bank to the extent that they have a lower interest rate than domestic deposits, with this spread given by \( S \). On the other hand, too much dollar borrowing increases mismatch, and the associated liquidity-constraint costs when the dollar appreciates, with the magnitude of this cost parameterized by \( \gamma \). And absent financial regulation, there is no motive in our simple model for the bank to finance itself with the more expensive equity capital.

3.3. Central Bank

To address the risk of having to bail out the banking sector, the central bank can in principle make use of three policy tools: (i) it can accumulate dollar reserves; (ii) it can regulate the equity capital of the banking sector; and (iii) it can regulate the deposit mix of the banking sector, i.e., the relative proportions of dollar-denominated and home-currency denominated deposits. We discuss each of these tools in turn.

**Dollar Reserve Holdings** The central bank purchases dollar-denominated reserves, \( R_S \), paying \( Q_S R_S \) at time 0. We assume that in doing so, it holds the overall size of its balance sheet constant, and finances the purchase by selling off other assets (e.g., a portfolio of global stocks)
that yield an equity-like rate of return. This implies that the central bank earns an expected negative return (in time-1 units) of $S_K R_s \equiv \left( \frac{q_s}{\beta} - 1 \right) R_s$ on its reserve holdings, with $S_K$ denoting the spread between the rate of return on equity and the safe dollar interest rate.\footnote{An alternative approach is to assume that the central bank expands its balance sheet by issuing local-currency-denominated money to finance its reserve purchases, in which case the relevant carry cost is reduced, and is given by $S_R$ instead of $S_K R_s$. All of our results carry through in this case, although when we analyze global externalities it is less clean, because various transfer terms between the U.S. and other countries do not cancel out as completely.} This negative return amounts to a net transfer to foreigners (e.g. to the U.S. Treasury or other non-domestic issuers of dollar-denominated securities) and so reduces the time-1 consumption of the household sector. We assume that this expected cost associated with the negative carry on reserves does not involve any distortionary taxation.

However, if there is a banking crisis, the central bank has to bail out depositors either by raising taxes on domestic residents, or by using the net profits (or losses) it earns on its reserve holdings. We assume that in the crisis state, fiscal capacity is limited, and the deadweight costs of any incremental taxation are convex and are given by $\psi \tau^2$, where $\tau$ is the tax that is raised.

Putting it together, the central bank chooses $R_s$ to minimize the sum of reserve carrying costs $S_K R_s$ and deadweight costs of taxation $\Omega(\tau)$:

$$\min_{R_s} S_K R_s + \Omega(\tau) = S_K R_s + \frac{\psi q}{2} \left[ \left( p B_h + (1 + z) p B_s - z R_s \right)^2 + \left( p B_h + (1 - z) p B_s + z R_s \right)^2 \right] \quad \text{(8)}$$

This leads to the following expression for optimal reserve holdings in an interior solution:

$$R_s^{**} = p B_s - \frac{S_K}{2 q z^2 \psi} \quad \text{(9)}$$

Here and in what follows, a double-asterisk superscript ($^{**}$) refers to a choice made by the central bank. The expression in (9) holds true for any value of $B_s$. If there is no financial regulation, then $B_s$ is given by the bank’s choice in (7), and reserves satisfy $R_s^{**} = p B_s^{**} - \frac{S_K}{2 q z^2 \psi} = \frac{p S_l}{\gamma} - \frac{S_K}{2 q z^2 \psi}$. If...
there is regulation, $B^*_S$ may or may not be lower, depending on the form of regulation, as we show below. Either way, the logic behind (9) is intuitive: in the limit where taxation is very expensive (as $\psi$ goes to infinity) the central bank holds sufficient reserves $pB_S$ to fund a bailout entirely via reserves, without resorting to taxation. As deadweight costs of taxation decline, the central bank relies less on reserves and more on taxation, particularly to the extent that the carrying cost $S_K$ of reserve holdings is significant.

It is worth being clear on the precise mechanism that makes dollar-denominated reserves attractive to the central bank in our model. The motive is one of risk management: dollar-denominated reserves allow the central bank to *transfer wealth across states of the world* and, crucially, to leave itself with more wealth when the dollar has appreciated. This is of value because: (i) the cost of bailing out dollar-denominated deposits is higher in this state; and (ii) there are convex costs of financing the bailout with taxation.\(^{22}\)

One implication of this observation is that central-bank swap lines cannot serve as a substitute for dollar reserves. A swap line from the Federal Reserve to another country’s central bank does not enable a transfer of wealth across states; rather it is an ex post liquidity-provision mechanism that just allows the recipient central bank to borrow dollars on a collateralized basis *against whatever wealth it already has in that state*. Thus swap lines and reserves serve entirely different purposes in our setting.

**Capital Requirements** If the central bank imposes a capital requirement of $K''$, this will act as a constraint on the *sum* of home-currency and dollar-denominated borrowing. However, the central bank cannot control these components individually. Moreover, we can see from the bank’s first-order condition in (7) that in an interior optimum, its choice of dollar borrowing $B^*_S = \frac{S_I}{\gamma}$ is independent of the total amount of deposit funding raised. Therefore, it follows that a capital requirement will not change dollar borrowing and can be thought of as equivalent to the regulator

\(^{22}\) This logic is exactly parallel to the theory of risk management for non-financial firms developed by Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), who argue that costly external finance makes firms want to transfer wealth to states where internal resources are scarce relative to investment opportunities. Here, convex costs of taxation for the sovereign simply take the place of costly external finance for firms.
simply picking a reduced value of home currency borrowing $B_h$. It then further follows that a capital requirement will not change the central bank’s desired reserve holdings, since from (9) these are only influenced by dollar borrowing and are unrelated to home-currency deposits.

To solve for the central bank’s optimal choice of $B_h$, we need to write down the planner’s problem. To do so, note that we can write:

$$C_0 = Z – I – Q_s(D_s – B_s) – Q_h(D_h – B_h) \tag{10}$$

$$E[C_1] = Y + (D_s – B_s) + (D_h – B_h) – \frac{(1 – pq)\gamma B_s^2}{2l} – S_K R_s – \Omega(\tau) \tag{11}$$

Note that (10) follows from (2), combined with the bank’s balance-sheet constraint in (5). And (11) reflects the fact that consumption at time 1 is the sum of: (i) the net profits of the banks (gross revenues $Y$, less the repayment of their borrowings, less the liquidity-constraint costs incurred in the event of local-currency depreciation); (ii) the deposit savings that households have accumulated; minus (iii) the carrying costs of central-bank reserve holdings and the deadweight costs of taxation, which are ultimately borne by households.

So overall, social welfare $W$ can be written as (neglecting the exogenous terms $Z$, $I$ and $Y$):

$$W = -Q_s(D_s – B_s) – Q_h(D_h – B_h) + \beta\{(D_s – B_s) + (D_h – B_h)\} + \theta_d(D_s + D_h) + f(D_s) – \beta\left\{\frac{(1 – pq)\gamma B_s^2}{2l} + (S_K R_s + \Omega(\tau))\right\} \tag{12}$$

This can be simplified to:

$$W = B_s(Q_s – \beta) + B_h(Q_h – \beta) + (f(D_s) – D_s f'(D_s)) – \beta\left\{\frac{(1 – pq)\gamma B_s^2}{2l} + S_K R_s + \Omega(\tau)\right\} \tag{13}$$
The first three terms in (13) have an intuitive interpretation. The first two are the bank’s excess profits from borrowing with dollar and home-currency deposits respectively, rather than by issuing equity. The third is related to the utility created for households from their holdings of dollar assets.

Importantly, this third term is exogenous from the perspective of a small-country planner since households’ dollar asset holdings are pinned down by the exogenous $Q_s$ and are thus invariant to any policies that the planner implements. So, in the small-country case, the planner’s problem boils down to maximizing local welfare $W_L$, given by:

$$W_L = B_s(Q_s - \beta) + B_h(Q_h - \beta) - \beta \left\{ \frac{(1-pq)\gamma B^2_s}{2l} + S_K R_s + \Omega(\tau) \right\}$$ (14)

A local planner who controls only capital requirements effectively picks $B_h$ to maximize this objective function. In this case, the optimal value of $B_h$ in an interior optimum is given by:

$$B_h^{**} = \left( \frac{Q_h - \beta}{2\beta \psi q p^2} - B_s \right).$$ (15)

If the regulator does not control $B_s$ directly, it continues to be given by the bank’s optimum of $B_s^* = \frac{S_I}{\gamma}$. From adding up, this implies that the capital requirement is given by $K^{**} = \frac{1 - Q_s B_s^* - Q_h B_h^{**}}{Q_K}$. And from (9), this implies that reserves are unchanged from the unregulated case and are again given by: $R_s^{**} = p B_s^* - \frac{S_K}{2 q z^2 \psi} = \frac{p S_I}{\gamma} - \frac{S_K}{2 q z^2 \psi}$.

**Funding Regulation** Finally, we consider the case where a planner can also control a bank’s funding mix—its proportions of dollar and local-currency deposits—in addition to its capital ratio. We do so in order to draw out the logic of the model more fully, and to provide a benchmark that will be useful when we move to the general-equilibrium version of the model where dollar interest rates are endogenous. At the same time, we are mindful of the fact that this case almost surely overstates the scope of financial regulation in the real world. As we have
emphasized, the empirical reality is that the vast majority of currency mismatch occurs on the balance sheets of non-financial firms, where traditional regulatory tools do not reach.23

With that caveat in place, this case is equivalent to the planner picking both $B_s^*$ and $B_h$ to maximize $W_L$ as given in (14). The first order condition for $B_s^*$ in an interior optimum is:

$$B_s^{**} = \frac{(Q - \beta) - 2\psi q p^2 \beta B_h^{**} + 2\psi q p^2 \beta R_h^{**}}{\beta (1 - pq) \gamma + 2\psi q p^2 (1 + z^2)}$$

(16)

The first-order conditions for $B_h$ and $R_s$ continue to be given by equations (15) and (9), respectively. These three equations (i.e., (16), (15), and (9)) can then be solved jointly to yield expressions for the three policy variables as functions of the primitive parameters.

