Central bank research hub - Papers by Satyajit Chatterjee
https://www.bis.org/cbhub/list/author/author_6880/index.rss
Research hub papers by author Satyajit ChatterjeeenThe Firm Size and Leverage Relationship and Its Implications for Entry and Concentration in a Low Interest Rate World
https://philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2019/wp19-18.pdf
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Papers by Satyajit Chatterjee and Burcu EyigungorThe Firm Size and Leverage Relationship and Its Implications for Entry and Concentration in a Low Interest Rate World2019-03-14T00:00:00ZLarger firms (by sales or employment) have higher leverage. This pattern is explained using a model in which firms produce multiple varieties and borrow with the option to default against their future cash ow. A variety can die with a constant probability, implying that bigger firms (those with more varieties) have lower coefficient of variation of sales and higher leverage. A lower risk-free rate benefits bigger firms more as they are able to lever more and existing firms buy more of the new varieties arriving into the economy. This leads to lower startup rates and greater concentration of sales.The Firm Size and Leverage Relationship and Its Implications for Entry and Concentration in a Low Interest Rate WorldFull texthttps://philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2019/wp19-18.pdfSatyajit ChatterjeeBurcu EyigungorSatyajit Chatterjee and Burcu Eyigungor2019-03-14Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working PapersE22E43E44G32G33G34Incumbency Disadvantage of Political Parties: The Role of Policy Inertia and Prospective Voting
https://philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2019/wp19-07.pdf
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Papers by Satyajit Chatterjee and Burcu EyigungorIncumbency Disadvantage of Political Parties: The Role of Policy Inertia and Prospective Voting2019-01-24T00:00:00ZWe document that postwar U.S. elections show a strong pattern of "incumbency disadvantage": If a party has held the presidency of the country or the governorship of a state for some time, that party tends to lose popularity in the subsequent election. To explain this fact, we employ Alesina and Tabellini's (1990) model of partisan politics, extended to have elections with prospective voting. We show that inertia in policies, combined with sufficient uncertainty in election outcomes, implies incumbency disadvantage. We find that inertia can cause parties to target policies that are more extreme than the policies they would support in the absence of inertia and that such extremism can be welfare reducing.Incumbency Disadvantage of Political Parties: The Role of Policy Inertia and Prospective VotingFull texthttps://philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2019/wp19-07.pdfSatyajit ChatterjeeBurcu EyigungorSatyajit Chatterjee and Burcu Eyigungor2019-01-24Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working PapersD72H50Incumbency Disadvantage in U.S. National Politics: The Role of Policy Inertia and Prospective Voting
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2017/wp17-43.pdf?utm_campaign=WorkingPapers=2017/12/20=E-mail
Philadelphia Fed Working Papers by Satyajit Chatterjee and Burcu EyigungorIncumbency Disadvantage in U.S. National Politics: The Role of Policy Inertia and Prospective Voting2017-12-21T00:00:00ZWe document that postwar U.S. national elections show a strong pattern of incumbency disadvantage": If the presidency has been held by a party for some time, that party tends to lose seats in Congress. We develop a model of partisan politics with policy inertia and prospective voting to explain this finding. Positive and normative implications of the model are explored.Incumbency Disadvantage in U.S. National Politics: The Role of Policy Inertia and Prospective VotingFull texthttps://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2017/wp17-43.pdf?utm_campaign=WorkingPapers=2017/12/20=E-mailSatyajit ChatterjeeBurcu EyigungorSatyajit Chatterjee and Burcu Eyigungor2017-12-21Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working PapersD72H50Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises, Revisited: The Art of the Desperate Deal
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2017/wp17-07.pdf
Philadelphia Fed Working Papers by Mark Aguiar, Satyajit Chatterjee, Harold L. Cole and Zachary StangebyeSelf-Fulfilling Debt Crises, Revisited: The Art of the Desperate Deal2017-03-27T00:00:00ZWe revisit self-fulfilling rollover crises by introducing an alternative equilibrium selection that involves bond auctions at depressed but strictly positive equilibrium prices, a scenario in line with observed sovereign debt crises. We refer to these auctions as "desperate deals", the defining feature of which is a price schedule that makes the government indifferent to default or repayment. The government randomizes at the time of repayment, which we show can be implemented in pure strategies by introducing stochastic political payoffs or external bailouts. Quantitatively, auctions at fire-sale prices are crucial for generating realistic spread volatility.Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises, Revisited: The Art of the Desperate DealFull texthttps://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2017/wp17-07.pdfSatyajit ChatterjeeZachary StangebyeMark AguiarHarold L. ColeMark Aguiar, Satyajit Chatterjee, Harold L. Cole and Zachary Stangebye2017-03-27Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working PapersIncumbency Disadvantage in U.S. National Politics
