


Basel Committee on Banking Supervision



Basel III Monitoring Report

Revised – November 2025



Queries regarding this document should be addressed to the Secretariat of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (email: qis@bis.org).

Since the report published in September 2021, the monitoring reports no longer include a statistical annex. However, the data underlying the graphs are available for download as a separate Excel file. This presents the same data as the annex in previous reports but in a format that is easier to use for readers' own analyses. Some analyses that were previously presented in the report have been published as Tableau dashboards. The Committee welcomes any feedback on the dashboards at qis@bis.org.

This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org/bcbs/qis/).

Grey underlined text in this publication shows where hyperlinks are available in the electronic version.

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ISBN 978-92-9259-895-2 (online)

Basel III Monitoring Report

November 2025

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Conventions used in this report

billion thousand million

trillion thousand billion

lhs, rhs left-hand scale, right-hand scale

Group 1 banks are those that have Tier 1 capital of more than €3 billion and are internationally active. All other banks are considered Group 2 banks.

Components may not sum to totals because of rounding.

The term “country” as used in this publication also covers territorial entities that are not states as understood by international law and practice but for which data are separately and independently maintained.

All data, including for previous reporting dates, reflect revisions received up to 26 September 2025.

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Highlights of the Basel III monitoring exercise as of 31 December 2024

Basel III risk-based capital ratios increase while leverage ratio and Net Stable Funding Ratio remain stable for large internationally active banks

To assess the impact of the Basel III framework on banks, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision monitors the effects and dynamics of the reforms. For this purpose, a semiannual monitoring framework has been set up for the risk-based capital ratio, the leverage ratio and liquidity metrics, using data collected by national supervisors on a representative sample of institutions in each country. Since the end-2017 reporting date, the analyses have also captured the effects of the Committee's finalisation of the Basel III reforms.¹ This summary is based on aggregate results using data as of 31 December and compares it with the previous reporting period. The Committee believes that the information contained in this summary and the related dashboards will provide relevant stakeholders with a useful benchmark for analysis.

Information considered in the analysis was obtained from voluntary and confidential submissions of data from individual banks and their national supervisors. At the jurisdictional level, there may be ongoing mandatory data collection, which also feeds into this report. Data were included for 176 banks, including 116 large internationally active ("Group 1") banks, among them 29 global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) and 59 other ("Group 2") banks.² Members' coverage of their banking sector is very high for Group 1 banks, reaching 100% coverage for some countries, while coverage is lower for Group 2 banks and varies by country.

In general, these analyses do not consider any transitional arrangements such as grandfathering arrangements. Rather, the estimates presented assume full implementation of the Basel III requirements based on data as of 31 December 2024. No assumptions have been made about banks' profitability or behavioural responses, such as changes in bank capital or balance sheet composition, since this date or in the future. Furthermore, the report does not reflect any additional capital requirements under Pillar 2 of the Basel III framework.

¹ See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, *High-level summary of Basel III reforms*, December 2017, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424_hlsummary.pdf; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, *Basel III: finalising post-crisis reforms*, December 2017, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.htm.

² Group 1 banks are those that have Tier 1 capital of more than €3 billion and are internationally active. All other banks are considered Group 2 banks. Not all banks provided data relating to all parts of the Basel III framework.

Overview of results (unbalanced data set)

Table 1

	30 June 2024 ¹			31 December 2024		
	Group 1	Of which: G-SIBs	Group 2	Group 1	Of which: G-SIBs	Group 2
<i>Initial Basel III framework</i>						
CET1 ratio (%)	13.4	13.2	18.9	14.0	13.8	18.0
Target total capital shortfalls (€ bn) ²	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TLAC shortfall 2022 minimum (€ bn)	7.3	7.3		8.8	8.8	
Total accounting assets (€ bn)	83,501	62,632	2,752	67,056	45,746	3,289
Leverage ratio (%) ³	6.1	6.0	6.7	6.2	6.0	6.5
LCR (%)	135.9	133.5	194.1	134.8	131.7	200.8
NSFR (%)	123.6	123.8	137.5	123.7	124.3	135.2
<i>Fully phased-in final Basel III framework (2028)</i>						
Change in Tier 1 MRC at the target level (%)	1.8	1.4	5.2	1.4	0.4	1.3
CET1 ratio (%)	13.0	12.8	17.7	13.4	13.3	16.2
Target capital shortfalls (€ bn); of which:	0.9	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
CET1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Additional Tier 1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Tier 2	0.9	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TLAC shortfall 2022 minimum (€ bn)	6.8	6.8		5.7	5.7	
Leverage ratio (%) ³	6.1	6.0	6.8	6.2	6.0	6.5

