Heterogeneity in Effect of COVID-19 Mortgage Forbearance: Evidence from U.S. Large Bank Servicers

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
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
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U.S. Mortgage Lending Strong in 2020-21 amid Accommodative Monetary Polices of Low Rates and Fed MBS Purchases

Refinance shot up in 2020-21 due to historically low rates; purchase loans rose amid strong housing demand.



March and April of 2020 were the largest two months of MBS purchases by Fed ever. MBS on the Fed balance sheet totaled \$2.7 trillion in March 2022, the highest level ever.



Source: eMBS, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Urban Institute

So were fiscal polices (enhanced unemployment benefits, direct payments, and others):

- CARES Act: Signed into law on March 27, 2020; the largest single relief package in U.S. history; appropriated \$2.3 trillion for many different stimulus and relief efforts. In Dec 2020, a \$0.9 trillion stimulus and relief bill was passed.
- American Rescue Plan: Signed into law on March 11, 2021, implementing a \$1.9 trillion of stimulus and relief.

This paper focuses on the regulatory responses, especially mortgage forbearance (pause in monthly payments).

Examining Mortgage Forbearance, Focusing on Heterogeneity

- An examination of the effect of COVID-19 forbearance
 - With a particular focus on heterogeneity in effects
 - Across borrowers by credit scores
 - Across neighborhoods: percent of lower income, education level
- Differs from existing studies
 - Examine entry, payment, exits, performance post exits
 - A unique data set: (largest 18) bank servicers
 - Bank-serviced residential mortgages
 - Mortgages held on banks' book
- Add value in understanding
 - Lender loss allowance and lending
 - Servicer loss mitigation
 - Policy making: heterogeneity in effects


Existing Literature on Covid-19 Impact on Mortgage Market

- Effect of mortgage forbearance
 - Diana et al (2020): Used Chase data; linked with borrower checking account
 - Cherry et al (2021): Used credit bureau data; examined both government and private debt relief (auto too)
- Inequality in Covid-19 event
 - Agarwal et al. (2020):
 - Used GSE data; focused on refinance inequality across borrowers
 - An et al. (2021):
 - Used BlackKnight loan-level data, credit bureau data, HMDA (race); focused on payment heterogeneity under forbearance across borrowers by race etc.
 - Gerardi et al. (2021):
 - BlackKnight loan-level data, credit bureau data, HMDA (race); focused on refinance inequality across borrowers
- Credit provision: Fuster et al. (2021)
 - Fed quantitative easing: purchase of MBS


Data & Variable Constructs

- Federal Reserve Y-14 data
 - 18 largest national bank servicers
 - February 2020 through December 2020 (with extension to July 2021 for performance)
- Identify Covid-19 mortgage forbearance
 - In variable "loss_mit_perf_status"
 - Remove those that takes the value of 1 in February 2020
- A 10% random sample
 - 10% of February 2020 outstanding loans
 - 10% of originations for each following month
- Merged with macro data
 - County unemployment rates from U.S. Department of Labor
 - Percent of high-income households from American Community Survey
 - Merged with Y-14 data at zip-code level.

Number of Borrowers under Covid-19 Mortgage Forbearance Has Been Declining





Borrowers with Lower Credit Scores Had Higher Forbearance Entry Rate



Data source: FRB Y-14 as of Dec 2020, 18 largest national bank servicers. Current FICO (lagged 1 month) is used.

Borrowers Facing Higher Unemployment Rate Had Higher Forbearance Entry Rate






Data source: FRB Y-14M as of Dec 2020, 18 largest national bank servicers.

UR: Zip-code level Unemployment rate.

Entry Response to Unemployment Shock Greater for Higher FICO Borrowers in Proportion



Data source: FRB Y-14, 18 largest national bank servicers.

But in terms of magnitude, the entry response to unemployment shock is greater for lower FICO borrowers.