3.4. Banking and Currency Crises are Correlated

Thus far, we have been assuming that the probability of a banking crisis is independent of the exchange rate. This is likely to be too simplistic, as banking crises often coincide with large depreciations of the local currency (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1998). We can easily extend our framework to capture such a correlation. To do so, assume that there is an increased probability ($q + h$) of a banking crisis when the exchange rate is $(1 + z)$, i.e., when the local currency depreciates against the dollar. And symmetrically, there is a reduced probability ($q - h$) of a banking crisis when the exchange rate is $(1 - z)$. All else is the same as before. Here the parameter $h$ is a measure of the strength of the correlation between exchange rates and banking crises; note that this setup nests our previous no-correlation case if $h = 0$. With these assumptions in place, we can re-derive our various results. First, we have that an unregulated bank now sets:

$$B_s^* = \frac{I((1 - q)S + hpz)}{(1 - p(q + h))y}$$

(17)

---

23 As Acharya, Cecchetti, De Gregorio, Kalemli-Ozcan, Lane, and Panizza (2015) put it: “Policymakers have a challenging task controlling these risks [arising from mismatch on the part of non-financial firms] directly, as it is difficult to intervene to reduce the external foreign-currency borrowing by what are generally unregulated institutions.”
Relative to the previous solution given in equation (7), the primary change is the addition of the \( h_pz \) term in the numerator of (17). This is a moral hazard effect—since the bank is more likely to default when the dollar has appreciated, it effectively has a call option on the dollar in the crisis state. So, dollar borrowing is increased in this version of the model. A second mechanical effect of the reformulation is that there are fewer states of the world with no crisis and a stronger dollar, so expected mismatch costs are not as important, which also increases dollar borrowing.

The central bank now sets:

\[
R_{t}^{*} = \frac{p(B_s + B_h)}{qz} + pB_s - \frac{S_K}{2qz^2\psi}
\]  

(18)

As compared to the no-correlation case in equation (9), central bank reserves are potentially much higher, by an amount \( \frac{p(B_s + B_h)}{qz} \), and are now influenced by both dollar and home-currency bank deposits, though the effect of the former is still stronger. This is because of an additional risk-management motive, beyond the one identified previously. Now, when there is a banking crisis, we know the dollar is more likely to have strengthened than to have weakened. So, holding dollar reserves is a good way to hedge the possibility of having to bail out both dollar and home-currency deposits. In the zero-correlation case, there was no motive to hedge home-currency deposits with dollar reserves, because the central bank was equally likely to have to bail out these home-currency deposits if the dollar strengthened or weakened.

One implication of this observation is that in the case with correlation between banking crises and exchange rates, any kind of financial regulation that reduces bank deposits of either type will be associated with a decline in reserve holdings. Importantly, this was not true in the zero-correlation case, where capital regulation alone had no impact on reserve holdings.

The local planner's objective function is now given by:

\[
W_L = B_s(Q_s - \beta) + B_h(Q_h - \beta) - \beta\{(1 - p(q + h))B^2_s/2I + S_K R_s + \Omega(\tau)\}
\]

(19)

where deadweight costs of taxation can now be written as:
\[ \Omega(\tau) = \frac{\psi}{2} \left( (q + h)(pB_h + (1 + z)pB_s - zR_s)^2 + (q - h)(pB_h + (1 - z)pB_s + zR_s)^2 \right) \] (20)

If the central bank sets just capital requirements, i.e., it just controls \( B_h \), it sets:

\[
B_h^{**} = \frac{(Qh - \beta)}{2\beta \psi q p^2} - \left( 1 + \frac{zh}{q} \right) B_s + \frac{zh}{pq} R_s, \quad (21)
\]

with \( B_s \) and \( R_s \) given by equations (17) and (18) respectively.

If in addition, the central bank controls the funding mix, i.e., it also chooses \( B_s \), we have:

\[
B_s^{**} = \frac{(Qs - \beta)}{\left( \frac{\beta (1 - p(q + h))}{q} \right)^p \psi q p^2 B_s + 2z \frac{(b + z)}{q} \psi q p \beta R_s + \psi q p \beta R_s}{(Qs - \beta) - 2(q + zh) \psi q p^2 B_s + 2z \frac{(b + z)}{q} \psi q p \beta R_s}, \quad (22)
\]

and in this case the full solution is given by equations (18), (21) and (22).

**Numerical Example:** Set the parameter values as follows: \( I = 100; \beta = 0.9; \theta_d = 0.045; p = 0.25; z = 0.75; q = 0.1; h = 0.07; \gamma = 0.06; \psi = 0.053; \) and \( Q_s = 0.97 \). In this case, the solutions to the model are given in Table 3 below.

**Table 3: Numerical Example**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Regulation</th>
<th>Capital Regulation Only</th>
<th>Capital and Funding Regulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( B_s )</td>
<td>67.744</td>
<td>67.744</td>
<td>14.505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( B_h )</td>
<td>36.284</td>
<td>26.528</td>
<td>79.766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( K )</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10.245</td>
<td>11.724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R_s )</td>
<td>28.165</td>
<td>25.888</td>
<td>12.578</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The parameters in the example are such that absent any regulation (column 1 of the table), banks finance themselves with more dollar-denominated deposits than local currency deposits. In this case, the only policy tool the central bank has available is to accumulate dollar reserves, which take on a value of 28.17, relative to private-sector investment of 100. In column 2, we allow the central bank to impose capital regulation, and it sets a capital requirement of approximately 10.25%. With this capital requirement in place—and given that we have assumed a modest correlation between banking crises and exchange rates—dollar reserve holdings fall to 25.89, even though dollar deposits are unchanged, so that the capital requirement only crowds out local-currency deposits. Finally, in column 3, we further allow the central bank to control the volume of dollar deposits directly. When given this power, it keeps the capital requirement roughly the same as in column 2, but significantly cuts back on dollar deposits relative to local-currency deposits. This in turn allows it to further economize on dollar reserve holdings, which decline to 12.58.

To summarize the analysis to this point: we have developed a relatively bare-bones model of how a small open-economy central bank can attempt to mitigate the costs of banking crises that are associated with currency mismatch on the part of the private sector. The central bank can do so either by accumulating dollar reserves, or by imposing various forms of financial regulation. There is an intuitive tradeoff between these tools: when we give the central bank more scope to deploy regulatory measures, it holds less in the way of reserves.

However, all of this is in a partial equilibrium setting where the small-country central bank takes the interest rate on dollar-denominated assets to be exogenous, and the supply of these assets to be perfectly elastic. We next turn to the question of global externalities, asking whether a planner who internalizes the general-equilibrium effects would strike the balance between regulation and reserve accumulation differently.

4. Global Externalities from Reserve Accumulation

4.1. Basic Setup

We now assume that the global economy consists of a unit measure of identical small countries indexed by $i \in [0,1]$, as well as the United States. We continue to allow for a correlation
between banking crises and exchange rates, as in the latter part of the previous section. However, to highlight most starkly the externality of interest, we further assume that: (i) all countries draw the same exchange rate, $\tilde{\epsilon}$, against the dollar; and (ii) the occurrence of banking crises is perfectly correlated across countries. These assumptions have the effect of making all risks non-diversifiable, so absent a pecuniary externality with respect to the dollar interest rate, there would be no reason for a global planner to choose a different level of reserve holdings than a local planner. Clearly, if risks are imperfectly correlated across countries, there can be an additional risk-sharing motive for economizing on reserve holdings, but we neutralize this motive for the time being and return to it in the next section.

We focus on symmetric outcomes, so now when we refer to any given endogenous variable (e.g., $B_s$), this should be interpreted as representing the common value of this variable across countries. We can then write aggregate welfare among the mass of small countries as:

$$W_L = B_s(Q_s - \beta) + B_h(Q_h - \beta) + (f(D_s) - D_s f'(D_s)) - \beta[(1 - p(q + \tilde{h})) \gamma B_s^2 / 2I + S_K R_s + \Omega(\tau)]$$

(23)

However to capture all elements of global welfare, we also have to consider the welfare of the U.S., which issues an exogenous quantity of Treasury securities, $X_s$, at time 0 at a price of $Q_s$. Thus the U.S. takes in $Q_s X_s$ at time 0, and pays out $X_s$ at time 1 to those investors that bought the Treasuries, i.e., to investors in the other small countries. Hence U.S. welfare is given by:

$$W_{US} = X_s (Q_s - \beta)$$

(24)

And global welfare is:

$$W_G \equiv W_L + W_{US} = X_s(Q_s - \beta) + B_s(Q_s - \beta) + B_h(Q_h - \beta) + (f(D_s) - D_s f'(D_s)) - \beta[(1 - p(q + \tilde{h})) \gamma B_s^2 / 2I + S_K R_s + \Omega(\tau)]$$

(25)

The global market clearing conditions are given by:
\[ B_S + X_S = R_S + D_S \]  
\[ (26) \]

\[ D_{hi} = B_{hi} \]  
\[ (27) \]

Equation (26) says that the total supply of dollar assets—which comes from either external sources, or from dollar-denominated deposits in non-U.S. banks—must equal the demand for such assets, which comes from both households and central-bank reserve managers. Equation (27) is an analogous market-clearing condition for local-currency safe assets, but in this case stating that household demand for local-currency safe assets can only be satisfied by local banks. Note that this second market-clearing condition has to hold country-by-country, as opposed to globally.