See Table A.4 for the target level capital requirements. ¹ The values for the previous period may differ slightly from those published in the previous report. This is caused by data resubmissions for previous periods to improve the underlying data quality and enlarge the time series sample. ² These use the 2017 definition of the leverage ratio exposure measure. ³ The leverage ratios reflect temporary exclusions from leverage exposures introduced in some jurisdictions.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.


- Compared with the June 2024 reporting period, the average Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital ratio under the initial Basel III framework increased from 13.4% to 14.0% for Group 1 banks. This is mainly due to the fact that capital increases in a larger scale than risk-weighted assets (RWA).
- The average impact of the Basel III framework on the Tier 1 minimum required capital (MRC) of Group 1 banks decreased when compared with June 2024 (+1.4% impact). The impact also decreased slightly for G-SIBs (+0.4%).
- There has not been any capital shortfall in H2 2024, while in the previous period it was negligent.
- Applying the 2022 minimum total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) requirements and the current Basel III framework, 20 G-SIBs reporting TLAC data reported an aggregate incremental shortfall of €5.7 billion.
- The average Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) of Group 1 banks slightly decreased (–1.1 percentage points) compared with June 2024, which is mainly due to an increase in net outflows. On the other hand, the average Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) is stable at around 123.7%.

Current Basel III capital ratios show a sizeable increase, driven by the Americas


Group 1 banks, balanced data set

Graph 1


CET1, Tier 1 and total capital ratios¹



Determinants of changes²



Tier 1 ratios by region



¹ The solid lines depict the relevant minimums, the dotted lines the minimums plus the capital conservation buffer. See Table A.4 for the relevant levels. ² Exchange rates as at the current reporting date.


Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- The balanced data set for Group 1 banks showed a slightly increase (+0.6 percentage points) in current total Basel III capital ratios in December 2024 in comparison with June 2024, driven by an increase in Tier 1 capital of a larger magnitude than the increase in RWA. The overall CET1 capital ratios for Group 1 banks in the balanced data set were 14.3% in December 2024.
- Currently, the Tier 1 capital ratios are higher in Europe than in the Americas and the rest of the world. However, this relationship was the reverse from 2011 to 2014. The Americas are also the main driver for the increase in H2 2024 (+127 basis points).

Impact of final Basel III standards for Group 1 banks lower compared with the previous exercise

Change in Tier 1 MRC at the target level due to the final Basel III standards

Graph 2



Credit risk shows the change in minimum required capital (MRC) due to revised standardised and internal ratings-based approaches, including securitisation. Operational risk figures may not show supervisor-imposed capital add-ons under Pillar 2. Therefore, changes in MRC may be overestimated. Output floor results are net of the existing Basel I-based floor according to national implementation of the Basel II framework. The target level accounts for Tier 1 minimum capital requirements and the capital conservation buffer (ie resulting in an 8.5% Tier 1 capital requirement) as well as any applicable G-SIB surcharge.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.


- For Group 1 banks, Tier 1 MRC would increase by 1.4%, following the full phase-in of the final Basel III standards. The increase in the MRC is underpinned by the incremental impact of the risk-based requirements by 2.7%, offset by the reduction in leverage ratio requirements by –1.4%. The increase in risk-based components is mainly driven by the output floor (+1.7%), market risk (+1.2%) and credit risk (+0.5%).
- The impact on MRC across regions varies considerably for Group 1 banks. There is a moderate impact in the “rest of the world” region (+1.1%) and in the Americas (+0.9%) while the impact on MRC for European banks (+2.5%) is quite significant.
- For Group 2 banks, the overall 1.3% impact on Tier 1 MRC is driven by an increase in the risk-based measure of 4.7%, stemming mainly from credit risk (+0.8%) and the output floor (+3.0%), which is partially offset by a reduction in leverage ratio MRC (–3.5%).

