Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision

# Basel III Monitoring Report

March 2026

BIS

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The analyses that were previously presented in the detailed sections of the Basel III Monitoring Report have been published as Tableau dashboards. Please note that occasionally published data are updated to reflect revised data submissions in between the publication dates of the reports. Therefore, the dashboards should be used to view the most up-to-date data and analysis. The Basel Committee welcomes any feedback on the dashboards at qis@bis.org.

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# Basel III Monitoring Report

March 2026

## Conventions used in this report

| | |
|---|---|
| billion | thousand million |
| trillion | thousand billion |
| lhs, rhs | left-hand scale, right-hand scale |

Group 1 banks are those that have Tier 1 capital of more than €3 billion and are internationally active. All other banks are considered Group 2 banks.

Components may not sum to totals because of rounding.

The term "country" as used in this publication also covers territorial entities that are not states as understood by international law and practice but for which data are separately and independently maintained.

All data, including for previous reporting dates, reflect revisions received up to 3 February 2026.

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# Highlights of the Basel III monitoring exercise as of 30 June 2025

## Basel III risk-based capital and leverage ratios are stable while liquidity indicators increase slightly for large internationally active banks

To assess the impact of the Basel III framework on banks, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision monitors the effects and dynamics of the reforms. For this purpose, a semiannual monitoring framework has been set up for the risk-based capital ratio, the leverage ratio and liquidity metrics, using data collected by national supervisors on a representative sample of institutions in each country. Since the end-2017 reporting date, the analyses have also captured the effects of the Basel Committee's finalisation of the Basel III reforms.[1] This summary is based on aggregate results using data as of 30 June 2025 and compares them with the previous reporting period (December 2024). The Basel Committee believes that the information contained in this summary and the related dashboards will provide relevant stakeholders with a useful benchmark for analysis.

Information considered in the analysis was obtained from voluntary and confidential submissions of data from individual banks and their national supervisors. At the jurisdictional level, there may be ongoing mandatory data collection, which also feeds into this report. Data were included for 150 banks, including 101 large internationally active ("Group 1") banks, among them 29 global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), and 49 other ("Group 2") banks.[2] Members' coverage of their banking sector is very high for Group 1 banks, reaching 100% coverage for some countries, while coverage is lower for Group 2 banks and varies by country.

In general, these analyses do not consider any transitional arrangements such as grandfathering arrangements. Rather, the estimates presented assume full implementation of the Basel III requirements based on data as of 30 June 2025. No assumptions have been made about banks' profitability or behavioural responses, such as changes in bank capital or balance sheet composition, since this date or in the future. Furthermore, the report does not reflect any additional capital requirements under Pillar 2 of the Basel III framework.

[1] See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, *High-level summary of Basel III reforms*, December 2017, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424_hlsummary.pdf; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, *Basel III: finalising post-crisis reforms*, December 2017, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.htm.

[2] Group 1 banks are those that have Tier 1 capital of more than €3 billion and are internationally active. All other banks are considered Group 2 banks. Not all banks provided data relating to all parts of the Basel III framework.

| Overview of results (unbalanced data set) | | | | | | Table 1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 31 December 2024[1] | | | 30 June 2025 | | |
| | Group 1 | Of which: G-SIBs | Group 2 | Group 1 | Of which: G-SIBs | Group 2 |
| *Initial Basel III framework* | | | | | | |
| CET1 ratio (%) | 13.9 | 13.5 | 17.8 | 13.9 | 13.4 | 19.1 |
| Target total capital shortfalls (€ bn)[2] | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.3 |
| TLAC shortfall 2022 minimum (€ bn) | 7.8 | 7.8 | | 24.6 | 24.6 | |
| Total accounting assets (€ bn) | 62,207 | 42,320 | 3,275 | 58,977 | 44,647 | 3,008 |
| Leverage ratio (%)[3] | 6.1 | 6.0 | 6.8 | 6.1 | 5.9 | 6.9 |
| LCR (%) | 134.1 | 130.6 | 200.3 | 135.0 | 130.8 | 191.6 |
| NSFR (%) | 122.8 | 122.5 | 135.1 | 123.8 | 124.1 | 134.2 |
| *Fully phased-in final Basel III framework (2028)* | | | | | | |
| Change in Tier 1 MRC at the target level (%) | 2.8 | 0.9 | 3.0 | 1.7 | 0.4 | 0.8 |
| CET1 ratio (%) | 13.5 | 13.2 | 16.2 | 13.4 | 13.1 | 17.6 |
| Target capital shortfalls (€ bn); of which: | 2.4 | 1.8 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.3 |
| CET1 | 1.4 | 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Additional Tier 1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.3 |
| Tier 2 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| TLAC shortfall 2022 minimum (€ bn) | 5.0 | 5.0 | | 3.2 | 3.2 | |
| Leverage ratio (%)[3] | 6.1 | 6.0 | 6.8 | 6.1 | 5.9 | 6.9 |

