Credit Risk Concentrations under Stress

Gabriel Bonti¹, Michael Kalkbrener¹, Christopher Lotz², Gerhard Stahl²

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Abstract

This article deals with methods for identifying as well as stressing risk concentrations in credit portfolios, in particular concentrations caused by large exposures to a single sector or to several highly correlated sectors. We present a general and yet computationally efficient framework for implementing stress scenarios in a multi-factor credit portfolio model and illustrate the proposed methodology by stressing a large investment banking portfolio. Although the methodology is developed in a particular factor model, the main concept - stressing sector concentration through a truncation of the distribution of the risk factors - is independent of the model specification. We introduce the concept of Factor Concentration that formalizes the proposed approach and analyze its mathematical properties.

1 Introduction

In a typical bank the economic as well as regulatory capital charge for credit risk far outweighs capital for any other risk class. Concentrations in a bank’s credit portfolio are key drivers of credit risk capital. These risk concentrations may be caused by material concentrations of exposure to individual names as well as large exposures to a single sector (geographic region or industry) or to several highly correlated sectors. While single-name risk concentrations are relatively straightforward to measure and to manage, this is much harder for sector concentrations. Therefore quantitative techniques that support the identification of sector concentration are valuable tools for credit risk management. The objective of the present paper is the development of a stress testing methodology for this type of concentration risk.

The IRB approach in BIS [2004] does not provide an appropriate quantitative framework for analyzing concentration risk. It is based on a credit portfolio model which is only applicable under the assumptions that (cf. Gordy [2003]):

1. bank portfolios are perfectly fine-grained and
2. there is only a single source of systematic risk.

The simplicity of the model ensures its analytical tractability. However, it makes it impossible to model risk concentrations in a realistic way: neither name concentration is captured nor is it possible to define sector concentration in this one-factor model.

¹Deutsche Bank AG, Credit Risk Management, Risk Analytics & Instruments. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ personal opinions and should not be construed as being endorsed by Deutsche Bank.

²Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin), Bonn. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ personal opinions and should not be construed as being endorsed by BaFin. The author thanks the participants of the RTF Subgroup on Concentration Risk for many useful comments and suggestions.
Concentration risk could therefore be paraphrased as “the difference between the risk ascribed to a credit portfolio by the IRB approach and its real risk”. To fill this gap, banks are required to address credit concentration risk under Pillar 2 of BIS [2004] (para. 770-777). Stress tests are an essential technique to identify and quantify risk concentrations and are needed to understand the full risk profile of large credit portfolios. In order to develop meaningful stress tests, we need to generalize the IRB approach to a multi-factor credit portfolio model that takes into account individual exposures and has a richer correlation structure. Note, however, that in such a model concentration risk cannot be separated from credit risk. Stressing concentration risk therefore is an integral part of the stress testing methodology for credit risk.

We consider two types of scenarios for stressing sector concentration:

1. economic stress scenarios or market shocks and
2. portfolio specific worst case scenarios.

These scenario types serve different purposes. Economic stress scenarios and market shocks are usually specified by risk management. The objective is to quantify the impact of a plausible economic downturn or a market shock on a credit portfolio. This type of stress test is designed to provide information that can be easily translated into concrete management actions.

The aggregated loss of portfolio specific worst case scenarios, on the other hand, serves more as a benchmark to create some awareness of the current market situation rather than providing guidance for specific risk management actions.

In order to implement an economic stress scenario in the credit risk model, the model should include a set of systematic risk factors that have a clear economic interpretation, e.g. the systematic factors represent either countries or industries. Via this link, the economic stress scenario can be translated into constraints on the corresponding systematic factors. These constraints are used to truncate the distribution of the stressed risk factors or - in other words - restrict the state space of the model, where each state represents values of the systematic and idiosyncratic factors. The response of the peripheral (or unstressed) risk factors is specified by the dependence structure of the model. This approach is superior to a simple aggregation of exposures by sector, because it can also be used for the identification of risk concentrations across distinct, but highly correlated sectors.

The translation of stress scenarios into constraints on the state space of the model has a number of advantages:

1. Stress scenarios are implemented in a way that is consistent with the existing quantitative framework. This implies that the relationships between (unrestricted) risk factors remain intact and the experience gained in the day-to-day use of the model can be used to interpret the results from stress testing.

2. The probability of each stress scenario, e.g. the probability that the risk factors satisfy all the constraints under non-stress conditions, can be easily calculated. This is a good indicator for the severity of a stress scenario.

3. It is a flexible framework for the implementation of stress tests of different complexity, while at the same time being computationally efficient: importance sampling
techniques can be applied to keep the computational effort close to an unconditional simulation.

In the present paper, stress tests are performed in a Merton-type credit portfolio model. This quantitative framework provides the necessary flexibility to incorporate stress scenarios by restricting the state space of the model. The actual calculation of the stressed loss distribution of the portfolio is done through Monte Carlo simulation on the restricted model space. It is therefore straightforward to calculate risk measures like Expected Loss, Value-at-Risk or Expected Shortfall for the loss distribution under stress and to use statistical techniques such as QQ-plots to study its behaviour.

