http://www.bis.org/cbhub/list/jel_classification/jel_N/index.rss Latest research hub papers with the JEL classification:N en http://www.ijcb.org/journal/ijcb10q3a2.pdf IJCB International Journal of Central Banking by Michael Bordo, Ali Dib and Lawrence Schembri Canada's Pioneering Experience with a Flexible Exchange Rate in the 1950s: (Hard) Lessons Learned for Monetary Policy in a Small Open Economy 2010-09-01T12:39:59Z This paper revisits Canada’s pioneering experience with a flexible exchange rate over the period 1950–62. It examines whether the floating rate was the best option for Canada in the 1950s by developing and estimating a New Keynesian small open-economy model of the Canadian economy. The model is then used to conduct a counterfactual analysis of the impact of different monetary policies and exchange rate regimes. The main finding is that the flexible exchange rate helped reduce the volatility of key macroeconomic variables. The Canadian monetary authorities, however, did not understand all of the implications of conducting monetary policy under a flexible exchange rate and a high degree of capital mobility. The paper confirms that monetary policy was more volatile in the post-1957 period and Canada’s macroeconomic performance suffered as a result. Canada's Pioneering Experience with a Flexible Exchange Rate in the 1950s: (Hard) Lessons Learned for Monetary Policy in a Small Open Economy 2010-09-01T12:39:59Z Abstract http://www.ijcb.org/journal/ijcb10q3a2.htm Full text http://www.ijcb.org/journal/ijcb10q3a2.pdf Michael D. Bordo Ali Dib Lawrence L. Schembri Michael Bordo, Ali Dib and Lawrence Schembri 2010-09 IJCB International Journal of Central Banking E32 E37 F31 F32 N1 http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/2010/wp1009.pdf Cleveland Fed Working papers by Ellis Tallman and Elmus R Wicker Banking and Financial Crises in United States History: What Guidance Can History Offer Policymakers? 2010-07-30T06:27:00Z This paper assesses the validity of comparisons between the current financial crisis and past crises in the United States. We highlight aspects of two National Banking Era crises (the Panic of 1873 and the Panic of 1907) that are relevant for comparison with the Panic of 2008. In 1873, overinvestment in railroad debt and the default of railroad companies on that debt led to the failure of numerous brokerage houses, precursor to the modern investment bank. During the Panic of 1907, panic-related deposit withdrawals centered on the less regulated trust companies, which had only indirect access to the existing lender of last resort, similar to investment banks in 2008. The popular press has made numerous references to the banking crises of the Great Depression as relevant comparisons to the recent crisis. This paper argues that such an analogy is inaccurate. The previous banking crises in U.S. history refl ected widespread depositor withdrawals whereas the recent panic arose from counterparty solvency fears and large counterparty exposures among large complex financial intermediaries. In historical incidents, monitoring counterparty exposures was standard banking practice and the exposures were smaller. From this perspective, the lessons from the past appear less directly relevant for the current crisis. Banking and Financial Crises in United States History: What Guidance Can History Offer Policymakers? 2010-07-30T06:27:00Z Full text http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/2010/wp1009.pdf Elmus R Wicker Ellis W. Tallman Ellis Tallman and Elmus R Wicker 2010-07 Cleveland Fed Working papers E42 E44 E58 N11 N12 N21 N22 http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/2010/wp1009.pdf Cleveland Fed Working papers by Ellis Tallman and Elmus R Wicker Banking and Financial Crises in United States History: What Guidance Can History Offer Policymakers? 