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**Discussion of**

**“Relationship Lending, Accounting Disclosure, and Credit Availability during Crisis”**

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# Objectives and Results

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## General topic:

- Economic value of relationship lending (RL).
- Specifically:
  - ◆ Value of RL in a macro-crisis w.r.t. credit availability.
  - ◆ Impact of accounting / disclosure quality.
  - ◆ Cross-country evidence.

## Proceeding

- Description of macroeconomic conditions.
- Determinants of credit availability.
- Impact of accounting certification on credit availability.

## Key results:

- More intensive relationships *can* improve credit availability in macro-crisis.
- Heterogeneous effects for different countries.
  - ◆ Due to state-ownership of banks and severity of credit supply shocks.
- Accounting certification does not affect credit availability.

# Strengths of the Paper

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## Contribution / New Insights

- First empirical paper that addresses the value of RL in macroeconomic crises.
  - ◆ Allows to test specific predictions from theoretical literature on the value of multiple bank lending (Detragiache/Garella/Guiso 2000).
  - ◆ Cross-country comparison highlights the importance of regulatory / economic conditions.

## Methodology

- *Selection Bias*: Measure for credit denial is not affected by potential selection bias
  - ◆ Such as a firm anticipates that it will be denied credit and does not demand credit in the first place.
- *Endogeneity*: Empirical design accounts for endogeneity between key variables.
  - ◆ Credit availability, incidence of RL, loan terms (collateral), audit.
- *Identification of RL*: Number of bank relationships seems good choice in light of theory and empirical evidence.

# Comments (I): Fundamentals

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## Interpretation of Results

- What explains cross-country differences :
  - ◆ No explicit analysis relating credit supply / state-ownership to impact of lender diversity.
  - ◆ Control for the type of bank the firm borrows from?
  
- *Why* should state-ownership of banks affect value of RL?
  - ◆ No obvious theoretical argument.
  - ◆ Evidence:
    - Indonesian banking sector has highest share with 48% of state-ownership.
    - In Germany, the prime example for the relevance of RL, publicly owned savings banks have a share of 35% in total banking assets (2000).

# Comments: Fundamentals (II)

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## Measuring Credit Rationing

- What exactly is „more restrictive / somewhat more restrictive“ credit availability?
- Provide some evidence that the measure truly reflects rationing.
  - ◆ Compare firms that answered „more restrictive“ to firms that did not.
    - Use standard indicators (trade credit, leverage etc.)
  - ◆ Consider macro-variables (e.g. change in aggregate loan volume) to test plausibility.

## Information Complementarity RL / Auditing

- External, independent audits potentially eliminate bias or provide certification of information.
- It is unclear whether valuable *new* information is generated.
  - ◆ A substitution effect for RL is not that obvious.
- As argued in the paper, banks may *require* audited annual reports.
  - ◆ Why not included as regressor in audit regression?

# Comments: Methodology (I)

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## Control for Investment Opportunities

- Credit availability should crucially depend on future investment opportunities.
- R&D expenses seem not very informative
  - ◆ 96.1% of Korean but only 19% of Indonesian firms conduct R&D?
  - ◆ What are corresponding disclosure requirements? Alternative measure?
- No real measure for profitability included.

## Endogeneity / Instrumental-Variable Approach

- IV-approach requires (at least) one instrumental variable specific for each endogenous variable.
  - ◆ Identical instruments for *collateral*- and *lender diversity*-equations for each country. Identification?
  - ◆ Covariance matrix needs adjustment to account for using estimates rather than observed values.

# Comments: Methodology (II)

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## Other Issues (Robustness)

### ■ Information Structure of Regression

- ◆ Information from three periods, the last captures the crisis.
- ◆ Data for explanatory variables are taken from which period?
- ◆ Panel Data?
  - Potentially severe bias by assuming independence of observations.

### ■ Sample Selection / Sample Size

- ◆ Huge difference in number of observations between descriptive statistics and regressions
  - Indonesia      164 / 697
  - Phillipines    107 / 550
  - Thailand        106 / 693

# Suggestions

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## Summary

- Paper makes a really nice contribution by focusing on the value of RL (multiple bank relationships) in macroeconomic crises.

## Suggestions

- Describe data, time structure and construction of variables more carefully.
- Examine characteristics of rationing measure.
- Validate R&D as a proxy for investment opportunities.
- Check IV-approach and provide more detailed description.
- Test for relevance of state-ownership of banks, if possible.
- If necessary, focus on RL rather than auditing issue.