Although our stress testing methodology is developed in a particular factor model, the main concept - stressing sector concentration through a truncation of the distribution of the risk factors - is completely independent of the model specification and the way that default dependencies are parameterized, e.g. whether asset or default correlations are used. In fact, it can be applied to factor models for market and operational risk as well. The proposed notion of sector (or factor) concentration is also largely independent of the marginal distributions of the risk factors and the portfolio loss, thus focusing on the dependence of these variables. It can be considered as a generalization of Tail Dependence (see Embrechts et al [2002] for a definition of this measure of dependence).

The paper is structured in the following way: The second section introduces the quantitative framework we will work in. The third section provides a survey on stress testing methodology and gives an outline of our approach to stressing concentration risk. The actual implementation in a multi-factor credit portfolio model is described in the fourth section. Results from stressing a sample portfolio are presented. In section 5, the concept of factor concentration is formalized and its basic properties are analyzed. The sixth section provides a short classification of our stress testing methodology in the Revised Framework and outlines how the impact of a stress scenario on regulatory capital can be assessed. Section 7 concludes.

2 Concentration Risk and Credit Risk Models

To a certain degree, any real credit portfolio will contain concentrations of exposures. We differentiate between two kinds of concentrations:

Name concentration. When there are material concentrations of exposure to individual names, there will be a residual of undiversified idiosyncratic risk in the portfolio that is not captured by the IRB model. This form of credit concentration risk has been addressed via a granularity adjustment to portfolio capital, see for example Gordy [2004] or Martin and Wilde [2002]. Name concentration only depends on the characteristics of individual portfolio positions. Hence, name concentration is easier to identify (and to measure) than sector concentration.

Sector concentration. Borrowers may differ in their degree of sensitivity to systematic risk, but few firms are completely indifferent to the wider economic conditions in which they operate. As a consequence, defaults of different borrowers are usually not independent. The realistic estimation of default dependence is essential for the quantification of credit risk. The most common approach to introduce default dependence into a credit portfolio model is through systematic factors, for example through factors corresponding to different sectors
(geographic regions or industries). A large exposure to a single sector or to several highly correlated sectors can give rise to so-called sector concentrations.

It is a difficult practical issue to identify those factors that are particularly important for a given portfolio. However, it is obvious that a single systematic factor is not sufficient to capture the complex dependence structure in a large credit portfolio. Hence, the IRB model is not an appropriate framework for quantifying concentration risk due to sector concentration. It depends on the correlation between credits (or equivalently their correlation to the systematic factor) whether the IRB capital requirements underestimate or overestimate risk: since the Basel II correlation was calibrated to “a well-diversified portfolio of a large national bank”, it probably is too low for a bank specializing in one sector, industry or region but may actually be too high for a well-diversified internationally active bank (due to only partial recognition of portfolio diversification).

We will perform our analysis in a typical multi-factor credit portfolio model which takes into account individual exposures and has a much richer correlation structure. Note, however, that the model itself does not distinguish concentration risk from credit risk. On the contrary, name and sector concentrations are the main drivers of economic capital for credit risk, and are inextricably linked to the default risk of individual obligors. Therefore any attempt to separate concentration risk from the notion of basic portfolio credit risk cannot be naturally grounded in the multi-factor model but needs to draw on externally derived artificial criteria. As a consequence, stressing concentration risk in a multi-factor model is an integral part of a general stress testing methodology for credit risk. It is also a crucial prerequisite for successful risk management of a credit portfolio because the calculation of stress scenarios is imperative to fully quantify the impact of economic downturn scenarios or market shocks on risk concentrations.

We will now introduce a multi-factor credit portfolio model that will serve as the formal framework for the development of stress scenarios for concentration risk. In order to fix some notation, let us consider a portfolio of $n$ loans with loss-at-default $l_i$. With each loan we associate a Bernoulli variable $L_i$ that specifies the loan loss over one period:

\[
\text{default: } L_i = l_i \text{ with probability } p_i, \\
\text{no default: } L_i = 0 \text{ with probability } 1 - p_i.
\]

We can calculate expected loss and loss variance of the portfolio, taking into account default event correlations:

\[
\mathbb{E}[L] = \sum_i l_i p_i \\
\mathbb{V}[L] = \sum_i \mathbb{V}[L_i] + \sum_{i \neq j} \rho_{ij} \sqrt{\mathbb{V}[L_i] \mathbb{V}[L_j]}.
\]

Here $\rho_e$ denotes the default event correlation between two credits.

We are further interested in the Value-at-Risk $\text{VaR}_\alpha(L)$ of $L$ at level $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ defined as an $\alpha$-quantile of $L$,

\[
\text{VaR}_\alpha(L) := \inf \{ x \in \mathbb{R} \mid P(L \leq x) \geq \alpha \}
\]

and we define the Economic Capital $\text{EC}(L)$ by

\[
\text{EC}(L) = \text{VaR}_\alpha(L) - \mathbb{E}[L].
\]
In this setup, an example of a portfolio which only has name concentration would be given by credits of different notional $N_i$ which default independently but have identical default probability $p_i$. The loss variance for such a portfolio is given by

$$V[L] = p(1-p) \sum l_i^2 = p(1-p)(1-r)^2 N^2 \sum w_i^2,$$

where $l_i = (1-r)N_i$ and $N_i$ denotes the notional of the $i$-th loan with relative weights $w_i = N_i/N$, $N = \sum N_i$. The sum is the well-known Herfindahl-Hirshman concentration index, $H = \sum w_i^2$. $H$ is maximal if there is only one credit in the portfolio, and is minimal if all credits have equal notional. It is an easy consequence of the Central Limit Theorem (see, for instance, Embrechts et al [1997] ) that for an infinitely granular portfolio, the portfolio loss $L$ converges (in probability) to its expected loss and the variance goes to zero. As a consequence, the VaR$_a(L)$ converges to the expected loss and therefore the economic capital $EC(L)$ converges to 0.

