An Options-Based Analysis of Emerging Market Exchange Rate Expectations:
Brazil's *Real* Plan, 1994-1997

by

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ABSTRACT

This paper uses currency option data from the BMF, the Commodities and Futures exchange in Sao Paulo, Brazil, to investigate market expectations on the Brazilian Real-U.S. dollar exchange rate from October 1994 through July 1997. Using options data, we derive implied probability density functions (PDF) for expected future exchange rates and thus measures of the credibility of the "crawling peg" and target zone ("maxiband") regimes governing the exchange rate. Since we do not impose an exchange rate model, our analysis is based on either the risk-neutral PDF or arbitrage-based tests of target zones. The paper, one of the first to use options data from an emerging market, finds that target zone credibility was poor prior to February 1996, but improved afterwards. The market anticipated periodic band adjustments, but over time developed greater confidence in the Real. We also test whether devaluation intensities estimated from these option prices can be explained by standard macroeconomic factors.

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This paper uses a new data set of options on the Brazilian Real / US dollar exchange rate to extract market expectations, as embodied in the risk-neutral probability density function (PDF), of real-dollar exchange rates over horizons of one to three months. Unlike ordinary exchange rate forecasts that provide only a point estimate of the future exchange rate, options-based forecasts, by permitting the derivation of a PDF, describe a range of realizations and the probability attributed to each range.

This PDF-based approach is especially effective for an analysis of the Real/$ exchange rate, which since the June 1994 Real Plan has been characterized by a combination of a crawling peg and a target zone regime. Over short horizons, the exchange rate has followed a crawling peg surrounded by a "miniband," but for long horizons, superimposed on the crawling peg, there has also been an official "maxiband" with a fixed (non-crawling) central rate, floor, and ceiling.

The PDF's derived in this paper enable us to compare market expectations embedded in options with these two concurrent regimes. From the derived PDF's, we can identify any divergences between market expectations and the existing crawling peg—e.g., whether markets in fact anticipated a faster depreciation, and if so, where (relative to the crawling peg) probability was concentrated. Relative to single-point expectation of the future exchange rate, a great advantage of a full PDF is the ability to disentangle magnitude and probability of expected depreciation—e.g., a high probability of a small depreciation *vs.* a low probability of a large depreciation, with presumably very different policy responses. For the longer-horizon fixed target zones, we can perform a similar decomposition of probability and magnitude of depreciation, and moreover, conduct "arbitrage-based tests" of credibility, developed in Campa and Chang (1996), that are virtually assumption-free. Given these target zones, we are also able to determine both "intensities" and probabilities of realignment, and to investigate possible economic determinants of realignment intensity. Thus, a single approach using dollar-Real options permits us to analyze both facets of the post-Real Plan Brazilian exchange rate regime.

This work contributes to the growing literature on the use of options to characterize expected asset returns, and in particular to predict currency crises. Recent empirical work using options to identify the distribution of expected exchange rates includes Malz (1996) and Campa et al. (1997, 1998). Papers specifically focusing on currency crises, especially the 1992 ERM crisis, include Campa and Chang (1996), Malz (1996), and Mizrach (1996). These can be contrasted against measures of devaluation risk *not* based

on options, as in Bertola and Svensson (1993), Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1997) and, Svensson (1991).

The motivation for this research is two-fold: first, to use options-based estimates of the PDF to compare and contrast market expectations with the two concurrent exchange rate regimes in the post-Real Plan Brazil; and second, to observe the time path of market perceptions to gauge policy effectiveness over time. Furthermore, this is one of the first options-based tests of exchange rate regime credibility on an emerging market. Within emerging markets, this is also the first paper to deal with the data challenges of exchange-traded options, rather than over-the-counter (OTC) volatility quotes. OTC data are normally subject to less observation error, and are by construction free of arbitrage violations. Hence, OTC data are easier to interpret empirically. Thus, results obtained here may have implications for applying this technique to other emerging markets, including those with only exchange-traded currency options.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section I describes the theoretical background behind the use of option prices to determine risk-neutral probability density functions (PDF's)—and for target zone regimes, the derivation of re-alignment intensities and probabilities, as well as arbitrage-based tests of credibility. Section II discusses the Real Plan and pertinent historical background, including the "miniband" and "maxiband" regimes. Section III introduces our option data, provides summary statistics, and conducts a preliminary analysis. Section IV investigates the behavior of the PDF over time, and in the context of a crawling peg, describes the probability and magnitude characterizing expected deviations from this regime. Section V addresses the "maxiband" target zones, estimated realignment intensities and probabilities, and arbitrage-based measures of credibility. Section VI explores the empirical relation between estimated intensities and standard macroeconomic factors. Section VII concludes.

I. Options-Based Indicators of Devaluation and Tests of Exchange Rate Band Credibility

Options—whose payoff depends on a limited range of future exchange rates rather than an entire distribution—are able to provide more precise information than other financial indicators about the future exchange rates expected by the market, and the amount of probability attributed to any given realization. In contrast, the forward rate, for example, can indicate only the mean of this distribution. The advantages of an options-based approach will be discussed further below.

A. Options and the Risk-Neutral Distribution

We begin with a few brief definitions. A *call* option gives its holder the right but not the obligation to purchase a fixed amount of foreign currency (in the case of Brazilian Real-US dollar options, $1000 US)

at a pre-determined price (referred to as the *strike* price or *exercise* price) in local currency. A *put* option gives the right but not the obligation to conduct the reverse transaction, i.e., to sell a fixed amount of the foreign currency ($1000 US) for a given strike price in local currency.

An *American* option may be exercised at any time before its expiration date; a *European* option, only on its expiration date. Because the European option can be exercised only on a single date, an analytical relationship known as *put-call parity* can be established between the price of a European call and European put of the same strike. This relation, which is derived from arbitrage restrictions, permits the price of a call to be computed from the price of a put with the same strike, and vice-versa. The analysis in this paper focuses exclusively on relationships derived from European call options (though some of the call option data were constructed from European put data via put-call parity).

It was first shown in Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) that the decline in the value of a European call option due to an infinitesimal increase in the strike price equals the discounted risk-neutral probability that the option will finish "in-the-money" (spot exceeding the strike on expiration). Accordingly, the value of a call option (under risk-neutrality) at time T with a strike price K is then given by

$$Call_{K,T} = \frac{1}{1+i_T} \int_K^\infty (S_T - K) f(S_T) dS_T \ ,$$

(1)

where S_T is the spot exchange rate at time T, $f(S_T)$ is the risk-neutral density function for the spot at time T, and i_T is the domestic risk-free rate for an investment maturing at time T. The partial derivative of equation (1) with respect to strike price K is:

$$\frac{\partial Call_{K,T}}{\partial K} = -\frac{1}{1+i_T} \left[1 - F(K)\right],$$

(2)

where F(K) is the risk-neutral cumulative density function of the exchange rate at time T, evaluated at strike price K. Taking the second partial derivative of equation (1) with respect to strike yields:

$$\frac{\partial^2 Call_{K,T}}{\partial K^2} = \frac{1}{1+i_T} f(S_T) \ .$$

(3)

This then provides a direct relationship between observed European call prices and the value of the corresponding risk-neutral probability density function, i.e. the PDF. Note that the call price is based on the payoff $(S_T - K)$ multiplied by its risk-neutral probability $f(S_T)$, which incorporates both the actual probability of that realization of spot and the value the market places on that state of nature. In other words,

$f(S_T)$ is not necessarily the actual density function, since—because of risk—a dollar in one state may be valued differently from a dollar in a different state.

Equation (3) is important because it provides the method by which the PDF can be extracted from call prices. If a continuous call price function twice-differentiable in strike exists, then the PDF is uniquely determined. In reality, such a continuous call price function is not available, but will be estimated from discrete point observations using a method described in Section IV of this paper.

B. "Intensity" of Devaluation or Realignment

When there are specific reference exchange rates in place, as in the case of target zones, a risk-neutral PDF can be used to indicate the perceived probability of devaluations or "re-alignments" of various sizes beyond that specific reference level. By looking at only that part of the PDF representing a deviation from the reference exchange rates, we can isolate the risk of a change in regime. A summary measure incorporating both probability and magnitude of change from given reference rates, over all possible realizations deviating from these reference rates, can be termed an "intensity" measure. Campa and Chang (1996) define such an intensity as:

$$G(T) = \int_{\underline{S}}^{\infty} (S_T - \overline{S}) f(S_T) dS_T \, , \tag{4}$$

Intuitively, intensity G(T) is a risk-neutral probability-weighted average of all exchange-rate realizations requiring a re-alignment, or under deviation scenarios beyond S-overbar. In other words, the magnitude of realignment is multiplied by the risk-neutral probability of each realization. Comparing equations (4) and (1), the intensity of realignment is simply the future value of a European call with a strike price at the upper-bound. Mathematically,

$$G(T) = Call_{\overline{S},T} (1 + i_T) \, . \tag{5}$$

Though this call with a strike price at the upper-bound does not exist in most cases, its price (and hence the intensity of realignment) is easily calculated once a risk-neutral PDF has been derived.