2010-07-30T06:27:00Z This paper assesses the validity of comparisons between the current financial crisis and past crises in the United States. We highlight aspects of two National Banking Era crises (the Panic of 1873 and the Panic of 1907) that are relevant for comparison with the Panic of 2008. In 1873, overinvestment in railroad debt and the default of railroad companies on that debt led to the failure of numerous brokerage houses, precursor to the modern investment bank. During the Panic of 1907, panic-related deposit withdrawals centered on the less regulated trust companies, which had only indirect access to the existing lender of last resort, similar to investment banks in 2008. The popular press has made numerous references to the banking crises of the Great Depression as relevant comparisons to the recent crisis. This paper argues that such an analogy is inaccurate. The previous banking crises in U.S. history refl ected widespread depositor withdrawals whereas the recent panic arose from counterparty solvency fears and large counterparty exposures among large complex financial intermediaries. In historical incidents, monitoring counterparty exposures was standard banking practice and the exposures were smaller. From this perspective, the lessons from the past appear less directly relevant for the current crisis. Banking and Financial Crises in United States History: What Guidance Can History Offer Policymakers? 2010-07-30T06:27:00Z Full text http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/2010/wp1009.pdf Elmus R Wicker Ellis W. Tallman Ellis Tallman and Elmus R Wicker 2010-07 Cleveland Fed Working papers E42 E44 E58 N11 N12 N21 N22 http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/2010/wp1009.pdf Cleveland Fed Working papers by Ellis Tallman and Elmus R Wicker Banking and Financial Crises in United States History: What Guidance Can History Offer Policymakers? 2010-07-30T06:27:00Z This paper assesses the validity of comparisons between the current financial crisis and past crises in the United States. We highlight aspects of two National Banking Era crises (the Panic of 1873 and the Panic of 1907) that are relevant for comparison with the Panic of 2008. In 1873, overinvestment in railroad debt and the default of railroad companies on that debt led to the failure of numerous brokerage houses, precursor to the modern investment bank. During the Panic of 1907, panic-related deposit withdrawals centered on the less regulated trust companies, which had only indirect access to the existing lender of last resort, similar to investment banks in 2008. The popular press has made numerous references to the banking crises of the Great Depression as relevant comparisons to the recent crisis. This paper argues that such an analogy is inaccurate. The previous banking crises in U.S. history refl ected widespread depositor withdrawals whereas the recent panic arose from counterparty solvency fears and large counterparty exposures among large complex financial intermediaries. In historical incidents, monitoring counterparty exposures was standard banking practice and the exposures were smaller. From this perspective, the lessons from the past appear less directly relevant for the current crisis. Banking and Financial Crises in United States History: What Guidance Can History Offer Policymakers? 2010-07-30T06:27:00Z Full text http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/2010/wp1009.pdf Elmus R Wicker Ellis W. Tallman Ellis Tallman and Elmus R Wicker 2010-07 Cleveland Fed Working papers E42 E44 E58 N11 N12 N21 N22 http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/2010/wp1010.pdf Cleveland Fed Working papers by Jon R Moen and Ellis Tallman Liquidity Creation without a Lender of Last Resort: Clearing House Loan Certificates in the Banking Panic of 1907 2010-07-30T06:27:00Z We employ a new data set comprised of disaggregate figures on clearing house loan certificate issues in New York City to document how the dominant national banks were crucial providers of temporary liquidity during the Panic of 1907. Clearing house loan certificates were essentially “bridge loans” arranged between clearing house members. They enabled and were issued in anticipation of gold imports, which took a few weeks to arrive. The large, New York City national banks acted as private liquidity providers by requesting (and the New York Clearing House issuing) a volume of clearing house loan certificates beyond their own immediate liquidity needs, in accord with their role as central reserve city banks in the national banking system. Liquidity Creation without a Lender of Last Resort: Clearing House Loan Certificates in the Banking Panic of 1907 2010-07-30T06:27:00Z Full text http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/2010/wp1010.pdf Jon R. Moen Ellis W. Tallman Jon R Moen and Ellis Tallman 2010-07 Cleveland Fed Working papers E44 N21 http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/2010/wp1009.pdf Cleveland Fed Working papers by Ellis Tallman and Elmus R Wicker Banking and Financial Crises in United States History: What Guidance Can History Offer Policymakers? 