In what follows, we specialize households’ utility function from dollar assets, so that it is quadratic in nature. This will allow us to continue writing down all first-order conditions in closed form. In particular, we assume that:

\[ f(D_S) = \theta_{s1} D_S - \frac{1}{2} \theta_{s2} D_S^2 \]  
\[ (28) \]

Under this specification, we can express the price of safe dollar assets as:

\[ Q_S = \beta + \theta_d + \theta_{s1} - \theta_{s2} D_S, \]  
\[ (29) \]

where we assume that \( \frac{\theta_{s1}}{\theta_{s2}} \) is large enough that the dollar interest rate is always lower than the domestic-currency interest rate in equilibrium. It follows that the spreads \( S \) and \( S_K \) are given by:

\[ S = \frac{\theta_{s1} - \theta_{s2} (X_S + B_S - R_S)}{\beta + \theta_d} \]  
\[ (30) \]

\[ S_K = \frac{\theta_d + \theta_{s1} - \theta_{s2} (X_S + B_S - R_S)}{\beta} = \left(1 + \frac{\theta_d}{\beta}\right) S + \frac{\theta_d}{\beta} \]  
\[ (31) \]
4.2. Global Equilibrium When Reserves and Capital Are Chosen Locally

We begin by solving for the global equilibrium—now with endogenous values of the interest-rate spread spreads $S$ and $S_K$—that arises when each country sets reserve holdings and capital requirements locally, ignoring their impact on the aggregate supply of dollar claims and hence on $S$ and $S_K$. In Appendix B.1, we show that in this case, one can solve out the model in terms of primitive parameters to obtain the following expressions for $B^*_S$, $R^{**}_S$, and $S^{**}$:

\[ B^*_S = a_1 S^{**} + a_2 \]  \hspace{1cm} (32)

\[ R^{**}_S = b_1 S^{**} + b_2 \]  \hspace{1cm} (33)

\[ S^{**} = \frac{\theta S_1 - \theta S_2 (x^*_S + a_2 - b_2)}{\beta + \theta d + \theta S_2 (a_1 - b_1)} \]  \hspace{1cm} (34)

where the constants $a_1$, $a_2$, $b_1$ and $b_2$, all expressed in terms of primitive parameters, are defined in Appendix B.1, and where $S^{**}$ denotes the equilibrium interest-rate spread that arises under the decentralized equilibrium. And once we have pinned down $B^*_S$ and $R^{**}_S$ the equilibrium value of $B^*_h$ follows from equation (21).

4.2. Equilibrium With a Global Planner

We now turn to the case where a global planner sets both reserve holdings and capital requirements. The crucial difference in this case is that a global planner recognizes that the choice of $R_S$ impacts the dollar interest rate, and hence the interest rate spreads $S$ and $S_K$, as can be seen in equations (30) and (31). To see this explicitly, we can take the global planner’s first order condition for $R_S$. To simplify matters, note that given that: (i) $\beta S_K R_S = R_S (Q_S - \beta)$; and (ii) $(B_S + X_S - R_S = D_S)$, we can re-write global welfare as:

\[ W_G = D_S (Q_S - \beta) + B_h (Q_h - \beta) + \left( f(D_S) - f'(D_S) \right) - \beta \left( (1 - p(q + h)) \gamma B^2_S / 2I + \Omega(\tau) \right) \]  \hspace{1cm} (35)
The first order condition is then given by:

\[
\frac{dW_G}{dR} = \frac{d}{dR_s}(D_s(Q_s - \beta)) + \frac{d}{dR_s}(f(D_s) - D_sf'(D_s)) - \beta \frac{d}{dR_s}\left(\frac{(1 - p(q + h))yB_s^2}{2l}\right)
\]

\[-\beta \frac{d}{dR_s} \Omega(\tau) = 0
\]

(36)

where the four individual components of (36) can be expressed as:

\[
\frac{d}{dR_s}(D_s(Q_s - \beta)) = (\phi - 1)(Q_s - \beta) + D_s(\theta \psi_2(1 - \phi))
\]

(37)

\[
\frac{d}{dR_s}(f(D_s) - D_sf'(D_s)) = -(1 - \phi)\theta \psi_2D_s
\]

(38)

\[
\frac{d}{dR_s}\left(\frac{\beta(1 - p(q + h))yB_s^2}{2l}\right) = -\frac{\phi\beta(1 - p(q + h))yB_s}{l}
\]

(39)

\[
\frac{d}{dR_s}(-\beta \Omega(\tau)) = -2\psi\beta(\phi q p^2 - zhp(1 - p\phi))(B_h + B_s) - 2\psi\beta(\phi z p h - q z^2(1 - p\phi))(pB_s - R_s)
\]

(40)

and where:

\[
\phi \equiv \frac{dB_s}{dR_s} = \frac{\theta \psi_2 l(1 - qp)}{y (1 - p(q + h))(\beta + \theta_d) + \frac{\theta \psi_2 l(1 - qp)}{y}} < 1
\]

(41)

To understand why the global planner’s solution differs from that with a local planner, note that by netting the second term in (37) against (38)—and thereby eliminating pure transfer effects—we can re-write \(\frac{dW_G}{dR_s}\) as:
Equation (42), which is derived in more detail in Appendix B.2, highlights the core intuition for the results that follow. The first two terms in (42) represent the first-order condition for a local planner, who trades off the fact that more reserves entail a carry cost (the first term), but reduce deadweight costs of taxation (the second term). The remaining three terms capture the wedge between the local planner and the global planner. Crucially, this wedge arises only to the extent that \( \phi \equiv \frac{dI}{dR} > 0 \), i.e., to the extent that a change in aggregate central-bank reserve holdings influences dollar interest rates and hence dollar mismatch by banks. In this case, three additional terms come into play.

The first term inside the wedge, \( (Q_s - \beta) \), is positive, pushing the global planner to actually prefer more reserves than the local planner. This reflects the fact that, via a lower interest rate, more reserves mean more aggregate dollar borrowing in equilibrium, which all else equal increases the supply of safe assets, and thereby increases household utility. A local planner does not take this effect into account since they behave as if the supply of safe assets is infinitely elastic.

The second two terms inside the wedge are negative, leading the global planner to prefer a lower value of reserves than the local planner. These terms capture the idea that an interest-rate-induced change in mismatch matters to the global planner because it in turn has knock-on implications for mismatch-related liquidity costs, as well as for deadweight costs of taxation.

Based on this logic, we have:

**Proposition 1**: If, when evaluated at the local planner’s optimum, it is the case that

\[
\left( (Q_s^{**} - \beta) - \frac{\beta(1-p(q+h))yB_s^*}{l} - \beta \frac{\partial \alpha}{\partial B_s} \right) < 0,
\]

then \( R_s^{***} < R_s^{**} \), i.e. the global planner chooses a lower level of reserves than the local planner.
The proposition follows directly from equation (42). First, by definition, at the local planner’s optimum, the first two terms in (42), which represent the local planner’s first-order condition, sum to zero. This leaves the three terms that enter the wedge between the global planner’s and the local planner’s first order conditions. The first term, \((Q_S - \beta)\), will lead the global planner to want to increase reserves from its level under the local planner’s optimum. By contrast, the latter two terms, \(-\frac{\beta(1-p(q+h))yB_S}{I}\) and \(-\beta \frac{\partial \phi}{\partial B_S}\), will lead the global planner to want to reduce reserves from this level. These latter two effects will tend to overwhelm the former if: (i) \(\beta\) is large relative to \(Q_S\); or (ii) either mismatch costs or deadweight costs of taxation, as proxied by \(\gamma\) and \(\psi\), respectively, are large enough. If so, then starting at the local planner’s optimum it will be the case that \(\frac{dW_G}{dR_S} < 0\), meaning that the global planner will wish to reduce reserves below the local planner’s optimum value.

It turns out that there is a very natural way to think about the condition in Proposition 1. In Appendix B.5, we show that it can alternatively be stated as follows:

**Proposition 2**: Suppose a more-empowered local planner could choose a value of \(B_S\) directly. Define mismatch as socially excessive if, when starting from the local planner’s optimum, such an empowered local planner would choose a lower value than the bank’s privately optimal value \(B_S^*\). If mismatch is socially excessive in this sense, then \(R_S^{***} < R_S^{**}\), i.e. a less-empowered global planner who cannot set \(B_S\) directly chooses a lower level of reserves than the local planner.

Proposition 2 reflects the observation that the only reason a global planner differs from a local planner is that the global planner recognizes that \(\phi \equiv \frac{dB_S}{dR_S} > 0\). Therefore the global planner will want to restrain reserve accumulation if and only if the ultimate goal is to reduce \(B_S\).

Regarding capital regulation, recall that capital regulation is equivalent to picking a value of domestic-currency deposits \(B_H\). It is easy to show that the global planner’s first-order condition for this variable is identical to that of an individual central bank as given in (21). Domestic-currency deposits do not affect the externalities we are focused on, since these externalities involve
only the quantity and price of dollar-denominated assets. So, holding all else fixed, there is no motive for a global planner’s behavior to diverge from that of a local planner. Similarly, given that we are studying the case with only capital regulation, the value of dollar-denominated deposits \( B_\$ \) continues to be chosen by the banks themselves. So the relevant first-order condition for \( B_\$ \) is again given by (17). Of course, while the partial-equilibrium first-order conditions are the same, the ultimate general-equilibrium values of \( B_h \) and \( B_\$ \) will differ with a global planner, because they depend on the planner’s choice of \( R_\$ \) and the resulting value of \( S \).

Putting it all together, the solutions for the global-planner case, which we denote with triple-asterisk superscripts (***) are obtained by combining (17), (21), and (36), along with the formula for the spread \( S \) given in (30) and expressing everything in terms of primitive parameters. In Appendix B.6, we derive:

\[
B_\$^{***} = a_1 S^{***} + a_2
\]

(43)

\[
R_\$^{***} = b_3 S^{***} + b_4
\]

(44)

\[
S^{***} = \frac{\theta_{51} - \theta_{52}(x_\$ + a_2 - b_4)}{\beta + \theta_{d} + \theta_{52}(a_1 - b_3)}
\]

(45)

where \( a_1, a_2, b_3 \) and \( b_4 \) are given in Appendix B.6. We use these expressions to compute the numerical examples below.