C. *Minimum* Intensity of Devaluation or Realignment

In the absence of a complete risk-neutral PDF, Campa and Chang (1996) show how one can compute a lower bound on re-alignment intensity using far fewer data points but relying on convexity properties of the call price with respect to strike, and the existence of one credible second reference rate.

This method uses both an observed at-the-money option, as well as the hypothetical price of an option whose strike price is the *credible* side of the target zone. The latter option will *always* end in-the-money, and hence can be evaluated as a bond or forward contract, since there is no uncertainty and no time value. The method then relies on the arbitrage-based condition that call prices are always a convex and non-increasing function of strike price. Therefore, when the call is graphed as a function of strike, the point corresponding to a call with a strike at the upper band (i.e. the realignment intensity) must lie *above* the rightward extension of a line connecting $Call_{\underline{S},T}$ (a call with a strike at the lower band expiring at time T) and any $Call_{K,T}$ (with strike K below the upper band). The following inequality summarizes this:

$$Call_{\overline{S},T}(1+i_T) \geq \left[\frac{\overline{S}-\underline{S}}{K-\underline{S}}\right] + K - \overline{S} \tag{6}$$

D. Arbitrage-Based Tests of Target Zone Credibility

Campa and Chang (1996) also develop two tests of band credibility relying solely on arbitrage or convexity arguments, without assumptions about risk preferences. These tests will be used for analysis and comparison in Section V.

The first test (hereafter referred to as "Test 1") is based only on a simple no-arbitrage restriction: the maximum future spot rate cannot exceed any credible upper band. At expiration, the payoff of a European call equals, at most, spot minus strike. Therefore, under credibility, the maximum value of the call cannot exceed the present value of the upper band minus the strike. Thus, credibility can be rejected whenever

$$Call_{K,T} > \frac{\overline{S}-K}{1+i_T} \tag{7}$$

Note that this test can be used even when there is only one reference rate.

The second test ("Test 2" from here on) is derived from convexity arguments and also provides an upper bound for the value of a call with a strike between two reference rates, or within the bands of a target zone. The argument is that under credibility, a call with a strike at or below the lower band will always finish in-the-money, and therefore is worth exactly its intrinsic value. This intrinsic value is $S_0/(1+i_T^*)$- $K/(1+i_T)$, where i_T^* is the foreign risk-free rate and S_0 is the current spot. Furthermore, a call with a strike greater than the upper band will always finish out-of-the-money, and therefore be worthless. Call value, when mapped against strike, is a convex function passing through these two points. Therefore, a straight line—since we do not know the degree of convexity of the call function, but do know that it cannot be less

convex than a line—connecting these two points must provide an upper bound on all points in between.

Thus, credibility can be rejected whenever the call value exceeds this upper bound, or

$$Call_{K,T} > \left[\frac{S_0}{1+i_T *} - \frac{\underline{S}}{1+i_T} \right] \frac{\overline{S} - K}{\overline{S} - \underline{S}} . \tag{8}$$

Notice that by rearranging the terms of Test 2, we can show that the RHS of Test 2 is equal to the RHS of

Test 1 times a coefficient less than one, provided the forward rate does not exceed the upper band.

Therefore, as long as the forward rate is within the band, Test 2 is always at least as restrictive as Test 1.

The one advantage of Test 1 is that it does not require the existence of a credible second reference rate, and

provides a valid test even in the absence of, for example, a credible lower band. Test 2, in fact, is a test of

the joint hypothesis that two reference rates, or the lower and the upper band of a target zone, are credible.

This section has summarized four different (but related) measures of exchange rate band credibility

based on options data alone: (1) the PDF-based realignment intensity, when a full PDF can be described; (2)

the minimum realignment intensity, given a credible second reference rate, (3) arbitrage test 1 (on one

exchange rate band), and (4) arbitrage test 2 (based on lower and upper bands).   In terms of how these four

measures are related, recall that Test 2 is always more powerful than Test 1, but requires more assumptions.

There is also a one-to-one mapping between violation by Test 2 and a positive minimum intensity of

realignment, as both are based on convexity properties alone.

II. The Real Plan and Relevant History

Brazil has been subject to high levels of inflation since the early 1980's, and had unsuccessfully

attempted to rein in inflation several times prior to 1994's Real Plan. Economic problems, in part, date

back to 1964 when the military overthrew the civilian government, resulting in military control of the

economy until 1985. (It was not until 1990 that the first popularly elected president was inaugurated.)

During this military-ruled period, Brazil pursued industrialization policies based on import substitution,

creating a number of large state-owned enterprises. The government engaged in protectionist trade policies

to spur such industrialization and to create economic independence in key industries. As a result, by the

1980's, foreign investment in support of the inefficient industries collapsed, and hyperinflation followed

because the high levels of government spending could not be reduced in line with reduced capital inflows.

By 1990, hyperinflation had been structured into the economy, through both indexation and expectations,

with the concomitant debilitating effects.

Prior to the Real Plan, several attempts were made to contain inflation, usually involving combinations of wage and price controls, tightening of the money supply, tax hikes, and freezing of bank deposits. These all failed as the fundamental problem lay in expectations of high inflation and excessive government spending. Wage and price controls were often ignored by the private sector, as immediate shortages often resulted, creating price pressure. In many industries, cartels also prevailed, reflecting the low degree of market competition. Government spending proved difficult to curtail given large entitlement programs in place, and vested interests resisting spending cutbacks and privatization of government industries, particularly during a recession. Fiscal troubles were compounded by a badly written constitution providing tenure for government employees after only five years (making them virtually impossible to lay off), and guaranteeing individual states a right to share in the federal revenues without restricting state spending. An attempt to introduce a new currency in 1993, the Cruzeiro Real ran into the same problem of inflationary expectations.

The Real Plan, introduced in December 1993 by Finance Minister Fernando Henrique Cardoso, differed from the previous plans in that it directly addressed the problem of inflationary expectations. Cardoso recognized that past inflation was being transmitted into future expectations by indexing and various contract negotiations, as inflation figured into all wage and business contracts. The idea was to break this connection by creating a unit of transactional account in which price and wage contracts would be negotiated and written, and whose value would be kept roughly equal to $1. The official currency, the cruzeiro real, would then be devalued against this unit. The Unit was called the Unit of Real Value (URV), and was introduced in March 1994. At the same time, the constitutional links between revenue and expenditure were circumvented by creating a special fund (Fundo Social de Emergencia - FSE) to eliminate the public sector deficit, thereby addressing a fundamental source of inflationary pressure. (The creation of the FSE was necessary to avoid the structural claims guaranteed by the constitution to the states and to entitlement programs.) Four months after the introduction of the URV, the Real was introduced. The central bank (Banco Central do Brazil) committed not to permit a depreciation beyond 1.00 Real/$, though appreciation would be allowed. Furthermore, a reserve ratio was implemented requiring one American dollar to each Real emitted.

The result of the Real Plan was a reduction in inflation from 50% per month, as of June 1994, to less than 2% per month by the end of the year. Inflation has since then continued to drop, and in May 1998, 12-month inflation was 3.12%, its lowest value since November 1949. The Real Plan has also had positive

effects on the rate of economic activity. Brazil's real GDP grew at an average annual rate of 4.0% during the four-year period 1994-1997, compared with an average annual growth rate of -0.2% during the four years prior to the implementation of the plan[1].

Exchange rate stabilization was an integral part of the Real Plan. Upper and lower bands ("maxibands")—as indicators of the maximum possible movement up or down—were established in March 1995, at a rate of .93 and .88 Real/$. Since then, they have been adjusted several times to allow the Real to depreciate at a controlled rate.

While announcing these broader "maxibands," the central bank in practice followed a "crawling peg" system, in which the Real gradually depreciated, but remained within a "miniband" surrounding a depreciating central rate . Under this informal system, the Real's central rate was devalued approximately 0.5%-0.6%/month, and central bank intervention assured that at all times, the spot rate would not deviate by more than 0.25% (half the "miniband width") in either direction. In practice, the central rate was devalued discretely by about 0.10% (although sometimes 0.05% or 0.15%) about 5-7 times per month. Starting April 1997, the government started devaluing the central rate by about 0.7% monthly. To discourage speculation against the system, the actual magnitude and timing of these mini-devaluations was kept slightly irregular. Furthermore, the size of the minidevaluation would be smaller than the width of the miniband itself, so the instantaneous direction of the spot rate could not be known with certainty, discouraging "one way" bets.