In order to include varying default probabilities and recovery rates, a useful quantity to measure name concentration may be

$$NC = \frac{\sum_i \mathbb{E}[L_i^2]}{N^2 p^2} = \frac{\sum w_i^2 (1-r)^2 p_i}{1/n \sum p_i}.$$

This is similar to a Herfindahl index on credit weights and expected losses, but weighted with the default probability of the credit. Notice that this quantity is invariant to a simultaneous relative shift of the default probabilities $p_i$. Subtracting the expected loss in the numerator would keep that property.

Stressing name concentration is rather straightforward since only individual exposures are involved. In this paper, we will therefore exclusively deal with sector concentration. A prerequisite is the specification of the dependence structure of the credit portfolio.

The default event correlations $\rho^G$ used above are difficult to estimate historically (because they describe the correlation of rare events) and are not very intuitive (they have widely varying values depending on the default probabilities of the credits). A common way to describe dependencies between credits in a portfolio is the following Merton-type factor model, where loss variables $L_i$ are linked to ability-to-pay variables $Y_i$:

$$L_i(\omega) := l_i \text{ if } Y_i(\omega) \leq \Phi^{-1}(p_i), \quad \omega \in \Omega$$

$$L_i(\omega) := 0 \text{ if } Y_i(\omega) > \Phi^{-1}(p_i), \quad \omega \in \Omega.$$

Here $\Phi^{-1}$ is the inverse of the standard Gaussian distribution function and $Y_i$ is a standard Gaussian variable on $\Omega$. The dependency structure is parameterized in terms of systematic factors $X_i$ which drive the individual ability-to-pay variables:

$$Y_i = \sum_{j=1}^m \phi_{ij} X_j + \sqrt{1 - R_i^2} Z_i \quad \text{and}$$

$$Z_i \overset{iid}{\sim} \mathcal{N}(0, 1),$$

where $0 \leq R_i^2 \leq 1$ and $(\phi_{i1}, \ldots, \phi_{im})$ is a weight vector. The systematic factors form an $m$-dimensional Gaussian vector $(X_1, \ldots, X_m)$ with mean 0 and covariance matrix $\Sigma$.

Seen in the context of a multi-factor credit portfolio model, sector concentration risk is due to the systematic risk factors driving individual credits’ asset price processes. For the rest of this paper, we will place ourselves in the setting of this model.
3 Stress Scenarios

Stress testing has been adopted as a generic term describing various techniques used by financial firms to gauge their potential vulnerability to exceptional but plausible events (see BIS [2000, 2001, 2005] and Blaschke et al [2001] for industry studies on stress testing). The most common of these techniques involve the determination of the impact on the portfolio of a bank or business unit of a move in a particular risk factor (a simple sensitivity test) or of a simultaneous move in a number of risk factors, reflecting an event which the bank’s risk managers believe may occur in the foreseeable future (scenario analysis).\(^3\) The following classification should serve as a rough guide and distinguish different types of stress scenarios.

1. **Macroeconomic scenarios.** A macroeconomic scenario usually requires the use of a macroeconomic model. It specifies an exogeneous shock to the whole economy that is propagated over time and may impact the banking system in various ways. This type of stress scenario is sometimes used by financial regulators or central banks in order to gain an understanding of the resilience of financial markets or the banking system as a whole, see for example DeBandt and Oung [2004].

2. **Market shocks.** These scenarios specify shocks to financial markets. Also included in this category are certain shocks of a "systemic" nature affecting credit risk (such as a sudden flight to liquidity), or sectoral shocks, for instance the deterioration in credit spreads in the TMT (Technology Media-Telecommunications) sector. Historical scenarios are frequently used for this type of shocks in order to increase the plausibility of these stress scenarios.

3. **Portfolio specific worst case scenarios.** The objective of this worst case analysis is to identify scenarios that are most adverse for a given portfolio (Breuer and Krenn [2000]). The specification of worst case scenarios can either be based on expert judgement or quantitative techniques, for instance importance sampling (see, for example, Kalkbrener et al [2004]). Rather than providing guidance for specific risk management actions, the aggregated loss in these scenarios serves more as a benchmark to create some awareness of the current market situation.

Stress scenarios are typically analyzed within the existing model. The focus is different for those tests where the model itself is challenged, and alternative assumptions or models are used to value a portfolio or measure its risk. This implies that the usual framework for risk management is abandoned, and the experience gained in the old framework may no longer be valid in the alternative model. As a consequence, model stress is not part of the day-to-day risk management process in a financial institution. It is typically used to analyze the sensitivity of model outputs with respect to specific model assumptions and therefore a way to gauge model risk.