Fully phased-in Basel III leverage ratios¹ of large internationally active banks were stable in H2 2024


Group 1 banks, balanced data set, exchange rates as at the current reporting date

Graph 3

Leverage ratios and their determinants



Leverage ratios by region



¹ Data points from H1 2011 to H2 2012 use the original definition of the leverage ratio. Data points from H1 2013 to H1 2017 use the definition of the leverage ratio set out in the 2014 version of the framework. Note that the data points for H1 2013 use an approximation for the initial definition of the Basel III leverage ratio exposure where gross instead of adjusted gross securities financing transaction values are used. Data points from H2 2017 onwards use the final definition of the leverage ratio to the extent data are available. Temporary exclusions from the leverage ratio exposure measure in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic have not been added back.


Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- For the balanced data set of Group 1 banks, the leverage ratio was stable during H2 2024. This contrasts with the decrease that started at end-2021, particularly for the Americas.
- Leverage ratios for Group 1 banks are still lower in Europe (5.1%) than in the Americas (5.8%) and the rest of the world (7.1%).
- For the unbalanced data set as of the December 2024 reporting date, the average fully phased-in final Basel III Tier 1 leverage ratios are 6.2% for Group 1 banks, 6.0% for G-SIBs and 6.5% for Group 2 banks.

No capital shortfall at the target level under the final Basel III standards

Fully phased-in final Basel III standards,¹ sample and exchange rates as at the reporting dates

Graph 4



¹ Results for H2 2015 are based on the Committee's cumulative Quantitative Impact Study and are not fully comparable from a methodological point of view. Compared with H2 2017 and H1 2018, the results since H2 2018 include the revised market risk framework as finalised in January 2019.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.


- For this reporting date, none of the banks in the sample reported a regulatory capital shortfall.

Capital and dividend payout ratio for large internationally active banks increased


Group 1 banks, balanced data set, exchange rates as at the current reporting date

Graph 5


Level of capital



Change in CET1 by region



Profits, dividends and CET1 capital raised externally¹



¹ The dividend payout ratio is calculated as common share dividends divided by profits after tax by using a rolling 12-month window.


Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- From end-June 2011 to end-December 2024, the level of Group 1 banks' CET1 capital increased by 146% from €1,357 billion to €3,336 billion. Since end-June 2024, Group 1 CET1 capital has increased by €92 billion (or 2.8%).
- Over H2 2024, CET1 capital increased across all regions, with the most notable increment in the rest of the world.
- Overall, profits after tax increased for the Group 1 banks in the sample and stood at €245.1 billion in H2 2024, but still below their peak as observed at end-June 2023. The dividend payout ratio stood at 39.6%, which is about 153 basis points above the one reported in the preceding period.

Dividend payout ratios varied across regions

Group 1 banks, balanced data set, exchange rates as at the current reporting date

Graph 6



The dividend payout ratio is calculated as the common share dividends divided by profits after tax by using a rolling 12-month window.


Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- Annual after-tax profits for the Group 1 banks (ie summed up over two consecutive reporting dates) increased in the Americas (+20.4%) while they declined in Europe (-1.4%) and the rest of the world (-16.4%) compared with the 12-month period ending December 2023.
- Compared with the previous reporting date, the annual dividend payout ratio has increased significantly in the rest of the world, while it has been stable in Europe and in the Americas. It is significantly below the record high ratios observed in 2019 and 2020 in the Americas, while it is at pre-pandemic levels in Europe and the rest of the world.