See Table A.4 for the target level capital requirements.

[1] The values for the previous period may differ slightly from those published in the previous report. This is due to data resubmissions for previous periods to improve the underlying data quality and enlarge the time series sample. [2] These use the 2017 definition of the leverage ratio exposure measure. [3] The leverage ratios reflect temporary exclusions from leverage exposures introduced in some jurisdictions.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.

- Compared with the December 2024 reporting period, the average Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital ratio under the current Basel III framework was stable at 13.9% for the unbalanced sample of Group 1 banks.
- The average impact of the Basel III framework on the Tier 1 minimum required capital (MRC) of Group 1 banks and for G-SIBs decreased when compared with December 2024 (by –1.1 and –0.5 percentage points, respectively), driven by implementation progress.
- Banks in the H1 2025 sample show a cumulative capital shortfall of €1.0 billion under the final Basel III framework.
- Applying the 2022 minimum total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) requirements and the current Basel III framework, 14 G-SIBs reporting TLAC data reported an aggregate incremental shortfall of €3.2 billion.
- The average Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) of Group 1 banks increased slightly (+0.8%) compared with December 2024, mainly due to lower net outflows compared with the previous period. The average Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) increased slightly (+1.1%) in the same period because of a smaller increase in required stable funding (RSF) compared with available stable funding (ASF).

Current Basel III capital ratios show a slight increase, driven by Europe and the rest of the world

Group 1 banks, balanced data set Graph 1

CET1, Tier 1 and total capital ratios[1] | Determinants of changes[2] | Tier 1 ratios by region




[1] The solid lines depict the relevant minimums, the dotted lines the minimums plus the capital conservation buffer. See Table A.4 for the relevant levels. [2] Exchange rates as at the current reporting date.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- The balanced data set for Group 1 banks showed a small increase (+0.1%) in current Basel III capital ratios in June 2025 in comparison with December 2024, driven by an increase in Tier 1 capital of a larger magnitude than the increase in risk-weighted assets (RWA). The overall CET1 capital ratios for Group 1 banks in the balanced data set were 14.1% in June 2025.
- Currently, the Tier 1 capital ratios are higher in Europe than in the Americas and the rest of the world. However, this relationship was reversed from 2011 to 2014. The rest of the world is the main driver for the increase in H1 2025 (+2.7%).

## The impact of final Basel III standards on Group 1 banks is lower compared with the previous exercise, driven by implementation progress

Change in Tier 1 MRC at the target level due to the final Basel III standards — Graph 2




CVA = credit valuation adjustment.

