http://www.bis.org/cbhub/list/jel_classification/jel_D8/index.rss Latest research hub papers with the JEL classification:D8 en http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/temidi/td13/td911_13/en_td911/en_tema_911.pdf Bank of Italy Working Papers by Giuseppe Albanese, Guido de Blasio and Paolo Sestito Trust and preferences: evidence from survey data 2013-04-24T06:19:59Z This paper considers the role of preferences in explaining trust. By using the Bank of Italy's Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), the paper shows that time preferences and risk preferences are key covariates of self-reported trust. They both predict negatively a measure of generalized trust; however, risk aversion is positively correlated with an index of particularized trusting behaviour (which refers to family and friends). Moreover, the results are robust to using a different data source to gauge the role of social preferences and personality traits. The study highlights that neglecting preferences when analysing the role of trust in explaining socio-economic outcomes might pose serious challenges in terms of omitted variables. Trust and preferences: evidence from survey data 2013-04-24T06:19:59Z Abstract http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/temidi/td13/td911_13/en_td911 Full text http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/temidi/td13/td911_13/en_td911/en_tema_911.pdf Paolo Sestito Giuseppe Albanese Guido de Blasio Giuseppe Albanese, Guido de Blasio and Paolo Sestito 2013-04 Bank of Italy Working Papers D1 D8 Z1 http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/Publications/Discussion_Paper_1/2013/2013_04_15_dkp_10.pdf?__blob=publicationFile Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Papers by Mathias Hoffmann, Michael U. Krause, Thomas Laubach The expectations-driven U.S. current account 2013-04-18T06:19:59Z Since 1991, survey expectations of long-run output growth for the U.S. relative to the rest of the world exhibit a pattern strikingly similar to that of the U.S. current account, and thus also to global imbalances. We show that this -nding can to a large extent be rationalized in a two-region stochastic growth model simulated using expected trend growth -ltered from observed productivity. In line with the intertemporal approach to the current account, a major part of the buildup of the U.S. current account de-cit appears to be driven by the optimal response of households and -rms to improved growth prospects. The expectations-driven U.S. current account 2013-04-18T06:19:59Z Full text http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/Publications/Discussion_Paper_1/2013/2013_04_15_dkp_10.pdf?__blob=publicationFile Mathias Hoffmann Thomas Laubach Michael U. Krause Mathias Hoffmann, Michael U. Krause, Thomas Laubach 2013-04-15 Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Papers D83 E13 E32 F32 O40 http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/institute/wpapers/2013/0142.pdf Dallas Fed Institute Working Papers by Aitor Erce Sovereign Debt Crises: Could an International Court Minimize Them? 2013-04-16T17:36:59Z This paper discusses the merits of the statutory approach to sovereign debt crises. It presents a model of sovereign debt roll-overs where, in the event of a liquidity crisis, a Sovereign Bankruptcy Court has powers to declare a standstill on debt payments. The model shows the ability of the Court to mitigate the coordination problem inherent to roll-overs in sovereign debt markets. Moreover, the scale of the coordination problem is reduced regardless of the quality of the information handled by the Court. The mere existence of the Court forces investors to focus on its course of action rather than on other investors beliefs. Nonetheless, such an entity might affect negatively countries' incentives to apply costly policies. Sovereign Debt Crises: Could an International Court Minimize Them? 2013-04-16T17:36:59Z Full text http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/institute/wpapers/2013/0142.pdf Aitor Erce-Domínguez Aitor Erce 2012-04 Dallas Fed Institute Working Papers D82 F02 K41 http://www.dnb.nl/en/publications/dnb-publications/dnb-working-papers-series/dnb-working-papers/working-papers-2012/dnb282368.jsp Netherlands Bank DNB Working Papers by Henriette Prast, Federica Teppa and Anouk Smits Is Information Overrated? Evidence from the Pension Domain 2012-12-10T12:37:59Z This paper presents empirical evidence from the Netherlands indicating that the current policy based on information is unlikely to help