Analysis of the share of MRC by asset class¹ according to current rules shows stable credit risk MRC

Balanced data set

Graph 7



¹ "Other credit" includes exposures subject to partial use of the standardised approach for credit risk that cannot be assigned to a specific asset class, past-due items under the standardised approach, capital requirements specified in Part 1 of the Basel II framework, capital requirements for other assets, and additional capital requirements due to regulatory calculation differences if there is a shortfall of provisions over expected loss amounts for exposures subject to the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach for credit risk. The category "other" includes Pillar 1 capital requirements in member countries for risks not covered by the Basel Framework, and reconciliation differences (ie shortfalls of provisions over expected loss amounts for exposures subject to the IRB approach for credit risk). The term "reconciliation differences" refers to the difference between MRC reported at the entire bank level and the sum of MRC reported for the individual asset classes.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- As of December 2024 and for Group 1 banks, non-securitisation credit risk³ continues to be the dominant portion of overall MRC, on average covering 70.1% of total MRC. Among the non-securitisation credit risk asset classes, the share of MRC for corporate exposures increased from 29.6% at end-June 2011 to 31.5% at the current reporting date. Other notable changes compared with the previous reporting date are equity exposure (+2.4 percentage points) and bank exposure (–0.4 percentage points).
- The share of operational risk in MRC increased sharply from 8.7% at the end-June 2011 to 18.5% at end-2018 and then decreased to reach 16.0% at the current reporting date. The increase in the early 2010s was attributed in large part to the surge in the number and severity of operational risk events during and after the financial crisis, which are factored into the calculation of MRC for operational risk under the advanced measurement approach. More recently, there has been some "fading out" of the financial crisis losses so that in 2022, the lowest loss level of the previous 10 years is observed. This explains the latest decrease in capital requirements, especially for the banks heavily affected in the Great Financial Crisis. In contrast, losses triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic are not yet having a significant impact on the loss severity level, but this may be the case in the near future.
- The share of MRC for securitisation exposures decreased rather steadily between end-June 2011 and end-December 2024.


³ Here, non-securitisation credit risk is defined as the sum of corporate, bank, sovereign, retail, equity and other credit, as illustrated in the graph.

All banks exceeded the 100% threshold for NSFR, while three banks reported an LCR below 100%¹


Overall distribution

Graph 8

Liquidity Coverage Ratio²



Net Stable Funding Ratio



¹ The median value is represented by a horizontal line, with 50% of the values falling in the 25th to 75th percentile range shown by the box. The upper and lower endpoints of the thin vertical lines show the range of the entire sample. In some cases, arrows at the top of the vertical line indicate banks with ratios outside the range shown in the graph. The dots represent weighted averages. The horizontal red lines represent the 100% minimums. ² The sample is capped at 400%, meaning that all banks with an LCR above 400% were set to 400%.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.


- The weighted average LCR at end-December 2024 is 134.8% for Group 1 banks and 200.8% for Group 2 banks.
- In the current reporting period, three Group 1 banks had an LCR below 100% and hence a shortfall (ie the difference between high-quality liquid assets and net cash outflows), which amounts to €17.8 billion.
- The weighted average NSFR was 123.7% for Group 1 banks and 135.2% for Group 2 banks at end-December 2024.
- All banks reported an NSFR that exceeded 100%.

For Group 1 banks, LCRs decreased slightly, while NSFRs are stable


Group 1 banks, balanced data set¹

Graph 9


LCR, NSFR and related shortfalls²



LCR and change in its determinants³



NSFR and change in its determinants³



ASF = available stable funding; HQLA = high-quality liquid assets; RSF = required stable funding.