Credit risk shows the change in MRC due to revised standardised and internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches, including securitisation. Operational risk figures may not show supervisor-imposed capital add-ons under Pillar 2. Therefore, changes in MRC may be overestimated. Output floor results are net of the existing Basel I-based floor according to national implementation of the Basel II framework. The target level accounts for Tier 1 minimum capital requirements and the capital conservation buffer (ie resulting in an 8.5% Tier 1 capital requirement) as well as any applicable G-SIB surcharge, any countercyclical capital buffer requirements and any other higher domestic Pillar 1 requirements to the extent these have been reported. The analysis also reflects any additional Pillar 1 RWA as reported by banks and their supervisors.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- For Group 1 banks, the Tier 1 MRC would increase by 1.7% following the full phase-in of the final Basel III standards. The increase in the MRC is underpinned by the incremental impact of the risk-based requirements of 2.6%, offset by the reduction in leverage ratio requirements by –0.9 percentage points. The increase in risk-based components is mainly driven by market risk (+1.7%).
- The impact on MRC across regions varies considerably for Group 1 banks. There is a low impact for European banks (+1.0%) and the rest of the world (+3.9%), while the impact is negative for the Americas (–1.7%).
- For Group 2 banks, the overall 0.8% impact on Tier 1 MRC is driven by a 3.4% increase in the risk-based measures, stemming mainly from the output floor (+3.6%), which is partially offset by a reduction in leverage ratio MRC (–2.6%).
- This is the first period in which banks in the European Union reported results under their national final Basel III standards for all risk types but market risk. Banks with full implementation of the final Basel III standards for all risk types may still contribute to the change in MRC shown in the impact analysis due to any remaining phase-in arrangements, for example regarding the level of the output floor. Considering the overall report sample of 101 Group 1 banks for the June 2025 reporting period, 28 banks for Europe, 13 banks for the Americas and 44 banks for the rest of the world were included in the Group 1 banks' impact analysis.

## Fully phased-in Basel III leverage ratios[1] of large internationally active banks were slightly lower in H1 2025

Group 1 banks, balanced data set, exchange rates as at the current reporting date — Graph 3

Leverage ratios and their determinants | Leverage ratios by region




[1] Data points from H1 2011 to H2 2012 use the original definition of the leverage ratio. Data points from H1 2013 to H1 2017 use the definition of the leverage ratio set out in the 2014 version of the framework. Note that the data points for H1 2013 use an approximation for the initial definition of the Basel III leverage ratio exposure which uses gross instead of adjusted gross securities financing transaction values. Data points from H2 2017 onwards use the final definition of the leverage ratio to the extent data are available. Temporary exclusions from the leverage ratio exposure measure in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic have not been added back.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- For the balanced data set of Group 1 banks, the leverage ratio was slightly lower during H1 2025 in comparison with the previous reporting period. This contrasts with the sharp decrease that started at end-2021, particularly for the Americas.
- Leverage ratios for Group 1 banks are still lower in Europe (5.0%) than in the Americas (5.7%) and the rest of the world (7.0%).
- For the unbalanced data set as of the June 2025 reporting date, the average fully phased-in final Basel III Tier 1 leverage ratios are 6.1% for Group 1 banks, 6.0% for G-SIBs and 6.9% for Group 2 banks.

## Overall capital shortfall at the target level under the final Basel III standards

Fully phased-in final Basel III standards,[1] sample and exchange rates as at the reporting dates — Graph 4




[1] Results for H2 2015 are based on the Basel Committee's cumulative quantitative impact study and are not fully comparable from a methodological point of view. Compared with H2 2017 and H1 2018, the results since H2 2018 include the revised market risk framework as finalised in January 2019.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- For this reporting date, banks in the sample reported a regulatory capital shortfall of €1.0 billion.

## Capital for large internationally active banks increased

Group 1 banks, balanced data set, exchange rates as at the current reporting date — Graph 5




[1] The dividend payout ratio is calculated as common share dividends divided by profits after tax using a rolling 12-month window.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- From end-June 2011 to end-June 2025, the level of Group 1 banks' CET1 capital increased by 152% from €1,203 billion to €3,029 billion. Since end-December 2024, Group 1 CET1 capital has increased by €90.2 billion (or 3.1%).
- Over H1 2025, CET1 capital increased across all regions, with the most notable increment in the rest of the world.
- Overall, profits after tax increased for the Group 1 banks in the sample and stood at their highest level of €182.4 billion in H1 2025. The dividend payout ratio stood at 34.2%, which is about 109 basis points lower than the one reported in the preceding period.