**4.3. When Regulators Can Control Mismatch Directly**

Next, we consider the scenario where central banks have all three regulatory instruments at their disposal: reserves, capital requirements, and regulation of the dollar funding mix. In other words, we now allow both local central banks, as well as the global planner, to select their preferred values of all of \( R_\$, B_\$ \) and \( B_h \), as opposed to optimizing solely over \( R_\$ \) and \( B_h \). Here we have the following result, which is proven in Appendix B.5.

**Proposition 3:** When regulators can directly control dollar mismatch \( B_\$ \), the outcome is the same under a global planner as under decentralized regulation by individual central banks.
The intuition for this proposition also follows directly from equation (42), and the observation that a wedge between a local planner and a global planner in choosing an optimal level of reserves only arises to the extent that the level of reserves indirectly influences dollar mismatch via its effect on the dollar interest rate—i.e., to the extent that $\phi \equiv \frac{dB_S}{dR_S} > 0$. If, by contrast, regulators can set $B_S$ directly, this effectively makes $\phi = \frac{dB_S}{dR_S} = 0$, thereby eliminating the wedge between a local planner and the global planner. In Appendix B.5, we formally demonstrate that in this case, all the first-order conditions characterizing the decisions of individual central banks are identical to those characterizing the decisions of the global planner.

Again, we stress that we do not believe that the case where regulators can control $B_S$ directly is an accurate description of reality. As a practical matter, it would require an ability to dictate the capital-structure choices of those non-financial firms that engage in mismatched dollar borrowing, something that seems beyond the reach of traditional bank-centric regulatory tools. But this case highlights a key piece of economics, namely that the externality in reserve accumulation that we have been focused on only arises in the presence of imperfect regulation, and as such, relies on a second-best kind of logic. This general insight—that, when regulatory tools are imperfect, policymakers have to consider the indirect impact of interest rates on various financial-stability considerations—applies in other settings as well, including monetary policy and purely domestic bank liquidity regulation (Kashyap and Stein 2023; Greenwood, Hanson and Stein 2015).

**Numerical Example (continued):** Set the parameter values as follows: $I = 100; \beta = 0.9; \theta_d = 0.045; p = 0.25; z = 0.75; q = 0.1; h = 0.07; \gamma = 0.06; \psi = 0.053$. Unlike in the partial-equilibrium case, $Q_S$ is no longer exogenous. Rather, we have to specify three further parameters that now serve to pin it down. To do so, we set: $\theta_{s1} = 0.11666; \theta_{s2} = 0.0009; \text{and } X_S = 60$. These values are chosen so that, in the case where local central banks choose reserve holdings and capital requirements, $Q_S$ endogenously turns out to be about 0.97, consistent with the value in the partial-equilibrium version of the example in Table 3.
Table 4: Numerical Example

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Regulation or Reserve Holdings</th>
<th>Local Planners Set Reserves and Capital</th>
<th>Global Planner Sets Reserves and Capital</th>
<th>Planner Also Sets Funding Mix</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$Q_s$</td>
<td>0.961</td>
<td>0.970</td>
<td>0.967</td>
<td>0.986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S$</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$B_s$</td>
<td>51.744</td>
<td>67.737</td>
<td>63.140</td>
<td>37.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$B_R$</td>
<td>53.196</td>
<td>26.538</td>
<td>17.923</td>
<td>45.243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10.242</td>
<td>24.422</td>
<td>22.996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R_s$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25.888</td>
<td>18.447</td>
<td>12.536</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 summarizes this example, showing how all the endogenous variables are affected as we consider different policy regimes. Column 1 displays the outcomes for a completely unregulated economy, in which there are no reserve holdings or capital requirements. Column 2 examines the case where policies are set by local central banks, which control both reserve holdings and capital requirements. (Note that column 2 of Table 4 is identical, up to rounding error, to column 2 of Table 3 from the partial-equilibrium case.) Column 3 asks what happens when instead the global planner chooses reserve holdings. And finally, column 4 shows the outcome when a regulator—either local or global—can control reserves, capital, and the funding mix.

One policy-relevant comparison in the table is between columns 2 and 3 of Table 4, which contrasts local central-bank determination of reserves and capital requirements with the globally coordinated solution. One can see that in the latter case, reserve holdings decline markedly, from 25.89 to 18.45. At the same time, the capital requirement becomes much stricter, with $K$ rising from 10.24 to 24.42. This comparison highlights our central point: when regulation is imperfect, so that dollar borrowing cannot be directly controlled, a global planner prefers tougher capital regulation and less reserve accumulation than does a local central bank. And as a result of the

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24 Interestingly, in our model, once the global planner has set reserve holdings, the choice of the capital requirement can be decentralized back to the local central banks. Of course, in a richer and more realistic setting, there are good reasons why international coordination in setting capital requirements may have additional value. See, e.g., Clayton and Schaab (2022).
reduced reserve holdings, the interest rate spread $S$ is lower—i.e. the dollar interest rate is higher—in the global-planner regime. One important consequence of this drop in $S$ is that even though regulation cannot control banks’ dollar borrowing $B_S$ directly, dollar borrowing is nevertheless meaningfully reduced, from 67.74 to 63.14, in the global-planner case. This is because the incentive for banks to borrow in dollars declines when the dollar interest rate goes up.

Column 4 of Table 4 makes the point that when regulators can in fact control dollar borrowing $B_S$ directly, they make aggressive use of this authority, knocking it down to 37.08. Having done so, they are content to operate with lower levels of both reserves and capital as compared to the case in column 3. Also noteworthy is that with less dollar borrowing, the dollar interest rate is now significantly lower, as can be seen in the elevated value of $S$ in column 4.

Table 5 presents a detailed welfare decomposition, showing how each component of aggregate social welfare varies across the policy regimes. The values are normalized so that total welfare in the case without regulation or reserve holdings is equal to 100.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5: Welfare Decomposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Regulation or Reserve Holdings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small-Country Welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Profits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH Utility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserves Carry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing columns 2 and 3 of the table, we can see how moving from the local to globally coordinated regime affects different stakeholders. A first observation is that although total welfare
goes up, and the small countries benefit as a whole, the higher interest rates associated with the
global planner’s solution actually harm U.S. borrowers. There are also winners and losers within
the small countries: bank profits decline significantly, but this is more than offset by the cumulative
impact of an increase in household utility from holding dollar deposits, as well as by reductions in
the carrying cost of reserves, the deadweight costs of taxation and the liquidity costs associated
with bank mismatch.

By contrast, in the less realistic case where regulators can also control dollar mismatch
directly, the sharp decline in dollar borrowing $B$, and the associated reduction in the dollar interest
rate benefits the U.S., and raises overall global welfare, but now the small countries are collectively
worse off. This is mostly because their households have access to less in the way of safe dollar
assets to invest in, which reduces their utility. Interestingly, according to Proposition 3, the adverse
outcome for small countries in column 4 of Table 5 occurs regardless of whether regulation is set
in this case by a global planner, or by local planners acting independently. In the latter case, the
comparison between column 4 and column 2 tells us that, paradoxically, the small countries as a
whole are made worse off when they have stronger regulatory tools—i.e. when they can control
both dollar borrowing and bank capital, as opposed to just bank capital. This is because no
individual small country internalizes the fact that when they clamp down on dollar borrowing, this
reduces the aggregate supply of safe dollar claims available to their households.

5. Further Implications: Global Risk Sharing

In the previous section, we assumed that banking crises were perfectly correlated across
countries. This assumption helps to cleanly isolate the externalities in reserve accumulation that
are our primary interest. However, one can also ask how things change if crises are imperfectly
correlated, so that there is scope for global risk-sharing in reserve holdings. Crucially, however,
such risk-sharing is only possible if countries can agree to a mechanism that allows them to re-
distribute reserves ex post to those who are experiencing a crisis. For example, a supra-national
institution might hold reserves of its own, and then allocate them to countries on an as-needed
basis—much like a bank that offers credit lines to its clients, thereby reducing the need for them
to hold their own individual buffer stocks of securities. This approach, which amounts to a form
of insurance, raises a set of challenging moral hazard and monitoring issues that do not arise when simply capping the reserve holdings of individual central banks. Will countries now take the proper ex ante precautions to avert crises? What conditions would need to be imposed on the availability of the credit lines, both ex ante and ex post, to minimize these concerns?

For the moment, we set aside these important considerations, and just assume that there is a frictionless mechanism to implement the ex-post allocation of reserves. To see the forces at play in the simplest possible way, we revert back to the more tractable case where \( h = 0 \), so that there is no correlation between exchange rates and banking crises. We also set the spreads \( S \) and \( S_K \) to be fixed constants, which is tantamount to saying that the demand for dollar safe assets is linear, i.e. that \( \theta_{S_2} = 0 \). However, we now assume that, instead of there being a probability \( q \) that all countries experience a banking crisis simultaneously at time 1, it is a certainty that a fractional mass \( q \) of countries will experience a crisis; this is equivalent to thinking of crises as completely independent and uncorrelated occurrences in our continuum of countries.

