


### ILLIQUIDITY AND ALL ITS FRIENDS

# BIS Conference on "Financial Systems and Macroeconomic Resilience"

### June 25-26, 2009

Jean TIROLE

## Funding and market liquidity




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Hard to capture with a single statistics



### Demand for liquidity

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- (1) Return to capital market ("finance as you go")
- (2) "Reserves"
  - self-hoarding low ST debt (relative to earnings)
    - liquid assets on balance sheet
    - resell, securitize less liquid assets
  - contracted for credit line, CDS, ...



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- ✓ In theory: underhoarding (sacrifice insurance for scale), or overhoarding (Jensen: too much cash) if left unmonitored.
- ✓ Underhoarding key concern:
  - regulator protects debt claims
  - externalities (systemic risk)
  - macro-prudential regulation.

# MARKET LIQUIDITY BREAKDOWNS

- $\checkmark~2$  causes: adverse selection and insufficient financial muscle (local liquidity).
- $\checkmark$  Recent work: adverse selection and market breakdowns highly endogenous.



### Well-known

 $\bullet$  rationales

[exit and reinvestment; demand for stores of value; diversification]

• hazards.



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Does perceived fragility create a stigma? (Malherbe 2009)

Assumption: banks have imprecise estimates of other banks' liquidity position.



Topsy-Turvy principle:

- funding liquidity: perceived fragility impairs refinancing [discount window, CCL, ...]
- market liquidity (securitization): Perceived fragility helps.



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- funding liquidity: perceived fragility impairs refinancing [discount window, CCL, ...]
- market liquidity (securitization): Perceived fragility helps.
- ✓ Multiple equilibria:

market believes little liquidity  $\rightarrow$  little adverse selection  $\rightarrow$  securitization market operates  $\rightarrow$  no need to hoard much liquidity, and conversely.



Dang-Gorton-Holmström (2009): State-contingent liquidity Background:

• Debt as a low-information intensity security

[Myers-Majluf 1984, security design literature]




Dang-Gorton-Holmström (2009): State-contingent liquidity Background:

- Debt as a low-information intensity security [Myers-Majluf 1984, security design literature]
- Agents relying on market liquidity (short horizons) have a preference for easily resalable, low-information-intensity claims [Gorton-Pennacchi 1990]



#### DGH's double whammy argument:





# FINANCIAL MUSCLE

Are there specialized buyers (with financial muscle) on other side?

• Allen-Gale (1994, 1998, ...) cash-in-the-market pricing model: precursor of fire-sale models:

Lots of liquidity sellers  $\rightarrow$  may trigger further sales & price decrease Price softness [bankruptcy in their work, MVA]



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- Underhoarding: if intact banks' liquidity exerts a positive externality on distressed ones [Caballero-Krishnamurthy 2001, 2003]
- Overhoarding: vulture behaviors; hoard liquidity to overbid rivals for distressed assets. Reinterpretation: wait for prices to decrease even more [Holmström-Tirole 2009]



# COUNTERPARTY RISK AND CONTAGION

✓ Regulators' lenient attitude toward OTC markets [indirect form of regulatory evasion/put on taxpayer money]



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- $\bullet\,$  multilateral netting
- transparency.



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- $\checkmark\,$  Benefits of centralized platforms with standardized products
  - multilateral netting
  - transparency.

Remarks:

- platform should be carefully monitored (avoid TBTF)
- can have bilateral exposures in centralized system [some payment systems]
  - OK. Key is transparency and netting.



### Reforms

- don't try to regulate everything:
  - (1) insufficient staff,
  - (2) migration
- insulate "regulated sphere" against large-scale defaults [representation hypothesis].

To this purpose impose high capital charges on OTC contracts.



# Models of contagion

 $\checkmark$  Allen-Gale (2000) and others: domino effects:

Caballero-Krishnamurthy (2009): as in Dang et al., information acquisition in bad times

[here: about health of counterparty of counterparty of... Daunting task]



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  - regulatory environment
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[compare OTC and payment systems]



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[compare OTC and payment systems]

✓ What are bilateral exposures about? Must go together with incentives to monitor. Otherwise not justified.

[Rochet-Tirole 1996 monitoring model]



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# AGGREGATE LIQUIDITY

- $\checkmark$  Possibility of shortages
  - [Holsmtröm-Tirole 1998]



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Key:

Imperfect pledgeability of income

private demand for liquidity

[none in Arrow-Debreu]

rationale for shortages of private liquidity/public supply of liquidity

[creation of stores of value]



- $\checkmark\,$  Recent crisis: dire consequences of a wide spread maturity mismatch:
  - Commercial banks' liquidity support to conduits, and wholesale borrowing.
  - Increase in market share of investment banks (which rely more on repos and CP than retail banks).
  - Primary dealers.
  - LBOs, households (ARMs, refinancing), ...



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  - LBOs, households (ARMs, refinancing), ...
- / Widespread monetary and fiscal bailouts.



# A CALL FOR MACRO-PRUDENTIAL REGULATION

[Farhi-Tirole 2009]

Benefit: Rescue institutions that rely on the wholesale market for funding.



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Monetary bailouts: Costs of low interest rates

- wedge MRS/MRT
- (implicit) subsidy to borrowers
- sows seed of next crisis. Three channels: incentive to lever; incentive to borrow short; reputation
- inflation; price dispersion (New Keynesian models).



### Observation:

Distortion costs are to a large extent "fixed"

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When everyone engages in maturity transformation....

- authorities have little choice but enabling refinancing
- refusing to adopt risky balance sheet lowers ROE.



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- An increase in probability of distress may well *reduce* liquidity/capital insurance.



- There may exist multiple equilibria.
- Endogenous macroeconomic uncertainty. In contrast with CAPM, banks, if can choose states of nature in which face financial difficulties, have an incentive to choose perfect positively correlated positions.
- An increase in probability of distress may well *reduce* liquidity/capital insurance.
- *TI problem*: central bank would like to commit to rigorous monetary policy. But when push comes to shove...

 $\rightarrow$  rationale for macro-prudential regulation



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- Need to monitor *quality* of liquid assets. *SC* in substituting toward toxic assets.
- Monitor liquidity of strategic and politically powerful agents.



### OPTIMAL BAILOUT PACKAGE

Mechanism design (optimal monetary + recapitalization bailout)

• *Question*: Does monetary policy still have a role? Involves subsidy anyway, and is not targeted...



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• *Question*: Does monetary policy still have a role? Involves subsidy anyway, and is not targeted...

Answer: monetary policy helps those who really need refinancing. Fiscal bailouts are more restricted, but may hand over money to institutions that do not need it (analysis: authorities face adverse selection).



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Thank you very much!