While this system of a predictable crawling peg surrounded by a miniband provided short-term stability in the spot rate, the government wished to maintain some flexibility in its commitment to the exchange rate over longer periods such as several months. To commit to a very narrow range, even one surrounding a crawling peg, risked tying the government's hands unnecessarily and inviting outside speculation against the currency. Thus, the government remained free to alter either the rate of devaluation or the width of the miniband. At the same time, the government also wished to provide some indicative levels for medium-term forecasting. This dual objective was reached by instituting wider "maxibands." Though the exchange rate never technically violated these bands, the central bank adjusted the maxibands as markets gradually approached the maximum Real/$ exchange rate, an event that has typically occurred every six to twelve months (Figure 1) .

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[1] It is worth noting that measures to address the structural problems also appear to be proceeding. Privatization of state industries is continuing, and the Brazilian Congress has agreed to several constitutional reforms. These include: the relaxation of protectionist provisions not mentioned here, reform of the social security system, and provisions relaxing the excessive protections provided to pubic workers.

Since the original maxibands were implemented in March 1995, through the end of our data in July 1997, the bands were changed on three separate occasions: June 22, 1995; January 30, 1996; and February 18, 1997. Since the end of our data, the maxibands were changed on January 19, 1998, to the current upper and lower bands of 1.22 and 1.12 Real/$ respectively.   In April of 1998, the government also announced that the lower end of the miniband would depreciate at a rate of 0.65% a month, while the upper band would depreciate at a rate of 0.75%, de facto widening the minibands over time. Despite its short history, the Real Plan appears to have been quite successful in taming Brazilian inflation and establishing a relatively stable currency with a reasonably predictable rate of devaluation. Given this track record, the following sections will seek to investigate issues of exchange rate regime credibility—both the crawling peg and the maxiband system—and how market perceptions of the distribution of Real/$ spot rate have changed over time.

III. Data Description

The data obtained consist of high, low, average, and last transaction prices for every trading day of dollar futures (daily observations of contracts of multiple maturities), calls and puts (daily observations of multiple strikes and expiries), and closing spot rates, from the Commodities & Futures Exchange (Bolsa de Mercadorias & Futuros, known as the BM&F) in Sao Paulo, Brazil. The data cover the period from July 1994, shortly after implementation of the Real Plan, through July 1997. Calls are initially both European and American, until a 1995 shift in convention, making all calls expiring after October 1995 European. All put contracts are European.

The BM&F was formed in July 1985 and began trading in January 1986. Currently, the exchange offers a range of futures and options contracts on the US dollar, the Ibovespa (the Brazilian stock index), sovereign debt instruments, inter-bank deposit rates, US-Brazilian interest rate spreads, gold, cattle, and agricultural commodities. With a total trading volume of 102.3 million contracts and a financial volume of 6.1 trillion US dollars during 1997, BM&F is currently ranked fourth among the world's derivative exchanges[2]. In 1997, 39.7 million contracts traded were US dollar futures, 8.1 million contracts were US dollar call options, and 71,820 contracts were US dollar put options[3]. Total trading volume in foreign exchange contracts has actually declined since 1985, but this is due primarily to increases in contract size; financial volume has more than doubled from 1996 to 1997. US dollar contracts for both futures and

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[2] Bolsa de Mercadorias & Futuros 1997 Annual Report.
[3] These figures are for contracts based on commercial US dollar rate. Contracts are also available based on the floating rate, however, these represent less than one percent of total transactions volume.

options apply to the "commercial" (as opposed to financial) exchange rate on a notional amount of $100,000.

In this paper, we focus on European call data, which significantly outnumber put data. Put data were translated using put-call parity and used only to augment the call data if a corresponding call did not exist. The call data consist of 5855 observations from the time period with mixed American and European calls, and 4837 usable (about 200 questionable observations were deleted) observations of the later time period with purely European calls. These call prices were supplemented with put data consisting of 530 observations for the first time period, and 218 from the second time period. This revised data set forms the basis for our subsequent analysis.

In deriving the PDF and conducting credibility tests, we use futures prices as an approximation of the forward rate, as in Bodurtha and Courtadon (1987). US interest rate data are daily Eurodollar rates for 1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 3 month, 6 month, and 1 year, obtained through Datastream . Linear interpolation between the two closest maturities along the yield curve is used to obtain the Eurodollar rate corresponding to the options' maturity. For example, if an 18-day rate is required then we use a weighted average of the 1-week and 1-month rates. Brazilian interest rate data is computed using covered interest rate parity, using the appropriate futures contract (whose maturity normally coincides with that of the options), spot exchange rate (again the mid-point of bid and ask), and computed Eurodollar rate. Since we have closing spot and U.S. interest rate data, we use the last traded futures contract in each day's calculations. Finally, exchange rate band information was obtained from the World Bank.

Macroeconomic indicators used in Section V to determine economic explanatory variables are drawn primarily from International Financial Statistics (IFS) by the International Monetary Fund. The choice of variables, follows Rose and Svensson (1994). The "real exchange rate" is constructed from the nominal exchange rate (IFS code ...rf), the US PPI (IFS code 63BB.ZF), and the Brazilian WPI (IFS code 63.Z.CF). "Output" is represented by industrial production (IFS code 66...b for the United States, Data Stream code BRINPRODH for Brazil). "Inflation" is the percentage change in the consumer prices (IFS line 64...x). The "trade balance" is the ratio of exports to imports (IFS line 70 divided by line 71); "Reserves" are foreign exchange excluding gold (IFS code 1l.d) and "Money" is Reserve Money (IFS line 14).

In Table 1a, we report the mean and standard deviation of strike price over three maturity ranges (i.e. 1-30 days, 31-60 days, and 61-90 days) and four time periods corresponding to different exchange rate regimes. Maturities vary because unlike over-the-counter option contracts, which have a fixed time-to-expiration, BM&F standardized options and futures contracts settle on the first business day of the maturity month.[4] Note that especially in the first time period (March 10, 1995 – June 22, 1995) even the mean strike price was often outside the band.

In Table 1b, we report the distribution of these strike prices over time relative to the spot, forward, and upper-band. The concentration of strike prices is important for two reasons. First, it indicates in what exchange rate range market liquidity and interest were greatest. Second, it will affect the reliability of the PDF we extract from these data. Generally, the PDF is most reliable in ranges spanned by the observed strikes. Notice in Table 1b that the distribution of strike prices has become more concentrated over time: the percentage of strikes above the spot is increasing over the four periods, but the percentage above the upper-band is decreasing over the four periods. To the degree that market activity reflects a concentration of expectations (to be verified more formally later in the paper), this pattern suggests that market expectations are exhibiting less dispersion over time, and that the upper-band is becoming increasingly credible (as indicated by decline in the percentage of strikes exceeding the upper-band).

The behavior of the underlying Real-dollar exchange rate also appears to have shifted over these periods. Table 2 reports the standard deviation of daily changes in the spot and forward rates. These standard deviations have decreased over the first three periods, a pattern coincident with less dispersed expectations as suggested by the increased concentration in observed strike prices.

IV. The Implied PDF and Expected Deviations from the Crawling Peg

A. Estimation of the Risk-Neutral PDF (over 15-day periods)

We first use our option data to derive risk-neutral PDF's corresponding to horizons of one, two, and three months. Because of data limitations, this procedure will require certain numerical approximations, but the resulting PDF's provide potentially richer information about expectations than simple point-estimate characterizations of expectations as provided by the forward rate or an econometric model.

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[4] The exchange does offer a 'flexible' option contract that can be tailored to the issuers needs including style, maturity, dollar value, etc. However, data on these contracts were not available, and in any event,

A common approach to deriving the PDF from option prices characterizes Black-Scholes

volatilities ("vols") implied in option prices as a function of the strike price. For any given date and time

horizon, one can interpolate and extrapolate from existing implied vols to express implied vol as a

continuous function of only the strike price. This function is commonly known as the "volatility smile"[5].

The function is then transformed into a continuous call price function that is twice-differentiable in strike.

This approach does not require that the Black-Scholes model hold; indeed, the fact that implied vol varies

with strike rather than being constant across all strikes is itself evidence against Black-Scholes assumptions.

Note that the numerical technique in this volatility smile-based approach can vary, as discussed in Shimko

(1993) and Campa, Chang, and Reider (1997, 1998). In Shimko (1993), the method applied in this paper,

the implied volatility smile is fitted as a quadratic function of the strike. In contrast, Campa, Chang, and

Reider (1997, 1998) use the method of cubic splines.[6]

Table 3 reports, by option maturity and exchange rate regime, the mean and standard deviation of

the Black-Scholes implied volatilities extracted from observed option prices. A number of stylized facts are

worthwhile noting. First, in all cases but one, shorter maturities are associated with high mean volatility.