2010-07-30T06:27:00Z This paper assesses the validity of comparisons between the current financial crisis and past crises in the United States. We highlight aspects of two National Banking Era crises (the Panic of 1873 and the Panic of 1907) that are relevant for comparison with the Panic of 2008. In 1873, overinvestment in railroad debt and the default of railroad companies on that debt led to the failure of numerous brokerage houses, precursor to the modern investment bank. During the Panic of 1907, panic-related deposit withdrawals centered on the less regulated trust companies, which had only indirect access to the existing lender of last resort, similar to investment banks in 2008. The popular press has made numerous references to the banking crises of the Great Depression as relevant comparisons to the recent crisis. This paper argues that such an analogy is inaccurate. The previous banking crises in U.S. history refl ected widespread depositor withdrawals whereas the recent panic arose from counterparty solvency fears and large counterparty exposures among large complex financial intermediaries. In historical incidents, monitoring counterparty exposures was standard banking practice and the exposures were smaller. From this perspective, the lessons from the past appear less directly relevant for the current crisis. Banking and Financial Crises in United States History: What Guidance Can History Offer Policymakers? 2010-07-30T06:27:00Z Full text http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/2010/wp1009.pdf Elmus R Wicker Ellis W. Tallman Ellis Tallman and Elmus R Wicker 2010-07 Cleveland Fed Working papers E42 E44 E58 N11 N12 N21 N22 http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/2010/wp1007.pdf Cleveland Fed Working papers by Michael D Bordo, Owen F Humpage and Anna J Schwartz U.S. Foreign-Exchange-Market Intervention during the Volcker-Greenspan Era 2010-07-03T12:58:59Z The Federal Reserve abandoned foreign-exchange-market intervention because it conflicted with the System’s commitment to price stability. By the early 1980s, economists generally concluded that, absent a portfolio-balance channel, sterilized foreign-exchange-market intervention did not provide central banks with a mechanism for systematically influencing exchange rates independent of their monetary policies. If intervention were to have anything other than a fleeting, hit-or-miss effect on exchange rates, monetary policy had to support it. Exchange rates, however, often responded to U.S. monetary-policy initiatives, so intervention to offset or reverse those exchange-rate responses can seem a contrary policy move and can create uncertainty about the strength of the System?s commitment to price stability. That the U.S. Treasury maintained primary responsibility for foreign-exchange intervention only compounded this uncertainty. In addition, many FOMC participants feared that swap drawings and warehousing could contravene the Congressional appropriations process and, therefore, potentially pose a threat to System independence, a necessary condition for monetary-policy credibility. U.S. Foreign-Exchange-Market Intervention during the Volcker-Greenspan Era 2010-07-03T12:58:59Z Full text http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/2010/wp1007.pdf Michael D. Bordo Anna J. Schwartz Owen F. Humpage Michael D Bordo, Owen F Humpage and Anna J Schwartz 2010-07 Cleveland Fed Working papers F3 N1 N2 http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/2010/wp1007.pdf Cleveland Fed Working papers by Michael D Bordo, Owen F Humpage and Anna J Schwartz U.S. Foreign-Exchange-Market Intervention during the Volcker-Greenspan Era 2010-07-03T12:58:59Z The Federal Reserve abandoned foreign-exchange-market intervention because it conflicted with the System’s commitment to price stability. By the early 1980s, economists generally concluded that, absent a portfolio-balance channel, sterilized foreign-exchange-market intervention did not provide central banks with a mechanism for systematically influencing exchange rates independent of their monetary policies. If intervention were to have anything other than a fleeting, hit-or-miss effect on exchange rates, monetary policy had to support it. Exchange rates, however, often responded to U.S. monetary-policy initiatives, so