Summary Statistics for Forbearance Entry Sample

Variable	Total	GSE	GNM	PLS	Portfolio	GNM Buyout
Under forbearance	1.1%	0.9%	1.8%	2.2%	1.0%	4.8%
Investor	100%	64.0%	14.2%	2.8%	16.1%	0.7%
FICO_Current Less than 579	3.6%	1.7%	6.9%	16.0%	3.0%	48.9%
580-619	2.5%	1.3%	5.7%	9.1%	2.0%	13.5%
620-679	7.0%	4.9%	14.7%	17.1%	5.6%	14.6%
680-719	9.1%	8.0%	14.4%	13.3%	7.4%	5.0%
720-759	13.9%	13.7%	16.5%	13.6%	13.1%	2.7%
760+	60.9%	68.3%	38.8%	27.6%	62.6%	1.7%
Missing	3.0%	2.0%	2.9%	3.2%	6.4%	13.7%
Refreshed LTV less than 30%	24.6%	28.4%	9.3%	21.0%	24.5%	11.7%
30% - 40%	13.3%	14.8%	8.5%	14.7%	11.7%	8.2%
40% - 50%	14.9%	15.3%	14.4%	16.9%	13.7%	13.2%
50% - 60%	15.1%	14.1%	19.8%	15.9%	14.8%	18.5%
60% - 70%	13.4%	11.6%	19.8%	12.9%	14.6%	20.4%
70% - 80%	10.8%	9.4%	13.7%	8.7%	14.2%	14.7%
80% - 90%	4.7%	4.2%	7.9%	4.7%	3.6%	7.8%
90% - 100%	2.4%	1.8%	5.2%	2.2%	1.9%	3.0%
>100%	0.3%	0.1%	0.4%	2.3%	0.3%	1.8%
Missing	0.4%	0.2%	1.0%	0.7%	0.6%	0.6%

Data source: FRB Y-14, 18 largest national bank servicers. Observations after forbearance entry are dropped.

Summary Statistics for Forbearance Entry Sample (Cont'd)

Debt to income less than 0.15	22.2%	23.1%	13.5%	37.2%	25.7%	8.0%
0.15 - 0.21	19.3%	21.1%	16.3%	7.9%	18.3%	11.2%
0.21 - 0.29	20.7%	21.4%	20.3%	12.1%	20.3%	20.6%
0.29 - 0.41	14.7%	14.5%	14.5%	12.9%	15.4%	18.1%
> 0.41	3.4%	3.8%	2.7%	3.6%	2.4%	3.5%
Missing	19.6%	16.0%	32.8%	26.3%	17.9%	38.6%
Loan type: Conventional w/o PMI	69.2%	81.1%	0.0%	78.5%	85.9%	0.1%
FHA	11.7%	0.1%	69.8%	8.6%	2.6%	80.6%
VA	3.7%	0.0%	23.7%	1.3%	0.5%	12.9%
Conventional w/ PMI	12.9%	18.7%	0.0%	5.5%	3.3%	0.4%
Other	2.5%	0.2%	6.4%	6.1%	7.6%	6.0%
Loan Purpose: Purchase	41.2%	35.8%	63.2%	43.0%	39.9%	74.5%
Refi: rate	35.4%	39.9%	23.8%	17.2%	33.0%	17.7%
Refi: cash-out	19.0%	20.0%	7.3%	37.3%	22.7%	6.8%
Refi: home improvement	1.7%	1.8%	0.9%	1.2%	2.0%	0.1%
Other	2.7%	2.4%	4.7%	1.1%	2.4%	0.9%
Loan Product: FRM 30 year	69.0%	69.0%	92.4%	61.5%	48.0%	80.2%
FRM 15 year	21.9%	27.6%	5.0%	3.0%	19.5%	2.1%
FRM 40 year	1.9%	1.1%	1.3%	7.6%	3.7%	15.0%
ARM	5.5%	2.0%	1.3%	18.0%	20.8%	2.2%
Other	1.8%	0.3%	0.0%	9.8%	7.9%	0.5%

Data source: FRB Y-14, 18 largest national bank servicers. Observations after forbearance entry are dropped.