When normally calm markets experience occasional periods of high uncertainty expected to be temporary,

implied volatility will increase, and most markedly for short-maturity options. Longer-dated options will

also show a rise in volatility, but since the high-uncertainty state is not expected to continue throughout the

option's remaining life, the implied volatility will reflect both the high-uncertainty period and the normal

lower-uncertainty period, thereby diluting the effect of the temporary high-volatility period. Second, by

similar reasoning, the standard deviation of short-dated volatility will be the highest, since longer-dated

volatility will again reflect an average of high-volatility and low-volatility periods. Third, the mean implied

volatility is one to two orders of magnitude greater than realized volatility obtained from the time series of

exchange rate changes. This is because implied volatility reflects the presence of "peso problem"—the risk

of a rare but substantial exchange rate shock, in this case a devaluation of the Real. Throughout the periods

in question, the Real has remained stable, or depreciated only gradually against the dollar. For the most

part, in our very brief sample, the Real has avoided the large price movements reflected in options' implied

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given the potentially unique structure of each contract, each observation would have to be individually
evaluated. Furthermore, low liquidity would reduce the reliability of such data.

[5] Volatility plotted as a function of the strike price often resembles a "smile" because Black-Scholes implied
volatilities tend to increase as the strike price moves away from the forward rate.

[6] For a number of dates, we also fit a cubic spline (as in Campa, Chang, and Reider (1997, 1998)) to the
data, and obtain similar results to the quadratic, suggesting that the results are robust to the method used.

volatility. Of course, in small samples, realized volatility can very easily be substantially below implied volatility in the presence of a "peso problem."

In our attempt to derive a PDF from the Brazilian options data, a significant empirical problem is that, for any given observation date and maturity date, we observe an insufficient range of strike prices to trace out a reasonably complete volatility smile. This prevents us from constructing daily estimates of the PDF on all but a few dates. Also, as mentioned previously, options expire on the first business day of every month, reducing the frequency to only monthly if we wish to compare PDFs with the same time horizon. To overcome these data limitations, we make the assumption that the shape of the volatility smile remains constant for a period of 15 days. For convenience, we assign the period's midpoint as the "observation date" for each 15-day period. For instance, for 60-day call options, implied volatilities are collected for options ranging from 53 to 67 days to expiration. Each volatility corresponds to a strike/forward ratio for the collection period. We convert each strike/forward ratio to an absolute price by multiplying by the forward rate central to the period. The implicit assumption is that during this period, the relationship between volatility and the strike/forward ratio remains constant.

Aggregating option observations over such 15-day periods, we obtain a semi-monthly series of PDF's for 35, 60, and 91-day call options (the 35-day periodicity captured a greater spectrum of strikes than did a 30-day). Many of these PDF's are estimated using over 20 data points on the volatility smile, and most use over 10 data points. Only in one case do we use as few as three options data points. PDF's are discarded if the associated continuous call price function is non-convex, as occurred in two instances. PDF's were also smoothed using an exponential smoothing technique, which removes non-monotonicities or negative values on the posterior and anterior slopes. When this technique is applied, if a non-monotonicity or negative value is detected, the computed PDF at this point is modified to decline from the previous value towards zero at an exponentially decreasing rate.

Figures 2a-c provide three-dimensional time series of risk-neutral PDF's estimated using numerical derivatives, for 35, 60, and 91-day options respectively. The PDF's are presented as a function of the strike/forward ratio. The first observation in any of the graphs is October 3, 1994 though the continuum of observations does not in general start until June 2, 1995. (The dates on the horizontal axes are shown in reverse to facilitate a better view of the fluctuations in the estimated distributions over time.) All time series appear to exhibit increasing skewness and decreasing kurtosis over time. Positive skewness in this context indicates that a large depreciation of the Real is more likely than a large appreciation. The increase in

skewness largely stems from the disappearance of a downside tail, in the region of Real appreciation. Kurtosis, on the other hand, reflects "fatter tails," relative to the lognormal distribution. Kurtosis (above that found in the lognormal distribution) denotes a relatively high probability of extreme outcomes— holding volatility constant. These graphical results reinforce our earlier inferences from the distribution of strike prices. Positive skewness confirms that the market perceives a greater probability of a large Real depreciation than a large Real appreciation. Increasing kurtosis indicates the relative increase in very large expected exchange rate changes, and hence conditional on the level of volatility, less total probability of devaluation. Towards the end of the sample, it is striking how the part of the distribution below the forward rate is extremely concentrated in values very close to (but below) the forward rate (i.e. small Real appreciation). In contrast, for values above the forward rate, the distribution quickly drops to zero for points beyond a 2% depreciation from the forward rate. This is consistent with the government's stated policy of constant depreciation over time.

B. Deviations from the Crawling Peg (Miniband) Regime

We now use these PDF's to identify potential divergences between market expectations and the existing crawling peg regime of 0.5%-0.6% per month. We focus on possible Real devaluations of a larger magnitude than the crawling peg, namely 2% and 5% over horizons of 35, 60, and 91 days (approximately 1, 2, and 3 months). All these combinations of devaluations and time horizons represent a rate of Real depreciation at least as fast as under the crawling peg, and usually more so. For example, the existing crawling peg would imply about a 1.5% depreciation over three months.

For each devaluation size ($x\%$) and horizon, we calculate the "probability" of devaluations at least $x\%$. "Probability" denotes the total amount of probability, not weighted by distance, representing devaluations of at least $x\%$ from the current spot. Graphically, this corresponds to the area under the curve in the right-hand tail of the risk-neutral PDF beyond an $x\%$ devaluation. In contrast, "intensity" denotes the total probability, *weighted by the amount of depreciation beyond x%*, of all devaluations of at least x%.

Table 4 depicts the probability, at the start of each month, of a depreciation of at least 2% or 5% over horizons of 35, 60, and 91-days. A number of points are striking in this table. First, the credibility of the crawling peg regime has improved consistently over time. Late in the sample, probabilities of a given depreciation (from spot) are much lower than early in the sample.

Second, within any of the three exchange rate regimes, the probability of a 2% or 5% depreciation does not change markedly in the months just prior to the maxiband realignment. In the first regime, from August 1995 (when our data begin) through January 1996, depreciation probabilities remain high throughout these six months. Beginning in February 1996, the probability of depreciation drops significantly, and remains low even up to the February 1997 realignment. This does not imply that markets expected no maxiband realignment, as we will see in the following section. Yet, the options data indicate that any anticipated maxiband realignment was not expected to be accompanied by a large spot depreciation.

Third, around times of realignments (the months preceding January 1996 and January 1997) the probability of a 5% depreciation is usually far smaller than that of a 2% depreciation. This indicates that the probability mass of a depreciation of 2% or more arises primarily from expected small depreciations—i.e. between 2% and 5%--rather than expected large depreciations of 5% or more. Thus, even when the crawling peg regime is not perceived as fully credible by the market—i.e. some depreciation beyond the usual 0.5%-0.6% per month is expected, much of the market's "doubt" surrounding the crawling peg regime is in the form of minor rather than major expected depreciations beyond the crawl.

Fourth, our estimates of depreciation risk prove extremely sensitive to news affecting the Brazilian economic and political situation. Probabilities of large depreciations increased considerably in April and May of 1996. This coincided with a humiliating defeat suffered in Congress by the Brazilian government on Social Security Reform, a key part of the structural reforms under the Real Plan. Likewise, in May 1997, bribery accusations against some Congress members resulted in a sharp temporary rise in depreciation probabilities. Table 5 lists certain key economic and political events that may have played a role in the market's perception of depreciation risk over this period.

V. Empirical Findings: Tests of Exchange Rate "Maxi-Band" Credibility

 A. Arbitrage-Based Tests (Daily Observations)

We now focus on Brazil's "maxibands" and perform a number of tests, including the arbitrage-based tests of band credibility using Tests 1 and 2 (equations (7) and (8) respectively) discussed in Section I of this paper. We start by focusing simply on the behavior of the spot and three ranges of forward rates (1-30 days, 31-60 days, and 61-90 days) against the band. We see in Figure 1a that there is no violation of the upper-band by the spot. In Figure 1b, for 1-30 day data, an ongoing violation of the upper-band by the

forward occurs only in the first target zone regime, although the longer-dated forward prices (Figures 1c-d) do approach and at times cross the upper-band in other regimes just prior to subsequent adjustments.