intervention to offset or reverse those exchange-rate responses can seem a contrary policy move and can create uncertainty about the strength of the System?s commitment to price stability. That the U.S. Treasury maintained primary responsibility for foreign-exchange intervention only compounded this uncertainty. In addition, many FOMC participants feared that swap drawings and warehousing could contravene the Congressional appropriations process and, therefore, potentially pose a threat to System independence, a necessary condition for monetary-policy credibility. U.S. Foreign-Exchange-Market Intervention during the Volcker-Greenspan Era 2010-07-03T12:58:59Z Full text http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/2010/wp1007.pdf Michael D. Bordo Anna J. Schwartz Owen F. Humpage Michael D Bordo, Owen F Humpage and Anna J Schwartz 2010-07 Cleveland Fed Working papers F3 N1 N2 http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/publications/telechar/ner/ner272.pdf Bank of France Working Papers by Emmanuelle Lavallée and Vincent Vicard National borders matter... where one draws the lines too 2010-06-18T12:46:59Z National borders matter... where one draws the lines too 2010-06-18T12:46:59Z Abstract http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/publications/ner/1-272.htm Full text http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/publications/telechar/ner/ner272.pdf Vincent Vicard Emmanuelle Lavallée Emmanuelle Lavallée and Vincent Vicard 2010-01 Bank of France Working Papers F1 N70 http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/publications/telechar/ner/ner271.pdf Bank of France Working Papers by Gilbert Cette, Yusuf Kocoglu and Jacques Mairesse Productivity Growth and Levels in France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States in the Twentieth Century 2010-06-18T12:46:59Z Productivity Growth and Levels in France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States in the Twentieth Century 2010-06-18T12:46:59Z Abstract http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/publications/ner/1-271.htm Full text http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/publications/telechar/ner/ner271.pdf Yusuf Kocoglu Jacques Mairesse Gilbert Cette Gilbert Cette, Yusuf Kocoglu and Jacques Mairesse 2010-01 Bank of France Working Papers E22 J24 N10 O47 O57 http://www.banxico.org.mx/publicaciones-y-discursos/publicaciones/documentos-de-investigacion/banxico/{EA68D592-2D2E-7169-B722-4650F0F63532}.pdf Bank of Mexico Working Papers by Salcedo Alejandrina; Schoellman Todd; Tertilt Michèle Families as Roommates: Changes in U.S. Household Size from 1850 to 2000 2010-06-18T06:27:59Z The size of the average American household has fallen dramatically -from six in 1850 to three in 2000. To explain this decline we model households as collections of roommates who share the costs of household public goods. If private goods are more income elastic than public goods, as we document in the paper, an increase in income endogenously leads to smaller households. We calibrate the model to match data from 2000. Changing incomes to their 1850 levels, we find that our mechanism can explain 37 percent of the observed reduction in the number of adults per household and 16 percent of the reduction in the number of children. Families as Roommates: Changes in U.S. Household Size from 1850 to 2000 2010-06-18T06:27:59Z Full text http://www.banxico.org.mx/publicaciones-y-discursos/publicaciones/documentos-de-investigacion/banxico/{EA68D592-2D2E-7169-B722-4650F0F63532}.pdf Todd Schoellman Alejandrina Salcedo Michèle Tertilt Salcedo Alejandrina; Schoellman Todd; Tertilt Michèle 2010 Bank of Mexico Working Papers D10 E10 J11 N30 O10 http://www.bis.org/publ/work313.pdf Bank for International Settlements Working papers by Madhusudan Mohanty and Philip Turner Banks and financial intermediation in emerging Asia: reforms and new risks 2010-06-12T06:35:00Z The conventional view is that microeconomic reforms after the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis have greatly strengthened banking systems in Asia. Banks have become better capitalised, external exposures have been reduced and credit risk has been managed more effectively. But this conventional view does not take enough account of the macroeconomic background. A sharp rise in domestic savings, combined with the recent large-scale sterilised intervention and easy monetary policy, has led