Multi-variate Analyses of Forbearance Entry

We estimate the following equation to examine factors that affect forbearance entry:

$$Ln(\frac{p_{ict}}{1 - p_{ict}}) = \beta_x X_{i,t} + \beta_u U R_{c,t} + \gamma U R_{c,t} * X_{i,t} + \alpha_s + \alpha_{sv} + \varepsilon_{ict}$$

$$\tag{1}$$

where

*p=probability(Enter=*1) where Enter changes from 0 to 1 when a borrower enters Covid-19 forbearance;

i is loan; c is county; t is month;

X: borrower-, loan-, or community- level characteristics as detailed in Table 1;

UR: county-level unemployment rate (merged to zip-level in Y14);

s: state; sv: servicer

Regression Analyses: Forbearance Entry

			(1)			(2)			(3)	
		В	aseline		Interact Uf	R with FI	CO	Interact (oct_inc_>75k	
Variable	Class	Estimate	StdErr	p value	Estimate	StdErr	p value	Estimate	StdErr	p value
Intercept		-4.72	0.19	0.00	-4.68	0.19	0.00	-4.63	0.20	0.00
FICO_Current (lag)	580-619	0.53	0.01	0.00	0.65	0.02	0.00	0.53	0.01	0.00
(omitted: <580)	620-679	0.40	0.01	0.00	0.39	0.01	0.00	0.40	0.01	0.00
	680-719	0.10	0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.46	0.10	0.01	0.00
	720-759	-0.26	0.01	0.00	-0.43	0.01	0.00	-0.26	0.01	0.00
	760+	-0.97	0.01	0.00	-1.18	0.01	0.00	-0.98	0.01	0.00
	missing	-0.40	0.01	0.00	-0.28	0.03	0.00	-0.40	0.01	0.00
Unemployment Rate (UR)	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.00	0.00
UR*FICO_Curr (lag)	580-619				-0.01	0.00	0.00			
	620-679				0.00	0.00	0.28			
	680-719				0.01	0.00	0.00			
	720-759				0.01	0.00	0.00			
	760+				0.02	0.00	0.00			
	missing				-0.01	0.00	0.00			
Pct_abv_75k (zip)								-0.19	0.04	0.00
UR*pct_abv_75k								0.06	0.00	0.00

Forbearance entry response to unemployment shock is greater for borrowers with higher credit scores and in zip-codes with greater proportion of high-income households.


Data source: FRB Y-14, 18 largest national bank servicers. Observations after forbearance entry are dropped.

The Greater Entry Response by Higher FICO Borrowers Holds Across Investor Type


			GSE			FHA	7		Portfolio			PLS	
Variable	Class	Estimate	StdErr	ProbChiSq	Estimate	StdErr	ProbChiSq	Estimate	StdErr	ProbChiSq	Estimate	StdErr	ProbChiSo
Intercept		-4.36	1.09	0.00	-6.96	59.09	0.91	-6.29	41.05	0.88	-32.83	14.13	0.02
FICO_Current (lag)	580-619	0.78	0.03	0.00	0.61	0.03	0.00	0.52	0.06	0.00	0.30	0.07	0.00
(omitted: <580)	620-679	0.46	0.02	0.00	0.34	0.02	0.00	0.29	0.04	0.00	0.17	0.05	0.00
	680-719	0.06	0.02	0.00	-0.14	0.03	0.00	0.13	0.04	0.00	-0.01	0.06	0.88
	720-759	-0.38	0.02	0.00	-0.51	0.03	0.00	-0.36	0.04	0.00	-0.36	0.07	0.00
	760+	-1.15	0.02	0.00	-1.23	0.03	0.00	-1.06	0.03	0.00	-0.78	0.06	0.00
Unemployment Rate (UF	R)	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.00	0.17	0.15	0.00	0.00
UR*FICO_Curr (lag)	580-619	-0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.86
	620-679	0.00	0.00	0.85	0.00	0.00	0.53	0.01	0.00	0.34	0.01	0.00	0.15
	680-719	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00
	720-759	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00
	760+	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00
Servier fixed effects		Yes			Yes			Yes			Yes		
State fixed effects		Yes			Yes			Yes	7		Yes		
AUC		0.812			0.794			0.82	7		0.77		
N obs		10.1M			2.40M	1		2.45M	1		0.44M		

Data source: FRB Y-14, 18 largest national bank servicers. Observations after forbearance entry are dropped.


