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    <title>Central Bank Research Hub - Papers by Gustavo A. Suarez</title>
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    <description>Research hub papers by author Gustavo A. Suarez</description>
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        <rdf:li resource="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200946/200946pap.pdf" />
        <rdf:li resource="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200936/200936pap.pdf" />
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  <item rdf:about="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200946/200946pap.pdf">
    <title>19Nov/Firm Volatility and Banks: Evidence from U.S. Banking Deregulation</title>
    <link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200946/200946pap.pdf</link>
    <description>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System FEDS series by Ricardo Correa and Gustavo A. Suarez</description>
    <dc:title>Firm Volatility and Banks: Evidence from U.S. Banking Deregulation</dc:title>
    <dc:date>2009-11-19T12:43:00Z</dc:date>
    <dcterms:abstract>This paper exploits the staggered timing of state-level banking deregulation in the United States during the 1980s to study the causal effect of banking integration on the volatility of non-financial corporations. We find that firm-level employment, production, sales, and cash flows are less volatile after interstate banking deregulation, particularly for firms that have limited access to external finance. This finding suggests that bank-dependent firms exploit wider access to finance after deregulation to smooth out idiosyncratic shocks. In fact, short-term credit becomes less pro-cyclical after out-of-state bank entry is permitted. Finally, lower volatility in real-side variables after deregulation translates into lower idiosyncratic risk in stock returns.</dcterms:abstract>
    <cb:paper>
      <cb:simpleTitle>Firm Volatility and Banks: Evidence from U.S. Banking Deregulation</cb:simpleTitle>
      <cb:occurrenceDate>2009-11-19T12:43:00Z</cb:occurrenceDate>
      <cb:resource>
        <cb:title>Abstract</cb:title>
        <cb:link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200946/200946abs.html</cb:link>
        <cb:description />
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      <cb:resource>
        <cb:title>Full text</cb:title>
        <cb:link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200946/200946pap.pdf</cb:link>
        <cb:description />
      </cb:resource>
      <cb:person type="author">
        <cb:nameAsWritten>Gustavo A. Suarez</cb:nameAsWritten>
      </cb:person>
      <cb:person type="author">
        <cb:nameAsWritten>Ricardo Correa</cb:nameAsWritten>
      </cb:person>
      <cb:byline>Ricardo Correa and Gustavo A. Suarez</cb:byline>
      <cb:publicationDate>2009-11</cb:publicationDate>
      <cb:publication>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System FEDS series</cb:publication>
      <cb:JELCode>G21</cb:JELCode>
      <cb:JELCode>G32</cb:JELCode>
    </cb:paper>
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  <item rdf:about="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200936/200936pap.pdf">
    <title>15Sep/The Evolution of a Financial Crisis: Panic in the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Market</title>
    <link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200936/200936pap.pdf</link>
    <description>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System FEDS series by Daniel M. Covitz, Nellie Liang, and Gustavo A. Suarez</description>
    <dc:title>The Evolution of a Financial Crisis: Panic in the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Market</dc:title>
    <dc:date>2009-09-15T07:14:59Z</dc:date>
    <dcterms:abstract>The $350 billion contraction in the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market in the last five months of 2007 played a central role in transforming concerns about the credit quality of mortgage-related assets into a global financial crisis. This paper attempts to better understand why the substantial contraction in ABCP occurred by measuring and analyzing runs on ABCP programs over the period from August 2007 through December 2007. While it has been suggested that commercial paper programs, like commercial banks, may be prone to runs, we are the first to conduct a comprehensive empirical analysis of runs in the ABCP market using a rich and novel issue-level data set for all ABCP programs in the U.S. market. A program is defined as being run when it does not issue new paper during a week despite having a substantial share of its outstandings scheduled to mature, and then continuing in a run until it issues. We find evidence of extensive runs: more than 100 programs (one-third of all ABCP programs) were in a run within weeks of the onset of the turmoil and the odds of subsequently leaving the run state were very low. We interpret this finding as an indication that the ABCP market was subject to a bank-like &amp;quot;panic.&amp;quot; We also find that while runs were linked to credit and liquidity exposures of individual programs, runs were also related importantly to non-program specific variables in the first several weeks of the turmoil, indicating that runs were relatively indiscriminate during the early part of the panic. Thus the ABCP market may be inherently unstable and a source of systemic risk.</dcterms:abstract>