people make the pension choices required in a system in which employees are the ultimate bearers of asset market risk. This holds even if information is made easier to understand, disseminated by the relevant media, and provided made to measure. The paper offers a behavioral explanation of the findings and concludes that policy makers, financial supervisors, and the pension industry should adopt alternative instruments for helping employees make good choices. These strategies may be useful in the context of recent proposals for a structural change of the pension system, including the increase in the eligibility age for the first layer pension (AOW). Is Information Overrated? Evidence from the Pension Domain 2012-12-10T12:37:59Z Abstract http://www.dnb.nl/en/publications/dnb-publications/dnb-working-papers-series/dnb-working-papers/working-papers-2012/dnb282368.jsp Full text http://www.dnb.nl/en/binaries/Working%20Paper%20360_tcm47-282363.pdf Federica Teppa Henriette Prast Anouk Smits Henriette Prast, Federica Teppa and Anouk Smits 2012-12-10 Netherlands Bank DNB Working Papers D1 D84 H3 I3 http://www.suomenpankki.fi/en/julkaisut/tutkimukset/keskustelualoitteet/Documents/BoF_DP_1225.pdf Bank of Finland Discussion Papers by Martin Ellison - Thomas J. Sargent Welfare cost of business cycles in economies with individual consumption risk 2012-08-14T16:12:59Z The welfare cost of random consumption fluctuations is known from De Santis (2007) to be increasing in the level of individual consumption risk in the economy. It is also known from Barillas et al. (2009) to increase if agents in the economy care about robustness to model misspecification. In this paper, we combine these two effects and calculate the cost of business cycles in an economy with consumers who face individual consumption risk and who fear model misspecification. We find that individual risk has a greater impact on the cost of business cycles if agents already have a preference for robustness. Correspondingly, we find that endowing agents with concerns about a preference for robustness is more costly if there is already individual risk in the economy. The combined effect exceeds the sum of the individual effects. Welfare cost of business cycles in economies with individual consumption risk 2012-08-14T16:12:59Z Abstract http://www.suomenpankki.fi/en/julkaisut/tutkimukset/keskustelualoitteet/Pages/dp2012_25.aspx Full text http://www.suomenpankki.fi/en/julkaisut/tutkimukset/keskustelualoitteet/Documents/BoF_DP_1225.pdf Thomas J. Sargent Martin Ellison Martin Ellison, Thomas J. Sargent 2012-07-30 Bank of Finland Discussion Papers D81 E32 E63 http://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/ingl/wps285.pdf Central Bank of Brazil Working Papers by Marta Areosa and Waldyr Areosa Asset Prices and Monetary Policy - A sticky-dispersed information model 2012-07-25T17:40:00Z We present a DSGE model with heterogeneously informed agents and two investment opportunities - stocks and bonds - to study the interaction between monetary policy and asset prices. The information is both sticky, as in Mankiw e Reis (2002), and dispersed, as in Morris e Shin (2002). This framework allows us to (i) show that variations in stock market wealth affect consumption, (ii) demonstrate that a central bank can prevent the creation of boom-bust episodes in the economy, (iii) determine the moment of a bust occurrence and (iv) study the impulse responses to dividend and informational shocks. Asset Prices and Monetary Policy - A sticky-dispersed information model 2012-07-25T17:40:00Z Abstract http://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/port/wp285.asp?idiom=I Full text http://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/ingl/wps285.pdf Waldyr D. Areosa Marta B. M. Areosa Marta Areosa and Waldyr Areosa 2012-07 Central Bank of Brazil Working Papers D82 E31 E58 http://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/ingl/wps286.pdf Central Bank of Brazil Working Papers by Waldyr Areosa and Marta Areosa Information (in) Chains: information transmission through production chains 2012-07-25T17:40:00Z We study the transmission of information in a model with a vertical input-output structure and dispersed information. Firms observe input prices with noise that endogenize the precision of information that is public within a stage but not across stages. In contrast to the case with an exogenous and overall public signal, our main result is that agents may find it optimal to rely less on public information along the chain. A direct implication is that, while