Dividend payout ratios varied across regions

Group 1 banks, balanced data set, exchange rates as at the current reporting date Graph 6




The dividend payout ratio is calculated as common share dividends divided by profits after tax using a rolling 12-month window.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- Annual after-tax profits for Group 1 banks (ie summed up over two consecutive reporting dates) increased in all regions, with Europe showing an increase of 5.5%, the Americas of 15.7% and the rest of the world of 10.8%, compared with the 12-month period ending June 2024.
- Compared with the previous reporting date, the annual dividend payout ratio has decreased in the rest of the world rand in Europe, while it has been stable in the Americas. It is significantly below the record high ratios observed in 2020 in the Americas, while it is at pre-pandemic levels in Europe and the rest of the world.

## Analysis of the share of MRC by asset class[1] according to current rules shows stable credit risk MRC

Balanced data set | Graph 7




CVA = credit valuation adjustment.

[1] "Other credit" includes exposures subject to partial use of the standardised approach for credit risk that cannot be assigned to a specific asset class, past-due items under the standardised approach, capital requirements specified in Part 1 of the Basel II framework, capital requirements for other assets, and additional capital requirements due to regulatory calculation differences if there is a shortfall of provisions over expected loss amounts for exposures subject to the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach for credit risk. The category "other" includes Pillar 1 capital requirements in member countries for risks not covered by the Basel Framework and reconciliation differences (ie shortfalls of provisions over expected loss amounts for exposures subject to the IRB approach for credit risk). The term "reconciliation differences" refers to the difference between MRC reported at the entire bank level and the sum of MRC reported for the individual asset classes.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- As of June 2025 and for Group 1 banks, non-securitisation credit risk[3] continues to be the dominant portion of overall MRC, on average covering 70.7% of total MRC. Among the non-securitisation credit risk asset classes, the share of MRC for corporate exposures increased from 30.4% at end-June 2011 to 31.2% at the current reporting date. In addition to this, the other credit exposure has experienced the biggest increase (+6.7%) in comparison with December 2024, and equity exposure has experienced the most significant decrease (–5.0%).
- The share of MRC for operational risk increased sharply from 8.6% at end-June 2011 to 18.1% at end-2016, and then decreased to reach 15.2% at the current reporting date. The increase in the early 2010s was attributed in large part to the surge in the number and severity of operational risk events during and after the financial crises, which are factored into the calculation of MRC for operational risk under the advanced measurement approach. More recently, there has been some "fading out" of the financial crisis losses so that in 2022 the lowest loss level of the previous 10 years is observed. This explains the latest decrease in capital requirements, especially for banks heavily affected by the Great Financial Crisis. In contrast, losses triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic have not yet had a significant impact on the loss severity level, but this may realise in the near future.
- The share of MRC for securitisation exposures has halved between end-June 2011 and end-June 2025.

[3] Here, non-securitisation credit risk is defined as the sum of corporate, bank, sovereign, retail, equity and other credit, as illustrated in the graph.

## All banks exceeded the 100% threshold for LCR and NSFR[1]

Overall distribution | Graph 8

Liquidity Coverage Ratio[2] | Net Stable Funding Ratio




[1] The median value is represented by a horizontal line, with 50% of the values falling in the 25th to 75th percentile range shown by the box. The upper and lower endpoints of the thin vertical lines show the range of the entire sample. In some cases, arrows at the top of the vertical line indicate banks with ratios outside the range shown in the graph. The dots represent weighted averages. The horizontal red lines represent the 100% minimums. [2] The sample is capped at 400%, meaning that all banks with an LCR above 400% were set to 400%.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- The weighted average LCR was 135.0% for Group 1 banks and 191.6% for Group 2 banks at end-June 2025.
- In the current reporting period, all banks reported an LCR above 100%, and hence no shortfall, compared with an €18.3 billion shortfall for three banks reported in December 2024.
- The weighted average NSFR was 123.8% for Group 1 banks and 134.2% for Group 2 banks at end-June 2025.
- All banks reported an NSFR in excess of 100%.

For Group 1 banks, the LCR increased while the NSFR remained stable

Group 1 banks, balanced data set[1]

Graph 9

LCR, NSFR and related shortfalls[2]




LCR and change in its determinants[3]




NSFR and change in its determinants[3]




ASF = available stable funding; HQLA = high-quality liquid assets; RSF = required stable funding.