Regardless of the motivation for considering a particular scenario, there exist a number of criteria that characterize useful stress scenarios:

1. **Plausible.** Stress scenarios must be realistic, e.g. have a certain probability of actually

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\(^3\)Extreme Value Theory (EVT) is another technique used by some banks to capture their exposure to extreme market events. We refer to Embrechts et al [1997] for an introduction to Extreme Value Theory and to Longin [2000] and Schachter [2001] for an application of EVT to stress testing.
occurring. Risk management will not take any actions based on scenarios that are regarded as implausible.

2. **Consistent.** One objective is to implement stress scenarios in a way that is consistent with the existing quantitative framework. This has the advantage that the relationships between risk factors remain intact and the experience gained in the day-to-day use of the model can be used to interpret scenario results.

3. **Adapted.** Stress tests should include scenarios that are specifically designed for the portfolio at hand. They should reflect certain portfolio characteristics and particular concerns in order to give a complete picture of the risks inherent in the portfolio.

4. **Reportable.** Stress scenarios should provide useful information for risk management purposes which can be translated into concrete actions. For reporting purposes, it is crucial that the stress scenario is characterized by a clearly identifiable set of stressed risk factors, sometimes called the “core” factors. The remaining “peripheral” factors should then move in a consistent way with those “core” factors.

In many banks stress scenarios supplement statistical VaR models in order to improve the risk assessment under exceptional circumstances. For integrating scenarios and statistical models, Cherubini and Della Lunga [1999] use Bayesian statistics whereas Berkowitz [1999] proposes the application of a mixture model. Both integration techniques require knowledge of the precision or probability of a stress scenario. For many hypothetical as well as historical scenarios, however, the estimation of their likelihood in the future is very difficult. In fact, it is recognised in the finance industry that the lack of probability measures for scenarios is the main limitation for their application in a quantitative framework (see BIS [2000]). It is an important feature of our approach that the probability of a stress scenario in the existing model can be easily calculated (see section 4.2).

In the general multi-factor framework (1), stress scenarios for sector concentration apply stress to the systematic factors of the model. When designing specific stress scenarios, we usually focus on a small number of directly stressed factors, e.g. those factors that correspond to the sectors of interest. In addition, a small number of stressed factors makes it easier to transform the stress results into concrete management actions. The response of the other risk factors is specified by the dependence structure of the model (see also Kupiec [1998]). This approach is also a superior way to identify risk concentrations compared to just aggregating exposures per sector, because there it can happen that concentrations in distinct but highly correlated sectors remain undetected.

In order to increase plausibility and relevance of individual stress scenarios

- we derive the stress applied to systematic factors of the credit risk model from economic (or market) stress scenarios or

- use quantitative techniques to identify those systematic factors with the highest weights in a given portfolio (or combinations of these factors.)

In summary, we propose the following stress test for sector concentration:

1. Specify economic stress scenario or scenario based on the characteristics of the portfolio
Example: A typical stress scenario might be a decline of 20% in the automotive production index.

2. Translate scenario into stress of systematic factors of credit risk model

The stress scenarios are chosen in such a way that the translation involves only a small number of systematic factors. All other factors are impacted through correlations to the stressed factors. In this way a consistent set of stressed PDs is generated for all credits in the portfolio, where the change in PD depends on the credit’s correlation to the stressed factors.

3. Determine impact of stress scenario by calculating conditional expected loss and other statistics of the portfolio.

4 Factor Stress Methodology

The objective of this section is to describe how an economic stress scenario for sector concentration can be implemented in the credit portfolio model. First of all, a precise meaning has to be given to the systematic factors in (1).

4.1 Interpretation of systematic factors in the portfolio model

Recall that each ability-to-pay variable

\[ Y_i = \sum_{j=1}^{m} \phi_{ij} X_j + \sqrt{1 - R_i^2} Z_i \]

is a weighted sum of \( m \) systematic factors \( X_1, \ldots, X_m \) and one specific factor \( Z_i \). The systematic factors\(^4\) correspond either to countries or industries. In our model 75 systematic factors are used, for example factors for Germany, U.K, South America, the automotive and the electrical engineering industry, etc. The systematic weights \( \phi_{ij} \) are chosen according to the relative importance of the corresponding factors for the given counterparty, e.g. the automobile company BMW might have the following representation:

\[
\text{BMW assets} = 0.8 \times \text{German factor} + 0.2 \times \text{US factor} \\
+ 0.9 \times \text{Automobile factor} + 0.1 \times \text{Finance factor} \\
+ \text{BMW’s non-systematic risk.}
\]

The specific factor is assumed independent of the systematic factors. Its role is to model the remaining (non-systematic) risk of the counterparty.

The joint probability distribution of the systematic factors is assumed Gaussian with zero mean. Figure 1 shows histograms of the marginal distributions for two factors. To measure credit risk, country and industry factors are simulated together with the specific risk factors.