https://www.philadelphiafed.org:443/-/media/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2016/wp16-36.pdf?la=en
Philadelphia Fed Working Papers by Satyajit Chatterjee and Burcu EyigungorIncumbency Disadvantage in U.S. National Politics2017-01-05T06:23:00ZThe authors document that postwar U.S. national elections show a strong pattern of "incumbency disadvantage": If the presidency has been held by a party for some time, that party tends to lose seats in Congress. A model of partisan politics with policy inertia and elections is presented to explain this finding. The authors also find that the incumbency disadvantage comes sooner for Democrats than Republicans. Based on the observed Democratic bias in Congress (Democrats, on average, hold more seats in the House and Senate than Republicans), the model also offers an explanation for the second finding.Incumbency Disadvantage in U.S. National PoliticsFull texthttps://www.philadelphiafed.org:443/-/media/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2016/wp16-36.pdf?la=enSatyajit ChatterjeeBurcu EyigungorSatyajit Chatterjee and Burcu Eyigungor2016-01Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working PapersA Tractable City Model for Aggregative Analysis
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2015/wp15-37.pdf?la=en
Philadelphia Fed Working Papers by Satyajit Chatterjee and Burcu EyigungorA Tractable City Model for Aggregative Analysis2015-10-17T06:17:59ZAn analytically tractable city model with external increasing returns is presented. The equilibrium city structure is either monocentric or decentralized. Regardless of which structure prevails, intracity variation in endogenous variables displays exponential decay from the city center, where the decay rates depend only on parameters. Given population, the equilibrium of the model is generically unique. Tractability permits explicit expressions for when a central business district (CBD) will emerge in equilibrium, how external increasing returns affect the steepness of downtown rent gradients, and how wages and welfare vary with population. An application to urban growth boundary is presented.A Tractable City Model for Aggregative AnalysisFull texthttp://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2015/wp15-37.pdf?la=enBurcu EyigungorSatyajit ChatterjeeSatyajit Chatterjee and Burcu Eyigungor2015-10Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working PapersR30Z10A Quantitative Analysis of the U.S. Housing and Mortgage Markets and the Foreclosure Crisis
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2015/wp15-13.pdf
Philadelphia Fed Working Papers by Satyajit ChatterjeeA Quantitative Analysis of the U.S. Housing and Mortgage Markets and the Foreclosure Crisis2015-04-08T17:34:59ZThe authors present a model of long-duration collateralized debt with risk of default. Applied to the housing market, it can match the homeownership rate, the average foreclosure rate, and the lower tail of the distribution of home-equity ratios across homeowners prior to the recent crisis. The authors stress the role of favorable tax treatment of housing in matching these facts. They then use the model to account for the foreclosure crisis in terms of three shocks: overbuilding, financial frictions, and foreclosure delays. The financial friction shock accounts for much of the decline in house prices, while the foreclosure delays account for most of the rise in foreclosures. The scale of the foreclosure crisis might have been smaller if mortgage interest payments were not tax deductible. Temporarily higher inflation might have lowered the foreclosure rate as well. Supersedes Working Paper 11-26. (565 KB, 44 pages)A Quantitative Analysis of the U.S. Housing and Mortgage Markets and the Foreclosure CrisisFull texthttp://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2015/wp15-13.pdfSatyajit ChatterjeeSatyajit Chatterjee2015-04Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working PapersE21E32E44G21H24A Seniority Arrangement for Sovereign Debt
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2015/wp15-07.pdf
Philadelphia Fed Working Papers by Satyajit ChatterjeeA Seniority Arrangement for Sovereign Debt2015-04-08T17:34:59ZA sovereign's inability to commit to a course of action regarding future borrowing and default behavior makes long-term debt costly (the problem of debt dilution). One mechanism to mitigate the debt dilution problem is the inclusion of a seniority clause in sovereign debt contracts. In the event of default, creditors are to be paid off in the order in which they lent (the "absolute priority" or "first-in-time" rule). In this paper, the authors propose a modification of the absolute priority rule that is more suited to the sovereign debt context and analyze its positive and normative implications within a quantitatively realistic model of sovereign debt and default. (708 KB, 38 pages)A Seniority Arrangement for Sovereign DebtFull texthttp://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2015/wp15-07.pdfSatyajit ChatterjeeSatyajit Chatterjee2015-04Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working PapersE44F34G12G15Dealing with Consumer Default: Bankruptcy vs. Garnishment
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2011/wp11-35.pdf