¹ This graph depicts the NSFR as calculated under different versions of the NSFR framework released in December 2010, January 2014 and October 2014. Calculations performed according to the final standard approved by the Committee in October 2014 start with the end-December 2014 reporting period. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, *Basel III: the net stable funding ratio*, October 2014, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d295.htm. Since the Committee did not collect NSFR data through its Basel III monitoring exercise for the end-June 2020 reporting date, the relevant data points show the same values as for end-December 2019. ² Exchange rates as at the reporting dates. ³ Exchange rates as at the current reporting date.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- For a balanced data set of Group 1 banks, all but two banks meet a 100% LCR at end-December 2024, resulting in an aggregate shortfall of €16.0 billion. The shortfall increased by €4.0 billion since December 2023. The average LCR for this sample decreased to 133.2% at end-December 2024 compared with 135.0% in the previous reporting period. Banks in the sample did not experience drops in the LCR during the turmoil as some banks outside the monitoring sample did.
- There was again no aggregate NSFR shortfall for the balanced data set of Group 1 banks. The average NSFR for the same sample of banks increased from 122.0% as of June 2024 to 123.0% in December 2024.

Group 2 banks showed an increase in both LCR and NSFR with no shortfalls


Group 2 banks, balanced data set¹

Graph 10

LCR, NSFR and related shortfalls²

LCR and change in its determinants³

NSFR and change in its determinants³



ASF = available stable funding; HQLA = high-quality liquid assets; RSF = required stable funding.

¹ As described in footnote 1 to Graph 9, the NSFR time series depicts data reflecting NSFR standards released in December 2010, January 2014 and October 2014. ² Exchange rates as at the reporting dates. ³ Exchange rates as at the current reporting date.


Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- For a balanced data set of Group 2 banks, the LCR shortfall has remained at zero since June 2017. The average LCR for the same sample of banks decreased by 0.1 percentage points to 193.9% in December 2024, caused by a lower increase in HQLA relative to net outflows compared with the last reporting date.
- The aggregate NSFR shortfall remained at zero for the balanced data set of Group 2 banks. The average NSFR for the same sample of banks increased by 5.2 percentage points to reach 137.1% in December 2024 in comparison with the previous reporting date.

For Group 1 banks, LCRs increased in Europe and the Americas but decreased in the rest of the world, while NSFRs were mostly stable across all regions

Group 1 banks, balanced data set

Graph 11



¹ The NSFR time series depicts data reflecting NSFR standards released in December 2010, January 2014 and October 2014.

Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See the Excel data file for underlying data and sample size.

- Since 2020, the weighted average LCR for both Europe and the rest of the world has largely been above 140%, while the average LCR for the Americas has been around 120%. While Europe and the Americas initially had lower average LCRs compared with the rest of the world, the average LCRs of Europe and the rest of the world tended to gradually converge before the onset of the pandemic. The regions with lower end-2012 average ratios saw significant increases, in particular between end-2012 and June 2014, and Europe saw such increases again at the start of the pandemic. The increase in Europe was reversing between June 2021 and June 2022, although since then the LCR of European banks is still above end-2019 levels.
- The weighted average NSFR at end-December 2024 for Group 1 banks in each of the three regions was well in excess of 100%. The average NSFR in Europe decreased from 122.6% at end-June 2024 to 121.8% at end-December 2024. After a significant drop during H1 2022, the NSFR of banks in the Americas reverted, landing at 120.8% at end-December 2024.

Annex A: Basel III standards and phase-in arrangements

Basel III minimum requirements and buffers		Table A.1
	As of 1 January 2019	
Leverage ratio	3.0%	
Minimum CET1 ratio	4.5%	
Capital conservation buffer	2.50%	
G-SIB surcharge	1.0–2.5%	
Minimum common equity plus capital conservation buffer	7.0%	
Phase-in of deductions from CET1 (including amounts exceeding the limit for DTAs, MSRs and financials)	100%	
Minimum Tier 1 capital	6.0%	
Minimum total capital	8.0%	
Minimum total capital plus capital conservation buffer	10.5%	
Capital instruments that no longer qualify as Tier 1 capital or Tier 2 capital	Phased out over 10-year horizon beginning 2013	
Liquidity Coverage Ratio	100%	
Net Stable Funding Ratio	100% ¹	

¹ Note that as of September 2023, a final rule for the Net Stable Funding Ratio is in force in 26 out of 27 Basel Committee member jurisdictions. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, *RCAP: Basel III implementation dashboard*, October 2023, www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation/rcap_reports.htm.