\(^4\)As opposed to specific risk, these factors influence the default of more than one obligor and therefore introduce a correlated default structure.
4.2 Specification and implementation of stress scenarios

Multi-factor credit risk models offer a number of possibilities to implement stress tests, e.g. adjustments of model parameters or distributions of risk factors, etc. The basic idea in our stress testing approach is the specification of stress scenarios as constraints on systematic risk factors. More precisely, these constraints are used to restrict the sample space in the Monte Carlo simulation of the model. This is a very general framework for stress testing. It offers the additional advantage that we can estimate the probability of each stress scenario, e.g. the probability that the risk factors satisfy all the constraints under non-stress conditions. This is a good indicator for the severity of a stress scenario.

In the following, we will describe our approach by means of a specific scenario. As an example, consider a downturn scenario for the automotive industry. The simplest implementation in the portfolio model is the following restriction of the state space of the model: only those samples are considered in the Monte Carlo simulation where the automotive industry factor decreases by a certain percentage, say at least 2%. In other words, the distribution of the automotive industry factor is truncated from above at -2%. More precisely, the steps in the calculation of stressed EL and EC are:

- simulate risk factors under their original (non-stress) joint distribution
- dismiss any simulation not satisfying the scenario constraints
- derive EL, EC and other statistics from the loss distribution specified by the MC scenarios that satisfy the constraints

Note that the automotive downturn scenario does not only have an impact on the automotive industry factor: because of correlations, other country factors as well as industry factors are also affected. Figure 2 shows the impact on the factor for the chemical industry. Note that the distribution of this factor has moved to the left.

In our model the joint distribution of systematic factors is derived from stock indices and it is therefore straightforward to implement scenarios involving constraints on those indices. Sometimes, however, it is desirable to define scenarios based on other economic variables. For example, a scenario might be defined by a constraint on the production index of a specific industry. Because of the multivariate normal distribution of the factor model, correlation is the easiest way to incorporate dependence of production indices. Suppose,
Figure 2: Histogram of simulated factor changes (stress case)

however, that the production index and the corresponding industry risk factor do not show a high correlation, perhaps because their relationship is nonlinear. A crude way to overcome this weak dependence is to define a scenario just in terms of the risk factor for the same industry in such a way that the probabilities of both scenarios (under non-stress conditions) agree.

In the example above, the factor stress was derived from an economic downturn scenario. An alternative approach is the specification of scenarios that are most adverse for a given portfolio. Importance sampling is a quantitative technique that can be used for the identification of worst case scenarios. We refer to Glasserman and Li [2003], Kalkbrener et al [2004] and Egloff et al [2005] for importance sampling techniques in Gaussian credit portfolio models, e.g. models of the form (1). In these papers, a vector \((x_1, \ldots, x_m) \in \mathbb{R}^m\) is constructed such that a shift of the systematic factors by \((x_1, \ldots, x_m)\) reduces the variance of Monte Carlo estimates of Value-at-Risk or Expected Shortfall. The variance reduction is achieved because the systematic shift generates a large number of high portfolio losses. Hence, \((x_1, \ldots, x_m)\) is a natural candidate for the identification of those systematic factors that have to be constrained in worst case scenarios.

Restricting the state space is a flexible technique to incorporate stress scenarios into the portfolio model. Complex stress scenarios can be implemented

1. by specifying constraints that involve more than one systematic factor or

2. by defining more complex constraints than simple caps on individual factors.

One possibility is to restrict the state space of the model in such a way that the dependence of particular risk factors is increased. This technique provides an interesting alternative to simply changing correlation parameters of the model. By keeping the original model parameters intact, consistency problems are avoided such as maintaining the positive semi-definiteness of the correlation matrix of the systematic factors. We would like to emphasize, however, that changing correlation parameters is a useful way to gauge the sensitivity of a credit risk model against errors or changes in correlation estimates (see, for instance, Kim and Finger [2000]).
4.3 Credit risk concentrations under stress: a case study

Consider the following downturn scenario for the automotive industry: the industry production is forecast to drop by 8% during next year. To represent this scenario in the credit portfolio model, a constraint is chosen for the corresponding risk factor in such a way that the mean factor change coincides with the forecast. Using a sample investment banking portfolio\(^5\) we obtain the risk estimates (in mn EUR) shown in Table 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-stress</th>
<th>Stress</th>
<th>% chg.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expected Loss</td>
<td>7.03</td>
<td>10.94</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99.98% quantile</td>
<td>103.23</td>
<td>122.80</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cond. tail expectation at 99.98%</td>
<td>119.68</td>
<td>145.45</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Portfolio risk estimates

Notice that calculating VaR in this stress scenario does not amount to double-counting in any way. As we have stressed only one of many systematic risk factors, there is still a large amount of stochasticity in the stress scenario so that a measure such as VaR is needed to calculate risk. The impact of the stress scenario on the portfolio VaR could be interpreted as a measure of "concentration" of the portfolio in the respective risk factor. However, using VaR in this way results in several problems, such as the fact that it is not indifferent to an overall change in PDs. In the next section, we will propose a superior quantity as a promising candidate to measure factor concentration.

Figure 3 exhibits the portfolio’s exposure by rating class both in the non-stress and stress case. The analysis is done separately for automotive companies and all other borrowers. Figure 3 clearly shows that exposure is shifted from investments grades (BBB or above) to non-investment grades. As expected, the deterioration of ratings is more pronounced for the automotive industry. Note, however, that due to the dependence structure of the portfolio this stress scenario also has a significant impact on other borrowers.