A Sizable Proportion Continued to Pay under Forbearance



GSE and Portfolio Loans had Highest Exit Rates




Covid Deferral is An Important Path to Exit




Covid-deferral: forborne monthly payments are deferred to loan maturity, refinance, or sale of the property

Borrowers with Greater Credit Scores Had Higher Exit Rates



Borrowers Facing Higher Unemployment Rate had Lower Exit Rates



Dependent variable		Forbearance	pt prepay)	Forbearand	ce exit (exc	cept prepay)	Forbearand	ce exit (ex	cept prepay)		
Variable	Class value	Estimate	StdErr	ProbChiSq	Estimate	StdErr	ProbChiSq	Estimate	StdErr	ProbChiSq	
Intercept		-1.62	3.24	0.62	-1.89	5.34	0.72	-1.81	5.34	0.74	
FICO Current, lag	580-619	-0.12	0.01	0.00	-0.13	0.04	0.00	-0.15	0.01	0.00	
	620-679	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.09	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.72	
	680-719	0.17	0.01	0.00	0.16	0.02	0.00	0.14	0.01	0.00	
	720-759	0.28	0.01	0.00	0.20	0.02	0.00	0.24	0.01	0.00	
	760+	0.44	0.01	0.00	0.33	0.02	0.00	0.40	0.01	0.00	
	missing	-0.49	0.02	0.00	-0.34	0.05	0.00	-0.32	0.02	0.00	
Month in forbearance	2				-0.09	0.01	0.00	-0.09	0.01	0.00	
(omitted is 0-1 month)	3				0.49	0.01	0.00	0.49	0.01	0.00	
	4				0.04	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.01	
	5				0.54	0.01	0.00	0.54	0.01	0.00	Exit Response
	6				0.62	0.01	0.00	0.62	0.01	0.00	LAIT NC3POII3C
	7				0.31	0.02	0.00	0.31	0.02	0.00	to Employmen
	8				0.35	0.02	0.00	0.35	0.02	0.00	to Limpioyinch
	9				0.27	0.03	0.00	0.27	0.03	0.00	Improvement
Delinquency status, lag	30-59 dpd	-1.20	0.01	0.00	-1.12	0.01	0.00	-1.12	0.01	0.00	Improvement
(omitted is Current)	60-89dpd	-0.90	0.01	0.00	-1.18	0.01	0.00	-1.18	0.01	0.00	Smaller for
	90-119	-0.44	0.01	0.00	-0.76	0.01	0.00	-0.76	0.01	0.00	Silialiei 101
	120+	-1.11	0.01	0.00	-1.41	0.01	0.00	-1.41	0.01	0.00	High FICO
	Foreclosure	0.40	0.06	0.00	0.41	0.06	0.00	0.41	0.06	0.00	riigiriico
	REO	-2.54	0.99	0.01	-2.77	1.01	0.01	-2.77	1.01	0.01	Borrowers
Unemployemnt Rate		-0.09	0.00	0.00	-0.03	0.00	0.00	-0.04	0.00	0.00	bollowers
UR*FICO_Curr in	580-619				0.00	0.00	0.55				
	620-679				-0.01	0.00	0.00				
	680-719				0.00	0.00	0.26				
	720-759				0.00	0.00	0.08				
	760+				0.01	0.00	0.00				Data assuras FDD V 14 10
	missing				0.00	0.01	0.66				Data source: FRB Y-14, 18
pct_HH_inc>75k								-0.16	0.07	0.02	largest national bank
UR*pct_HH_inc>75								0.01	0.01	0.22	servicers. Kept are
Borrower/loan controls			Yes			Yes			Yes		observations after
AUC			0.73			0.76			0.76		forbearance entry.