to very easy financing conditions for banks. Bank credit expanded. Banks have accumulated a large stock of government bonds. How these conditions will change and how this will affect banks in Asia is uncertain. Supervisory authorities therefore need to be sure that the present very liquid position of most banking systems in Asia does not allow significant (but so far only latent) increases in market and credit risk to go undetected. Banks and financial intermediation in emerging Asia: reforms and new risks 2010-06-12T06:35:00Z BIS Abstract http://www.bis.org/publ/work313.htm Full text http://www.bis.org/publ/work313.pdf Philip Turner Madhusudan Mohanty Madhusudan Mohanty and Philip Turner 2010-06 Bank for International Settlements Working papers E21 E44 F31 N25 http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/WP/WP679.pdf Minneapolis Fed Working Papers by Warren E. Weber Bank Liability Insurance Schemes Before 1865 2010-04-24T06:27:59Z Bank Liability Insurance Schemes Before 1865 2010-04-24T06:27:59Z Full text http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/WP/WP679.pdf Warren E. Weber Warren E. Weber 2010-04 Minneapolis Fed Working Papers E42 N21 http://www.banxico.org.mx/publicaciones-y-discursos/publicaciones/documentos-de-investigacion/banxico/{21F08AB0-1135-4B81-83C9-1E30E7039418}.pdf Bank of Mexico Working Papers by Martínez André; Musacchio Aldo Endowments, Fiscal Federalism, and the Cost of Capital for States: Evidence from Brazil, 1891-1930 2010-04-12T17:42:00Z In this paper, we contribute to the discussion of what determines country risk by arguing that an important explanatory factor is the impact that commodities have on the capacity to pay. We use a newly created data base with state-level fiscal and risk premium data for Brazil states between 1891 and 1930 to show that Brazilian states with natural endowments that allowed them to export commodities that were in high demand ended up having higher revenues per capita and, thus, lower cost of capital. We also explain that the variation in revenues per capita across states was both a product of the variation in natural endowments and a commodity boom that had asymmetric effects among states. We end by running instrumental variable estimates using indices of export prices for each state to instrument for revenues per capita. Our IV estimates confirm our results that states with commodities that had higher price increases had lower risk premia. Endowments, Fiscal Federalism, and the Cost of Capital for States: Evidence from Brazil, 1891-1930 2010-04-12T17:42:00Z Full text http://www.banxico.org.mx/publicaciones-y-discursos/publicaciones/documentos-de-investigacion/banxico/{21F08AB0-1135-4B81-83C9-1E30E7039418}.pdf Aldo Musacchio André Martínez Martínez André; Musacchio Aldo 2009 Bank of Mexico Working Papers H71 H74 N26 N46 N96 http://www.banxico.org.mx/publicaciones-y-discursos/publicaciones/documentos-de-investigacion/banxico/{21F08AB0-1135-4B81-83C9-1E30E7039418}.pdf Bank of Mexico Working Papers by Martínez André; Musacchio Aldo Endowments, Fiscal Federalism, and the Cost of Capital for States: Evidence from Brazil, 1891-1930 2010-04-12T17:42:00Z In this paper, we contribute to the discussion of what determines country risk by arguing that an important explanatory factor is the impact that commodities have on the capacity to pay. We use a newly created data base with state-level fiscal and risk premium data for Brazil states between 1891 and 1930 to show that Brazilian states with natural endowments that allowed them to export commodities that were in high demand ended up having higher revenues per capita and, thus, lower cost of capital. We also explain that the variation in revenues per capita across states was both a product of the variation in natural endowments and a commodity boom that had asymmetric effects among states. We end by running instrumental variable estimates using indices of export prices for each state to instrument for revenues per capita. Our IV estimates confirm our results that states with commodities that had higher price increases had lower risk premia. Endowments, Fiscal Federalism, and the Cost of Capital for States: Evidence from Brazil, 1891-1930 2010-04-12T17:42:00Z Full text http://www.banxico.org.mx/publicaciones-y-discursos/publicaciones/documentos-de-investigacion/banxico/{21F08AB0-1135-4B81-83C9-1E30E7039418}.pdf Aldo Musacchio André Martínez Martínez André; Musacchio