[1] This graph depicts the NSFR as calculated under different versions of the NSFR framework released in December 2010, January 2014 and October 2014. Calculations performed according to the final standard approved by the Basel Committee in October 2014 start with the end-December 2014 reporting period. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, *Basel III: the net stable funding ratio*, October 2014, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d295.htm. Since the Basel Committee did not collect NSFR data through its Basel III monitoring exercise for the end-June 2020 reporting date, the relevant data points show the same values as for end-December 2019. [2] Exchange rates as at the reporting dates. [3] Exchange rates as at the current reporting date.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- For a balanced data set of Group 1 banks, all banks met a 100% LCR at end-June 2025, resulting in no shortfall, same as at end-December 2024. The average LCR for this sample increased to 134.5% at end-June 2025 compared with 133.4% in the previous reporting period. Banks in the sample did not experience drops in the LCR during the turmoil that some banks outside the monitoring sample experienced.
- There was no aggregate NSFR shortfall for the balanced data set of Group 1 banks. The average NSFR for the same sample of banks remained stable, shifting slightly from 122.3% as of December 2024 to 122.1% in June 2025.
- Both the LCR and NSFR were above pre-pandemic levels at the reporting date.

## Group 2 banks showed a slightly decreasing LCR and a stable NSFR with no shortfalls

Group 2 banks, balanced data set[1] — Graph 10

LCR, NSFR and related shortfalls[2] | LCR and change in its determinants[3] | NSFR and change in its determinants[3]




ASF = available stable funding; HQLA = high-quality liquid assets; RSF = required stable funding.

[1] As described in footnote 1 to Graph 9, the NSFR time series depicts data reflecting NSFR standards released in December 2010, January 2014 and October 2014. [2] Exchange rates as at the reporting dates. [3] Exchange rates as at the current reporting date.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- For a balanced data set of Group 2 banks, the LCR shortfall has remained at zero since June 2017. The average LCR for the same sample of banks decreased by 0.9 percentage points to 186.7% in June 2025, due to a greater increase in net cash outflows compared with the last reporting date.
- The aggregate NSFR shortfall remained at zero for the balanced data set of Group 2 banks. The average NSFR for the same sample of banks increased marginally by 0.1 percentage points to 138.3 in June 2025 in comparison with the previous reporting date.

For Group 1 banks, LCRs remained stable in the Americas, increased in the rest of the world and decreased in Europe, while NSFRs were mostly stable across all regions

Group 1 banks, balanced data set

Graph 11




[1] The NSFR time series depicts data reflecting NSFR standards released in December 2010, January 2014 and October 2014.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- Since 2020, the weighted average LCRs for both Europe and the rest of the world have largely been above 140%, while the average LCR for the Americas has been around 120%. While Europe and the Americas initially had lower average LCRs compared with the rest of the world, the average LCRs of Europe and the rest of the world tended to gradually converge before the onset of the pandemic. The regions with lower end-2012 average LCRs saw significant increases, in particular between end-2012 and June 2014, and Europe saw such increases again at the start of the pandemic. The increase in Europe reversed between June 2021 and June 2022, although since then the LCR of European banks is still above end-2019 levels.
- At end-June 2025 the weighted average NSFR or Group 1 banks in each of the three regions was well in excess of 100%. The average NSFR at end-June 2025 across all three regions remained stable, with less than 0.5-percentage point changes in the NSFRs from December 2024. After a significant drop during H1 2022, the NSFR of banks in the Americas slowly reverted, landing at 117.6% at June 2025.