With dollar interest rates exogenously fixed, we can ignore U.S. welfare, which is constant. Thus for the case of \( h = 0 \), the global planner’s objective function is the same as in equation (13), which we reproduce here for convenience:

\[
W_c = B_S (Q_S - \beta) + B_h (Q_h - \beta) + (f(D_S) - D_S f'(D_S) ) - \beta \left\{ \frac{(1-pq)y B_S^2}{2} + S_K R_S + \Omega_c(\tau) \right\}
\]  

(46)

where the deadweight costs of taxation \( \Omega_c(\tau) \) (with the subscript “c” denoting the correlated-crises case) could be written as:

\[
\Omega_c(\tau) = \frac{\psi q}{2} [(pB_h + (1+z)pB_z - zR_z)^2 + (pB_h + (1-z)pB_z + zR_z)^2]
\]  

(47)

By contrast, when banking crises are uncorrelated, the only modification to the global planner’s objective function is in this cost-of-taxation term, which we denote by \( \Omega_u(\tau) \) and which now takes the form:
\[
\Omega_u(\tau) = \frac{\psi a}{2} \left[ \left( pB_h + (1 + z)pB_s - \frac{z}{q} R_s \right)^2 + \left( pB_h + (1- z)pB_s + \frac{z}{q} R_s \right)^2 \right] \tag{48}
\]

The only change from (47) to (48) is that the terms involving \( R_s \) are multiplied by \( \frac{z}{q} \), rather than by \( z \). This reflects the fact that an individual country in crisis now has access to a \( \frac{1}{q} \) share of the pool of reserves, rather than just a pro-rata share. Or said differently, with uncorrelated crises, a dollar of reserves held by the supra-national institution goes further than a dollar of reserves held at the individual-country level, because it can be reallocated to those countries who need it.

With \( h = 0 \) and \( S_K \) fixed, we have already solved for the optimal level of reserve holdings in the correlated-crises case; it is given by equation (9), reproduced below:

\[
R^{**}_{sc} = pB_s - \frac{S_K}{2qz^2\psi} \tag{49}
\]

If we recompute the first-order condition for optimal reserves using the new expression in (48) for the deadweight costs of taxation in the uncorrelated-crises case, we get:

\[
R^{***}_{su} = pqB_s - \frac{qS_K}{2z^2\psi} \tag{50}
\]

Comparing equations (49) and (50), we can see that there are two competing effects. On the one hand, the first term in (50) is reduced by a factor of \( q \) relative to that in (49). This cuts in the direction of reserves being lower in the uncorrelated-crises case. The intuition is that it only takes reserves of \( pqB_s \), as opposed to \( pB_s \), to cover all possible needs, on account of the risk-sharing effect. On the other hand, the second term in (50) is also reduced relative to its counterpart in (49), this time by a factor of \( q^2 \). This cuts in the other direction. The idea here is that when one spends an amount \( S_K \) to add a unit of reserves, it now buys more effective coverage than before, since the reserves can be deployed more efficiently.

Putting it together, it is apparent that for relatively small values of \( S_K \), the first effect will dominate, and the ability of countries to share risk will lead to a lower equilibrium value of reserve
holdings when crises are uncorrelated. However, it is possible for this conclusion to be reversed if $S_K$ is sufficiently high. To see why, set $S_K$ high enough so that reserves $R^{***}$ are exactly equal to zero in the correlated-crises case, i.e., so that $pB_S = \frac{s_K}{2qz^2\psi}$. From (47), we can see that reserves in the uncorrelated-crises case $R^{***}$ will still be positive and given by $R^{***} = pqB_S(1 - q)$.

To the extent that the small-$S_K$ configuration is the more relevant one, this analysis further underscores the message of the paper, namely that there may be considerable efficiencies to be obtained from international coordination in the management of dollar reserves. We now have seen two distinct mechanisms which can push in this direction: the first being the internalization of the impact of reserve accumulation on the overall scarcity of dollar assets, and the second being a risk-sharing motive that arises when banking crises are imperfectly correlated across countries.

As noted above, taking full advantage of the latter risk-sharing benefit is likely to entail significant institutional challenges. It is worth noting that the IMF offers precautionary credit facilities to member countries—including the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) and the Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL)—that are in the spirit of what we have in mind here. To minimize moral hazard issues the IMF has strict eligibility requirements for a country to access these facilities that include sound policy frameworks and economic fundamentals. For varying reasons not all countries that are eligible avail of the precautionary facilities. Those that have tend to hold a smaller level of their own reserves, excluding what they can access through the IMF facility. At end-2022 FCL/PLL users on average held 21.5 percent of GDP in reserves, while East Asian countries that rely mainly on self-insurance held 26.3 percent of GDP in reserves.

Interestingly, the IMF’s managing director, Kristalina Georgieva, has recently called for a strengthening of the IMF’s role at the center of the global financial safety net. In Georgieva (2023), she writes: “In a world with more frequent and severe shocks, countries have to find ways to cushion the adverse impacts on their economies and people. That will require building economic buffers in good times that can then be deployed in bad times. One such buffer is a country’s

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international reserves—that is, the foreign currency holdings of its central bank…. No country should rely on its reserves alone, of course…. countries are better off if they can complement their own reserves with access to various international insurance mechanisms that are collectively known as ‘the global financial safety net.’ At the center of the net is the IMF, which pools the resources of its membership and acts as a cooperative global lender of last resort…Although self-insurance through international reserves has sharply increased for some countries, pooled resources centered on the IMF have increased far less than self-insurance and have shrunk markedly relative to measures of global financial integration. That is why the international community must strengthen the global financial safety net, including by expanding the availability of pooled resources in the IMF.”

6. Conclusions
Central banks around the world hold large volumes of dollar-denominated reserves. Our empirical work suggests that one important motive for these reserve holdings is a concern on the part of central banks with currency mismatch in the composition of private-sector liabilities in their countries, with many firms financing themselves heavily with relatively cheap dollar borrowing. Ironically, however, when the mismatch problem cannot be directly controlled by a surgical form of financial regulation, the collective reserve-accumulation decisions of individual price-taking central banks can exacerbate the problem, because they drive down dollar interest rates and thereby further increase the incentive for the private sector to over-borrow in dollars.

Given this externality, we have shown that a global regulator would prefer to see individual central banks holding fewer dollar reserves, and instead using their existing regulatory tools—such as bank capital requirements—more aggressively in an effort to shore up financial stability. However, unlike with capital regulation, where the importance of international cooperation in standard-setting is well-understood, and is enshrined in the Basel process, the potential benefits of coordinating reserve-holding behavior across countries are less fully appreciated. This paper can be thought of as an initial attempt to highlight these benefits, and perhaps to contribute to a conversation over what such a coordination process might look like.
References


Figure 1
Nonfinancial company dollar loans and central bank dollar reserves: country averages (2013-20, 53 countries)

The horizontal axis in Fig. 1 shows average NFC dollar loans from cross-border banks, scaled by GDP. The vertical axis shows central bank dollar reserves, also scaled by GDP. Average loans and average reserves are calculated over different years across different countries, but the same years within a country (ranging from 1-8 years).

Figure 2
Nonfinancial company dollar loans and central bank dollar reserves: country averages excluding Hong Kong (2013-20, 52 countries)

The horizontal axis in Fig. 1 shows average NFC dollar loans from cross-border banks, scaled by GDP. The vertical axis shows central bank dollar reserves, also scaled by GDP. Average loans and average reserves are calculated over different years across different countries, but the same years within a country (ranging from 1-8 years). Relative to Figure 1, this figure drops Hong Kong SAR (HKG).

Figure 3
Nonfinancial company dollar loans and central bank dollar reserves: disaggregation across advanced, emerging and developing countries

a. Advanced economies

b. Emerging markets

c. Developing economies

Figure 3 shows the same data as in Figure 2, disaggregated into advanced, emerging and developing economies. The identities of the countries in each group are given in Appendix A Table A2.

Table 1
Summary statistics: Central bank dollar reserves and nonfinancial company dollar loans, % of GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Std Dev</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign reserves</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>denominated in USD</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AE</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFC dollar loans</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AE</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. Summary statistics are provided for all country-years for which data on central bank reserve currency composition and NFC dollar loans from cross-border banks are available, with the exception of Hong Kong SAR which is dropped due to significant outliers (see Figure1). We also drop two country-year observations where dollar reserve shares are either greater than 100% or less than 0%.

Sources: IMF (2020), Chinn et al. (2021), Data.imf.org, BIS.
Table 2
Regressions of central bank dollar reserves vs. nonfinancial company dollar loans
Dependent variable: central bank dollar reserves as % of GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No fixed effects</th>
<th>No fixed effects</th>
<th>Fixed effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td>AE</td>
<td>EM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFC dollar liabilities</td>
<td>1.645*</td>
<td>3.825*</td>
<td>2.330**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.918)</td>
<td>(1.756)</td>
<td>(0.885)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M2</td>
<td>0.0209</td>
<td>0.248***</td>
<td>-0.0624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0492)</td>
<td>(0.0653)</td>
<td>(0.0494)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial openness</td>
<td>-1.772</td>
<td>16.73</td>
<td>5.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral trade w/US</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td>0.153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>-0.0230</td>
<td>-0.434</td>
<td>-0.442**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln Population</td>
<td>-0.325</td>
<td>-8.067***</td>
<td>0.970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominal dollar ER</td>
<td>2.074***</td>
<td>15.41**</td>
<td>2.884***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.667)</td>
<td>(6.353)</td>
<td>(0.366)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. NFC dollar liabilities are dollar liabilities to cross-border banks. AE, EM and DE are as per the IMF classification (Appendix Table 3). Standard errors are clustered by country. Central bank dollar reserves, NFC dollar liabilities, bilateral trade with the US, and M2 are in % of GDP. Nominal dollar ER is the nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar. Columns (9)-(12) drop China for which we have only one year’s data. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
## Appendix Table A1
### Data sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NFC cross-border USD liabilities to banks, loans and deposits</td>
<td>BIS, Locational Banking Statistics Table A6.1</td>
<td>Loans and Deposits liabilities in USD only</td>
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<td>NFC local USD liabilities to banks, loans and deposits</td>
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<td>Foreign reserves</td>
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<td>International reserves, billions of USD</td>
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<td>Nominal GDP</td>
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<td>Data.imf.org, Data.worldbank.org, Haver for EMU</td>
<td>In millions of USD</td>
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<td>Bilateral trade with the U.S.</td>
<td>Data.imf.org</td>
<td>Sum of exports and imports; in billions of USD</td>
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<td>Financial Openness (index)</td>
<td>Chinn and Ito (2006), updated</td>
<td>Last available observation (2019) is maintained until 2020</td>
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<td>PPP GDP per capita</td>
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<td>Nominal dollar ER</td>
<td>International Financial Statistics</td>
<td>Nominal local currency per U.S. dollar end of period exchange rate</td>
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## Appendix Table A2
Countries in advanced, emerging and developing sub-samples