information precision remains unchanged with exogenous public signals (information chains), it may decrease along the chain when semi-public signals are endogenous (information in chains). Information (in) Chains: information transmission through production chains 2012-07-25T17:40:00Z Abstract http://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/port/wp286.asp?idiom=I Full text http://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/ingl/wps286.pdf Waldyr D. Areosa Marta B. M. Areosa Waldyr Areosa and Marta Areosa 2012-07 Central Bank of Brazil Working Papers D82 D83 E31 http://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/ingl/wps286.pdf Central Bank of Brazil Working Papers by Waldyr Areosa and Marta Areosa Information (in) Chains: information transmission through production chains 2012-07-25T17:40:00Z We study the transmission of information in a model with a vertical input-output structure and dispersed information. Firms observe input prices with noise that endogenize the precision of information that is public within a stage but not across stages. In contrast to the case with an exogenous and overall public signal, our main result is that agents may find it optimal to rely less on public information along the chain. A direct implication is that, while information precision remains unchanged with exogenous public signals (information chains), it may decrease along the chain when semi-public signals are endogenous (information in chains). Information (in) Chains: information transmission through production chains 2012-07-25T17:40:00Z Abstract http://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/port/wp286.asp?idiom=I Full text http://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/ingl/wps286.pdf Waldyr D. Areosa Marta B. M. Areosa Waldyr Areosa and Marta Areosa 2012-07 Central Bank of Brazil Working Papers D82 D83 E31 http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-024.pdf St Louis Fed Working Papers by David L. Fuller, B. Ravikumar, and Yuzhe Zhang Unemployment Insurance Fraud and Optimal Monitoring 2012-07-24T06:25:00Z The most prevalent incentive problem in the U.S. unemployment insurance system is that individuals collect unemployment benefits while being gainfully employed. We show how the unemployment insurance authority can efficiently use a combination of tax/subsidy and monitoring to prevent such fraud. The optimal policy monitors the unemployed at fixed intervals. Employment tax is nonmonotonic: it increases between verifications but decreases after a verification. Unemployment benefits are relatively flat between verifications but decrease sharply after a verification. Unemployment Insurance Fraud and Optimal Monitoring 2012-07-24T06:25:00Z Abstract http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/more/2012-024 Full text http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-024.pdf B. Ravikumar Yuzhe Zhang David L. Fuller David L. Fuller, B. Ravikumar, and Yuzhe Zhang 2012-07 St Louis Fed Working Papers D82 D86 J65 http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-024.pdf St Louis Fed Working Papers by David L. Fuller, B. Ravikumar, and Yuzhe Zhang Unemployment Insurance Fraud and Optimal Monitoring 2012-07-24T06:25:00Z The most prevalent incentive problem in the U.S. unemployment insurance system is that individuals collect unemployment benefits while being gainfully employed. We show how the unemployment insurance authority can efficiently use a combination of tax/subsidy and monitoring to prevent such fraud. The optimal policy monitors the unemployed at fixed intervals. Employment tax is nonmonotonic: it increases between verifications but decreases after a verification. Unemployment benefits are relatively flat between verifications but decrease sharply after a verification. Unemployment Insurance Fraud and Optimal Monitoring 2012-07-24T06:25:00Z Abstract http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/more/2012-024 Full text http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-024.pdf B. Ravikumar Yuzhe Zhang David L. Fuller David L. Fuller, B. Ravikumar, and Yuzhe Zhang 2012-07 St Louis Fed Working Papers D82 D86 J65 http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/temidi/td12/td875_12/en_td875/en_tema_875.pdf Bank of Italy Working Papers by Antonio Filippin and Marco Paccagnella Family background, self-confidence and economic outcomes 2012-07-12T17:36:59Z In this paper we analyze the role played by self-confidence, modeled as beliefs about one's ability, in shaping task choices. We propose a