# Annex A: Basel III standards and phase-in arrangements

## Basel III minimum requirements and buffers

Table A.1

| | As of 1 January 2019 |
|---|---|
| Leverage ratio | 3.0% |
| Minimum CET1 ratio | 4.5% |
| Capital conservation buffer | 2.50% |
| G-SIB surcharge | 1.0%–2.5% |
| Minimum common equity plus capital conservation buffer | 7.0% |
| Phase-in of deductions from CET1 (including amounts exceeding the limit for DTAs, MSRs and financials) | 100% |
| Minimum Tier 1 capital | 6.0% |
| Minimum total capital | 8.0% |
| Minimum total capital plus capital conservation buffer | 10.5% |
| Capital instruments that no longer qualify as Tier 1 capital or Tier 2 capital | Phased out over 10-year horizon beginning 2013 |
| Liquidity Coverage Ratio | 100% |
| Net Stable Funding Ratio | 100%[1] |

DTA = deferred tax assets; MSR = mortgage servicing rights.

[1] Note that as of September 2023, a final rule for the Net Stable Funding Ratio is in force in 26 out of 27 Basel Committee member jurisdictions. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, *RCAP: Basel III implementation dashboard*, October 2023, www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation/rcap_reports.htm.

## Final Basel III phase-in arrangements

Shading indicates transition periods – all dates are as of 1 January.

Table A.2

| | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revisions to the standardised and internal ratings-based approaches to credit risk | Introduce | | | | | |
| Revised CVA and market risk frameworks | Introduce | | | | | |
| Revised operational risk framework | Introduce | | | | | |
| Output floor | 50% | 55% | 60% | 65% | 70% | 72.5% |
| | Increase in RWA subject to 25% cap at national discretion. | | | | | |
| Leverage ratio exposure measure and G-SIB surcharge | Introduce | | | | | |

## Definition of different Basel III regimes

Table A.3

| | Initial Basel III framework | Transitional final Basel III framework | Fully phased-in final Basel III framework |
|---|---|---|---|
| Definition of capital | *Basel III: A global framework for more resilient banks and the banking system*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm | | |
| Credit risk | *Basel III: A global framework for more resilient banks and the banking system*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm; *Capital requirements for bank exposures to central counterparties*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs227.htm | *Basel III: finalising post-crisis reforms*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.htm; *Capital requirements for bank exposures to central counterparties*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs227.htm; *Capital requirements for banks' equity investments in funds*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs266.htm | |
| Operational risk | Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.htm | *Basel III: finalising post-crisis reforms*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.htm | |
| Market risk | *Revisions to the Basel II market risk framework*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs158.htm; *Guidelines for computing capital for incremental risk in the trading book*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs159.htm | *Minimum capital requirements for market risk*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d457.htm | |
| Counterparty credit risk | *Basel III: A global framework for more resilient banks and the banking system*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm | *The standardised approach for measuring counterparty credit risk exposures*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs279.htm | |
| CVA | *Basel III: A global framework for more resilient banks and the banking system*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm | *Basel III: finalising post-crisis reforms*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.htm; Targeted revisions to the revised CVA framework published in July 2020 are **not** yet considered for the end-December 2019 reporting date. They will be reflected in the exercise on the end-2020 reporting date, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d507.htm | |
| Securitisation | *Basel III: A global framework for more resilient banks and the banking system*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm | *Revisions to the securitisation framework*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d374.htm | |
| Floor | *Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.htm | Output floor of 50%, *Basel III: finalising post-crisis reforms*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.htm | Output floor of 72.5%, *Basel III: finalising post-crisis reforms*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.htm |
| Leverage ratio | *Basel III: A global framework for more resilient banks and the banking system*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm; *Basel III leverage ratio framework and disclosure requirements*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs270.htm | *Basel III: finalising post-crisis reforms*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.htm; *Leverage ratio treatment of client cleared derivatives*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d467.htm | |

## Minimum and target risk-based capital and leverage ratio requirements

Fully phased-in final Basel III standards, in per cent

Table A.4

| | Fully implemented risk-based requirement | | | Fully implemented leverage ratio requirement | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Minimum | Target non-G-SIBs | Target G-SIBs | Minimum all banks and target non-G-SIBs | Target G-SIBs |
| CET1 capital | 4.5 | 7.0 | 8.0–9.5 | | |
| Tier 1 capital | 6.0 | 8.5 | 9.5–11.0 | 3.0 | 3.5–4.25 |
| Total capital | 8.0 | 10.5 | 11.5–13.0 | | |