The % increase in Expected Loss by original (e.g. non-stress) rating class is depicted in Figure 4. It shows that in % terms the increase in EL is significantly higher for the good rating classes.

Rather than just looking at certain quantiles or other summary statistics, we can get a better

\(^5\)The test portfolio consists of 25000 loans with an inhomogeneous exposure and default probability distribution. The average exposure size is 0.004% of the total exposure and the standard deviation of the exposure size is 0.026%. Default probabilities vary between 0.02% and 27%.
understanding of the impact of a stress scenario by studying the whole loss distribution before and after the stress. In order to see the effect of the automotive stress scenario on the portfolio loss, the left graph of figure 5 shows the original (circles) and the stressed (triangles) loss densities, together with fitted Vasicek distributions (curves). Note that the original distribution is captured remarkably well by its fitted Vasicek distribution. By plotting quantiles of the two distributions against each other, we can clearly see where the stress scenario affects the loss distribution: while quantiles have moved higher overall, the impact is especially severe in the extreme tail of the distribution (right hand side).

5 A General Framework for Measuring Factor Concentration

Our approach to stressing risk concentrations is based on constraints of the form \( \{X_j \leq x\} \) applied to the systematic factors \( X_1, \ldots, X_m \) of the model. The objective of this section is a mathematical formalization of this concept that is independent of the specification of a
5.1 A formal definition of factor concentration

In section 4, the tail
\[ 1 - P(L < y) = P(L \geq y) \]
of the loss distribution \( L \) has been analyzed in stress scenarios of the form \( \{X_j \leq x\} \). For assessing the severity of the shock and the confidence level of the tail it is convenient to express the parameters \( x \) and \( y \) in quantile space, e.g.
\[ x = F_{X_j}^{-1}(p) \text{ and } y = F_L^{-1}(1 - q). \]

This parametrization leads to the following formalization of Factor Concentration: for a given loss distribution \( L \), the risk concentration in the systematic factor \( X \) is a function from \([0, 1]^2\) to \([0, 1]\) defined by
\[
FC_X(p, q) := P(L \geq F_L^{-1}(1 - q) \mid X \leq F_X^{-1}(p)) = P(P \leq F_P^{-1}(q) \mid X \leq F_X^{-1}(p)),
\]
where the probabilities \( p \) and \( q \) specify the severity of the factor stress and the confidence level applied to the portfolio loss distribution and \( P \) denotes the profit distribution \( P := -L \), e.g. losses are represented by negative and not by positive numbers.\(^6\)

The Factor Concentration \( FC_X(p, q) \) specifies the probability that a loss is above the \((1-q)\)-quantile of the loss distribution if a stress of the form \( \{X \leq F_X^{-1}(p)\} \) is applied to the systematic factor \( X \). The Factor Concentration divided by \( q \), \( FC_X(p, q)/q \), gives the relative change in the probability
\[ P(L \geq F_L^{-1}(1 - q)) = P(P \leq F_P^{-1}(q)) \]
under the stress \( \{X \leq F_X^{-1}(p)\} \). This notion of concentration risk has the advantage that it is completely independent of the specification of the credit risk model and the way that default dependencies are parameterized, e.g. whether asset or default correlations are used. In fact, it can be applied to factor models for market and operational risk as well. The parameters \( p \) and \( q \) provide the flexibility to analyze stress tests of different severity and to focus on specific parts of the distribution. Because the inequalities are expressed in quantile space, the Factor Concentration of \( X \) is largely independent of the marginal distributions of \( X \) and \( P \), thus focusing on the dependence of the variables.\(^7\) In particular, if \( X \) and \( P \) are continuously distributed variables with copula \( C \) then
\[
FC_X(p, q) = \frac{C(p, q)}{p}.
\]

\(^6\)In order to ensure that equality (3) is also satisfied for non-continuous distributions \( L \) and \( P \), the quantile \( F_L^{-1}(1 - q) \) of \( L \) has to be defined as the lower \((1-q)\)-quantile \( \inf \{x \in \mathbb{R} \mid P(L \leq x) \geq 1 - q\} \) whereas the quantile \( F_P^{-1}(q) \) of \( P \) has to be defined as the upper \( q \)-quantile \( \inf \{x \in \mathbb{R} \mid P(P \leq x) > q\} \).