This Finding Holds Mainly for GSE Loans

		-											
			GSE			FHA			Portfolio			PLS	
Variable	Class	Estimate	StdErr	p-value	Estimate	StdErr	p-value	Estimate	StdErr	p-value	Estimate	StdErr	p-value
Intercept		-3.38	1.80	0.06	-4.11	10.70	0.70	-3.34	25.43	0.90	-1.81	1094.66	1.00
FICO_Current (lag)	580-619	-0.09	0.06	0.10	-0.27	0.06	0.00	-0.06	0.10	0.51	-0.26	0.14	0.06
(omitted: <580)	620-679	0.00	0.04	0.92	0.12	0.04	0.01	0.17	0.07	0.01	0.20	0.11	0.08
	680-719	0.13	0.03	0.00	0.26	0.05	0.00	0.21	0.07	0.00	-0.02	0.13	0.87
	720-759	0.19	0.03	0.00	0.34	0.05	0.00	0.22	0.07	0.00	0.06	0.13	0.67
	760+	0.34	0.03	0.00	0.55	0.04	0.00	0.35	0.05	0.00	0.36	0.12	0.00
Delinquency status, lag	30-59 dpd	-1.10	0.02	0.00	-1.30	0.03	0.00	-1.14	0.04	0.00	-1.00	0.07	0.00
(omitted is Current)	60-89dpd	-0.64	0.01	0.00	-1.66	0.03	0.00	-1.15	0.04	0.00	-1.14	0.07	0.00
	90-119	-0.33	0.01	0.00	-1.22	0.03	0.00	-0.67	0.04	0.00	-0.92	0.07	0.00
	120+	-1.51	0.02	0.00	-1.67	0.03	0.00	-1.29	0.03	0.00	-1.47	0.06	0.00
	Foreclosure	-0.23	0.15	0.13	0.35	0.10	0.00	0.52	0.14	0.00	0.49	0.19	0.01
	REO	-11.79	137.92	0.93	-10.93	81.92	0.89	-1.60	1.02	0.12	-8.51	86.10	0.92
Month in forbearance		0.17	0.00	0.00	0.22	0.00	0.00	0.16	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.00
Unemployment Rate (UR	2)	-0.05	0.00	0.00	-0.04	0.00	0.00	-0.04	0.00	0.00	-0.07	0.01	0.00
UR*FICO_Curr (lag)	580-619	0.00	0.01	0.88	0.00	0.01	0.56	-0.01	0.01	0.59	0.03	0.01	0.05
	620-679	0.00	0.00	0.41	-0.01	0.00	0.12	-0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.07
	680-719	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.00	0.01	0.41	-0.02	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.67
	720-759	0.01	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.01	0.93	0.00	0.01	0.67	0.01	0.01	0.47
	760+	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.77	0.00	0.00	0.69	0.00	0.01	0.92
Servier fixed effects		Yes			Yes			Yes			Yes		
State fixed effects		Yes			Yes			Yes			Yes		
AUC		0.72			0.77			0.77			0.72		
No of obs		508,617			310,516			155,155			62,453		


Not all loan and borrower attributes are shown.


			(1)			(2)			(3)	
Dep. Var.:			Re-enter			PrePay		Serio	us Delinq	uency
Variable	ClassValue	Estimate	StdErr	ProbChiSq	Estimate	StdErr	ProbChiSo	Estimate	StdErr	ProbChiSo
Intercept		-2.81	6.16	0.65	-15.97	37.40	0.67	-4.88	39.80	0.90
FICO_Current_Lag	580-619	0.33	0.03	0.00	-0.45	0.12	0.00	0.40	0.03	0.00
	620-679	0.06	0.02	0.00	0.14	0.08	0.06	-0.15	0.03	0.00
	680-719	-0.15	0.02	0.00	0.36	0.07	0.00	-0.50	0.03	0.00
	720-759	-0.43	0.02	0.00	0.66	0.07	0.00	-0.80	0.03	0.00
	760+	-0.67	0.02	0.00	0.51	0.05	0.00	-1.09	0.02	0.00
	missing	0.22	0.05	0.00	-0.42	0.14	0.00	1.03	0.05	0.00
Refreshed LTV	missing	-0.07	0.11	0.49	5.15	1.05	0.00	-0.44	0.14	0.00
	30 - 40	-0.27	0.03	0.00	-1.40	1.50	0.35	-0.45	0.04	0.00
	40 - 50	-0.17	0.03	0.00	-1.36	1.49	0.36	-0.35	0.03	0.00
	50 - 60	-0.11	0.03	0.00	-1.61	1.47	0.27	-0.21	0.03	0.00
	60 - 70	-0.05	0.03	0.07	-1.29	1.28	0.31	-0.15	0.03	0.00
OTI Ratio	70 - 80	0.06	0.03	0.03	-2.03	1.66	0.22	0.20	0.04	0.00
	80 - 90	0.21	0.04	0.00	-1.06	2.07	0.61	0.44	0.05	0.00
	90 - 100	0.47	0.05	0.00	0.05	3.77	0.99	0.67	0.07	0.00
	101+	0.25	0.08	0.00	-2.22	7.78	0.78	0.93	0.08	0.00
DTI Ratio	0.21	-0.11	0.02	0.00	0.16	0.06	0.01	-0.05	0.03	0.10
	0.29	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.16	0.06	0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.30
	0.41	0.06	0.02	0.00	0.22	0.06	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.18
	0,41+	0.17	0.03	0.00	0.06	0.12	0.61	0.18	0.04	0.00
	missing	0.01	0.02	0.50	-0.32	0.06	0.00	0.05	0.02	0.04
Month in forbearance	2	-0.20	0.03	0.00	-0.09	0.08	0.30	-0.16	0.04	0.00
	3	-0.12	0.03	0.00	0.09	0.08	0.28	-0.32	0.04	0.00
	4	-0.15	0.03	0.00	-0.08	0.09	0.39	-0.33	0.04	0.00
	5	0.32	0.03	0.00	-0.14	0.10	0.15	0.48	0.04	0.00
	6	-0.12	0.04	0.00	-0.13	0.12	0.24	0.14	0.04	0.00
	7	-0.98	0.06	0.00	0.33	0.17	0.05	-1.02	0.08	0.00
	8	-0.85	0.18	0.00	0.84	0.50	0.09	-0.61	0.22	0.01
Jnemployment Rate		0.00	0.00	0.79	0.00	0.01	0.78	-0.04	0.00	0.00
Servicer & State FE			Yes			Yes			Yes	
AUC			0.78						0.87	