# Annex B: Previous monitoring reports published by the Basel Committee

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| December 2010 | *Results of the comprehensive quantitative impact study*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs186.htm | |
| April 2012 | *Results of the Basel III monitoring exercise as of 30 June 2011*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs217.htm | |
| September 2012 | *Results of the Basel III monitoring exercise as of 31 December 2011*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs231.htm | |
| March 2013 | *Results of the Basel III monitoring exercise as of 30 June 2012*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs243.htm | |
| September 2013 | *Results of the Basel III monitoring exercise as of 31 December 2012*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs262.htm | |
| March 2014 | *Results of the Basel III monitoring exercise as of 30 June 2013*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs278.htm | |
| September 2014 | *Basel III monitoring report as of 31 December 2013*, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs289.htm | |
| | Main findings of the trading book hypothetical portfolio exercise | Diana Iercosan, Derek Nesbitt and Arnaud Sandrin |
| March 2015 | *Basel III monitoring report*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d312.htm | |
| | Analysis of the QIS for the fundamental review of the trading book | |
| September 2015 | *Basel III monitoring report*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d334.htm | |
| March 2016 | *Basel III monitoring report*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d354.htm | |
| | Comprehensive QIS on interest rate risk in the banking book | Ethan Goh, Kamil Pliszka and Davy Reinard |
| September 2016 | *Basel III monitoring report*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d378.htm | |
| | Results of the quantitative impact study on the large exposures review clause | Marie-Céline Bard, Ken Taniguchi and Lynnette Withfield |
| February 2017 | *Basel III monitoring report*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d397.htm | |
| | Impact of the revised minimum capital requirements for market risk | Scott Nagel |
| | Results of the survey on the interaction of regulatory instruments | Diana Hancock and Doriana Ruffino |
| September 2017 | *Basel III monitoring report*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d416.htm | |
| | Impact of the revised minimum capital requirements for market risk | Scott Nagel |
| | Impact of the revised securitisation framework | Bernardo D'Alessandro, Thomas Morck and Emanuela Piani |
| December 2017 | *Basel III monitoring report – Results of the cumulative quantitative impact study*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d426.htm | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| March 2018 | *Basel III monitoring report*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d433.htm | |
| | Impact of the revised securitisation framework | Bernardo D'Alessandro, Thomas Morck and Emanuela Piani |
| October 2018 | *Basel III monitoring report*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d449.htm | |
| March 2019 | *Basel III monitoring report,* www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d461.htm | |
| September 2019 | *Basel III monitoring report,* www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d477.htm | |
| | Counterparty credit risk and credit valuation adjustment risk | Alexandra Gebauer, Evariste Beigneux and Giulio Malberti |
| April 2020 | *Basel III monitoring report,* www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d500.htm | |
| | Counterparty credit risk and credit valuation adjustment risk | Thomas Blumentritt |
| December 2020 | *Basel III monitoring report,* www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d512.htm | |
| | Counterparty credit risk and credit valuation adjustment risk | Thomas Blumentritt and Alexandra Gebauer |
| September 2021 | *Basel III monitoring report,* www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d524.htm | |
| | Exclusions from the leverage ratio exposure measure due to Covid-19 | Renzo Corrias |
| February 2022 | *Basel III monitoring report,* www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d531.htm | |
| September 2022 | *Basel III monitoring report,* www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d541.htm | |
| | Banks' exposures to cryptoassets – a novel dataset | Renzo Corrias |
| | Capital buffers and total CET1 requirements including Pillar 2 | Irina Barakova and Roberto Ottolini |
| February 2023 | *Basel III monitoring report,* www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d546.htm | |
| | Regional distributions of Group 1 and Group 2 banks and their impact on results in the Basel III monitoring reports | Martin Birn, Lea Charlotte Neugebauer and Verena Seidl |
| September 2023 | *Basel III monitoring report,* www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d554.htm | |
| March 2024 | *Basel III monitoring report*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d570.htm | |
| October 2024 | *Basel III monitoring report*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d581.htm | |
| March 2025 | *Basel III monitoring report*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d592.htm | |
| October 2025 | *Basel III monitoring report*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d599.htm | |