\(^7\)In the following analysis, it will be convenient to work with the profit distribution \( P \) instead of the loss distribution \( L \).
section. In special cases, however, the calculation of $FC_X$ is straightforward. Assume that $X$ and $P$ are independent. Then $FC_X(p, q)$ is independent of $p$ and for large portfolios we have\(^8\)

$$FC_X(p, q) = \mathbb{P}(P \leq F_p^{-1}(q)) \approx q.$$  

(5)

The opposite extreme is perfect dependence of $X$ and $P$, e.g. $X$ and $P$ are comonotonic or countermonotonic variables. Intuitively, this means that there exist monotonic functions $f$ and $g$ and a random variable $V$ such that $X = f(V)$ and $P = g(V)$. If both functions are non-decreasing, $X$ and $P$ are comonotonic.\(^9\) The most popular example of comonotonic variables in credit risk are the profit distribution $P$ and the unique systematic factor $X$ in the one-factor Vasicek model:

$$P = g(X) = -\Phi\left(\frac{\Phi^{-1}(p) - \sqrt{p}X}{\sqrt{1-p}}\right)$$

and $g$ is an increasing function applied to the systematic factor $X$. Hence, for probability $q$,

$$F_p^{-1}(q) = g(F_X^{-1}(q))$$

and therefore (except in the degenerate case $\rho = 0$)

$$FC_X(p, q) = \mathbb{P}(P \leq F_p^{-1}(q)|X \leq F_X^{-1}(p))$$

$$= \mathbb{P}(g(X) \leq g(F_X^{-1}(q))|X \leq F_X^{-1}(p))$$

$$= \mathbb{P}(X \leq F_X^{-1}(q)|X \leq F_X^{-1}(p))$$

As a consequence, for continuous comonotonic $X$ and $P$

$$FC_X(p, q) = 1 \quad \text{if } p \leq q$$

$$FC_X(p, q) = q/p \quad \text{if } p > q.$$ 

In the same way we obtain for continuous countermonotonic $X$ and $P$

$$FC_X(p, q) = (p + q - 1)/p \quad \text{if } p + q \geq 1$$

$$FC_X(p, q) = 0 \quad \text{if } p + q < 1.$$ 

Figure 6 displays the Factor Concentration

$$FC_X(0.4, q), \quad q \in [0, 1]$$

for comonotonic, independent and countermonotonic factors in the stress scenario $X \leq F_X^{-1}(0.4)$. The curve represented by triangles is the Factor Concentration $FC_X(0.4, q)$ of the automotive factor $X$ calculated in the case study in section 4.3. The Factor Concentrations of the comonotonic and countermonotonic variables provide the boundaries for values of $FC_X(p, q)$, the triangle above the diagonal is relevant for the identification of risk concentrations.

Another interpretation of Factor Concentration is obtained by reversing the roles of $X$ and $L$: by Bayes rule

$$FC_X(p, q) = \mathbb{P}(L \geq F_L^{-1}(1-q) | X \leq F_X^{-1}(p))$$

$$= \frac{\mathbb{P}(L \geq F_L^{-1}(1-q) \land X \leq F_X^{-1}(p))}{\mathbb{P}(X \leq F_X^{-1}(p))} \cdot \frac{\mathbb{P}(L \geq F_L^{-1}(1-q))}{\mathbb{P}(L \geq F_L^{-1}(1-q))}$$

$$\approx \mathbb{P}(X \leq F_X^{-1}(p) | L \geq F_L^{-1}(1-q)) \cdot \frac{q}{p}.$$  

(6)

\(^8\)In the general case, $\mathbb{P}(P \leq F_p^{-1}(q)) \geq q$. If $P$ has a continuous distribution then $\mathbb{P}(P \leq F_p^{-1}(q)) = q$ and equality holds in (5).

\(^9\)For a formal definition of these concepts, we refer to Embrechts et al [2002].
Figure 6: $FC_X(0.4, q)$ for comonotonic, independent and countermonotonic factors and for the automotive factor (triangles) in the case study.

It is worth noticing that in a Merton-type credit portfolio model of the form (1) there is a close formal relationship between (6) and risk contributions under the risk measure Expected Shortfall: the Expected Shortfall contribution (w.r.t. confidence level $1 - q$) of the $i$-th loan can be approximated by

$$E(L_i \mid L \geq F^{-1}_L(1 - q)) = P(Y_i \leq \Phi^{-1}(p_i) \mid L \geq F^{-1}_L(1 - q)) \cdot l_i.$$  

In both concepts, the quantification of risk is based on conditional probabilities in the tail $\{L \geq F^{-1}_L(1 - q)\}$. For allocating Expected Shortfall, the probability is calculated that the ability-to-pay variable $Y_i$ is below the PD-threshold $\Phi^{-1}(p_i)$. The risk concentration in the systematic factor $X$ is derived from the conditional probability of $\{X \leq F^{-1}_X(p)\}$.

### 5.2 Factor Concentration and Tail Dependence

The asymptotic behaviour of Factor Concentration is closely linked to Lower Tail Dependence, a well-known concept for quantifying the dependence of two random variables (see, for instance, Embrechts et al [2002] or Malevergne and Sornette [2002]): the Lower Tail Dependence of two random variables $X$ and $Y$ is defined by

$$\lambda(X, Y) := \lim_{u \to 0^+} P[Y \leq F^{-1}_Y(u) \mid X \leq F^{-1}_X(u)].$$

As a consequence of (4), Lower Tail Dependence is an asymptotic property of the copula $C$ for continuously distributed variables $X$ and $Y$. It can be rewritten as

$$\lambda(X, Y) = \lim_{u \to 0^+} \frac{C(u, u)}{u}$$

and its value is known explicitly for a large number of copulas. An extensive body of literature is available on this concept. Furthermore, graphical methods exist for detecting tail dependence (Chi-plots, K-plots) which could potentially be used for Factor Concentration as well.
It immediately follows from the definition of Factor Concentration that the limit
\[ \lim_{u \to 0^+} FC_X(u, u) \]
equals the Lower Tail Dependence of the risk factor \( X \) and the profit distribution \( P \), e.g.
\[
\lambda(X, P) = \lim_{u \to 0^+} \mathbb{P}((P \leq F_P^{-1}(u) \mid X \leq F_X^{-1}(u)) = \lim_{u \to 0^+} FC_X(u, u).
\]