The options-based test results are graphed in Figures 3a-l. Figures 3a-f report the results from Test 1 for options in three different maturity ranges (1-30 days, 31-60 days, and 61-90 days), while Figures 3g-l report the results of Test 2 for the same maturity ranges. We report two figures for each maturity. The first figure plots the observed price of the call option on a given date minus the corresponding "maximum" consistent with credibility from all the options with the relevant maturity range observed that day. Positive values for Tests 1 and 2 constitute a violation of upper-band credibility. If there are multiple call options observed on a given date, then only the maximum such statistic for each date is reported. On some days, these maxima include some calls whose strikes exceed the upper-band, i.e. automatic violations of the target zone. Recall that since these are arbitrage-based tests, a single option can be sufficient to reject credibility. The second figure reports for each day the percentage of the observed options resulting in a rejection of credibility, indicating the concentration of market liquidity in the non-credible area. This approach does not mix calls with different expiration dates, as these arbitrage-based tests specifically refer to a given band width and time horizon.

Credibility of the exchange rate band is consistently rejected for the initial months of the exchange rate band. During all of 1995 and until the exchange rate realignment of January 30, 1996, options with maturities beyond 30 days were consistently priced higher than their maximum value consistent with credibility. During this period, there also existed a large number of options traded with strike prices larger than the existing upper band, i.e. automatic violations of credibility. Using options with maturities less than 60 days, we find credibility harder to reject from February 1996 until about November 1996, with the exception of a few days around August 1996 coinciding with the turmoil caused by the resignation of the Argentinean Finance Minister. Options with longer maturities (more than 60 days) rejected the credibility of this exchange rate band slightly earlier, starting around mid-summer 1996.

After the realignment of January 30, 1997, credibility of the exchange rate band could still be rejected. Yet, the percentage of traded options whose price was inconsistent with credibility of the new band declined significantly, and remained stable through the end of the sample on July 30, 1997, at around 20% of the traded options.

B. Probability and Realignment Intensities of the Maxibands

As we did with the minibands above, we compute the estimated monthly probabilities and intensities of devaluation (reported in Table 6) implied by the estimated PDF's at the three different horizons. Devaluation probabilities were consistently large at all horizons during the first part of the sample ("Regime II"), until the realignment of January 30, 1996. After that devaluation, probabilities were very close to zero until about November 1996, four months prior to the February 18, 1997 realignment, when the probabilities of devaluation began to steadily increase again.

Realignment intensities in Table 6 are expressed on an annualized basis as a percentage of the existing upper band. These numbers refer the product of the probability of a devaluation and the expected size of the devaluation (measured from the upper band). At the beginning of January 1996, the estimated 35-day devaluation intensity was slightly higher than 10% annually. This suggests, for instance, a 50% probability of a 2% depreciation of the spot rate beyond the upper band over a 35-day horizon. This number seems plausible given the government's policy of aiming for a steady monthly nominal devaluation of the Real of about 0.5-0.6%. The low realignment intensities observed prior to the following realignment on February 19, 1997 corroborates this point. Estimated three-month realignment intensities at the beginning of February 1997 are 2.75% while the estimated probability of the devaluation was almost 98 percent. This again indicates that, although a realignment was widely expected, the expected devaluation of the spot rate from such a realignment was very small and of the same order as the observed depreciations in the previous months.

Like our estimates of expected depreciations beyond the crawling peg, probabilities and intensities of realignments (devaluations beyond the maxibands) also prove sensitive to news affecting the Brazilian economic and political situation. For example, the failure to pass Social Security Reform legislation (April-May 1996) and the Congressional bribery scandal (May 1997) increased both realignment intensity and realignment probability, especially at the 91-day horizons.

VI. Economic Determinants of Realignment Intensity

To ascertain whether variation in realignment intensity can be explained by common macroeconomic variables, we perform regressions whose dependent variable is the monthly estimates of devaluation intensity and its lower bound, as estimated in Section V. The macroeconomic variables used are similar to those in Rose and Svensson (1994). No lagged right-hand-side variables were included, however, because of the limited number of left-hand-side observations available.

The specific equation used is:

$$\text{Intensity}_t = \alpha + \beta_1(\text{RER})_t + \beta_2(\text{Infl})_t + \beta_3(\text{Output})_t + \beta_4(\text{Trade})_t + \beta_5(\text{FRES})_t + \beta_6(\text{Money})_t + \varepsilon_t \qquad (9)$$

The explanatory variables on the RHS are:

- the real exchange rate (RER), determined using the nominal monthly average exchange rate, the US PPI, and the Brazilian WPI;

- cumulative inflation (Infl), which is the difference between the Brazilian and US CPI's;

- Brazilian output divided by US output (Output);

- Brazilian trade balance divided by the US trade balance (Trade);

- Brazilian foreign reserves divided by US foreign reserves (FRES);

- and the ratio of Brazilian high-powered money to its US counterpart (Money).

All variables except inflation are expressed in logs. On the left-hand-side, we use devaluation intensity derived from the full estimated PDF.

Results from OLS regressions using equation (9) for the 35-day, 60-day, and 91-day intensity data are reported in Table 7.[7] We should first note the low power of these regressions owing to the small number of observations in our sample. The regression results clearly indicate the low explanatory power of these macroeconomic variables. For the specification using the 90-day realignment intensity, we can not reject the hypothesis that all the coefficients equal zero. None of the indicators is significant in all three regressions. Money is the only variable that has a significant coefficient in more than one regression—with higher money growth associated with higher realignment intensity. The coefficients on Trade and on Reserves do have the expected sign and are significant in the regression of the 60-day intensity. Increases in the Brazilian trade deficit and decreases in its level of reserves appear to increase the intensity of realignment. These economic linkages are *not* confirmed in regressions of the two other horizons' intensity, where the coefficients are insignificant and the sign changes.[8] Given the small number of observations, it is not appropriate to draw general conclusions from these estimates. Nevertheless, the results are consistent with the general conclusions of Svensson and Rose (1994) and Campa and Chang (1998): that macroeconomic variables are largely unable to explain intertemporal movements in realignment risk.

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[7] The results reported here do not change qualitatively if one replaces the dependent variable (realignment intensities) with either the probabilities of depreciations reported in Table 4 or the probabilities of devaluations reported in Table 6.

[8] We performed similar regressions using the average monthly minimum intensity of realignment computed according to equation (6) and the results were equally unsuccessful.

VI. Conclusion

This paper has used a new data set of exchange-traded options from August 1995 through July 1997 to derive risk-neutral probability density functions for the Real/Dollar exchange rate over horizons ranging from one to three months. The PDF is a superior indicator to a single point estimate of exchange rate expectations, such as a forward rate or survey-based forecast, in that it assigns varying amounts of probability to different possible outcomes. Although we introduce some approximations to compensate for sparse data, we make no assumptions about exchange rate dynamics. The PDF then can be used to analyze both the crawling peg and the maxiband exchange rate regimes. These two overlapping systems have been in operation in Brazil since early 1995, several months after the June 1994 introduction of the Real Plan, designed to combat inflation and currency depreciation.

In assessing market expectations under the crawling peg, we use the risk-neutral PDF to calculate both the intensity and probability of depreciation beyond the crawling peg. A high probability accompanied by a relatively low intensity, for example, indicates that the market anticipates depreciation beyond the peg, but most of this depreciation is concentrated just outside the peg. Empirically, we find that the credibility of the peg has increased over time, and that the occasional spikes in depreciation intensity and probability can usually be explained by identifiable political or economic news in Brazil.

Our evaluation of the maxiband regime consists of two arbitrage-based tests of target zone credibility, as well as a measure of devaluation intensity outside the band.   Tests based on arbitrage reject credibility whenever observed option prices are inconsistent with zero probability lying outside the band. When this occurs, devaluation intensity outside the band is positive. The numerical value of this intensity then provides a quantitative indicator of markets' questioning the maxiband regime. Empirically, we are usually able to reject credibility, but find that through our sample ending in July 1997, the intensity of devaluation has fallen over time as the regime became increasingly credible.

This paper also provides a more general methodology for extracting the risk-neutral PDF even when data are limited. In particular, we aggregate observations over several days, normalizing the option price by the contemporaneous forward rate. Our method involves fitting a single volatility smile to these multi-day observation periods. Assuming stationarity of the distribution over each period, this approach results in more precision when relatively few options are observed, a common difficulty with many emerging markets.

Analysis of the shape of the PDFs over time also provides insight into market perceptions. In general, the PDFs appear to exhibit a greater degree of kurtosis and skewness (towards Real devaluation) with time. Increased kurtosis, i.e. fatter tails for a given level of volatility, suggests that increasingly markets believed that *if* a depreciation were to occur, it would be a large depreciation. Holding volatility constant, an increase in kurtosis implies less probability of a devaluation outside the target zone, but a larger expected devaluation if devaluation occurs.

We also run regressions seeking to identify macroeconomic determinants of realignment risk. We find little evidence that standard macroeconomic indicators can explain observed realignment risk, consistent with Rose and Svensson (1994) and Campa and Chang (1998). Our observation of increasing kurtosis over time suggests that devaluation outside the band is increasingly perceived as a rare large event, rather than a more likely but not necessarily large event.