Final Basel III phase-in arrangements

Shading indicates transition periods – all dates are as of 1 January							Table A.2
	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	
Revisions to the standardised and internal ratings-based approaches to credit risk	Introduce						
Revised CVA and market risk frameworks	Introduce						
Revised operational risk framework	Introduce						
Output floor	50%	55%	60%	65%	70%		72.5%
	Increase in RWA subject to 25% cap at national discretion						
Leverage ratio exposure measure and G-SIB surcharge	Introduce						

Definition of different Basel III regimes			Table A.3
	Initial Basel III framework	Transitional final Basel III framework	Fully phased-in final Basel III framework
Definition of capital	<i>Basel III: A global framework for more resilient banks and the banking system,</i> www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm		
Credit risk	<i>Basel III: A global framework for more resilient banks and the banking system,</i> www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm <i>Capital requirements for bank exposures to central counterparties,</i> www.bis.org/publ/bcbs227.htm	<i>Basel III: finalising post-crisis reforms,</i> www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.htm <i>Capital requirements for bank exposures to central counterparties,</i> www.bis.org/publ/bcbs227.htm <i>Capital requirements for banks' equity investments in funds,</i> www.bis.org/publ/bcbs266.htm	
Operational risk	<i>Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework,</i> www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.htm	<i>Basel III: finalising post-crisis reforms,</i> www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.htm	
Market risk	<i>Revisions to the Basel II market risk framework,</i> www.bis.org/publ/bcbs158.htm <i>Guidelines for computing capital for incremental risk in the trading book,</i> www.bis.org/publ/bcbs159.htm	<i>Minimum capital requirements for market risk,</i> www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d457.htm	
Counterparty credit risk	<i>Basel III: A global framework for more resilient banks and the banking system,</i> www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm	<i>The standardised approach for measuring counterparty credit risk exposures,</i> www.bis.org/publ/bcbs279.htm	
CVA	<i>Basel III: A global framework for more resilient banks and the banking system,</i> www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm	<i>Basel III: finalising post-crisis reforms,</i> www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.htm Targeted revisions to the revised CVA framework published in July 2020 are not yet considered for the end-December 2019 reporting date. They will be reflected in the exercise on the end-2020 reporting date. www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d507.htm	
Securitisation	<i>Basel III: A global framework for more resilient banks and the banking system,</i> www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm	<i>Revisions to the securitisation framework,</i> www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d374.htm	
Floor	<i>Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework,</i> www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.htm	<i>Output floor of 50%,</i> <i>Basel III: finalising post-crisis reforms,</i> www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.htm	<i>Output floor of 72.5%,</i> <i>Basel III: finalising post-crisis reforms,</i> www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.htm
Leverage ratio	<i>Basel III: A global framework for more resilient banks and the banking system,</i> www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm ; <i>Basel III leverage ratio framework and disclosure requirements,</i> www.bis.org/publ/bcbs270.htm	<i>Basel III: finalising post-crisis reforms,</i> www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.htm ; <i>Leverage ratio treatment of client cleared derivatives</i> www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d467.htm	

Minimum and target risk-based capital and leverage ratio requirements

Fully phased-in final Basel III standards, in per cent

Table A.4

	Fully implemented risk-based requirement			Fully implemented leverage ratio requirement	
	Minimum	Target non-G-SIBs	Target G-SIBs	Minimum all banks and target non-G-SIBs	Target G-SIBs
CET1 capital	4.5	7.0	8.0–9.5		
Tier 1 capital	6.0	8.5	9.5–11.0	3.0	3.5–4.25
Total capital	8.0	10.5	11.5–13.0		