    <cb:paper>
      <cb:simpleTitle>The Evolution of a Financial Crisis: Panic in the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Market</cb:simpleTitle>
      <cb:occurrenceDate>2009-09-15T07:14:59Z</cb:occurrenceDate>
      <cb:resource>
        <cb:title>Abstract</cb:title>
        <cb:link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200936/200936abs.html</cb:link>
        <cb:description />
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      <cb:resource>
        <cb:title>Full text</cb:title>
        <cb:link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200936/200936pap.pdf</cb:link>
        <cb:description />
      </cb:resource>
      <cb:person type="author">
        <cb:nameAsWritten>Gustavo A. Suarez</cb:nameAsWritten>
      </cb:person>
      <cb:person type="author">
        <cb:nameAsWritten>Nellie Liang</cb:nameAsWritten>
      </cb:person>
      <cb:person type="author">
        <cb:nameAsWritten>Daniel M. Covitz</cb:nameAsWritten>
      </cb:person>
      <cb:byline>Daniel M. Covitz, Nellie Liang, and Gustavo A. Suarez</cb:byline>
      <cb:publicationDate>2009-09</cb:publicationDate>
      <cb:publication>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System FEDS series</cb:publication>
    </cb:paper>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2006/200618/200618pap.pdf">
    <title>01May/&amp;#39;Captive Markets&amp;#39;: The Impact of Kidnappings on Corporate Investment in Colombia</title>
    <link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2006/200618/200618pap.pdf</link>
    <description>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System FEDS series by Rony Pshisva and Gustavo A. Suarez</description>
    <dc:title>&amp;#39;Captive Markets&amp;#39;: The Impact of Kidnappings on Corporate Investment in Colombia</dc:title>
    <dc:date>2006-05-01T12:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dcterms:abstract>This paper measures the impact of crime on firm investment by exploiting variation in kidnappings in Colombia from 1996 to 2002. Our central result is that firms invest less when kidnappings directly target firms. We also find that broader forms of crime--homicides, guerrilla attacks, and general kidnappings--have no significant effect on investment. This finding alleviates concerns that our main result may be driven by unobserved variables that explain both overall criminal activity and investment. Furthermore, kidnappings that target firms reduce not only the investment of firms that sell in local markets, but also the investment of firms that sell in foreign markets. Thus, an unobservable correlation between poor demand conditions and criminal activity is unlikely to explain the negative impact of firm-related kidnappings on investment. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that managers are reluctant to invest when their freedom and life are at risk, although we cannot completely discard alternative explanations.</dcterms:abstract>
    <cb:paper>
      <cb:simpleTitle>&amp;#39;Captive Markets&amp;#39;: The Impact of Kidnappings on Corporate Investment in Colombia</cb:simpleTitle>
      <cb:occurrenceDate>2006-05-01T12:00:00Z</cb:occurrenceDate>
      <cb:resource>
        <cb:title>Abstract</cb:title>
        <cb:link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2006/200618/200618abs.html</cb:link>
        <cb:description />
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      <cb:resource>
        <cb:title>Full text</cb:title>
        <cb:link>http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2006/200618/200618pap.pdf</cb:link>
        <cb:description />
      </cb:resource>
      <cb:person type="author">
        <cb:nameAsWritten>Gustavo A. Suarez</cb:nameAsWritten>
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      <cb:person type="author">
        <cb:nameAsWritten>Rony Pshisva</cb:nameAsWritten>
      </cb:person>
      <cb:byline>Rony Pshisva and Gustavo A. Suarez</cb:byline>
      <cb:publicationDate>2006-04</cb:publicationDate>
      <cb:publication>Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System FEDS series</cb:publication>
      <cb:JELCode>D74</cb:JELCode>
      <cb:JELCode>G30</cb:JELCode>
      <cb:JELCode>K42</cb:JELCode>
      <cb:JELCode>O16</cb:JELCode>
      <cb:JELCode>P14</cb:JELCode>
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