Philadelphia Fed Working Papers by Satyajit ChatterjeeDealing with Consumer Default: Bankruptcy vs. Garnishment2011-08-26T06:23:59ZWhat are the positive and normative implications of eliminating bankruptcy protection for indebted individuals? Without bankruptcy protection, creditors can collect on defaulted debt to the extent permitted by wage garnishment laws. The elimination lowers the default premium on unsecured debt and permits low-net-worth individuals suffering bad earnings shocks to smooth consumption by borrowing. There is a large increase in consumer debt financed essentially by super-wealthy individuals, a modest drop in capital per worker, and a higher frequency of consumer default. Average welfare rises by 1 percent of consumption in perpetuity, with about 90 percent of households favoring the change.Dealing with Consumer Default: Bankruptcy vs. GarnishmentFull texthttp://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2011/wp11-35.pdfSatyajit ChatterjeeSatyajit Chatterjee2011-08Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working PapersMaturity, Indebtedness, and Default Risk
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2011/wp11-33.pdf
Philadelphia Fed Working Papers by Satyajit ChatterjeeMaturity, Indebtedness, and Default Risk2011-08-16T06:25:00ZIn this paper, the authors advance the theory and computation of Eaton-Gersovitz style models of sovereign debt by incorporating long-term debt and proving the existence of an equilibrium price function with the property that the interest rate on debt is increasing in the amount borrowed and implementing a novel method of computing the equilibrium accurately. Using Argentina as a test case, they show that incorporating long-term debt allows the model to match the average external debt-to-output ratio, average spread on external debt, the standard deviation of spreads and simultaneously improve upon the model's ability to account for Argentina's other cyclical facts.Maturity, Indebtedness, and Default RiskFull texthttp://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2011/wp11-33.pdfSatyajit ChatterjeeSatyajit Chatterjee2011-08Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working PapersA Quantitative Analysis of the US Housing and Mortgage Markets and the Foreclosure Crisis
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2011/wp11-26.pdf
Philadelphia Fed Working Papers by Satyajit ChatterjeeA Quantitative Analysis of the US Housing and Mortgage Markets and the Foreclosure Crisis2011-07-21T06:25:00ZThe authors construct a quantitative equilibrium model of the housing sector that accounts for the homeownership rate, the average foreclosure rate, and the distribution of home-equity ratios across homeowners prior to the recent boom and bust in the housing market. They analyze the key mechanisms that account for these facts, including the preferential tax treatment of housing and in ation. The authors then use the model to gain a deeper understanding of the recent housing and mortgage crisis by studying the consequence of an unanticipated increase in the supply of housing (overbuilding shock). They show that the model can account for the observed decline in house prices and much of the increase in the foreclosure rate if two additional forces are taken into account: (i) the lengthening of the time to complete a foreclosure (during which a defaulter can stay rent-free in his house) and (ii) the tightening of credit constraints in the market for new mortgages.A Quantitative Analysis of the US Housing and Mortgage Markets and the Foreclosure CrisisFull texthttp://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2011/wp11-26.pdfSatyajit ChatterjeeSatyajit Chatterjee2011-07Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working PapersInsuring Student Loans Against the Risk of College Failure
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2010/wp10-31.pdf
Philadelphia Fed Working Papers by Satyajit ChatterjeeInsuring Student Loans Against the Risk of College Failure2010-10-06T06:25:00ZParticipants in student loan programs must repay loans in full regardless of whether they complete college. But many students who take out a loan do not earn a degree (the dropout rate among college students is between 33 to 50 percent). The authors examine whether insurance against college-failure risk can be offered, taking into account moral hazard and adverse selection. To do so, they develop a model that accounts for college enrollment, dropout, and completion rates among new high school graduates in the US and use that model to study the feasibility and optimality of offering insurance against college failure risk. The authors find that optimal insurance raises the enrollment rate by 3.5 percent, the fraction acquiring a degree by 3.8 percent and welfare by 2.7 percent. These effects are more pronounced for students with low scholastic ability (the ones with high failure probability).Insuring Student Loans Against the Risk of College FailureFull texthttp://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2010/wp10-31.pdfSatyajit ChatterjeeSatyajit Chatterjee2010-10Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working PapersD82D86I22Maturity, Indebtedness, and Default Risk
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2010/wp10-12.pdf