Annex B: Previous monitoring reports published by the Basel Committee

December 2010	<i>Results of the comprehensive quantitative impact study</i> , December 2010, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs186.htm	
April 2012	<i>Results of the Basel III monitoring exercise as of 30 June 2011</i> , www.bis.org/publ/bcbs217.htm	
September 2012	<i>Results of the Basel III monitoring exercise as of 31 December 2011</i> , www.bis.org/publ/bcbs231.htm	
March 2013	<i>Results of the Basel III monitoring exercise as of 30 June 2012</i> , www.bis.org/publ/bcbs243.htm	
September 2013	<i>Basel III monitoring report</i> , www.bis.org/publ/bcbs262.htm	
March 2014	<i>Basel III monitoring report</i> , www.bis.org/publ/bcbs278.htm	
September 2014	<i>Basel III monitoring report</i> , www.bis.org/publ/bcbs289.htm Main findings of the trading book hypothetical portfolio exercise	Diana Iercosan, Derek Nesbitt and Arnaud Sandrin
March 2015	<i>Basel III monitoring report</i> , www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d312.htm Analysis of the QIS for the fundamental review of the trading book	
September 2015	<i>Basel III monitoring report</i> , www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d334.htm	
March 2016	<i>Basel III monitoring report</i> , www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d354.htm Comprehensive QIS on interest rate risk in the banking book	Ethan Goh, Kamil Pliszka and Davy Reinard
September 2016	<i>Basel III monitoring report</i> , www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d378.htm Results of the quantitative impact study on the large exposures review clause	Marie-Céline Bard, Ken Taniguchi and Lynnette Withfield
February 2017	<i>Basel III monitoring report</i> , www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d397.htm Impact of the revised minimum capital requirements for market risk Results of the survey on the interaction of regulatory instruments	Scott Nagel Diana Hancock and Doriana Ruffino
September 2017	<i>Basel III monitoring report</i> , www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d416.htm Impact of the revised minimum capital requirements for market risk Impact of the revised securitisation framework	Scott Nagel Bernardo D'Alessandro, Thomas Morck and Emanuela Piani
December 2017	<i>Basel III monitoring report – Results of the cumulative quantitative impact study</i> , www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d426.htm	
March 2018	<i>Basel III monitoring report</i> , www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d433.htm Impact of the revised securitisation framework	Bernardo D'Alessandro, Thomas Morck and Emanuela Piani
October 2018	<i>Basel III monitoring report</i> , www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d449.htm	
March 2019	<i>Basel III monitoring report</i> , www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d461.htm	

September 2019	<i>Basel III monitoring report, www.bis.org/bcbbs/publ/d477.htm</i> Counterparty credit risk and credit valuation adjustment risk	Alexandra Gebauer, Evariste Beigneux and Giulio Malberti
April 2020	<i>Basel III monitoring report, www.bis.org/bcbbs/publ/d500.htm</i> Counterparty credit risk and credit valuation adjustment risk	Thomas Blumentritt
December 2020	<i>Basel III monitoring report, www.bis.org/bcbbs/publ/d512.htm</i> Counterparty credit risk and credit valuation adjustment risk	Thomas Blumentritt and Alexandra Gebauer
September 2021	<i>Basel III monitoring report, www.bis.org/bcbbs/publ/d524.htm</i> Exclusions from the leverage ratio exposure measure due to Covid-19	Renzo Corrias
February 2022	<i>Basel III monitoring report, www.bis.org/bcbbs/publ/d531.htm</i>	
September 2022	<i>Basel III monitoring report, www.bis.org/bcbbs/publ/d541.htm</i> Banks' exposures to cryptoassets – a novel dataset Capital buffers and total CET1 requirements including Pillar 2	Renzo Corrias Irina Barakova and Roberto Ottolini
February 2023	<i>Basel III monitoring report, www.bis.org/bcbbs/publ/d546.htm</i> Regional distributions of Group 1 and Group 2 banks and their impact on results in the Basel III monitoring reports	Martin Birn, Lea Charlotte Neugebauer and Verena Seidl
September 2023	<i>Basel III monitoring report, www.bis.org/bcbbs/publ/d554.htm</i>	
March 2024	<i>Basel III monitoring report, www.bis.org/bcbbs/publ/d570.htm</i>	
October 2024	<i>Basel III monitoring report, www.bis.org/bcbbs/publ/d581.htm</i>	
March 2025	<i>Basel III monitoring report, www.bis.org/bcbbs/publ/d592.htm</i>	