model in which fully rational agents exploit all the available information to update their beliefs using Bayes' rule, eventually learning their true type. We show that when the learning process does not converge quickly to the true ability level, small differences in initial confidence can result in diverging patterns of human capital accumulation between otherwise identical individuals. If differences in self-confidence are correlated with socio-economic background (as a large body of empirical literature suggests), self-confidence can be a channel through which education and earning inequalities perpetuate across generations. Our theory suggests that cognitive tests should take place as early as possible, in order to avoid that systematic differences in self-confidence among equally talented people lead to the emergence of gaps in the accumulation of human capital. Family background, self-confidence and economic outcomes 2012-07-12T17:36:59Z Abstract http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/temidi/td12/td875_12/en_td875 Full text http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/temidi/td12/td875_12/en_td875/en_tema_875.pdf Marco Paccagnella Antonio Filippin Antonio Filippin and Marco Paccagnella 2012-07 Bank of Italy Working Papers D83 I24 J24 J62 http://www.snb.ch/n/mmr/reference/working_paper_2012_08/source/working_paper_2012_08.n.pdf Swiss National Bank Working Papers by Romain Baeriswyl and Camille Cornand Reducing overreaction to central banks' disclosures: theory and experiment 2012-07-11T12:37:59Z Financial markets are known for overreacting to public information. Central banks can reduce this overreaction either by disclosing information to a fraction of market participants only (partial publicity) or by disclosing information to all participants but with ambiguity (partial transparency). We show that, in theory, both communication strategies are strictly equivalent in the sense that overreaction can be indifferently mitigated by reducing the degree of publicity or by reducing the degree of transparency. We run a laboratory experiment to test whether theoretical predictions hold in a game played by human beings. In line with theory, the experiment does not allow the formulation of a clear preference in favor of either communication strategy. This paper then discusses the opportunity for central banks to choose between partial transparency and partial publicity to control market reaction to their disclosures. Reducing overreaction to central banks' disclosures: theory and experiment 2012-07-11T12:37:59Z Full text http://www.snb.ch/n/mmr/reference/working_paper_2012_08/source/working_paper_2012_08.n.pdf Romain Baeriswyl Camille Cornand Romain Baeriswyl and Camille Cornand 2012-07-11 Swiss National Bank Working Papers C92 D82 D84 E58 http://www.snb.ch/n/mmr/reference/working_paper_2012_08/source/working_paper_2012_08.n.pdf Swiss National Bank Working Papers by Romain Baeriswyl and Camille Cornand Reducing overreaction to central banks' disclosures: theory and experiment 2012-07-11T12:37:59Z Financial markets are known for overreacting to public information. Central banks can reduce this overreaction either by disclosing information to a fraction of market participants only (partial publicity) or by disclosing information to all participants but with ambiguity (partial transparency). We show that, in theory, both communication strategies are strictly equivalent in the sense that overreaction can be indifferently mitigated by reducing the degree of publicity or by reducing the degree of transparency. We run a laboratory experiment to test whether theoretical predictions hold in a game played by human beings. In line with theory, the experiment does not allow the formulation of a clear preference in favor of either communication strategy. This paper then discusses the opportunity for central banks to choose between partial transparency and partial publicity to control market reaction to their disclosures. Reducing overreaction to central banks' disclosures: theory and experiment 2012-07-11T12:37:59Z Full text http://www.snb.ch/n/mmr/reference/working_paper_2012_08/source/working_paper_2012_08.n.pdf Romain Baeriswyl Camille Cornand Romain Baeriswyl and Camille Cornand 2012-07-11 Swiss National Bank Working Papers C92 D82 D84 E58 http://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/ingl/wps282.pdf Central Bank of Brazil Working Papers by Waldyr Areosa and Marta Areosa The Signaling Effect of Exchange Rates: pass-through under dispersed information 2012-07-06T06:21:00Z We examine