Central bank research hub - JEL classification D01: Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
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Latest research hub papers with the JEL classification:D01enOptimal monetary policy under bounded rationality
https://helda.helsinki.fi/bof/bitstream/123456789/15394/1/BoF_%20DP_1809.pdf
Bank of Finland Discussion Papers by Jonathan Benchimol and Lahcen BounaderOptimal monetary policy under bounded rationality2018-04-19T00:00:00ZOptimal monetary policy under discretion, commitment, and optimal simple rules regimes is analyzed through a behavioral New Keynesian model. Flexible price level targeting dominates under discretion; flexible inflation targeting dominates under commitment; and strict price level targeting dominates when using optimal simple rules. The optimality of a particular regime is found to be independent of bounded rationality and only regime 's stabilizing properties condition its hierarchy. For every targeting regime, the policymaker 's knowledge of agents' myopia is decisive in terms of policy reactions. Welfare evaluation of different targeting regimes reveals that bounded rationality is not necessarily associated with decreased welfare. Several forms of economic inattention can increase welfare.Optimal monetary policy under bounded rationalityFull texthttps://helda.helsinki.fi/bof/bitstream/123456789/15394/1/BoF_%20DP_1809.pdfJonathan BenchimolLahcen BounaderJonathan Benchimol and Lahcen Bounader2018-04-19Bank of Finland Research Discussion PapersC53D01D11E37E52Cultural Differences in Monetary Policy Preferences
https://www.snb.ch/n/mmr/reference/working_paper_2018_02/source/working_paper_2018_02.n.pdf
Swiss National Bank Working Papers by Adriel JostCultural Differences in Monetary Policy Preferences2018-02-21T00:00:02ZThe monetary policy preferences of a population are often explained by the country's economic history. Based on Swiss data, this paper indicates that while different language groups may share the economic history, they demonstrate distinct monetary policy preferences. This suggests that distinct monetary policy preferences among the populations of different countries may be determined by not only their economic histories but also their distinct cultural backgrounds.Cultural Differences in Monetary Policy PreferencesFull texthttps://www.snb.ch/n/mmr/reference/working_paper_2018_02/source/working_paper_2018_02.n.pdfAdriel JostAdriel Jost2018-02-21Swiss National Bank SNB Working PapersD01E31E52E58Z13Optimal Monetary Policy Under Bounded Rationality
https://www.dallasfed.org/~/media/documents/institute/wpapers/2018/0336.pdf
Dallas Fed Institute Working Papers by Jonathan Benchimol and Lahcen BounaderOptimal Monetary Policy Under Bounded Rationality2018-01-01T00:00:00ZOptimal monetary policy under discretion, commitment, and optimal simple rules regimes is analyzed through a behavioral New Keynesian model. Flexible price level targeting dominates under discretion; flexible inflation targeting dominates under commitment; and strict price level targeting dominates when using optimal simple rules. Stabilizing properties and bounded rationality-independence generally affect the regime's optimality. The policymaker's knowledge of an agent's myopia is decisive, whereas bounded rationality is not necessarily associated with decreased welfare. Several forms of economic inattention can be welfare increasing.Optimal Monetary Policy Under Bounded RationalityFull texthttps://www.dallasfed.org/~/media/documents/institute/wpapers/2018/0336.pdfJonathan BenchimolLahcen BounaderJonathan Benchimol and Lahcen Bounader2018-01-01Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Globalization Institute Working PapersC53D01D11E37E52The distributional effects of contractual norms: the case of cropshare agreements
http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/wp/wp2015/wp1507.pdf
Boston Fed Working papers by Mary A. BurkeThe distributional effects of contractual norms: the case of cropshare agreements2015-04-01T00:00:00ZAccording to principal-agent theory, a share contract strikes an optimal balance between risk-sharing and incentive provision when it is difficult to gauge the agent's contribution. This theory predicts that the size of the share should vary with economic fundamentals. In practice, however, the share divisions that are specified often cluster around "usual and customary" levels - even when there is substantial heterogeneity among principal - agent pairs. Using Illinois farm-level data observed between 1980 and 1994 that include soil productivity ratings, tenant net income, and crop yields, the author examines the economic consequences of adhering to established contractual norms. Almost all share agreements in the northern two-thirds of the state specify an equal division of crops between the landowner and tenant farmer, while the majority of share contracts in the southern third allot either three-fifths or two-thirds of all production to the tenant. The paper tests whether existing share arrangements distort the division of surplus between the principal (landowner) and the agent (tenant farmer), or if these potential distortions are somehow preempted by adjustments along other contractual margins. No previous study has attempted to empirically estimate the effect that uniformity in share contracts has on factor returns.The distributional effects of contractual norms: the case of cropshare agreementsFull texthttp://www.bostonfed.org/economic/wp/wp2015/wp1507.pdfMary A. BurkeMary A. Burke2015-04-01Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working PapersD01D02D33Q15To Work or Not to Work: The Economics of a Mother's Dilemma