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Appendix B: Proofs
(For Online Publication Only)

B.1. Derivation of equations (32), (33) and (34)

Take the case of the local central bank, which takes the dollar spread $S$ as given, allowing banking and currency crises to be correlated. The local planner’s objective function is given by equation (23) in the text, dropping the term corresponding to household utility from dollar assets, $(f(D_s) - D_sf'(D_s))$:

$$W_L = B_s(Q_s - \beta) + B_h(Q_h - \beta) - \beta \left\{ \frac{(1-p(q+h))\gamma B_s^2}{2l} + S_K R_s + \Omega(\tau) \right\}$$

where the deadweight cost of taxation is:

$$\Omega(\tau) = \frac{\psi}{2} ((q + h)(pB_h + (1 + z)pB_s - zR_s)^2 + (q - h)(pB_h + (1 - z)pB_s + zR_s)^2)$$

We are interested in the case where the planner chooses the level of dollar reserves ($R_s$) and capital requirements ($B_h$). In this case, $B_s = \frac{l((1-qp)S + hpz)}{(1-p(q+h))y}$ is set by the unregulated bank.

Take the first-order condition of $W_L$ with respect to $B_h$ and we recover:

$$(Q_h - \beta) - \beta \frac{d\Omega(\tau)}{dB_h} = 0$$

where $\frac{dB_s}{dB_h} = 0$ and $\frac{dR_s}{dB_h} = 0$. Plugging in for $\frac{d\Omega(\tau)}{dB_h}$ and solving for $B_h^*$:

$$(Q_h - \beta) - \beta \psi p [(q + h)(pB_h + (1 + z)pB_s - zR_s)$$

$$+ (q - h)(pB_h + (1 - z)pB_s + zR_s)] = 0$$

$$(Q_h - \beta) - \beta \psi p [2qpB_h + 2(qp + zh)pB_s - 2hzR_s] = 0$$

$$B_h^* = \frac{(Q_h - \beta)}{2\beta \psi qp^2} - \left(1 + \frac{zh}{q} \right) B_s + \frac{zh}{pq} R_s$$
Next, we take the first-order condition of $W_L$ with respect to $R_s$. Note that in the case of the local planner, they do not internalize the effect of $R_s$ on the dollar spreads $S$ and $S_K$.

$$-\beta \frac{d(S_K R_s)}{dR_s} - \beta \frac{d\Omega(\tau)}{dR_s} = 0$$

Using that $S_K R_s = \left(\frac{Q_s}{\beta} - 1 \right) R_s$, this is equal to:

$$-(Q_s - \beta) - \beta \frac{d\Omega(\tau)}{dR_s} = 0 \quad (B1.1)$$

Plug in for $\frac{d\Omega(\tau)}{dR_s}$ and re-express the first term using the spread $S_K$:

$$-S_K - \psi[(q + h)(pB_h + (1 + z)pB_s - zR_s) + (q - h)(pB_h + (1 - z)pB_s + zR_s)] = 0$$

$$[-2hpB_h - 2p(qz + h)B_s + 2qzR_s] = -\frac{S_K}{\psi z}$$

$$R^*_s = \frac{hp}{qz} [B_h + B_s] + pb_s - \frac{S_K}{2\psi qz z^2}.$$ 

We can rewrite $R^*_s$ as

$$R^*_s = \frac{2\beta \psi z hp(B_s + B_h) + 2\beta \psi qz^2 pb_s - \beta S_K}{2\beta \psi qz^2}.$$ 

Now, we can write the first order conditions for the small open economy as:

$$B^*_s = \frac{I(1-qp)S + hpz}{(1-p(q+h)y) \equiv a_1 S + a_2}$$

$$B^*_h = \frac{(Q_h - \beta)}{2\beta \psi q p^2} - \left(1 + \frac{zh}{q} \right) B_s + \frac{zh}{pq} R_s$$

$$R^*_s = \frac{hp}{qz} [B_h + B_s] + pb_s - \frac{S_K}{2\psi qz z^2}.$$ 

Note that $B_s$ is a linear function of $S$ where $a_1 \equiv \frac{I(1-qp)}{y(1-p(q+h))}$ and $a_2 \equiv \frac{hpzI}{y(1-p(q+h))}$. Using the expression for $B^*_h$, we can write the term $\frac{h}{qz} \left( B^*_h + B^*_s \right) + B^*_s$, which appears in the simplified version of $R^*_s$, as:
\[
\frac{h}{qz}(B_h^{**} + B_s^{**}) + B_s^{**} = \frac{h(Q_h - \beta)}{2\beta \psi q^2 p^2 z} - \frac{h^2}{q^2} B_s + \frac{h^2}{p^2 q^2} R_s + B_s.
\]

Plug this and \(S_K = \left(1 + \frac{\theta_d}{\beta}\right) S + \frac{\theta_d}{\beta}\) into the expression for \(R_s^{**}\),

\[
R_s^{**} = p \left(\frac{h}{qz} [B_h^{**} + B_s^{**}] + B_s^{**}\right) - \frac{S_K}{2\psi q z^2}.
\]

\[
R_s^{**} = p \left(\frac{h(Q_h - \beta)}{2\beta \psi q^2 p^2 z} - \frac{h^2}{q^2} B_s + \frac{h^2}{p^2 q^2} R_s + B_s\right) - \frac{S (\beta + \theta_d)}{2\beta \psi q z^2} - \frac{\theta_d}{2\beta \psi q z^2}
\]

\[
\left(1 - \frac{h^2}{q^2}\right) R_s^{**} = p \left(\frac{h(Q_h - \beta)}{2\beta \psi q^2 p^2 z} + \left(1 - \frac{h^2}{q^2}\right) B_s\right) - \frac{S (\beta + \theta_d)}{2\beta \psi q z^2} - \frac{\theta_d}{2\beta \psi q z^2}
\]

\[
R_s^{**} = pB_s + \frac{h(Q_h - \beta)}{2\beta \psi p z (q^2 - h^2)} - \frac{\theta_d q}{2\beta \psi z^2 (q^2 - h^2)} - \frac{S q (\beta + \theta_d)}{2\beta \psi z^2 (q^2 - h^2)}
\]

Plug in for \(B_s^{**}\) to solve explicitly for the optimal level of dollar reserves as a function of the dollar spread, \(S\):

\[
R_s^{**} = p \frac{1}{\gamma(1-p(q+h))} + \frac{h(Q_h - \beta)}{2\beta \psi p z (q^2 - h^2)} - \frac{\theta_d q}{2\beta \psi z^2 (q^2 - h^2)} - \frac{S q (\beta + \theta_d)}{2\beta \psi z^2 (q^2 - h^2)}
\]

\[
R_s^{**} \equiv b_1 S + b_2
\]

where:

\[
b_1 = \frac{1}{\gamma(1-p(q+h))} - \frac{q (\beta + \theta_d)}{2\beta \psi z^2 (q^2 - h^2)}, \quad b_2 = \frac{h p^2 z t}{\gamma(1-p(q+h))} + \frac{h(Q_h - \beta)}{2\beta \psi p z (q^2 - h^2)} - \frac{\theta_d q}{2\beta \psi z^2 (q^2 - h^2)}.
\]

We want to solve for the equilibrium dollar spread. Note that:

\[
B_s^{**} - R_s^{**} = a_1 S + a_2 - (b_1 S + b_2)
\]

\[
B_s^{**} - R_s^{**} = (a_1 - b_1) S + (a_2 - b_2)
\]

To solve for the equilibrium spread in the local planner case, we use the equilibrium spread condition given by equation (28). Since we assume a unit mass of identical local planners, we plug in for the local planner’s optimal decision (found above) and solve for the equilibrium spread. We have from equation (28):

50
\[ S = \frac{\theta_{31} - \theta_{32}(B_S + X_S - R_S)}{\beta + \theta_d} = \frac{\theta_{31} - \theta_{32}(X_S + (a_1 - b_1)S + (a_2 - b_2))}{\beta + \theta_d} \]

Hence, we can pin down the explicit equilibrium solution as follows:

\[ S = \frac{\theta_{31} - \theta_{32}(X_S + a_2 - b_2)}{\beta + \theta_d + \theta_{32}(a_1 - b_1)} \]

\[ B^*_S = \frac{I((1-qp)S+hpz)}{(1-p(q+h))}\gamma \]

\[ R^*_S = pB_S + \frac{h(Q_h-\beta)}{2\beta \psi \rho z (q^2-h^2)} - \frac{S}{2q \psi z^2 (q^2-h^2)} \]

\[ B^*_h = \frac{(Q_h-\beta)}{2\beta \psi \rho p z^2} - \left(1 + \frac{zh}{q}\right)B_S + \frac{zh}{pq}R_S. \]

**B.2. Derivation of equation (42)**

In this section, we solve for the system of equations that implicitly define the equilibrium solution for the global planner problem when the planner chooses the amount of dollar reserves, \( R_S \), and capital requirements, \( B_h \), allowing for correlated banking and currency crises. This is the global planner equivalent of Appendix B.1. The explicit solution to this system of equations in terms of primitive parameters is derived in Appendix B.6. In this case, \( B_S \) is chosen by the banking sector and given by:

\[ B^*_S = \frac{I((1-qp)S+hpz)}{(1-p(q+h))}\gamma. \]