Overall, the paper's findings reinforce earlier work on options' superior ability, relative to macroeconomic or interest-rate based indicators, to anticipate the periodic realignments of the exchange rate bands. By providing a more sensitive indicator of exchange rate risk—either in the form of depreciation beyond the crawling peg or a realignment of the maxibands—we have also documented the steady increase in exchange rate credibility during the first years of Brazil's Real Plan.

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Table 1a: Mean and Standard Deviation of Strikes

This table reports the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of strikes for European call data in three maturity ranges (1-30 days, 31-60 days, and 61-90 days) for the period 3/95 to 7/97. The four periods over which these statistics are computed correspond to different exchange rate band regimes: March 10, 1995 through June 22, 1995 (.88-.93 R/$), June 23, 1995 through Jan 30, 1996 (.91-.99 R/$), Jan 31, 1996 through February 18, 1997 (.97-1.06 R/$), and February 19, 1997 through July 30, 1997, the end of data set (1.05-1.14 R/$). The number of observations is listed below each statistic.

	3/10/95 – 6/ 22/95	6/23/95 – 1/30/96	1/31/96 – 2/18/97	2/19/97 – 7/30/97
R/$ Band	.88-.93	.91-.99	.97-1.06	1.05-1.14
1-30 Days, Mean	1.027	1.010	1.040	1.097
Std.Dev.	(.227)	(.138)	(.051)	(.050)
# obs.	11	158	563	386
31-60 Days, Mean	.853	.985	1.047	1.101
Std. Dev.	(.066)	(.040)	(.050)	(.031)
# obs.	14	204	740	437
61-90 Days	.956	.991	1.046	1.107
Std. Dev.	(.172)	(.019)	(.050)	(.027)
# obs.	20	203	608	315

Table 1b: Percentage of Strikes Above to the Spot, Forward, and Upper-Band

This table reports the percentage of strike prices above the spot rate, forward rate and upper-bands, for European call data in three maturity ranges (1-30 days, 31-60 days, and 61-90 days), for the period 3/95 to 7/97. The four periods over which these statistics are computed correspond to different exchange rate band regimes: March 10, 1995 through June 22, 1995 (.88-.93 R/$), June 23, 1995 through Jan 30, 1996 (.91-.99 R/$), Jan 31, 1996 through February 18, 1997 (.97-1.06 R/$), and February 19, 1997 through July 30, 1997, the end of data set (1.05-1.14 R/$).

	3/10/95 – 6/ 22/95	6/23/95 – 1/30/96	1/31/96 – 2/18/97	2/19/97 – 7/30/97
R/$ Band	.88-.93	.91-.99	.97-1.06	1.05-1.14
1-30 Days				
Spot	.64	.85	.94	.99
Forward	.55	.80	.82	.96
Upper-Band	.55	.40	.28	.14
31-60 Days				
Spot	.43	.95	.97	1.00
Forward	.21	.77	.76	.89
Upper-Band	.21	.47	.33	.18
61-90 Days				
Spot	.40	.995	.997	1.00
Forward	.15	.78	.77	.87
Upper-Band	.30	.65	.36	.21

Table 2: Standard Deviation of Changes in the Forward and Spot Rates

This table reports the standard deviation of daily percent changes in the spot rate and three forward rates relative over the four Real/Dollar maxiband regimes during the sample period, 3/95 to 7/97. Observations on the forward rates are separated in three maturity ranges (1-30 days, 31-60 days, and 61-90 days). The four regimes are: March 10, 1995 through June 22, 1995 (.88-.93 R/$), June 23, 1995 through Jan 30, 1996 (.91-.99 R/$), Jan 31, 1996 through February 18, 1997 (.97-1.06 R/$), and February 19, 1997 through July 30, 1997, the end of the data set (1.05-1.14 R/$). Number of observations is provided below each statistic.

	3/10/95 – 6/ 22/95	6/23/95 – 1/30/96	1/31/96 – 2/18/97	2/19/97 – 7/30/97
R/$ Band	.88-.93	.91-.99	.97-1.06	1.05-1.14
Spot				
Std. Dev.	0.0045	0.0010	0.00073	0.00076
# obs.	69	149	259	110
1-30 Day				
Std. Dev.	.0065	.0026	.0015	.0017
# obs.	67	146	247	107
31-60 Day				
Std. Dev.	.0071	.0024	.0016	.0018
# obs.	67	147	251	107
61-90 Day				
Std. Dev.	.0079	.0026	.0018	.0018
# obs.	67	146	240	102

Table 3: Implied Volatilities from Real-U.S. Dollar Options

This table reports the mean and standard deviation of the implied volatilities (in percentage terms) of the options in the sample, 3/95 to 7/97. Observations on the options are separated into three categories defined by maturity (1-30 days, 31-60 days, and 61-90 days). The four periods over which these statistics are computed correspond to different exchange rate maxiband regimes: March 10, 1995 through June 22, 1995 (.88-.93 R/$), June 23, 1995 through Jan 30, 1996 (.91-.99 R/$), Jan 31, 1996 through February 18, 1997 (.97-1.06 R/$), and February 19, 1997 through July 30, 1997, the end of the data set (1.05-1.14 R/$). The number of observations is provided below each statistic.

	3/10/95 – 6/ 22/95	6/23/95 – 1/30/96	1/31/96 – 2/18/97	2/19/97 – 7/30/97
R/$ Band	.88-.93	.91-.99	.97-1.06	1.05-1.14
1-30Day				
Mean	46.64	13.65	5.06	5.75
Std. Dev.	29.20	19.85	6.68	6.43
# obs.	11	151	520	385
31-60Day				
Mean	18.74	4.57	4.13	4.23
Std. Dev.	7.83	5.96	4.48	3.41
# obs.	14	202	702	433
61-90 Day				
Mean	19.85	4.37	3.48	3.59
Std. Dev.	11.74	2.32	4.19	2.56
# obs.	20	201	581	311

Table 4: Probabilities of a 2% and of a 5% depreciation over 35, 60, and 91-day horizons, 8/95-7/97.

This table reports the probability that the expected exchange rate will depreciate by more than 2% and 5% over a given horizon. These probabilities are estimated monthly from implied PDFs at three different horizons (35, 60 and 91-days).

Date	35 Day		60 Day		91 Day	
	2 %	5%	2 %	5%	2 %	5%
Regime II: [.91-.99]						
Aug-95	3.32	0.51	12.38	2.98	21.78	9.47
Sep-95	25.39	19.38	12.00	4.04	12.35	1.90
Oct-95	31.48	24.64	32.43	26.27	9.68	1.82
Nov-95	15.88	12.70	35.18	24.59	8.26	1.57
Dec-95	28.00	18.80	10.79	7.75	2.74	0.24
Jan-96	22.34	14.56	3.76	0.86	4.72	0.56
Feb-96	0.50	0.02	2.12	0.17	3.50	0.37
Regime III: [.97-1.06]						
Mar-96	2.95	2.25	2.76	0.78	4.42	1.04
Apr-96	0.20	0.01	0.03	0.00	11.35	9.16
May-96	0.52	0.06	0.82	0.08	37.15	28.82
Jun-96	0.43	0.02	7.09	5.05	2.01	0.18
Jul-96	0.06	0.00	0.06	0.00	1.98	0.15
Aug-96	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.00 .	.	
Sep-96	0.66	0.04	2.26	0.20	2.42	0.19
Oct-96	0.00	0.00 .	.		0.02	0.00
Nov-96	0.00	0.00	0.30	0.00	0.84	0.01
Dec-96	1.34	0.07	0.12	0.00	0.00	0.00
Jan-97	0.06	0.00	6.28	2.17	2.35	0.09
Feb-97	0.33	0.00	0.89	0.00	0.00	0.00
Mar-97	0.33	0.00	0.01	0.00	1.96	0.22
Regime IV: [1.05-1.14]						
Apr-97	0.43	0.00	0.46	0.00	0.11	0.00
May-97	0.03	0.00	1.81	0.09	65.21	53.23
Jun-97	0.19	0.00	0.83	0.00	1.12	0.00
Jul-97	0.23	0.00	0.23	0.00	0.25	0.00

Table 5: Significant Events Affecting the Real-Dollar Exchange Rate, November 1994 – July 1997

Table presents a list of significant world or Brazilian events that occurred over the period covered by the data.