Loan Performance Post Forbearance Exits Have Little Relation with Unemployment Rates

Data Source: FRB Y-14 Sample: Feb – Dec 2020. Kept are observations after loans exit Covid forbearance.

A Significant Proportion under Forbearance are Refi-eligible





FICO is the major constraining factor reducing refi eligibility.


Data source: FRB Y-14, 18 largest national bank servicers.

NonPayment under Forbearance Reduced Refinance Post Exits, but Effect is Short-lived


		(1)			(2)			(3)			(4)			(5)		
		Lag 1 Mon	th		Lag 1 Month			Lag 1 Mont	th		Lag 3 Months			Lag 3 Mont	ths	
		All			Federally Back	ked		Private			Federally Bac	ked		Private		
Variable	ClassVal0	Estimate	StdErr	p-value	Estimate	StdErr	p-value	Estimate	StdErr	p-value	Estimate	StdErr	p-value	Estimate	StdErr	p-value
Intercept		-4.58	0.17	0.00	-5.39	4.01	0.18	-4.71	0.20	0.00	-5.65	5.16	0.27	-4.94	0.20	0.00
_ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \	580-619	-0.49				0.02	0.00	-0.41	0.03	0.00	-0.55	0.02	0.00	-0.38	0.03	0.00
(omitted: <580)	620-679	-0.09				0.01	0.00	-0.10	0.02	0.00	-0.14	0.01	0.00	-0.13	0.02	0.00
	680-719	0.24		0.00		0.01	0.00	0.17	0.02	0.00	0.21	0.01	0.00	0.11	0.02	0.00
	720-759	0.42				0.01	0.00	0.35	0.01	0.00	0.40	0.01	0.00	0.31	0.01	0.00
	760+	0.57	0.01			0.01	0.00	0.52	0.01	0.00	0.56	0.01	0.00	0.47	0.01	0.00
	missing	0.05				0.02	0.04	0.10	0.03	0.00	0.20	0.02	0.00	0.18	0.03	0.00
Forbearance, lag		-0.85				0.02	0.00	-0.66	0.04	0.00	-0.25	0.03	0.00	-0.08	0.05	0.11
FB_lag*Current_lag		0.49				0.03	0.00	0.24	0.05	0.00	0.14	0.03	0.00	-0.19	0.06	0.00
Current_lag		-0.25				0.02	0.00	-0.11	0.03	0.00	0.30	0.03	0.00	0.41	0.04	0.00
Unemployment		-0.02				0.00	0.00	-0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.04	0.00	0.00	-0.03	0.00	0.00
LTV	Missing	0.16	0.03	0.00	0.24	0.03	0.00	-0.02	0.07	0.83	0.23	0.03	0.00	-0.06	0.08	0.43
(omitted: <=30%)	30 - 40	-0.18				0.01	0.00	-0.05	0.02	0.02	-0.22	0.01	0.00	-0.04	0.02	0.05
	40 - 50	-0.12				0.01	0.00	-0.05	0.02	0.00	-0.15	0.01	0.00	-0.04	0.02	0.02
	50 - 60	-0.05				0.01	0.00	0.05	0.02	0.00	-0.09	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.02	0.00
	60 - 70	0.03				0.01	0.21	0.13	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.63	0.13	0.01	0.00
	70 - 80	0.13		0.00		0.01	0.00	0.20	0.01	0.00	0.11	0.01	0.00	0.21	0.01	0.00
	80 - 90	0.11	0.01	0.00		0.01	0.00	0.17	0.02	0.00	0.12	0.01	0.00	0.17	0.02	0.00
	90 - 100	0.07	0.01			0.01	0.00	-0.16	0.02	0.00	0.08	0.01	0.00	-0.15	0.02	0.00
	>100	0.06	0.01	0.00	0.18	0.01	0.00	-0.18	0.04	0.00	0.18	0.01	0.00	-0.17	0.04	0.00
Loan Purpose	Cashout	-0.10	0.02	0.00	-0.10	0.02	0.00	-0.09	0.04	0.02	-0.10	0.02	0.00	-0.09	0.04	0.02
(omitted: Purchas	Home Improve	-0.06	0.02	0.00	-0.10	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.05	0.89	-0.10	0.02	0.00	-0.02	0.05	0.74
	Missing	0.14	0.08	0.09	0.20	0.09	0.02	0.03	0.20	0.89	0.18	0.10	0.07	0.07	0.20	0.73
	Other	0.15	0.02	0.00	0.14	0.02	0.00	0.08	0.05	0.07	0.15	0.02	0.00	0.06	0.05	0.22
	Rate/term	-0.05	0.02	0.00	-0.07	0.02	0.00	-0.01	0.04	0.88	-0.05	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.93
AUC		0.65			0.64			0.67			0.65			0.67		
N obs		16.5M			13.6M			3.3M			10.6M			2.6M	24	