Note that the equilibrium dollar spread will solve:

\[ S = \frac{\theta_{31} - \theta_{32}(X_S + B_S - R_S)}{\beta + \theta_d} \]

where \( B_S \) is that given above and \( R_S \) will come from the optimization problem of the global planner. The welfare function for the global planner is given by equation (35) in the text:
\[ W_G = D_S (Q_S - \beta) + B_h (Q_h - \beta) + (f(D_S) - f'(D_S)) \]
\[ -\beta \left( (1 - p(q + h)) \gamma B_S^2 / 2I + \Omega(\tau) \right) \]

Consider first the first-order condition with respect to \( B_h \). We can see from the welfare function above that the first-order condition for \( B_h \) will take the same form as that for the local planner in Appendix B.1. Hence, we have:

\[ B_h^{**} = \frac{(Q_h - \beta)}{2\beta \psi qp^2} - \left( 1 + \frac{zh}{q} \right) B_S + \frac{zh}{pq} R_S. \]

Next, we need to determine the equilibrium dollar reserve policy for the global planner. In the global planner case, we must now take into account that the global planner internalizes the impact \( R_S \) has on the dollar spread, \( S \). The global planner’s first-order condition with respect to \( R_S \) is given by:

\[ \frac{dW_G}{dR_S} = \frac{d}{dR_S} \left( (B_S + X_S - R_S)(Q_S - \beta) \right) - \beta \frac{d}{dR_S} \left( \frac{(1 - p(q + h)) \gamma B_S^2}{2I} \right) + \]
\[ \frac{d}{dR_S} (f(D_S) - f'(D_S)) - \beta \frac{d}{dR_S} \Omega(\tau) = 0. \]

Note that \( B_S \) is a linear function of \( S \) where \( a_1 = \frac{i(1-qp)}{\gamma(1-p(q+h))} \) and \( a_2 = \frac{hpzI}{\gamma(1-p(q+h))} \).

Moving forward, using that \( S = \frac{Q_S}{Q_h} - 1 \) and \( Q_S = \beta + \theta_d + \theta_{S1} - \theta_{S2} D_S \) we have:

\[ B_S = \frac{i \left( 1 - qp \right) \left( \frac{\beta + \theta_d + \theta_{S1} - \theta_{S2} \left( B_S + X_S - R_S \right)}{Q_h} \right)^{-1} + hpz}{(1-p(q+h))\gamma} \]

which leads to:

\[ \frac{dB_S}{dR_S} = \frac{i(1-qp)\theta_{S2}}{(1-p(q+h))\gamma Q_h + i(1-qp)\theta_{S2}} \equiv \phi \]
\[
\frac{dD_s}{dR_s} = \frac{dB_s}{dR_s} - 1 = \phi - 1
\]
\[
\frac{dQ_s}{dR_s} = \theta S_2 (1 - \phi)
\]

Using these expressions and equation (28) in the text for \( f(D_s) \), we have that the derivatives of each term in \( W_G \) with respect to \( R_s \) are below (and given by equations (37)-(40) in the text):

\[
\frac{d}{dR_s} \left( (B_s + X_s - R_s)(Q_s - \beta) \right) = (\phi - 1)(Q_s - \beta) + (B_s + X_s - R_s)(\theta S_2(1 - \phi))
\]
\[
\frac{d}{dR_s} \left( \frac{(1-p(q+h))yB_s^2}{2I} \right) = \phi(1-p(q+h))yB_s
\]
\[
\frac{d}{dR_s} \left( f(D_s) - D_sf'(D_s) \right) = -(1 - \phi)\theta S_2(B_s + X_s - R_s)
\]
\[
\frac{d}{dR_s} \Omega(\tau) = (2\psi_\phi q \lambda q^2 - 2\psi z \lambda p(1 - p \phi))(B_h + B_s) + (2\psi z \lambda ph - 2\psi z \lambda q^2(1 - p \phi))(pB_s - R_s),
\]

and where:

\[
\phi \equiv \frac{dB_s}{dR_s} = \left( \frac{\theta S_2 I(1-qp)}{\gamma} \right) \frac{(1-p(q+h))(\beta + \theta d) + \theta S_2 I(1-qp)}{(1-p(q+h))(\beta + \theta d) + \theta S_2 I(1-qp)}
\]

Summing up these terms, we have

\[
\frac{dW_G}{dR_s} = -(1 - \phi)(Q_s - \beta) - \beta \phi(1-p(q+h))yB_sI - \beta \left( \frac{\partial \Omega}{\partial R_s} + \phi \frac{\partial \Omega}{\partial B_s} \right) + \beta \frac{\partial \Omega}{\partial B_s} = 0 \quad (B2.1)
\]

Arranging the terms, we can write this as

\[
\frac{dW_G}{dR_s} = -(Q_s - \beta) - \beta \frac{\partial \Omega}{\partial R_s} + \phi \left( (Q_s - \beta) - \beta \frac{(1-p(q+h))yB_sI}{I} - \beta \frac{\partial \Omega}{\partial B_s} \right) \quad \text{Local Planner’s FOC}
\]
\[
\frac{dW_G}{dR_s} = -(Q_s - \beta) - \beta \frac{\partial \Omega}{\partial R_s} + \phi \left( (Q_s - \beta) - \beta \frac{(1-p(q+h))yB_sI}{I} - \beta \frac{\partial \Omega}{\partial B_s} \right) \quad \text{Wedge Between Global and Local Planner}
\]
where, from equation (B1.1) in Appendix B.1., we can see that the first to terms are the same expression as the local planner’s first order condition with respect to $R_S$.

The equations that implicitly express the equilibrium solution to the global planner problem are

$$S^{***} = \frac{\theta_{s1} - \theta_{s2}(X_S + B_S^* - R_S^{***})}{\beta + \theta_d}$$

$$B_S^* = \frac{I((1-qp)S^{***} + hpz)}{(1-p(q+h))y}$$

$$B_h^{***} = \frac{(Q_h - \beta)}{2\beta\phi q\rho^2} - \left(1 + \frac{zh}{q}\right) B_S^* + \frac{zh}{pq} R_S^{***}$$

$$-(1 - \phi)(Q_S^{***} - \beta) - \beta \phi \left(1 - p(q + h)\right)yB_S^* - \beta \left( \frac{\partial \Omega}{\partial R_S} |_{R_S^{***}, B_S^*, B_h^{***}} + \phi \frac{\partial \Omega}{\partial B_S} |_{R_S^{***}, B_S^*, B_h^{***}} \right) = 0$$

where $|_{R_S^{***}, B_S^*, B_h^{***}}$ denotes that the term is to be evaluated at the equilibrium values, $R_S^{***}, B_S^*$, and $B_h^{***}$.

**B.3. Proof of Proposition 1**

Proposition 1 follows directly from equation (42).

**B.4. Proof of Proposition 3**

The global planner’s first-order condition with respect to $R_S$ is again given by:

$$\frac{dW_G}{dR_S} = \frac{d}{dR_S} \left( (B_S + X_S - R_S)(Q_S - \beta) \right) - \beta \frac{d}{dR_S} \left( (1 - p(q + h))yB_S^2 / 2I \right) +$$

$$\frac{d}{dR_S} \left( f(D_S) - f'(D_S) \right) - \beta \frac{d}{dR_S} \Omega(\tau) = 0.$$ 

Note that:

$$\frac{dD_S}{dR_S} = -1, \quad \frac{dQ_S}{dR_S} = \theta_{s2}$$

We have that the derivatives of each term in $W_G$ with respect to $R_S$ are:
\[
\frac{d}{dR_s} \left( (B_s + X_s - R_s)(Q_s - \beta) \right) = -(Q_s - \beta) + (B_s + X_s - R_s) \theta_{s2}
\]

\[
\frac{d}{dR_s} \left( (1 - p(q + h))\gamma B_s^2 / 2I \right) = 0
\]

\[
\frac{d}{dR_s} \left( f(D_s) - D_s f'(D_s) \right) = -\theta_{s2} (B_s + X_s - R_s)
\]

\[
\frac{d}{dR_s} \Omega(\tau) = -2\psi z hp (B_h + B_s) - 2\psi q z^2 (pB_s - R_s)
\]

in light of:

\[
\Omega(\tau) = \frac{\psi}{2} ((q + h)(pB_h + (1 + z)pB_s - zR_s)^2 + (q - h)(pB_h + (1 - z)pB_s + zR_s)^2)
\]

Arranging the terms, we have

\[-(Q_s - \beta) - 2\psi \beta z (-hp (B_h + B_s) - qz (pB_s - R_s)) = 0\]

Or,

\[R_s = pB_s + \frac{hp}{qz} (B_h + B_s) - \frac{(Q_s - \beta)}{2\psi \beta q z^2}\]  \hspace{1cm} (B4.1)

Turning to the first-order condition with respect to \(B_s\), we have

\[
\frac{d}{dB_s} \left( (B_s + X_s - R_s)(Q_s - \beta) \right) = (Q_s - \beta) - (B_s + X_s - R_s) \theta_{s2}
\]

\[
\frac{d}{dB_s} \left( (1 - p(q + h))\gamma B_s^2 / 2I \right) = (1 - p(q + h))\gamma B_s / I
\]

\[
\frac{d}{dB_s} \left( f(D_s) - D_s f'(D_s) \right) = \theta_{s2} (B_s + X_s - R_s)
\]

\[
\frac{d}{dB_s} \Omega(\tau) = \psi (q + h) p (1 + z)(pB_h + (1 + z)pB_s - zR_s) + \psi (q - h) p (1 - z)(pB_h + (1 - z)pB_s + zR_s)
\]
\[ = 2\psi(q + hz)p^2(B_h + B_s) + 2\psi(qz + h)pz(pB_s - R_s) \]
\[ = 2\psi(q + hz)p^2 B_h + 2\psi p^2(q(1 + z^2) + 2hz)B_s - 2\psi(qz + h)pzR_s \]