exchange-rate pass-through (ERPT) to prices in a model of dispersed information in which the nominal exchange rate imperfectly conveys information about the underlying fundamentals. If the information is complete, ERPT is also complete. Under dispersed information, we derive conditions under which our model displays three properties that are consistent with the stylized facts of pass-through. First, ERPT lies between 0 and 1 (incomplete ERPT). Second, ERPT is usually higher for imported goods prices than for consumer prices (exchange rate-consumer price puzzle). Third, there is a link between ERPT and macroeconomic stability. The Signaling Effect of Exchange Rates: pass-through under dispersed information 2012-07-06T06:21:00Z Abstract http://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/port/wp282.asp?idiom=I Full text http://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/ingl/wps282.pdf Marta B. M. Areosa Waldyr D. Areosa Waldyr Areosa and Marta Areosa 2012-06 Central Bank of Brazil Working Papers D82 D83 E31 F31 http://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/ingl/wps282.pdf Central Bank of Brazil Working Papers by Waldyr Areosa and Marta Areosa The Signaling Effect of Exchange Rates: pass-through under dispersed information 2012-07-06T06:21:00Z We examine exchange-rate pass-through (ERPT) to prices in a model of dispersed information in which the nominal exchange rate imperfectly conveys information about the underlying fundamentals. If the information is complete, ERPT is also complete. Under dispersed information, we derive conditions under which our model displays three properties that are consistent with the stylized facts of pass-through. First, ERPT lies between 0 and 1 (incomplete ERPT). Second, ERPT is usually higher for imported goods prices than for consumer prices (exchange rate-consumer price puzzle). Third, there is a link between ERPT and macroeconomic stability. The Signaling Effect of Exchange Rates: pass-through under dispersed information 2012-07-06T06:21:00Z Abstract http://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/port/wp282.asp?idiom=I Full text http://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/ingl/wps282.pdf Marta B. M. Areosa Waldyr D. Areosa Waldyr Areosa and Marta Areosa 2012-06 Central Bank of Brazil Working Papers D82 D83 E31 F31 http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2012/201241/201241pap.pdf Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System FEDS series by Anton Nakov Learning from Experience in the Stock Market 2012-06-27T06:23:59Z We study the dynamics of a Lucas-tree model with finitely lived individuals who "learn from experience." Individuals update expectations by Bayesian learning based on observations from their own lifetimes. In this model, the stock price exhibits stochastic fluctuations around the rational expectations equilibrium. This heterogeneous-agents economy can be approximated by a representative-agent model with constant-gain learning, where the gain parameter is related to the survival rate. Learning from Experience in the Stock Market 2012-06-27T06:23:59Z Abstract http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2012/201241/201241abs.html Full text http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2012/201241/201241pap.pdf Anton Nakov Anton Nakov 2012-06-26 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System FEDS series D83 D84 G12 http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2012/201241/201241pap.pdf Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System FEDS series by Anton Nakov Learning from Experience in the Stock Market 2012-06-27T06:23:59Z We study the dynamics of a Lucas-tree model with finitely lived individuals who "learn from experience." Individuals update expectations by Bayesian learning based on observations from their own lifetimes. In this model, the stock price exhibits stochastic fluctuations around the rational expectations equilibrium. This heterogeneous-agents economy can be approximated by a representative-agent model with constant-gain learning, where the gain parameter is related to the survival rate. Learning from Experience in the Stock Market 2012-06-27T06:23:59Z Abstract http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2012/201241/201241abs.html Full text http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2012/201241/201241pap.pdf Anton Nakov Anton Nakov 2012-06-26 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System FEDS series D83 D84 G12 http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/institute/wpapers/2012/0117.pdf