Aldo 2009 Bank of Mexico Working Papers H71 H74 N26 N46 N96 http://www.banxico.org.mx/publicaciones-y-discursos/publicaciones/documentos-de-investigacion/banxico/{21F08AB0-1135-4B81-83C9-1E30E7039418}.pdf Bank of Mexico Working Papers by Martínez André; Musacchio Aldo Endowments, Fiscal Federalism, and the Cost of Capital for States: Evidence from Brazil, 1891-1930 2010-04-12T17:42:00Z In this paper, we contribute to the discussion of what determines country risk by arguing that an important explanatory factor is the impact that commodities have on the capacity to pay. We use a newly created data base with state-level fiscal and risk premium data for Brazil states between 1891 and 1930 to show that Brazilian states with natural endowments that allowed them to export commodities that were in high demand ended up having higher revenues per capita and, thus, lower cost of capital. We also explain that the variation in revenues per capita across states was both a product of the variation in natural endowments and a commodity boom that had asymmetric effects among states. We end by running instrumental variable estimates using indices of export prices for each state to instrument for revenues per capita. Our IV estimates confirm our results that states with commodities that had higher price increases had lower risk premia. Endowments, Fiscal Federalism, and the Cost of Capital for States: Evidence from Brazil, 1891-1930 2010-04-12T17:42:00Z Full text http://www.banxico.org.mx/publicaciones-y-discursos/publicaciones/documentos-de-investigacion/banxico/{21F08AB0-1135-4B81-83C9-1E30E7039418}.pdf Aldo Musacchio André Martínez Martínez André; Musacchio Aldo 2009 Bank of Mexico Working Papers H71 H74 N26 N46 N96 http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/publications/telechar/ner/ner265.pdf Bank of France Working Papers by Gilbert Cette, Yusuf Kocoglu and Jacques Mairesse Productivity Growth and Levels in France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States in the Twentieth Century 2010-01-06T12:41:00Z Productivity Growth and Levels in France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States in the Twentieth Century 2010-01-06T12:41:00Z Abstract http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/publications/ner/1-265.htm Full text http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/publications/telechar/ner/ner265.pdf Yusuf Kocoglu Jacques Mairesse Gilbert Cette Gilbert Cette, Yusuf Kocoglu and Jacques Mairesse 2010-01 Bank of France Working Papers E22 J24 N10 O47 O57 http://www.dallasfed.org/research/papers/2009/wp0904.pdf Dallas Fed Working Papers by 0904Preventing a Repeat of the Money Market Meltdown of the Early 1930sJohn V. Duca Preventing a Repeat of the Money Market Meltdown of the Early 1930s 2009-11-21T07:16:59Z *** Warning - contains HTML *** Preventing a Repeat of the Money Market Meltdown of the Early 1930s 2009-11-21T07:16:59Z Full text http://www.dallasfed.org/research/papers/2009/wp0904.pdf 0904Preventing a Repeat of the Money Market Meltdown of the Early 1930sJohn V. Duca 2009-11 Dallas Fed Working Papers E44 E50 N12 http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200941/200941pap.pdf Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System FEDS series by Soohyung Lee and Benjamin A. Malin Education's Role in China's Structural Transformation 2009-10-16T07:14:59Z We explore education's role in improving the allocation of labor between China's agricultural and nonagricultural sectors and measure the portion of China's recent growth attributable to this channel. Building from micro-level estimates, we find that education's impact on labor reallocation between sectors accounts for about 9 percent of Chinese growth, whereas its impact on within-sector human capital growth explains only 2 percent. Our findings suggest that, when frictions cause large productivity gaps across sectors and returns to education are greater in higher-productivity sectors, education policy may be a useful tool for increasing efficiency. Education's Role in China's Structural Transformation 2009-10-16T07:14:59Z Abstract http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200941/200941abs.html Full text http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200941/200941pap.pdf Soohyung Lee Benjamin A. Malin Soohyung Lee and Benjamin A. Malin 2009-10 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System FEDS series I2 J6 N3 O1 