There exist various programs that facilitate refinance post forbearance if borrowers start to make payments. Include all observations.

Serious Delinquency Rate Continued to Decline Amid Rising Housing Price and Housing Shortages



According to Black Knight's updated repeat sales index, year-over-year home price appreciation increased to 20.61 percent in February 2022, Year-over-year home price appreciation as measured by Zillow's hedonic index was 19.95% in Feb 2021



Data source: FRB Y14.

Sources: Black Knight, Zillow, and Urban Institute.

Findings; Concluding Remarks

- Covid-19 forbearance reached mortgage borrowers affected by the economic fallout:
 - Entry by lower credit score borrowers.
 - Exits responded to employment improvements.
 - Delinquency post exit continued to be low.
 - Remaining exits with the availability of assistance from Covid-19 deferral/modifications.
- There exists large heterogeneity in the effect of forbearance program:
 - Borrowers throughout FICO spectrum responded to unemployment shock by entering.
 - In terms of percentage change, higher FICO borrowers were the highest.
 - Exit response to employment improvement by higher FICO borrowers is smaller.
 - The forbearance entry response to unemployment shock is larger for borrowers in zip-codes with a higher proportion of higher-income ones.
 - => Allowed some to take precautionary actions or accumulate liquidity.
- Potential un-intended consequence
 - Not paying under forbearance reduced refinance; but salvaged by policies.
 - Strategic non-paying (to qualify for pay reductions via loss mitigation/modification)?

Further Questions to Examine

- How did borrower credit scores evolve with forbearance and payment behavior?
 - How is credit scores' predictive power impacted?
 - How did borrowers use their forborne amounts (including student loan forbearance) - pay down debts, savings, or others?
- Any ways to be more targeted in providing reliefs and providing proper economic incentives?
 - Three-fold support besides monetary policy: fiscal (direct pays), unemployment benefits, and debt payment reliefs?
 - Forbearance programs: Are they targeting the most impacted groups in Covid-19 event?
 - How many are strategic (slower) forbearance exits (anticipating assistance)?
 - Would different private forbearance designs make a difference?