Philadelphia Fed Working Papers by Satyajit ChatterjeeMaturity, Indebtedness, and Default Risk2010-04-17T06:29:00ZIn this paper, the authors present a new approach to incorporating long-term debt into equilibrium models of unsecured debt and default. They make three sets of contributions. First, the authors advance the theory of sovereign debt begun in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) by proving the existence of an equilibrium price function with the property that the interest rate on debt is increasing in the amount borrowed. Second, using Argentina as a test case, they show that unlike a one-period debt model, their model of long-term debt is capable of accounting for the average external debt-to-output ratio, average spread on external debt, and the standard deviation of spreads for the 1993-2001 period, without any deterioration in the model's ability to account for Argentina's other cyclical facts. Third, the authors propose a new and very accurate method for solving the model.Maturity, Indebtedness, and Default RiskFull texthttp://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2010/wp10-12.pdfSatyajit ChatterjeeSatyajit Chatterjee2010-04Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working PapersInsuring College Failure Risk
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2010/wp10-1.pdf
Philadelphia Fed Working Papers by Satyajit ChatterjeeInsuring College Failure Risk2010-02-19T17:40:59ZParticipants in student loan programs must repay loans in full regardless of whether they complete college. But many students who take out a loan do not earn a degree (the dropout rate among college students is between 33 to 50 percent). The authors examine whether insurance against college-failure risk can be offered, taking into account moral hazard and adverse selection. To do so, they developed a model that accounts for college enrollment, dropout, and completion rates among new high school graduates in the US and use that model to study the feasibility and optimality of offering insurance against college-failure risk. The authors find that optimal insurance raises the enrollment rate by 3.5 percent, the fraction acquiring a degree by 3.8 percent and welfare by 2.7 percent. These effects are more pronounced for students with low scholastic ability (the ones with high failure probability).Insuring College Failure RiskFull texthttp://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2010/wp10-1.pdfSatyajit ChatterjeeSatyajit Chatterjee2010-02Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working PapersForeclosures and House Price Dynamics: A Quantitative Analysis of the Mortgage Crisis and the Foreclosure Prevention Policy
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2009/wp09-22.pdf
Philadelphia Fed Working Papers by Satyajit ChatterjeeForeclosures and House Price Dynamics: A Quantitative Analysis of the Mortgage Crisis and the Foreclosure Prevention Policy2009-09-24T17:42:59ZThe authors construct a quantitative equilibrium model of the housing market in which an unanticipated increase in the supply of housing triggers default mortgages via its effect on house prices. The decline in house prices creates an incentive to increase the consumption of housing space, but leverage makes it costly for homeowners to sell their homes and buy bigger ones (they must absorb large capital losses). Instead, leveraged households find it advantageous to default and rent housing space. Since renters demand less housing space than homeowners, foreclosures are a negative force affecting house prices. The authors explore the possible effects of the government's foreclosure prevention policy in their model. They find that the policy can temporarily reduce foreclosures and shore up house prices.Foreclosures and House Price Dynamics: A Quantitative Analysis of the Mortgage Crisis and the Foreclosure Prevention PolicyFull texthttp://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2009/wp09-22.pdfSatyajit ChatterjeeSatyajit Chatterjee2009-09Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working PapersMaturity, Indebtedness, and Default Risk
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2009/wp09-2.pdf
Philadelphia Fed Working Papers by Satyajit ChatterjeeMaturity, Indebtedness, and Default Risk2009-03-27T12:39:59ZThe authors present a novel and tractable model of long-term sovereign debt. They make two sets of contributions. First, on the substantive side, using Argentina as a test case they show that unlike one-period debt models, their model of long-term sovereign debt is capable of accounting for the average spread, the average default frequency, and the average debt-to-output ratio of Argentina over the 1991-2001 period without any deterioration in the model's ability to account for Argentina's cyclical facts. Using their calibrated model the authors determine what Argentina's debt, default frequency and welfare would have been if Argentina had issued only short-term debt. Second, on the methodological side, they advance the theory of sovereign debt begun in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) by establishing the existence of an equilibrium pricing function for long-term sovereign debt and by providing a fairly complete set of characterization results regarding equilibrium default and borrowing behavior. In addition, they identify and solve a computational problem associated with pricing long-term unsecured debt that stems from nonconvexities introduced by the possibility of default.Maturity, Indebtedness, and Default RiskFull texthttp://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2009/wp09-2.pdfSatyajit ChatterjeeSatyajit Chatterjee2009-03Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working PapersF34F41G12G33Spinoffs and the Market for Ideas
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2008/wp08-26.pdf