O5 http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/quest_ecofin_2/qf_46/QEF_46.pdf Bank of Italy Occasional Papers by Antonio Bassanetti, Martina Cecioni, Andrea Nobili, Giordano Zevi The main recessions in Italy: a retrospective comparison 2009-07-22T12:39:59Z This paper proposes a comparative analysis of the main macroeconomic aggregates (both real and credit aggregates), and the monetary policy response during the most severe recessions experienced by the Italian economy. This descriptive study focuses mainly on the last forty years, a period for which there is ample and detailed information available. In particular, the paper contrasts the data on the current deep recession with those in 1974-75 and 1992-93, at the times of the oil crisis and the currency crisis respectively. For a selected list of variables, a comparison is made with the dynamics of the recession of the 1930s. The main recessions in Italy: a retrospective comparison 2009-07-22T12:39:59Z Abstract http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/quest_ecofin_2/qf_46 Full text http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/quest_ecofin_2/qf_46/QEF_46.pdf Giordano Zevi Martina Cecioni Antonio Bassanetti Andrea Nobili Antonio Bassanetti, Martina Cecioni, Andrea Nobili, Giordano Zevi 2009-07 Bank of Italy Occasional Papers E20 E32 E50 N14 http://www.nationalbanken.dk/C1256BE9004F6416/side/5DF90C08E0757E4FC1257567003709C3/$file/CPI_DNWP_60.PDF National Bank of Denmark (Danmarks Nationalbank) Working papers by Abildgren, Kim Consumer Prices in Denmark 1502-2007 2009-02-27T07:16:00Z The paper presents a consumer price index for Denmark 1502-2007. For the post-1815 period the index is based on existing CPI figures whereas new data has been constructed for the pre-1815 period. For the earliest years 1502-1712 the new CPI covers only the price of corn, whereas the period 1712-1800 is based on the comprehensive price material collected in relation to the recently completed Danish Price History Project. If one define price stability as an inflation rate around 2 per cent per annum, or lower, the past five centuries in Denmark has been dominated by price stability. Disregarding actual war periods there seems only to have been one major exception from the overall picture of price stability: The first four decades following the end of the Second World War where inflation expectations lost their anchor. Consumer Prices in Denmark 1502-2007 2009-02-27T07:16:00Z Abstract http://www.nationalbanken.dk/C1256BE9004F6416/side/Consumer_Prices_in_Denmark_1502-2007!opendocument Full text http://www.nationalbanken.dk/C1256BE9004F6416/side/5DF90C08E0757E4FC1257567003709C3/$file/CPI_DNWP_60.PDF Kim Abildgren Abildgren, Kim 2009-02-24 National Bank of Denmark (Danmarks Nationalbank) Working papers C43 E31 N13 N14 http://www.nationalbanken.dk/C1256BE9004F6416/side/5DF90C08E0757E4FC1257567003709C3/$file/CPI_DNWP_60.PDF National Bank of Denmark (Danmarks Nationalbank) Working papers by Abildgren, Kim Consumer Prices in Denmark 1502-2007 2009-02-27T07:16:00Z The paper presents a consumer price index for Denmark 1502-2007. For the post-1815 period the index is based on existing CPI figures whereas new data has been constructed for the pre-1815 period. For the earliest years 1502-1712 the new CPI covers only the price of corn, whereas the period 1712-1800 is based on the comprehensive price material collected in relation to the recently completed Danish Price History Project. If one define price stability as an inflation rate around 2 per cent per annum, or lower, the past five centuries in Denmark has been dominated by price stability. Disregarding actual war periods there seems only to have been one major exception from the overall picture of price stability: The first four decades following the end of the Second World War where inflation expectations lost their anchor. Consumer Prices in Denmark 1502-2007 2009-02-27T07:16:00Z Abstract http://www.nationalbanken.dk/C1256BE9004F6416/side/Consumer_Prices_in_Denmark_1502-2007!opendocument Full text http://www.nationalbanken.dk/C1256BE9004F6416/side/5DF90C08E0757E4FC1257567003709C3/$file/CPI_DNWP_60.PDF Kim Abildgren Abildgren, Kim 2009-02-24 National Bank of Denmark (Danmarks Nationalbank) Working papers C43 E31 N13 N14 http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2008/2008-038.pdf St Louis Fed Working Papers by David C. Wheelock Government Response to Home