http://www.frbatlanta.org/pubs/wp/11_02.cfm
Atlanta Fed Working papers by Working Paper 2011-2To Work or Not to Work: The Economics of a Mother's Dilemma2011-03-21T17:40:00ZIn determining a woman's decision whether to reenter the labor force after the birth of a child, the authors find that both the direct and opportunity labor market costs of exiting the workforce figure prominently in the decision.To Work or Not to Work: The Economics of a Mother's DilemmaAbstracthttp://www.frbatlanta.org/pubs/wp/11_02.cfmMelinda PittsMary Beth WalkerJulie L. HotchkissWorking Paper 2011-22011-03-21Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working PapersD01D91J13J17J22Intertemporal Choice: A Nash Bargaining Approach
http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/research/discusspapers/dp10_08.pdf
Reserve Bank of New Zealand Discussion Papers by David Baqaee (PDF 198KB)Intertemporal Choice: A Nash Bargaining Approach2010-10-01T06:23:00ZA compelling, but highly tractable, axiomatic foundation for intertemporal decision making is established and discussed. This axiomatic foundation relies on methods employed in cooperative bargaining theory. Four simple axioms imply that the intertemporal objective function is a weighted geometric average of each period's utility function. This is in contrast to standard practice, which takes the objective function to be a weighted arithmetic average. The analysis covers both finite and infinite time.Intertemporal Choice: A Nash Bargaining ApproachFull texthttp://www.rbnz.govt.nz/research/discusspapers/dp10_08.pdfDavid BaqaeeDavid Baqaee (PDF 198KB)2010Reserve Bank of New Zealand Discussion PapersC7D01D91Limited Attention and Choice
http://www.banxico.org.mx/publicaciones-y-discursos/publicaciones/documentos-de-investigacion/banxico/{40528184-3AC9-E6C0-BDD7-7212D4944F2C}.pdf
Bank of Mexico Working Papers by Kaiser KarenLimited Attention and Choice2010-04-12T17:42:00ZThis paper analyzes a boundedly rational decision maker who is uncertain about his preference and faces the following trade-off: adding a good to the choice set has a positive option value but increases the complexity of the choice problem. The increased complexity is modeled as a reduction of the information available for each good. Because of this trade-off there is an optimal number of goods that the decision maker wants to analyze before making his final choice. The choice of the optimal set can be interpreted as the choice among stores. Stores maximize profits and choose a quality, an assortment, and a price. A lower cost of providing quality implies higher price and higher quality. Assortment will be small for very high levels of quality. Better quality of information implies greater variety and higher price. Greater variety combined with good consumer service can be a signal for high quality of the store.Limited Attention and ChoiceFull texthttp://www.banxico.org.mx/publicaciones-y-discursos/publicaciones/documentos-de-investigacion/banxico/{40528184-3AC9-E6C0-BDD7-7212D4944F2C}.pdfKaren KaiserKaiser Karen2010Bank of Mexico Working PapersD01D11D21Regular adjustment: theory and practice
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp669.pdf
European Central Bank Working papers by Jerzy (Jurek) D. Konieczny and Fabio RumlerRegular adjustment: theory and practice2006-08-18T18:15:00ZRegular adjustment: theory and practiceECBFull texthttp://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp669.pdfJerzy D. KoniecznyFabio RumlerJerzy (Jurek) D. Konieczny and Fabio Rumler2006-08European Central Bank Working PapersD01E31E52L1106-8
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/wp/wp2006/wp0608.pdf
Boston Fed Working papers by Matthias Benz and Stephan Meier06-82006-03-30T18:21:59Z06-8Abstracthttp://www.bos.frb.org/economic/wp/wp2006/wp0608.htmFull texthttp://www.bos.frb.org/economic/wp/wp2006/wp0608.pdfMatthias BenzStephan MeierMatthias Benz and Stephan Meier2006-03Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working PapersC91C93D01D6406-6
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/wp/wp2006/wp0606.pdf
Boston Fed Working papers by Stephan Meier06-62006-03-16T07:10:00Z06-6Abstracthttp://www.bos.frb.org/economic/wp/wp2006/wp0606.htmFull texthttp://www.bos.frb.org/economic/wp/wp2006/wp0606.pdfStephan MeierStephan Meier2006-03Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working PapersC93D01D64H41