Credit Risk Transfer: Implications for Financial Efficiency and Stability

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Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and De Nederlandsche Bank
Amsterdam, March 7, 2008

Drawing from research with Andreas Eckner, Guillaume Horel, and Leandro Saita.

Research assistance from Cliff Gray
Monthly returns on a hypothetical portfolio of sub-prime mortgage credit default swaps

Source: Bank of England
Outline

• What is credit risk transfer all about?

• How is it changing financial markets?

• Implications for financial efficiency and stability?
Key Forms of Credit Risk Transfer

- Disintermediation.
- Loan sales and syndication.
- Default swap protection (CDS).
- Asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits.
- Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).
- Credit derivative product companies (CDPCs).
- Structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and SIV-Lites.
- Other specialty finance companies.
Figure 1: Share of Private Nonfinancial Debt Outstanding. Source: Morgan Stanley from Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Data.
Institutional Investor Share of Primary Leveraged Loan Market

Source: Citibank
US Leveraged Loan Buyers

- Hedge, Distressed & High-Yield Funds
- Prime Rate Fund
- Finance Co.
- Insurance Company
- CLO

Source: Citibank
Figure 2: Syndicated loan issuance. Source: Bank of England (2007).
Figure 3: Estimates by Sufi (2007) of syndicated loan retention by lead arranger.
Figure 4: Secondary-market loan sales (more covenant restrictions increases the likelihood of a loan sale; loan sales increase credit access to borrowers). Source: Drucker and Puri (2006).
Figure 5: Buyer of protection pays coupons until default at $\tau$. Recovery of $Y(\tau)$ implies a loss-given-default settlement of $100 - Y(\tau)$. 


Third quarter of 2007 data for the U.S. is from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Third quarter of 2007 global data is provided by the Bank for International Settlements.
Figure 6: Aggregate U.S. Large-Bank Loans and CDS positions

Data: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
Figure 7: Net CDS protection bought as a fraction of loan book.
Net CDS Protection Purchased as a Fraction of Loan Book
(Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago)
Net CDS Protection Purchased as a Fraction of Loan Book
(Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago)

- Bank of America
- J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.
- Citigroup Inc.
Figure 8: “Waterfall” of a collateralized debt obligation.
Figure 9: Securitization of bank credit risk. Source: IMF
Figure 10: NationsBank 1997-1 CLO tranches (Source: Fitch)
Figure 11: Retention of toxic waste at low leverage.
Optimal issuer effort $X(q)$

Retention Fraction $q$
Figure 12: Issuance of CLOs by year and region. Source: Morgan Stanley.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collateral type</th>
<th>Outstanding (end-2006)</th>
<th>Issuance in 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stock</td>
<td>Total by CDOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset-backed securities</td>
<td>10.68</td>
<td>2.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment-grade bonds</td>
<td>10.20</td>
<td>2.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-yield bonds</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leveraged loans</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2007-08 Quarterly CLO and Structured Finance CDO Issuance
($ Billion, Source: Morgan Stanley)
Figure 13: New European CLO issuers in 2006. Source: Fitch.
Benefits of credit risk transfer

1. Releases lender’s capital for new credit intermediation, improving the efficiency of credit markets.

2. Provides diversification to lenders.

3. Distributes risk to investors that are less critical to the provision of liquidity to the financial system.

4. Provides an improved menu and supply of assets and hedging opportunities to asset managers.
Direct costs of credit risk transfer

1. The lemon’s premium that the investor charges because of the lender’s inside information regarding the borrower’s credit risk.

2. Moral hazard: inefficient control by the lender of borrowers’ default risks.


4. Legal, marketing, and other arrangement costs.
Systemic Risks of Credit Risk Transfer

1. Credit squeeze: Hoarding of credit.

2. Interference with central-bank monetary policy.

3. Bank runs (eg Northern Rock, Florida Pool).

4. Too-big-to-fail adverse incentives.

5. Spillover to other credit markets (e.g. muni bonds).

Key Concerns Going Forward

1. Even specialists in CDOs are ill equipped to measure the risks and fair valuation of tranches that are sensitive to default correlation.

2. Credit risk transfer has reduced the degree to which credit is intermediated by banks, relative to hedge funds, credit derivative product companies, and specialty finance companies. This reduces the ability of banks to be sources of liquidity in systemic crises.
Table 2: **CDX NA IG 5-year Series 7 tranche premia, Feb. 19, 2007.**
(Source: Morgan Stanley.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tranche</th>
<th>Up-front fee (%)</th>
<th>Running spread (b.p.)</th>
<th>Premium Allocation</th>
<th>“hedge” (Δ)</th>
<th>Base corr.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-3%</td>
<td>19.25</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>84.9%</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-7%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-10%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-15%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-30%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-100%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDX</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: **CDX NA IG 5-year Series 9 tranche premia, Feb. 25, 2008.**
(Source: Morgan Stanley.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tranche</th>
<th>Up-front fee (%)</th>
<th>Running spread (b.p.)</th>
<th>Premium Allocation (%)</th>
<th>“hedge” ((\Delta))</th>
<th>Base corr.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-3%</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-7%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-10%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-15%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>89%</td>
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<tr>
<td>15-30%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>109%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-100%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDX</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>157.0</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Number of defaults in 5 years from a 1813-firm portfolio as of January, 1998.
Unobserved Common Risk in January 1998, “then and now.”
Unobserved Common Factor: mean and two-σ band
Number of defaults in 5 years from a 1813-firm portfolio likelihood as of January, 1998.
Figure 15: CDS buyers of protection. Source: B of A, March 2007.
Figure 16: CDS sellers of protection. Source: B of A, March 2007.
Size of global securities markets

Government/banks
$70.7 trillion

- Money markets $6.4 trillion
- Government debt $25.8 trillion
- Bank deposits $38.5 trillion

Corporate
$67.7 trillion

- Corporate bonds $11.0 trillion
  - Investment-grade $10.2 trillion
  - High-yield $0.8 trillion\(^{(e)}\)
- Corporate loans $6.1 trillion
  - Investment-grade $5.6 trillion
  - Leveraged $0.5 trillion
- Corporate equities $50.6 trillion

Asset-backed securities $10.7 trillion

- Non-mortgage asset-backed securities, $3.5 trillion
- Commercial mortgage-backed securities $0.7 trillion
- Residential mortgage-backed securities $6.5 trillion
  - Europe $0.7 trillion
  - United States $5.8 trillion
    - Agency $4.0 trillion
    - Non-Agency $1.8 trillion
      - Jumbo $0.5 trillion
      - Alt-A $0.6 trillion
      - Sub-prime $0.7 trillion

Figure 17: Bank and non-bank investment in leveraged loans. Source: IMF.
Figure 18: Outstanding notional amount of default swaps. Source: BBA.
Figure 19: “Waterfall” of a collateralized debt obligation.
Ongoing Communication

Collateral Manager

| Trustee

Underlying Securities (Collateral)

CDO Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)

Hedge Provider (If Needed)

Senior Fixed/Floating Rate Notes

Mezzanine Fixed/Floating Rate Notes

Subordinated Notes/Equity

Figure 20: Typical CDO contractual relationships.
Figure 21: Venn diagram for obligors with a default correlation of 4.3%.