Mortgage Distress: Lessons from the Great Depression 2008-10-25T07:18:00Z The Great Depression was the worst macroeconomic collapse in U.S. history. Sharp declines in household income and real estate values resulted in soaring mortgage delinquency rates. According to one estimate, as of January 1, 1934, fully one-half of U.S. home mortgages were delinquent and, on average, some 1000 home loans were foreclosed every business day. This paper documents the increase in residential mortgage distress during the Depression, and discusses actions taken by state governments and the federal government to reduce mortgage foreclosures and restore the functioning of the mortgage market. Many states imposed moratoria on both farm and nonfarm residential mortgage foreclosures. Although moratoria reduced farm foreclosure rates in the short run, they appear to have also reduced the supply of loans and made credit more expensive for subsequent borrowers. The federal government took a number of steps to relieve residential mortgage distress and to promote the recovery and growth of the national mortgage market. The Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) was created in 1933 to purchase and refinance delinquent home loans as long-term, amortizing mortgages. Between 1933 and 1936, the HOLC acquired and refinanced one million delinquent loans totaling $3.1 billion. The HOLC refinanced loans on some 10 percent of all nonfarm, owner-occupied dwellings in the United States, and about 20 percent of those with an outstanding mortgage. The Great Depression experience suggests how foreclosures might be reduced during the present crisis. Government Response to Home Mortgage Distress: Lessons from the Great Depression 2008-10-25T07:18:00Z Abstract http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/more/2008-038/ Full text http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2008/2008-038.pdf David C. Wheelock David C. Wheelock 2008-10 St Louis Fed Working Papers G21 G28 N22 http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2008/2008-032.pdf St Louis Fed Working Papers by William Poole, Robert H. Rasche, and David C. Wheelock The Great Inflation: Did The Shadow Know Better? 2008-09-04T17:42:00Z The Shadow Open Market Committee was formed in 1973 in response to rising inflation and the apparent unwillingness of U.S. policymakers to implement policies necessary to maintain price stability. This paper describes how the Committee’s policy views differed from those of most Federal Reserve officials and many academic economists at the time. The Shadow argued that price stability should be the primary goal of monetary policy, and favored gradual adjustment of monetary growth to a rate consistent with price stability. The paper evaluates the Shadow’s policy rule in the context of the New Keynesian macroeconomic model of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999). Simulations of the model suggest that the gradual stabilization of monetary growth favored by the Shadow would have lowered inflation with less impact on output growth, and with less variability in output and inflation, than a one-time reduction in monetary growth. We conclude that the Shadow articulated a sensible policy that would have outperformed the policies actually implemented by the Federal Reserve during the Great Inflation era. The Great Inflation: Did The Shadow Know Better? 2008-09-04T17:42:00Z Abstract http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/more/2008-032/ Full text http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2008/2008-032.pdf David C. Wheelock William Poole Robert H. Rasche William Poole, Robert H. Rasche, and David C. Wheelock 2008-09 St Louis Fed Working Papers B22 E31 E52 E58 N12 http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp92.pdf European Central Bank Occasional papers by Michael Sturm, Jan Strasky, Petra Adolf and Dominik Peschel The Gulf Cooperation Council countries – economic structures, recent developments and role in the global economy 2008-07-23T12:37:59Z The Gulf Cooperation Council countries – economic structures, recent developments and role in the global economy 2008-07-23T12:37:59Z ECB Full text http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp92.pdf Jan Strasky Michael Sturm Dominik Peschel Petra Adolf Michael Sturm, Jan Strasky, Petra Adolf and Dominik Peschel 2008-07 European Central Bank Occasional papers E60 F14 F30 F40 N15 O53 Q40