While tail dependence is an asymptotic concept, we prefer to view \( FC \) as a function of its variables \( p \) and \( q \) for the purpose of managing the risk of a credit portfolio. In that way, the impact of various stresses on different parts of the loss distribution can be analyzed. In addition, we keep the freedom to set \( p \) and \( q \) independently. This is an important advantage because in typical applications the probability of a stress scenario will be far greater than the confidence level of the loss distribution we are interested in, e.g. \( q = 0.02% \) and \( p = 5% \).

5.3 Dynamic concentration risk

So far, we have focused on concentration risk which currently exists in a credit portfolio, and have defined the notion of Factor Concentration \( FC \) as an indicator. However, under certain circumstances such as market stress events, even a formerly well-diversified portfolio can become concentrated due to the deterioration or default of certain parts of the portfolio. In the same way that Factor Concentration \( FC \) can be viewed as a sensitivity or first “derivative” of the loss distribution with respect to a particular systematic factor, the second derivative measures how risk concentrations change under stress, i.e. dynamic concentration risk. The analysis of dynamic concentration risk can be embedded into our framework in a natural way:

1. Calculate the Factor Concentration for factor A in the original setup,
2. and repeat the calculation after stressing a different factor B.
3. The difference represents the change in Factor Concentration for factor A due to a stress in factor B.

Changes in concentration due to market stress events could be viewed as second order effects and therefore less important for risk management. However, it might be useful to be aware of those potential changes in concentration, in order to develop strategies in advance that make the portfolio more robust against stress events.

6 Stress Tests for Concentration Risk under Basel II

6.1 Classification of regulatory stress tests

Stress testing of concentration risk is obligatory under para. 775 of the Revised Framework (BIS [2004]):
A bank’s management should conduct periodic stress tests of its major credit risk concentrations and review the results of those tests to identify and respond to potential changes in market conditions that could adversely impact the bank’s performance.

Stress tests for concentration risk focus on portfolio risk concentrations and are not to be commingled with the general pillar 1 stress tests for capital adequacy mentioned in para. 434 of the Revised Framework (BIS [2004]). Pillar 1 stress tests are mainly focused on scenarios such as market risk events, liquidity conditions, or procyclicality (see Fig. 7). However, there seem to be overlaps between stress scenarios for economic or industry downturns (as mentioned in pillar 1), and stress tests for concentration risk. Equivalently, the general methodology presented in this paper is not limited to concentration risk but has a wider range of application, including some of the areas mentioned above.

### 6.2 Stressing risk concentrations: impact on regulatory capital

As discussed in section 2, the IRB approach in BIS [2004] does not provide an appropriate quantitative framework for modeling and stressing concentration risk. However, it can be used to forecast regulatory capital requirements in stress scenarios specified in multifactor models. More precisely, the impact of a stress scenario on regulatory capital can be assessed by recalculating the Basel II formula with the stressed PDs from the multifactor model. Since regulatory capital requirements are essential for capital management and strategic planning this impact analysis will be an important component of the stress testing methodology in a financial institution.

As an example, we consider the same portfolio and stress scenario as in the case study (section 4.3). Stressing the automotive factor increases the regulatory capital from 131.41mn to 156.48mn. The increase of 19% observed in this scenario is in line with the increase of the 99.98% quantile (see table 1).
7 Conclusion

In this paper, we have presented a general framework for stressing risk concentration in credit portfolios. Starting from the idealized IRB portfolio model, we have discussed the concepts of name and sector concentration and have demonstrated that a multi-factor model is needed as the basis for stressing sector concentration.

The proposed approach to stressing sector concentration uses economic downturn scenarios or market shocks as a starting point. The scenarios are then implemented in a way that is consistent with the quantitative framework (e.g. without destroying the dependence structure of risk factors in the model). This is achieved by translating the economic stress scenarios into constraints on the systematic factors and on the state space of the model. The main prerequisite here is that the systematic factors of the credit portfolio model can be linked to economic variables.

Our stress testing methodology detects concentrations in distinct but highly correlated sectors, as demonstrated in a case study: while stressing a particular systematic factor has the largest impact on creditors in this sector, it still has a significant (though less pronounced) effect on creditors outside the sector.

Although the methodology has been developed in a particular factor model, the main concept - stressing sector concentration through a truncation of the distribution of the risk factors - is completely independent of the model specification and the way that default dependencies are parameterized, e.g. whether asset or default correlations are used. The mathematical formalization of the concept of Factor Concentration and the analysis of its basic properties form an important part of the paper.

Stress tests are required for different purposes under Basel II. We have provided a short classification of our stress testing methodology in the Revised Framework and have outlined how the impact of a stress scenario on regulatory capital can be assessed by recalculating the Basel II formula with the stressed PDs from the multi-factor model.

References