| Date		Event(s)
1994:	March	Unit of Real Value introduced as basis for all Brazilian financial contracts and indices
	July	Real first introduced as official Brazilian currency
	November	U.S. Congress approves GATT
	December	Devaluation of Mexican Peso
1995:	January	Continued depreciation of Mexican Peso
	February	$40 billion bail-out plan for Mexico announced
	March	First Real/Dollar Maxibands introduced [.88-.93].
		Mexican Peso continues to tumble
		Argentina seeks $3 billion in credit lines to counter contagion effects from Mexican crisis
	April	Mexican peso shows steady appreciation / Mexican stocks start to rebound / Four largest Japanese brokerage houses announce $1 billion in losses
	May	Dollar begins to appreciate against yen / trade gap with Japan declines
	June	Realignment of the Real/Dollar Maxibands. New bands [.91-.99].
		Dow Jones experiences second largest decline in history
	August	Toyota Invests $150 million in new car manufacturing facility in Brazil
	October	Mexico begins repayment of US loan package.
	November	Delays in approval of constitutional reform for Social Security, Indexation and Taxes
1996:	January	Realignment of the Real/Dollar Maxibands. New bands [.97-1.06].
		FEF established by the Brazilian congress to eliminate fiscal deficit, renewed for 18 months
	February	US bond prices tumble, biggest drop in 7 months
	March	Dow experiences 3rd largest decline ever at beginning of month, then reaches record levels March 18
	May	Yields on US 30 year treasuries exceed 7% for first time in months
	June	Brazilian government suffers humiliating defeat on Social Security Reform in Congress
	July	Dow tumbles; 219 point swing in trading
	August	Argentina's finance minister is replaced raising uncertainty in emerging markets
	November	Brazilian municipal elections are held with mixed results for the party in power
	December	Peruvian terrorists seize Lima residence of Japanese Ambassador / 300 point decline and recovery of Dow
1997:	January	Mexico repays final $3.5 billion of US loan package
	February	Realignment of the Real/Dollar Maxibands. New bands [1.05-1.14].
		Constitutional amendment for reelection of high officials passes lower house
	May	Scandal on the government buying some congressional votes.
		Transaction tax is introduced to "cool" the economy
		Massive speculative attack on the Thai baht
	July	The baht devalues by about 15-20 percent
		Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia widened or abandoned their existing exchange rate bands

Table 6: Probabilities of Realizations outside the Maxiband and Intensities of Maxiband Realignment, 8/95-7/97

This table reports the total probability of the expected exchange rate realizations outside the maxiband and the annualized expected intensities of realignment (as a % of the upper end of the band) from the estimated PDFs at three different horizons (35, 60 and 91-days).

Date:	Probability (in %) outside the Upper Band			Intensity of Realignment		
(start of Month)	35-Day	60-day	91-Day	35-Day	60-day	91-Day
Regime II: [.91-.99]						
Aug-95	2.01	7.82	25.63	0.19	1.04	3.52
Sep-95	24.50	15.97	35.29	10.95	2.42	2.33
Oct-95	31.97	32.85	26.40	15.16	16.58	1.48
Nov-95	15.88	39.53	30.69	7.66	15.55	1.71
Dec-95	31.79	13.22	9.80	11.67	5.02	0.39
Jan-96	36.95	22.58	33.85	10.37	1.29	1.45
Regime III: [.97-1.06]						
Feb-96	0.00	0.04	0.19	0.00	0.00	0.01
Mar-96	1.93	0.48	0.80	0.67	0.07	0.08
Apr-96	0.00	0.00	8.79	0.00	0.00	2.59
May-96	0.04	0.05	28.56	0.00	0.00	7.96
Jun-96	0.02	5.16	0.33	0.00	1.95	0.02
Jul-96	0.00	0.00	0.47	0.00	0.00	0.02
Aug-96	0.00	0.00	.	0.00	0.00	.
Sep-96	0.19	1.11	2.21	0.01	0.09	0.12
Oct-96	0.00	.	0.01	0.00	.	0.00
Nov-96	0.00	0.46	3.27	0.00	0.01	0.09
Dec-96	3.61	1.12	3.45	0.20	0.03	0.05
Jan-97	4.92	25.59	38.11	0.12	2.46	1.50
Feb-97	0.00	50.37	97.96	0.00	1.55	2.75
Regime IV: [1.05-1.14]						
Mar-97	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.00	0.00	0.01
Apr-97	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
May-97	0.00	0.06	54.80	0.00	0.00	20.21
Jun-97	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00
Jul-97	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Table 7: Relationship between Realignment Intensities and Fundamentals, 8/95-7/97

This table reports the estimated coefficients from OLS regressions of the estimated monthly realignment intensities on a set of macroeconomic indicators. The indicators are: RER – real/US$ real exchange rate, INFL – Brazilian inflation rate, OUTPUT – index of industrial production, TRADE – trade balance, FRES – Brazilian foreign reserves, and MONEY – high-powered money. All variables except INFL are expressed as the log of the ratio of the value for Brazil of the corresponding measure to that for the U.S. Standard errors appear in italics below each reported coefficient.

	35-Day	60-Day	91-Day
RER	0.17	0.19	-0.29
	0.97	*1.33*	*-1.27*
INFL	0.00	0.00	0.00
	-1.05	*-0.42*	*0.19*
OUTPUT	0.02	0.07	-0.02
	0.68	*2.12**	*-0.42*
TRADE	0.00	-0.02	0.02
	0.14	*-2.04**	*0.93*
FRES	-0.01	-0.05	0.01
	-0.35	*-4.32**	*0.13*
MONEY	0.04	0.04	-0.01
	*2.05**	*1.86***	*-0.37*
Adj. R2	0.38	0.60	-0.14
N. Obs.	21	25	25

Figures 1a-1d: Real/Dollar Spot Rate and 30, 60 and 90 day Forward Rates

Spot vs Maxi—bands, 10/94—7/97

1— 30 Day Forward vs Maxi—bands, 10/94—7/97

31– 60 Day Forward vs Maxi–bands, 10/94–7/97

61– 90 Day Forward vs Maxi–bands, 10/94–7/97

Figures 2a-2c: Implied Exchange Rate Probability Distributions 10/94-7/97, 35, 60 and 91 days

35 Day PDF's

60 Day PDF's

91 Day PDF's

Figures 3a-3l: Arbitrage-Based Tests of Exchange Rate Credibility

Test1, Options with Maturities between 1 and 30 Days, 10/94—7/97


Fraction of Options Violating Test1

Test1, Options with Maturities between 31 and 60 Days, 10/94−7/97

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
Test1, Options with Maturities between 61 and 90 Days, 10/94−7/97

Fraction of Options Violating Test1

Test2, Options with Maturities between 1 and 30 Days, 10/94−7/97

Fraction of Options Violating Test2

Test2, Options with Maturities between 31 and 60 Days, 10/94−7/97



Fraction of Options Violating Test2

Test2, Options with Maturities between 61 and 90 Days, 10/94−7/97

Fraction of Options Violating Test2

Figures 4a-4c: Probabilities and Intensities of Realignment, 5/95-8/97

Realignment Intensity for 35 Day Calls Based on Maxi—bands

Realignment Intensity for 60 Day Calls Based on Maxi—bands

Reallignment Intensity for 91 Day Call Assuming Ex—ante Bands

Discussion of the paper by Campa, Chang and Refalo

"An Options-Based Analysis of Emerging Markets Exchange Rate Expectations: Brazil's *Real* Plan, 1994 – 1997"

Paul Söderlind[*]

Data and the Results

This paper studies the credibility of the (moving) Brazilian exchange rate bands, the "maxiband" between early 1995 and mid 1997. The main idea is to explore the information in data on US dollar/Brazilian Real futures and options from the Commodities and Futures Exchange in Sao Paolo, Brazil. A series of biweekly PDFs of the future exchange rate (at the 30, 60 and 90 days horizon) is estimated. This gives information about how the probability of a realignment evolved over time. The data is also checked for if no-arbitrage conditions implied by complete credibility of the exchange rate band are satisfied.

The main results from the estimated PDFs are as follows:

* In general, the Real regime became increasingly more credible over time.

* However, there were temporary decreases in credibility in May 1996 (probably associated with the defeat of the social security reform in congress) and in May 1997 (probably associated with the revelation of the government's bribes to some congress members).

* When the spot rate approached the upper boundary, as in early 1997, the current band was no longer credible.

All these results are clearly visible from the estimated PDFs, in particular for the 90 days horizons. However, only the first is easily seen from the no-arbitrage test. It would be useful to add a discussion of why there are so few significant results for the shorter horizons (30 to 60 days). It would also be interesting to get some more information about the "power" of the arbitrage tests. For instance, under which circumstances can we expect these tests to perform well?

According to Figure 1 of the paper, the most dramatic movements of the spot and futures rates occurred around the establishment of the first maxiband in March 1995. This is discussed relatively little in the paper. It would be interesting to say some more about how market expectations changed around this time. It would also be very interesting to extend the sample to include more recent events (Asian crisis, collapse of the Real).