Dallas Fed Institute Working Papers by J. Scott Davis Central Bank Credibility and the Persistence of Inflation and Inflation Expectations 2012-06-06T12:41:59Z This paper introduces a model where agents are unsure about the central bank's inflation target. They believe that the central bank's inflation target could lie between two extremes, and their beliefs vary depending on the central bank's stock of credibility. They form the expectations used in price and wage setting using this perceived inflation target, and they use past observations of inflation to update their beliefs about the credibility of the central bank. Thus a series of high inflation observations can lead them to believe (incorrectly) that the central bank has adopted a high target. High inflation expectations are incorporated into price and wage setting decisions, and a transitory shock to inflation can become very persistent. The model with endogenous credibility can match the volatility and persistence of both inflation and measures of long-term inflation expectations that we see in the data. The model is then calibrated to match the observed levels of Federal Reserve credibility in the 1980s and the 2000s. By simply changing the level of credibility, holding all else fixed, the model can explain nearly all of the observed changes in the volatility and persistence of inflation and inflation expectations in the U.S. from the 1980s to today. Central Bank Credibility and the Persistence of Inflation and Inflation Expectations 2012-06-06T12:41:59Z Full text http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/institute/wpapers/2012/0117.pdf J. Scott Davis J. Scott Davis 2012-06 Dallas Fed Institute Working Papers D83 E32 E50 http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1439.pdf European Central Bank Working papers by Florian Heider, Roman Inderst Loan prospecting 2012-05-30T12:35:59Z We offer a theoretical framework to analyze corporate lending when loan officers must be incentivized to prospect for loans and to transmit the soft information they obtain in that process. We explore how this multi-task agency problem shapes loan officers' compensation, banks' use of soft information in credit approval, and their lending standards. When competition intensifies, prospecting for loans becomes more important and banks' internal agency problem worsens. In response to more competition, banks lower lending standards, may choose to disregard soft and use only hard information in their credit approval, and in that case reduce loan officers to salespeople with steep, volume-based compensation. Our model generates "excessive lending" as banks' optimal response to an internal agency problem. Loan prospecting 2012-05-30T12:35:59Z ECB Full text http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1439.pdf Florian Heider Roman Inderst Florian Heider, Roman Inderst 2012-05-30 European Central Bank Working papers D82 G21 L13 http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/Publications/Discussion_Paper_1/2012/2012_04_23_dkp_09.pdf?__blob=publicationFile Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Papers by Gordon J. Alexander, Alexandre M. Baptista, Shu Yan Bank regulation and stability: an examination of the Basel market risk framework 2012-05-29T12:35:00Z Bank regulation and stability: an examination of the Basel market risk framework 2012-05-29T12:35:00Z Full text http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/Publications/Discussion_Paper_1/2012/2012_04_23_dkp_09.pdf?__blob=publicationFile Gordon J. Alexander Shu Yan Alexandre M. Baptista Gordon J. Alexander, Alexandre M. Baptista, Shu Yan 2012-04-23 Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Papers D81 G11 G21 G28 http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/Publications/Discussion_Paper_1/2012/2012_04_27_dkp_12.pdf?__blob=publicationFile Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Papers by Mathias Hoffmann, Michael U. Krause, Thomas Laubach Trend growth expectations and U.S. house prices before and after the crises 2012-05-29T12:35:00Z Trend growth expectations and U.S. house prices before and after the crises 2012-05-29T12:35:00Z Full text http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/Publications/Discussion_Paper_1/2012/2012_04_27_dkp_12.pdf?__blob=publicationFile Mathias Hoffmann Thomas Laubach Michael U. Krause Mathias Hoffmann, Michael U. Krause, Thomas Laubach 2012-04-27 Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Papers D83 E13 E32 O40 http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/Publications/Discussion_Paper_1/2012/2012_03_09_dkp_06.pdf?