Arranging the terms, we have

\[ (Q_s - \beta) - 2\psi\beta(q + hz)p^2 B_h - [2\psi\beta p^2(q(1 + z^2) + 2hz)]B_s + \\
2\psi\beta(qz + h)pzR_s = 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (B4.2)

The first order condition with respect to \( B_h \) is given by

\[ (Q_h - \beta) - \beta \frac{d\Omega(\tau)}{dB_h} = 0 \]

which can be rearranged into:

\[ B_h = \frac{(Q_h - \beta)}{2\psi q p^2} - \left(1 + \frac{2h}{q}\right)B_s + \frac{2h}{pq}R_s \]  \hspace{1cm} (B4.3)

Finally, we have

\[ Q_s = \beta + \theta_d + \theta_{s1} - \theta_{s2} (B_s + X_s - R_s) \]  \hspace{1cm} (B4.4)

Equations (B4.1), (B4.2), (B4.3) and (B4.4) constitute a linear system of equations. Turning to the local planner’s objective function, we have:

\[ W_L = B_s(Q_s - \beta) + B_h(Q_h - \beta) - \frac{\beta(1-p(q+h))\gamma}{2l}B_s^2 - (Q_s - \beta)R_s - \beta\Omega(\tau) \]

The FOCs for the local planner are:

\[ \frac{dW_L}{dB_h} = (Q_h - \beta) - \frac{\beta d\Omega(\tau)}{dB_h} = 0 \]

\[ \frac{dW_L}{dB_s} = (Q_s - \beta) - \frac{\beta(1-p(q+h))\gamma}{l}B_s - \frac{\beta d\Omega(\tau)}{dB_s} = 0 \]  \hspace{1cm} (B4.5)

\[ \frac{dW_L}{dR_s} = -(Q_s - \beta) - \frac{\beta d\Omega(\tau)}{dR_s} = 0 \]
Comparing these FOCs, we can see that they are the same as those of the global planner, where the derivatives of the deadweight cost of taxation are the same across the two planner cases. Thus, in the full regulation case, the local and global planner problems will yield the same solutions.

B.5. Proof of Proposition 2

From equation (B4.5) just above, we have
\[
\frac{dW_G}{dB_s} = (Q_s - \beta) - \frac{\beta(1-p(q+h))\gamma}{l}B_s - \frac{\beta d\Omega(r)}{dB_s}.
\]

Proposition 1 states that if, starting from the local planner’s optimum, it is the case that
\[
(Q_s^* + \beta) - \frac{\beta(1-p(q+h))\gamma B_s^*}{l} - \beta \frac{d\Omega}{dB_s} < 0,
\]
then \(R_s^{***} < R_s^{**}\). The condition that is required for \(R_s^{***} < R_s^{**}\) thus implies that, starting from the local planner’s optimum, \(\frac{dW_G}{dB_s} < 0\). This in turn means that starting from this point, if the planner could choose \(B_s\) directly, they would choose to reduce it. This is precisely our definition of mismatch being excessive.

B.6. Derivation of equations (43), (44) and (45)

Unpacking the terms, we can write equation (B2.1) as:
\[
\phi(Q_s - \beta) - \beta \phi(1 - p(q + h))\gamma B_s/l - (Q_s - \beta) - \\
\beta(2\psi\phi q p^2 - 2\psi z h p (1 - p\phi))(B_h + B_s) - \beta(2\psi z h p - 2\psi q z^2 (1 - p\phi))(pB_s - R_s) = 0.
\]

Isolate the \(R_s\) terms to get:
\[
[-2\beta \psi z h p + 2\beta \psi q z^2 (1 - p\phi)]R_s = \phi(Q_s - \beta) - (Q_s - \beta) + (2\beta \psi z h p (1 - p\phi) - \\
2\beta \psi q p^2)(B_h + B_s) - \beta \left(2\psi z h p^2 - 2\psi q z^2 (1 - p\phi)p + \frac{\phi(1-p(q+h))\gamma}{l}\right)B_s
\]

Plug in that \(B_h^{***} = \frac{(Q_h - \beta)}{2\beta \psi q p^2} - \left(1 + \frac{zh}{q}\right)B_s + \frac{zh}{pq}R_s\):

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\[-2\beta \psi \phi z \rho h + 2\beta \psi q z^2 (1 - p\phi)\] \(R_s = \phi (Q_s - \beta) - (Q_s - \beta) + (2\beta \psi z \rho p (1 - p\phi) - 2\beta \psi \phi p q^2) \left( \frac{Q_h - \beta}{2\beta \psi q p^2} - \frac{zh}{q} B_s + \frac{zh}{p q} R_s \right) - \beta \left( 2\psi \phi z p^2 h - 2\psi q z^2 (1 - p\phi) p + \frac{\phi (1 - p(q + h)) \gamma}{l} \right) B_s\]

Isolate the \(R_s\) terms and combine the \(B_s\) terms to get:

\[
\left[ -\frac{2\beta \psi z^2 h^2 (1 - p\phi)}{q} + 2\beta \psi z p h - 2\beta \psi \phi z \rho h + 2\beta \psi q z^2 (1 - p\phi) \right] R_s = \phi (Q_s - \beta) - (Q_s - \beta) + (2\beta \psi z \rho p (1 - p\phi) - 2\beta \psi \phi p q^2) \left( \frac{Q_h - \beta}{2\beta \psi q p^2} \right) - \left( \frac{zh}{q} \right) (2\beta \psi z \rho p (1 - p\phi) - 2\beta \psi \phi p q^2) + 2\beta \psi \phi z p^2 h - 2\beta \psi q z^2 (1 - p\phi) p + \frac{\beta \phi (1 - p(q + h)) \gamma}{l} B_s\]

Rearranging and combining terms results in:

\[
\left[ -\frac{2\beta \psi z^2 h^2 (1 - p\phi)}{q} + 2\beta \psi q z^2 (1 - p\phi) \right] R_s = \left( 2\beta \psi q z^2 (1 - p\phi) p - \frac{2\beta \psi z^2 h^2 p (1 - p\phi)}{q} - \frac{\beta \phi (1 - p(q + h)) \gamma}{l} \right) B_s + \phi (Q_s - \beta) - \phi (Q_h - \beta) - (Q_s - \beta) + \left( \frac{zh (1 - p\phi) (Q_h - \beta)}{q p} \right) \] \quad (B.6.1)

Substituting \(B_s = \frac{i ((1 - q p) S + h p z)}{(1 - p(q + h)) \gamma}\) and \(Q_s = Q_h (S + 1)\) into the equation,

\[
\left( 2\beta \psi q z^2 - 2\beta p \psi \phi q z^2 - \frac{2\beta \psi z^2 h^2 (1 - p\phi)}{q} \right) R_s = \]

\[
\left( 2\beta \psi q z^2 p (1 - p\phi) - \frac{2\beta \psi z^2 h^2 p (1 - p\phi)}{q} - \frac{\beta \phi (1 - p(q + h)) \gamma}{l} \right) \frac{i ((1 - q p) S + h p z)}{(1 - p(q + h)) \gamma} - (Q_s - \beta) + \phi Q_h S + \left( \frac{zh (1 - p\phi) (Q_h - \beta)}{q p} \right)\]

Plug in that \((Q_s - \beta) = Q_h (S + 1) - \beta\) to get:

\[
\left( 2\beta \psi q z^2 (1 - p\phi) (q^2 - h^2) \right) R_s = \]
\[
\left( \frac{2\beta \psi x^2p(1-p)(q^2-h^2)}{q} - \frac{\beta \phi(1-p(q+h))}{l} \right) \frac{l((1-qp)s+hpz)}{(1-p(q+h))y} + (\beta - Q_h) + (\phi - 1)Q_hS + \\
+ \left( \frac{zh(1-p\phi)(Q_h-\beta)}{qp} \right)
\]

We can explicitly solve for \( R_S \) and express it as a linear function of \( S \):

\[ R_S = b_3 S + b_4 \]

where:

\[ b_3 \equiv \frac{q(\phi-1)Q_h + \left( \frac{2\beta \psi x^2p(1-p\phi)(q^2-h^2)}{q} - \frac{\beta \phi(1-p(q+h))}{l} \right) \frac{l((1-qp)s+hpz)}{(1-p(q+h))y} }{2\beta \psi x^2(1-p\phi)(q^2-h^2)} \]

\[ b_4 \equiv \frac{q(-Q_h+\beta) + \frac{zh(1-p\phi)(Q_h-\beta)}{p} + \left( \frac{2\beta \psi x^2p(1-p\phi)(q^2-h^2)}{q} - \frac{\beta \phi(1-p(q+h))}{l} \right) \frac{hpzI}{(1-p(q+h))y} }{2\beta \psi x^2(1-p\phi)(q^2-h^2)} \]

Finally, recall that:

\[ S = \frac{\theta_{S_1}-\theta_{S_2}(x_S+a_1,S+a_2-b_3,S-b_4)}{\beta + \theta_d} \]

The explicit solution in the global planner case is therefore described by the following equations:

\[ S = \frac{\theta_{S_1}-\theta_{S_2}(x_S+a_2-b_4)}{\beta + \theta_d + \theta_{S_2}(a_1-b_3)} \]

\[ B_S^* = \frac{l((1-qp)s+hpz)}{(1-p(q+h))y} \]

\[ R_{S}^{**} = b_3 S + b_4 \]

\[ B_h^{**} = \frac{(Q_h-\beta)}{2\beta \psi q p^2} - \left( 1 + \frac{zh}{q} \right) B_S^{**} + \frac{zh}{pq} R_{S}^{**} \]