The lack of data lurks behind many of the methodological choices made in the paper. It would be interesting to see some more details on how much data there is. One possibility is to show a figure

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with time on the horizontal axis and strike prices on the vertical and to mark all points of time and strikes where there was trade. Dates and ranges of strike prices with little trade is likely to give less precise estimates of the PDF, so such a figure would help the readers to get a grasp of the quality of the results. It might also be useful to include some more details on exactly which data is used in the estimation and tests (min, max, last traded?).

The Methods

My remaining comments are on the assumptions behind the different tests and measures for European call options used in the paper.

Denote the (future) exchange rate at the expiry of the option by S_T, the lower exchange rate boundary $\underline{S}$, and the upper $\overline{S}$. The idea of the *first arbitrage test* is that if the upper exchange rate boundary is perfectly credible, $\Pr(S_T > \overline{S}) = 0$, then a European call option with a strike prices, K, at or above $\overline{S}$ should be worth zero. (The distinction between the risk neutral and true distribution is not important here, since zero probability in the true distribution means zero probability in the risk neutral distribution). If no such option is available, then for $K < \overline{S}$ the highest possible value of the option price, C_K, is $(\overline{S} - K)/(1+i)$, where i is the interest rate times time to expiry. This would be the option price if all probability mass is located at the upper boundary. Any call option price above this value indicates that the band is not completely credible. This test requires a minimum of assumptions and data, and is therefore very attractive. It is unclear, however, if 100% credibility is a reasonable hypothesis. In any case, it would be very useful to illustrate the power of this test in various circumstances – perhaps with some examples.

The *second arbitrage test* is somewhat tighter, but comes at the cost of assuming that the lower boundary is completely credible, $\Pr(S_T \geq \underline{S}) = 1$. In that case an option with strike price $K = \underline{S}$ is always in the money and is therefore worth $C_{\underline{S}} = (F - \underline{S})/(1+i)$, where F is the forward price. This second test is that any option with strike price within the band must, by convexity, have a price below the straight line between $C_{\underline{S}}$ and $C_{\overline{S}}$, where the latter is zero if the band is 100% credible. The new assumption of perfect credibility of the lower boundary is probably reasonable in most cases.

The *devaluation intensity* is defined as the price of a European call option of $C_{\overline{S}}$, which can be thought of a weighted probability of realignment. If no data is available for this strike price, then a lower bound can be derived by once again assuming that the lower boundary is perfectly credible. By convexity, $C_{\overline{S}}$ must be above a straight line between $C_{\underline{S}}$ and C_K for K inside the band. This seems to be a good complement to the no-arbitrage tests in the sense that it tries to capture whether a lack of credibility is due to expectations of a small or large devaluation.

2

The PDFs are estimated by a modified version of Shimko's approach, where a smooth curve is fitted to the volatility smile, which is then inverted (via the Black-Scholes formula) to option prices. This option pricing function is differentiated (following Breeden-Litzenberger) twice with respect to the strike price to get the risk neutral PDF (divided by $1 + i$). This method seems to be flexible and there is evidence that it works well in many cases. However, the properties seem to be somewhat dependent on how the interpolation between the available implicit volatilities is done and also on the number/range of existing strike prices. It would be useful to discuss this in the text, and to highlight how much data has been available – and to give an assessment of the quality of the estimated PDFs (especially, the mass in the upper tail).

Discussion on "An Options-Based Analysis of Emerging Market Exchange Rate
Expectations: Brazil's *Real* Plan, 1994 – 1997"
by Campa, Chang and Refalo (1999)
Disscussant: Mª Cruz Manzano

Firstly, I would like to thank the Bank for International Settlements and the organizers for the celebration of this interesting seminar.

The availability of indicators on agents expectations is a very relevant issue for monetary authorities and financial analysts, given the predominant role of those for the monetary transmission mechanism in developed financial markets. Agents assign subjective probabilities to each of the possible values of a variable in the future and, as a result, a specific probability distribution characterised and summarised the agents "feelings" about future realisations of variables. These distributions are not observed and an attempt is usually made to estimate some of the moments of the underlying distribution. Options markets, by definition of these assets, collect a very rich set of information on such distributions. But it has not been until very recently that such information has started to be analysed. The paper of Jose Mª Campa, Kevin Chang and James Refalo is an example of this growing body of analysis.

These authors exploit the information content of currency option data in terms of agents' expectations on future exchange rates and apply the analysis to the Brazilian case. The paper is an interesting contribution to the analysis of credibility of target zones regimes and, not less important, to the analysis of exchange rate developments in emerging countries.

There exists a large body of literature on credibility measures of target zone regimes both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view. But, to my knowledge, there are few studies on the case of emerging economies. It is not necessary to show the importance of these economies for world economic developments as the current world situation is stressing.

Campa, Chang and Refalo apply an analysis of credibility measures to the target zone regime governing the real –US $ exchange rate. As is explained in the paper, the Brazilian regime combine the imposition of a maxi-band- an upper and a lower band for the exchange rate- and a system of crawling peg in which movements within the band are controlled. The analysis of credibility is very close related to that of developments in expectations and in this regard, options are a privileged source of information as the authors show.

They use a PDF approach to examine the credibility of the crawling peg system and to build a realignment intensity indicator through the estimate of the exchange rate expectations distribution. In addition, they analyse the credibility of the upper band imposed on the exchange rate using some other

credibility measures – based on arbitrage and convexity hypothesis on options pricing – which are explained in an article of Campa and Chang published in the American Economic Review in 1996.

Let me make some comments on only two points of the paper: one of them related to the data used and the other in relation to the conclusions reached by the authors.

The main contribution of the paper is the estimation of PDFs for expected exchange rates of the Brazilian real. Because of this, data used to estimate these functions are very relevant.

Focusing my attention on this point, I would like to stress that the analysis carried out uses daily data on options but, as is explained by the authors, because of data limitations – insufficient range of strikes, the need of comparing PDFs with the same time horizon,etc – only a semi-monthly series of probability distribution functions are obtained. Hence, options observations are aggregated over a period of 15 days making the hypothesis that the relationship between volatility and the strike forward ratio remains constant.

With the data aggregation mentioned, a volatility smile is fitted as a quadratic function of the strike and, finally, PDFs are smoothed using an exponential smoothing technique.

In my opinion, the manipulation of data carried out is a point to be carefully discussed because it could distort the analysis in a relevant way.

In fact, the estimation of *daily* PDFs is a crucial issue in markets in which news and economic and political events are rapidly incorporated into expectations and, hence, into prices. This is the case of exchange rates markets. In this regard, the aggregation carried out in the paper could be blurring relevant information because is taking into account events happened in a period of fifteen days, which could have drastically affected expectations distributions. In addition, smoothing techniques used could worsen the problem.

Aggregation could be particularly negative if one of the purposes of the credibility analysis is to analyze the content of options to anticipate realignments of the exchange rate bands, as is pointed out by the authors. In my opinion, if the role of options as leading indicators of realignments is to be stressed, a daily frequency in the analysis is required.

For this reason, it is highly advisable to calibrate the disadvantages and advantages of using daily data, particularly when aggregation does not solve some of the problems of having sparse data and it is doubtful that other more serious concerns do not emerge as a consequence of data manipulation.

On the other hand, aggregation of data is also particularly problematic when an attempt to explain realignment intensities – the product of the probability of devaluation and the expected size of it – by economic variables is made. The absence of significance in the regressions carried out, could be attributed to the fact that, in this type of markets, realignment probabilities can be subject to daily and sudden changes. External or domestic events and news can cause them. Then, it would be more

convenient to analyse how certain events have affected, on a daily basis, the probabilities of realignment.

With respect to the estimation of the PDFs presented in the paper, some more details on the results would be desirable. In fact, because of the manipulation of option data carried out, it would be suitable to provide some measures of goodness to calibrate the quality of the exercise. In my view, some diagnosis -such as, for example, the comparison of first moments of distributions with forward exchange rates or the sum of probabilities estimated, is essential to evaluate to what extent the estimate of risk-neutral probability functions is a good, or at least a sensible, approximation of subjective probabilities.

My second comment is on the conclusions reached by the authors. They point out that their findings reinforce the superior ability of options relative to other indicators, to anticipate realignments of the exchange rate bands. In my opinion, there is no proof of such a statement. The paper highlights the relevance of the information content of options to characterise agents expectations on exchange rates and hence how they "feel" about the possibility of realignment. But the paper does not provide any evidence, in the Brazilian case, to state that options permit to anticipate realignments and no proof is given about the superior performance of options as leading indicators of realignments in relation to others.

To conclude, I would like to stress again the relevant contribution of the paper to the analysis of expectations in financial markets and, particularly, to the study of emerging economies.