__blob=publicationFile Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Papers by Felix Thierfelder Maturity shortening and market failure 2012-05-29T12:35:00Z Maturity shortening and market failure 2012-05-29T12:35:00Z Full text http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/Publications/Discussion_Paper_1/2012/2012_03_09_dkp_06.pdf?__blob=publicationFile Felix Thierfelder Felix Thierfelder 2012-03-08 Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Papers D82 G21 G32 http://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/pubs/wp/wp1207.pdf Atlanta Fed Working papers by Christopher L. Foote, Kristopher S. Gerardi, and Paul S. Willen Why Did So Many People Make So Many Ex Post Bad Decisions? The Causes of the Foreclosure Crisis 2012-05-16T17:38:00Z We present 12 facts about the mortgage crisis. We argue that the facts refute the popular story that the crisis resulted from finance industry insiders deceiving uninformed mortgage borrowers and investors. Instead, we argue that borrowers and investors made decisions that were rational and logical given their ex post overly optimistic beliefs about house prices. We then show that neither institutional features of the mortgage market nor financial innovations are any more likely to explain those distorted beliefs than they are to explain the Dutch tulip bubble 400 years ago. Economists should acknowledge the limits of our understanding of asset price bubbles and design policies accordingly. Why Did So Many People Make So Many Ex Post Bad Decisions? The Causes of the Foreclosure Crisis 2012-05-16T17:38:00Z Abstract http://www.frbatlanta.org/pubs/wp/12_07.cfm Full text http://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/pubs/wp/wp1207.pdf Christopher L. Foote Paul S. Willen Kristopher Gerardi Christopher L. Foote, Kristopher S. Gerardi, and Paul S. Willen 2012-05-03 Atlanta Fed Working papers D14 D18 D53 D82 G01 G02 G38 http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1434.pdf European Central Bank Working papers by Vincent Maurin, Jean-Pierre Vidal Monetary policy deliberations: committee size and voting rules 2012-05-14T12:35:00Z How large should a monetary policy committee be? Which voting rule should a monetary policy committee adopt? This paper builds on Condorcet's jury threorem to analyse the relationships between committee size and voting rules in a model where policy discussions are subject to a time constraint. It suggests that in large committees majority voting is likely to enhance policy outcomes. Under unanimity (consensus) it is preferable to limit the size of the committee. Finally, supermajority voting rules are social contrivances that contribute to policy performance in a more uncertain environment, when initial policy proposals are less likely to be correct, or when payoffs are asymmetric. Monetary policy deliberations: committee size and voting rules 2012-05-14T12:35:00Z ECB Full text http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1434.pdf Vincent Maurin Jean-Pierre Vidal Vincent Maurin, Jean-Pierre Vidal 2012-05-14 European Central Bank Working papers D71 D78 D81 E58 http://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/ingl/wps276.pdf Central Bank of Brazil Working Papers by Marta Areosa, Waldyr Areosa and Vinicius Carrasco A Sticky-Dispersed Information Phillips Curve: a model with partial and delayed information 2012-05-09T17:34:59Z We study the interaction between dispersed and sticky information by assuming that firms receive private noisy signals about the state in an otherwise standard model of price setting with sticky-information. We compute the unique equilibrium of the game induced by the firms' pricing decisions and derive the resulting Phillips curve. The main effect of dispersion is to magnify the immediate impact of a given shock when the degree of stickiness is small. Its effect on persistence is minor: even when information is largely dispersed, a substantial amount of informational stickiness is needed to generate persistence in aggregate prices and inflation. A Sticky-Dispersed Information Phillips Curve: a model with partial and delayed information 2012-05-09T17:34:59Z Abstract http://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/port/wp276.asp?idiom=I Full text http://www.bcb.gov.br/pec/wps/ingl/wps276.pdf Vinicius Carrasco Marta B. M. Areosa Waldyr D. Areosa Marta Areosa, Waldyr Areosa and Vinicius Carrasco 2012-04 Central Bank of Brazil Working Papers D82 D83 E31