Philadelphia Fed Working Papers by Satyajit ChatterjeeSpinoffs and the Market for Ideas2008-10-21T07:16:59ZThe authors present a theory of spinoffs in which the key ingredient is the originator's private information concerning the quality of his new idea. Because quality is privately observed, by the standard adverse-selection logic, the market can at best offer a price that refects the average quality of ideas sold. This gives the holders of above-average-quality ideas the incentive to spin off. The authors show that only workers with very good ideas decide to spin off, while workers with mediocre ideas sell them. Entrepreneurs of existing firms pay a price for the ideas sold in the market that implies zero expected profits for them. Hence, firms' project selection is independent of firm size, which, under some additional assumptions, leads to scale-independent growth. The entry and growth process of firms leads to invariant firm-size distributions that resemble the ones for the U.S. economy and most of its individual industries.Spinoffs and the Market for IdeasFull texthttp://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2008/wp08-26.pdfSatyajit ChatterjeeSatyajit Chatterjee2008-10Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working PapersA Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2007/wp07-16.pdf
Philadelphia Fed Working Papers by Satyajit Chatterjee, Dean Corbae, Makoto Nakajima, and Jose-Victor Rios-RullA Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default2007-06-23T15:35:59ZA Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of DefaultFull texthttp://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2007/wp07-16.pdfMakoto NakajimaDean CorbaeSatyajit ChatterjeeJosé-Víctor Ríos-RullSatyajit Chatterjee, Dean Corbae, Makoto Nakajima, and Jose-Victor Rios-Rull2007-06Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working PapersA Finite-Life Private-Information Theory of Unsecured Consumer Debt
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2007/wp07-14.pdf
Philadelphia Fed Working Papers by Satyajit Chatterjee, Dean Corbae, and José-Víctor Ríos-RullA Finite-Life Private-Information Theory of Unsecured Consumer Debt2007-06-01T15:35:59ZA Finite-Life Private-Information Theory of Unsecured Consumer DebtFull texthttp://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2007/wp07-14.pdfDean CorbaeSatyajit ChatterjeeJosé-Víctor Ríos-RullSatyajit Chatterjee, Dean Corbae, and José-Víctor Ríos-Rull2007-05Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working PapersSpin-Offs and the Market for Ideas
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2007/wp07-15.pdf
Philadelphia Fed Working Papers by Satyajit Chatterjee and Esteban Rossi-HansbergSpin-Offs and the Market for Ideas2007-06-01T15:35:59ZSpin-Offs and the Market for IdeasFull texthttp://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2007/wp07-15.pdfEsteban Rossi-HansbergSatyajit ChatterjeeSatyajit Chatterjee and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg2007-06Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working PapersUrban Density and the Rate of Invention
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2006/wp06-14.pdf
Philadelphia Fed Working Papers by Gerald Carlino, Satyajit Chatterjee, and Robert HuntUrban Density and the Rate of Invention2006-08-18T18:19:00ZUrban Density and the Rate of InventionFull texthttp://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2006/wp06-14.pdfRobert HuntSatyajit ChatterjeeGerald A. CarlinoGerald Carlino, Satyajit Chatterjee, and Robert Hunt2006-08Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working PapersMonetary and Financial Forces in the Great Depression
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2006/wp06-12.pdf
Philadelphia Fed Working Papers by Satyajit Chatterjee and Dean CorbaeMonetary and Financial Forces in the Great Depression2006-07-03T12:35:59ZMonetary and Financial Forces in the Great DepressionFull texthttp://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2006/wp06-12.pdfDean CorbaeSatyajit ChatterjeeSatyajit Chatterjee and Dean Corbae2006-07Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working PapersA Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2005/wp05-18.pdf
Philadelphia Fed Working Papers by Satyajit Chatterjee, Dean Corbae, Makoto Nakajima and Jose-Victor Rios-RullA Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default2005-09-01T12:00:00ZA Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of DefaultFull texthttp://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2005/wp05-18.pdfMakoto NakajimaDean CorbaeSatyajit ChatterjeeJosé-Víctor Ríos-RullSatyajit Chatterjee, Dean Corbae, Makoto Nakajima and Jose-Victor Rios-Rull2005Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working PapersOn the Contribution of Agglomeration Economies to the Spatial Concentration of U.S. Employment
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2003/wp03-24.pdf
Philadelphia Fed Working Papers by Satyajit ChatterjeeOn the Contribution of Agglomeration Economies to the Spatial Concentration of U.S. Employment2004-01-01T12:00:00ZOn the Contribution of Agglomeration Economies to the Spatial Concentration of U.S. EmploymentFull texthttp://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2003/wp03-24.pdfSatyajit ChatterjeeSatyajit Chatterjee2003Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working PapersA Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2002/wp02-6.pdf
Philadelphia Fed Working Papers by Satyajit ChatterjeeA Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default2004-01-01T12:00:00ZA Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of DefaultFull texthttp://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2002/wp02-6.pdfSatyajit ChatterjeeSatyajit Chatterjee2002Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Papers